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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis conceptually and empirically explores how American foreign policy is 
changing under the domestic and international pressures brought about by social and 
cultural processes associated with the global resurgence of religion. It argues that in 
response to these pressures the American foreign policy establishment, and American 
diplomatic, foreign assistance and national security practices and institutions are 
gradually undergoing, since the end of the Cold War and especially following September 
11, processes of “desecularization”.  
 
In order to explain these foreign policy changes, this thesis develops a Historical 
Sociological (HS) approach to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). This theoretical 
framework allows investigating the complex causal mechanisms that have led to the 
emergence of “desecularizing actors” at the domestic American level, which are 
embedded or responding to macro-processes of religious resurgence at home and abroad. 
These desecularizing actors have mobilized at the micro-level to challenge at critical 
historical junctures what they perceive is the problematic secular character of American 
foreign policy intellectual traditions, state practices and policy-making structures. In 
order to advance their preferred inherently religious policy agendas, desecularizing actors 
have articulated a number of principled and strategic discourses, which enable them to 
successfully contest and renegotiate the boundaries between “the secular” and “the 
religious” in American foreign policy.  
 
This thesis draws from ongoing conceptual debates in the sociology of religion on 
desecularization and applies this concept to that of a state’s foreign policy. It unpacks 
how processes of desecularization have taken place at multiple levels and with different 
intensities across the American foreign policy apparatus. This thesis identifies two broad 
processes that relate to foreign policy desecularization. First, processes of “counter-
secularization” in terms of a growing entanglement between functionally differentiated 
American secular state practices and policy-making structures, and religious norms and 
actors. Second, processes of “counter-secularism” in terms of a progressive weakening of 
dominant secular epistemic, ideological, and normative ideational constructs among 
American policy-makers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
“Whether governments around the world like it or not, this resurgence of religion has 
meant that they would now have to reckon with religion in a way that they did not forty, 
fifty, or sixty years ago.”  
Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah (2011, p.15) 
 
 
Since the 1990s, and particularly following three planes being flown into the symbols of 
American power at the cry of Allahu akhbar (God is great), American foreign policy has 
become ever more entangled with religious forces and dynamics. The study of religion in 
international politics, long ignored or consigned to the dustbin of history in the academy 
and elite circles in the United States, is going through a revival. Universities and think 
tanks that make up the intellectual backbone of the American foreign policy 
establishment have been busy launching research initiatives and creating centers 
exploring, from all possible angles, the ways in which religion increasingly “matters”, so 
it seems, in international relations and to the American national interest.  
 
Georgetown University (GTU), a training ground for aspiring American 
diplomats and security officials, has established two major centers that directly address 
issues at the nexus of religion and foreign affairs. The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, 
and World Affairs, created in 2006, hosts a thriving scholarly community on religion 
across the social sciences and actively engages in foreign policy debates. GTU also 
houses a Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, directed by leading scholars on 
Islam and political Islam. The Center was founded in 1993 and revamped with a $20 
million endowment in 2005. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the leading think 
tank on international issues in the U.S., launched a “Religion and Foreign Policy” 
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initiative in 2006 which hosts regular talks, meetings and conferences with religious 
activists and scholars. Foreign Affairs, CFR’s flagship journal, has led public debates in 
Washington about the role of culture and religion in world politics ever since the 
publication of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations?” article in 1993 (Huntington 
1993; Hoge 2010). 
 
Since 2002 the Brookings Institution has hosted a thriving “U.S. Relations with 
the Islamic World” project producing reports and high-level conferences on a wide 
variety of issues affecting a transcontinental and religiously-defined community of people 
and countries. Like Brookings, countless think tanks are exploring Islam’s apparent 
growing role in international politics. The PEW Research Center, a research and polling 
institute, launched in 2002 a “Forum on Religion & Public Life” to quantify and 
investigate religious dynamics at home and abroad. By 2012 the Forum has become one 
of PEW’s largest and most successful research programs. In the wake of 9/11, Gallup 
opened a “Center for Muslim Studies”, which assiduously tracks what “Muslims” around 
the world think about a wide variety of pressing social and political issues.  
 
Mirroring trends in the academy and the policy-oriented research worlds, notable 
changes in American foreign policy have occurred in the past twenty years in terms of a 
greater interest and concern for religious actors and issues. During the Cold War, 
American diplomats and policy-makers paid sporadic attention to religious prisoners and 
minorities around the world. Since the 1990s, however, restrictions and violence towards 
religious individuals and communities worldwide, especially Christian, has become an 
ever more significant concern. Following the 1998 Congressionally-mandated 
International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), the United States seeks to promote and 
advance in an explicit and structured way religious freedom norms and practices 
internationally.  
 
Since the U.S. Agency for International Aid (USAID) was established in the 
1960s, and for the following four decades, only a selected and restricted handful of large 
and well-known non-sectarian and non-proselytizing faith-based organizations (FBOs) 
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would be granted access to federal funds for aid programs. Indeed religion was often seen 
in policy circles as antithetical to development and progress, and FBOs would be rarely 
sought out as partners given stringent church-state separation norms. Secular non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were overwhelmingly the implementing partners of 
choice. Yet, from the early 2000s through the enactment of faith-based initiatives, the 
American government has progressively come to rely ever more on FBOs, even overtly 
religious and proselytizing ones, in the delivery of emergency and development aid 
worldwide.  
 
In the aftermath of 9/11 American presidents have regularly and repeatedly 
singled out a group of people and countries of a particular religious persuasion or identity 
as in need of special policy attention. Indeed in the past decade, the United States has 
come to see the confrontation or engagement, not just with secularly-defined Arabs, or 
Egyptians and Afghans, or Middle Easterners, but with the religiously-defined categories 
of “Muslims” and the “Muslim world”, as vital to its security. Theological disputes 
among Islamic scholars and activists have become central national security issues, and 
American policy-makers have increasingly sought to promote particular strands and 
interpretations of Islam that are deemed in line with its interests and values. All in all, 
compared to the Cold War, American decision-makers and foreign policy officials have 
become in the past two decades ever more explicitly and systematically concerned with 
engaging, reaching out and connecting with religious groups and leaders domestically 
and abroad. 
 
In the process new positions, offices, and commissions have been created across 
overwhelmingly secular American foreign policy institutions and bureaucracies with the 
scope of managing and directing diplomatic, aid and national security policies with an 
“inherently religious” character.1 An Ambassador-at-Large, an Office for International 
Religious Freedom (OIRF) within the State Department, and a government mandated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Allen Hertzke has described foreign policies with an apparent religious content as “inherently religious” 
(2012, p.16). Hertzke refers mainly to the international religious freedom and faith-based development 
agendas. I borrow the term from Hertzke and expand it to include policies targeting “Muslims”. 
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independent U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), have been 
established since 1998. These are tasked with monitoring international restrictions on 
religious beliefs and practices, and violence towards religious individuals and groups. 
They also carry out programs and advise the President, the Secretary of State and other 
senior policy- and law-makers on issues ranging from reducing religious restrictions, to 
promoting interfaith-dialogues, and curbing sectarian violence worldwide.  
 
A White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives was created by 
the Bush administration in 2001 and revamped as the Office of Faith-Based and 
Neighborhood Partnerships by the Obama administration (hereafter White House Faith-
Based Office: WHFBO). The WHFBO and its counterpart office within USAID, created 
in 2002, have been at the forefront of efforts to expand in normative and practical terms 
access by religious groups to federal resources for humanitarian and development 
projects internationally. With time the WHFBO has become ever more involved in a wide 
range of foreign policies with a religious dimension, especially following Obama’s 
appointment of a 25-strong Advisory Council in 2009. The Advisory Council, managed 
by the WHFBO, was tasked to think through how American foreign policy could benefit 
from a closer partnership with religious communities and actors to solve issues ranging 
from poverty and climate change to improving interreligious cooperation and decreasing 
conflict worldwide.  
 
During the Bush Presidency a number of coordinating committees designed to 
develop policies targeting Muslims and Islam were created in the National Security 
Council (NSC). A first ever Special Envoy to the then-Organization of Islamic 
Conference (now Organization of Islamic Cooperation) (OIC) was appointed in 2008. 
Under Obama a new Global Engagement Directive in the NSC was created around the 
time the President gave his famous 2009 Cairo speech reaching out to Muslims around 
the world. A great part of the directory’s work would be to coordinate the 
administration’s “Muslim engagement” policies following Cairo. Obama would re-
appoint a Special Envoy to the OIC and create a new Special Representative to Muslim 
Communities position in the State Department in 2009.  
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Accompanying these institutional developments designed to articulate, coordinate 
and deliver a growing range of policies with an inherent religious content, are cultural 
and normative shifts among the human and institutional actors involved in processes of 
policy-making and implementation. Within foreign policy circles and bureaucracies, 
knowledge about international religious dynamics had been, during the Cold War, largely 
discounted based on the widespread assumption that religion was a dying force in an 
ever-modernizing world. Before the late 1990s, entanglement with religious forces and 
actors was overwhelmingly feared and avoided, on the prevalent understanding among 
policy- and decision-makers that: a) religion was an incendiary issue best kept private, 
and b) on the grounds of an ingrained strict interpretation of church-state separation 
norms. In just over a decade both accumulation of religious knowledge and entanglement 
with religious actors and issues have, instead, been increasingly and systematically 
encouraged.  
 
 
The Argument  
 
 
Although new policies and institutional developments designed to promote international 
religious freedom, structure religious engagement, advance faith-based development and 
win over the hearts and minds of Muslims are in many ways unrelated, they all happen to 
share a religious content. They also have all come into being within a period of less than 
two decades. These specific changes are not unrelated. They are deeply connected. 
Indeed this thesis argues they are all part of a broader trend of American foreign policy 
desecularization.  
 
Compared to the Cold War period, religious concerns, norms, knowledge and 
actors have become in recent times ever more entangled with American foreign policies 
and policy-making structures. Before the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was little or no 
interest, for instance, in systematically, openly, and methodically: a) researching and 
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understanding international religious dynamics and how these intersected with political, 
economic and security outcomes; b) reaching out to religious communities or leaders to 
advance a wide range of foreign policy goals; or c) directly influencing religious 
institutions, interests and theologies to reduce violence and promote international peace 
and cooperation. This is not to say that these practices did not occur, they often did but in 
sporadic, ad hoc, circumscribed and often concealed ways. In this the delivery and 
formulation of foreign policy was more secular before the 1990s than it is today. That is 
what is meant here in a broad and general sense by suggesting that American foreign 
policy has undergone a process of desecularization.  
 
Why now? And how have processes of desecularization happened? First, this 
thesis contends that we cannot explain why these foreign policy changes have taken place 
in recent decades if we do not contextualize them within a broader historical, social and 
cultural context: one that has experienced a progressive resurgence of religion at the 
global level over the past four decades. 2  Second, we cannot understand how 
desecularization has come about without looking at the behavior and purposive actions of 
specific actors (individual or collective), what I call desecularizing actors. Desecularizing 
actors are individuals or organizations, mainly religious as well as secular in character, 
who by virtue of being embedded within or reacting to process of religious resurgence, 
have sought to mainstream inherently religious policies and alter bureaucratic structures 
and norms across the American foreign policy apparatus.  
 
Some clarifications are in order here. I am not claiming that I will prove or 
disprove in any substantial way the influence or lack thereof that religion per se - 
understood either in terms of religious interest groups, specific theological ideas or 
broader identity issues – has on American foreign policy.  This is not a thesis on whether 
religious interest group “X” has simply lead the U.S. to pursue policy “Y”. Or whether a 
certain type of foreign policy or grand strategic change can be explained in terms of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Some like Timothy Shah and Monica Duffy Toft have set a precise date to mark the beginning of the 
modern process of religious resurgence: 1967 (2006, p.40). This was the year of Israel’s victory against 
Arab nationalist regimes in the Six Day War. An event, according to Shah and Toft, which had a double 
effect of galvanizing religious activists in the Arab Middle East and Israel. 
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or that religious belief of a particular president, or is the result of a specific religious 
interpretation of America’s national identity.  
 
Furthermore, arguing that American foreign policy was largely a secular practice 
before the end of the Cold War, and since then increasingly less so, may strike some as 
odd. However I am not contending that before the 1990s American foreign policy was 
immune to any religious influence and following the end of the Cold War it suddenly 
acquired a distinctively religious character.  In many respects this would be an incorrect 
statement. As a growing body of historical literature has recently convincingly shown, 
religious ideas and religiously-infused worldviews at the mass or elite level have always 
had multiple and complex influences on American foreign policy (Inboden 2008; Preston 
2012; Ribuffo 2001).  
 
Indeed, Americans have long been a religious people and religion has mixed with 
politics ever since the first Puritan pilgrim set foot on America’s shores (Noll 2009). This 
is something that the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville promptly noticed during his 
travels in the New World in 1831-1832:  
“Upon my arrival in the United States, the religious aspect of the country 
was the first thing that struck my attention; and the longer I stayed there 
the more did I perceive the great political consequences resulting from this 
state of things, to which I was unaccustomed. In France I had almost 
always seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom pursuing 
courses diametrically opposed to each other; but in America I found that 
they were intimately tied, and that they reigned in common over the same 
country.” (2000, p.358) 3  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 On the relationship between Puritan influences and America, Tocqueville also would remark: “I see the 
destiny of America embodied in the first Puritan who landed on those shores, just as the human race was 
represented by the first man.” (2000, p.339) 
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This religious character is often said to underpin American exceptionalism.4 
Debates about the impact of American exceptionalism, civil religion or its sense of 
“manifest destiny” in molding the Manichean lenses through which international contests 
are repeatedly portrayed in Washington and liberal values spread abroad: have time and 
again highlighted the religiously-infused tones with which Americans see themselves, 
their country’s place in the world and frame their relations with the “other”.5 While 
presidents have indeed often used religious imagery in their discourses and American 
nationalism does have a messianic streak, the cornerstone of this thesis’ argument is 
premised on an important distinction. I distinguish between the management and 
execution of foreign policy by state policy-makers and bureaucracies from the character 
of specific presidents or the country at large.  
 
My main concern is with the former, that is, with the practices and policy-making 
structures of American foreign policy, and not the latter. Hence, while presidents may 
have at times called upon religious beliefs to interpret the world or religious language to 
justify particular decisions, rarely, if ever, were religious concerns and norms seen to 
inform and structure entire policy initiatives and underline specific institutional designs. 
In this sense, I argue that the implementation and policy-making processes of American 
foreign policy was overwhelmingly secularized during the Cold War and has undergone a 
process of desecularization since the late 1990s. This process is rooted in the novel 
qualitative and quantitative institutionalization of a growing number of inherently 
religious policies: religious freedom, religious engagement, faith-based initiatives, Islam-
centered initiatives. These changes, I contend, can be fully understood and explained only 
in the context of the recent global resurgence of religion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Indeed, Tocqueville was among the first to describe America as “exceptional” partly because of its 
religious character, arguing that: “The position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may 
be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one. Their strictly Puritanical origin, 
their exclusively commercial habits, even the country they inhabit…[emphasis added]” (2000, p.548) 
5  The literature on the relationship between Protestantism, Puritanism and Calvinism, in informing 
America’s identity, self-image and, by extension, its foreign policy is virtually infinite. For recent 
scholarship see: Dudney and Meiser (2012); Dueck (2006); Lieven (2005); Marsden (2011b); Monten 
(2005). For other important, but older sources, see: Davis and Lynn-Jones (1987); Kurth (1998); 
McDougall (1997). For seminal work, but unrelated to foreign policy, on American exceptionalism and 
civil religion see: Bellah (2006); Lipset (1996) 
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To sum up, this thesis does not ask what the impact of religious actors, ideas or 
identities are on American foreign policy X or grand strategy Y. Domestic religious 
forces, in a way or another, have tended to exercise across history complex and multiple 
influences on America’s international behavior. This project instead asks why, how, and 
why now American foreign policies and policy-making structures have desecularized 
acquiring over time an ever-more religious dimension. It explains this process by looking 
at the purposive actions of specific desecularizing actors at the domestic level, whose 
emergence and behavior cannot be fully grasped without looking at the macro-context 
and trends associated with the global resurgence of religion. As Elizabeth Prodromou 
points out: “a periodization of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War shows a gradual yet 
discernible shift in the salience of religion” (2008, p.299). This “gradual yet discernible 
shift” is what this project is interested in unpacking and explaining.  
 
“Religion”, “religious resurgence”, “the secular” and “desecularization” are broad, 
slippery and contested terms and it is good practice to define and circumscribe them. The 
next section is dedicated to this task. Definitions are an important conceptual moment in 
the development of an argument. As such as I discuss what I mean by these concepts, I 
will refer to and delineate where I stand with respect to ongoing debates within 
International Relations (IR) as well as the sociology of religion. 
 
 
Defining Key Concepts  
 
 
Religion 
 
Religion is a notoriously slippery and contested concept, and no pretense is here made 
resolve debates that have a long history. I advance and largely work within the confines 
of Christian Smith’s definition of religion as:  
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“…the distinctive way of life of communities of followers shaped by their 
particular system of beliefs and practices that are oriented towards the 
supernatural. Religion thus conceived is not merely a set of cognitive beliefs, 
emotional dispositions, or ethical imperatives, but is expressed fully as a way 
of life practiced by communities of people.”  (2003, p.vii) 
 
This is a “particularistic and substantive” definition (Smith 2003, p.vii). It 
includes those systems of beliefs, communities, institutions and practices of the vast 
majority of the world’s population that by popular convention are thought of as 
“religious”. Although it presents some problems in classifying something like 
Confucianism, it does include most major world religions and other smaller ones (even 
those which some may see as more approximating “philosophies” or “cults”) such as: 
Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, along with Sikhism, Jainism, Taoism, 
Mormonism, Baha’ism, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Alevi, Scientology, and so on.  
 
It is particularistic because it distinguishes religion from other forms of implicit 
religions, such as “civil religion” or secular ideologies like nationalism and Marxism, 
which appear to share some of religion’s characteristics (a system of beliefs, a 
community of believers, rituals and institutions), but are this-worldly oriented rather than 
towards the supernatural. In this sense a religion should involve a belief in the existence 
of one or multiple supernatural beings and/or other superhuman impersonal powers and 
forces. It is a substantive definition, as opposed to functionalist one, because – without 
having the pretense of being the most accurate or ultimate word about what religion 
“really is”6 – it does not focus on what religion/s does/do.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For example Scott Thomas argues, that there is “no universal concept of religion applicable to all societies 
and cultures […], despite the attempts since the Enlightenment to find one, and not only because the 
elements of religion are historically specific. Most importantly, the concept of religion is itself the historical 
product of the discursive practices and history associated with one particular culture, religion, or 
civilization “Latin Christendom”; which has now become the liberal modernity of Western civilization” 
(2005, p.23). For an in-depth account of the etymological roots and the modern political and social 
construction of the concept of “religion”, particularly in contraposition to “the secular”, see: Asad (1993, 
Ch.1); Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen (2011a, pp.7-8). Building on these insights, Mona 
Kanwal Sheikh warns that “IR theorists should not try to detect the “real” or universally applicable essence 
of religion”, but also contends that “treating religion as substantive does not mean to essentialize it – it is 
possible to see religion as distinctive even while holding the view that religion is in flux, changeable and is 
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Functionalist definitions tend to demarcate religion in terms of what functions it 
has in our social, human or psychological life (for instance Marx’s classical 
understanding of religion as “the opium of the people” would fall in this category). In a 
way functionalist definitions tend to veer towards seeing religion as comparable to 
“activities, ideologies, and organizational forms that seem to share some common 
features with religion although they are not necessarily or commonly designated as such” 
with the result that “[p]henomenona like nationalism or political ideologies can thus be 
studied as religious phenomena if they function in the same way” (Sheikh 2012, p.370). 
 
Subscribing to an idea that there is something sui generis about religion, not in 
what it does but what it is, has important implications for the development of my 
argument. IR scholars working through a substantive definition of religion are making 
interesting progress in exploring what is particular and characteristic about religious ideas, 
ethics, institutions, communities in and of themselves as opposed to secular ones (Lynch 
2009; Sheikh 2012). What I am instead interested here in is investigating and exploring, 
along the lines of others before me (Hallward 2008; Hurd 2008), the relationship between 
“the religious” and “the secular”. An issue that will be discussed in more detail later 
where I highlight the contributions this thesis seeks to make to the study of religion and 
the secular in IR.  
 
Global Resurgence of Religion 
 
What does the global resurgence of religion mean? And, does it make sense to speak of a 
“resurgence” in the first place? Up until the morning of September 11, 2001, most IR 
scholars,7 and the discipline at large, had largely “overlooked” religion (Fox 2001) 
implicitly believing the world to be a secular place or at least a relentlessly secularizing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
made by human beings and communities through different processes of construction – but then we can still 
look at religion when it is socially sedimented, upheld with a relative degree of consensus in a community – 
we can see religion as being constructed as a social fact without though being insensitive to the possibility 
of change” (2012, p.370). 
7 With some notable exceptions, such as: Jeffrey Haynes (1995, 1998); and Fabio Petito and Pavlos 
Haztopolous’s special issue of Millennium on religion (2000).  
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one (Philpott 2002). For example Daniel Philpott has counted that approximately only a 
total of six articles on religion were published between 1980 and 1999 in four leading 
journals of global politic: International Studies Quarterly, International Security, World 
Politics, and International Organization (2009, p.184). Over the past decade there has 
been a growing recognition among IR scholars that religious beliefs, actors, communities 
and institutions were not destined to the dustbin of history as often assumed.  
 
The realization that religion actually “mattered” and increasingly appeared to do 
so in international politics, has spurred a qualitative and quantitative turn towards its 
study in IR. Much of this discussion has been explicitly or implicitly framed in terms of a 
global resurgence of religion, with scholars busying themselves exploring the multiple 
and complex causes, manifestations and effects of religion’s return for international 
relations practices and IR theory itself (Hatzopoulos and Petito 2003a; Haynes 2005; 
Thomas 2005; Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011; Snyder 2011b). In a way IR scholarship has 
caught up with that in comparative politics (Kepel 1994) and sociology (Casanova 1994; 
Juergensmeyer 1993), which had already re-discovered religion a decade earlier.  
 
Yet, much confusion still remains within IR about what the term “religious 
resurgence” entails, whether it has any real analytical purchase, and whether it simply 
reifies something (i.e. religion) that has actually always been there but the discipline had 
a blind spot towards. At close inspection the notion of a resurgence – or non-resurgence 
for the skeptics – means quite different things to different scholars. This often reflects the 
kind of phenomena the particular observer is most interested in understanding/explaining 
as well as the theoretical and scientific philosophical school he/she explicitly or implicitly 
subscribes to. Overall, scholars appear talking past each other rather than dialoguing with 
one another. 
 
Before I move on to unpack what I mean by religious resurgence, I will go over 
some of the most common definitions, as well as misconceptions, associated with this 
concept in IR. In the process of reviewing various definitions I will in parallel address a 
number of critiques: mainly whether the term captures anything new at all and whether it 
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has any analytical power. This then leads me to advance my own definition, which seeks 
to conceptually clarify the constituent components of the resurgence and ground the 
thesis on what hopefully is a less contested understanding of the concept.  
 
Scott Thomas, one of the scholars most closely associated with these debates, 
gives the following definition: 
“…the global resurgence of religion is the growing saliency and 
persuasiveness of religion, i.e. the increasing importance of religious beliefs, 
practices, and discourses in personal and public life, and the growing role of 
religious or religiously-related individuals, non-state groups, political parties, 
and communities, and organizations in domestic politics, and this is occurring 
in ways that have significant implications for international politics.” (2005, 
p.26) 
 
This is somewhat too broad a starting point. What is most problematic about this 
definition is the split that Thomas makes between the resurgence in terms of personal life 
on the one hand, and public sphere on the other. In the latter case, Thomas’ definition 
leads him to explore the new “ways religion and politics are being mixed together around 
the world” (2005, p.26), which I contend is indeed a phenomenon of resurgence. But his 
insistence on the private realm also leads him to see as part of the “resurgence” also 
processes such as the “persistence”, “survival”, “spread”, “transformation” or 
“restructuring” of religions, religious communities or personal religious beliefs. For 
example Thomas argues that part and parcel of the resurgence are the spread of 
Pentecostalism, or the rise of new religious movements such as New Age spiritualists, 
Western Buddhists or the Falun Gong, in modern times and across continents (Thomas 
2005, pp.10-11, 26-30; see also: Thomas 2010). And this is somewhat problematic.  
 
By bringing in the private and personal aspect of religiosity, Thomas (and with 
him the broader discussion of resurgence) falls prey to those who are skeptical about the 
idea of a religious revival altogether. Indeed measuring in any satisfactory way personal 
religiosity and adherence to religion around the world, and its supposed increase over the 
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past half a century, seems a rather daunting and unfeasible task. Furthermore, the ebbs 
and flows of old and new religious beliefs and communities are part and parcel of what 
human history is generally (also) about. In such a case, can we really talk about a 
“resurgence” then? Or are social scientists just realizing that post-enlightenment theories 
of secularization and understandings of progress that pointed towards the death of God 
and the demise of religions were simply wrong?  
 
Religion/s, in fact, some contend may have never gone away in the first place. 
The problem, these critics argue, was with social scientists that had a blind spot and did 
not pay much attention to it/them (Fox 2006a, p.11; Sheikh 2012, p.369, see in particular 
note 17). Hence it makes little sense to talk in terms of a “resurgence” or “return”. And I 
agree, up to a point. There is indeed a growing literature exploring why religions have 
survived and thrived in modern times (Inglehart and Norris 2007; Robbins 2004). Issues 
of change and continuity in the life of religions and the religiosity of individuals, while 
important in their own right and with possible political consequences, hardly amount to a 
process of resurgence.8 The spread of Christianity in China is new and may have social, 
economic and political consequences, but does this really constitute in a strict sense a 
process of religious revival, return or indeed resurgence? Not really. And critics seem 
correct to suggest that there is not much new taking place if we look at the persistence 
and changing composition of religions and religiosity among individuals.  
 
Hence, if the word “resurgence” is to have any analytical weight in IR it should be 
associated more squarely with an understanding of religions’ growing political salience 
in societies and public life in domestic and international politics. Resurgence implies a 
change, a reversal, from a moment when religious actors, ideas, identities, discourses, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This is something Scott Thomas is well aware of. For example he argues: “It is important to be clear about 
the phenomena this book is trying to explain or understand in international relations. The dependent 
variable in this book is not greater religiosity per se, for in that case it would be a book about comparative 
religion or the sociology of religion. What is being explained is how the greater levels of religiosity or even 
spirituality are taking place in public life, and doing so in ways that have an impact on international 
relations” (2005, p.37). Nevertheless his continued interest and insistence on the “growth” of personal 
religiosity, and in process of religious “transformation”, “spread” and “restructuring” in the face of 
globalization leave him open in my opinion to the critic’s charge that there is little new and “resurging” 
going on.  
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practices and institutions appeared to have gone through some sort of decline in their 
public and political functions. Indeed this was very much the case – as Chapter 2 argues 
in more detail – with the emergence and spread of the modern state and secular political 
ideologies across the world in the past four centuries.   
 
Daniel Philpott, Timothy Samuel Shah and Monica Duffy Toft flesh out more 
explicitly the exclusively political dimension of the resurgence in their work (2011). 
These scholars do not see the survival, spread and vibrancy of religions worldwide as a 
sign of resurgence, and indeed they make little or no references to these developments. 
For them the main theme that characterizes the resurgence is the progressive evolution 
and qualitative shift in the orientation of “religious people and communities” from 
“private devotion, enclosed in family, community, and place of worship, to public 
engagement, characterized by active efforts to influence constitutions, laws, and policy” 
and “from a strategy of changing cultural attitudes – regarding matters like family and the 
personal practice of faith – to one of changing laws, policies, and even regimes” (2011a, 
p.13). In other words, they understand the resurgence as a growing trend whereby people 
and organizations are adopting political pursuits in the name of religion (2011a, p.22). 
 
They argue that since the 1960s in every major religious tradition, religious and 
religious-related actors have experienced a shift in their proximity to political power and 
a shift in their theology of political power towards more activist and engaged political 
theologies (understood as a set of religious ideas about what is legitimate political 
authority). Hence the resurgence of religion has a distinctive political meaning, it takes 
place as “major religious actors throughout the world enjoy greater capacity for political 
influence today than at any time in modern history [emphasis in the original]” (2011a, 
p.49). It constitutes a quantitative and qualitative rise of politically assertive theologies, 
and politically engaged religious actors9 and religious-related actors (individual and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Individual religious actors are: clerics, imams, pastors, priests, monks, religious scholars and so on. 
Collective religious actors: churches, congregations, mosques, orders, organized traditions, and so on.  
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collective).10 
 
This understanding of religious resurgence incorporates the rise of modern-day 
fundamentalisms across religious traditions (Marty and Appleby 2004), and moves 
beyond it. It is a definition very much akin to José Casanova’s understanding of the 
modern phenomena of religious “deprivatization” (1994). This includes a wide range of 
domestic, transnational and international phenomena connected with the increased overt 
political activism by religious groups and institutions, ranging from: Catholic Popes and 
orders; movements inspired by liberation theologies; Religious Zionist parties, violent or 
peaceful engaged Buddhist monks or laypeople; democratic or undemocratic political 
Islamic movements and parties, and Evangelical value-voters and faith-based 
organizations.  
 
Seen from this perspective – in terms of a growing political, social and public 
visibility of religions – there is indeed a process of religious resurgence in the world of 
international politics. This is very much what Elizabeth Shakman Hurd has in mind when 
she argues: “Although religious politics is not new, there has been an increase in the 
scope and intensity of the politicization of religion around the world in recent decades” 
(2008, p.135). This novel development is then reflected and mirrored by the growing 
attention to religion in the academy. In other words, our previous oversight and now 
sudden interest towards religion in IR, as well as in other disciplines, cannot be solely 
understood as an intellectual blind spot exogenous from real-world events.  
 
Yet, it seems to me that framing the resurgence solely in terms of the 
politicization, or deprivatization, of religion is somewhat reductive. Indeed, while the 
resurgence of religion can be thought in terms of a politicization of religion/s, it appears 
to be also taking place as a religionization of politics (Haynes 1995, p.119; Tibi 2007, 
pp.35-37). In other words the resurgence is not solely a sociopolitical process whereby, 
across religions, actors have developed activist political theologies and have become 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Religious-related individuals are: lay journalists, activists, intellectuals, propagandists, dissidents and so 
on. Religious-related collective actors could be: religiously-based political movements, faith-based parties 
or organizations (from charities to transnational terrorist groups).  
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more engaged in public debates and political practices. I contend it also takes shape as a 
cultural process, whereby religious discourses and identities, and the practices and 
symbols associated with them, have become more politically salient and publicly 
pervasive in recent decades.  
 
This is the process that Huntington (1993) and the larger identity politics literature 
indirectly point to, and that Fabio Petito more explicitly touches upon as constituting part 
and parcel of the resurgence. One of Petito’s key insights is that “the resurgence of 
religion as central factors (sic.) in contemporary international relations is linked to the 
renewed visibility of the concept of civilization in post-Cold War political discourses” 
(2010, p.173; see also Petito 2011). This process, Petito argues, should be read as an 
“ideational (or ideological) change” (2010, p.179). As a “kind of “systemic” shift in the 
way world politics is constructed by and through new ideas, discourses, and shared 
knowledge”, connected with the reassertion of civilizations defined in a fundamentally 
culturalist sense as “strategic frames of references, not as direct protagonists of 
international politics [emphasis in the original]” (2010, p.179). 
 
The notion of civilizations as “frames of reference” moves beyond the 
Huntingtonian idea of identifying X number of clearly defined civilizations out there and 
explaining why they will clash. It instead points at the growing references to Islam, 
Confucian values, Judeo-Christian heritage, and so on, as central political categories in 
contemporary world politics. These categories are increasingly embedded in the 
discourses and shaping the practices of a plurality of religious as well as non-religious 
state and non-state actors at multiple levels of analysis in international and global society 
(Petito 2010, p.178).  
 
Beyond civilizational appeals, the point here is that state and non-state actors, 
who one would have a hard time defining as religious, are regularly and increasingly 
appealing to religious identities and discourses in domestic and international politics (see 
also: Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 2011a, p.18). So it happens that 
during the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s between Croats, Serbs and 
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Bosnian Muslims each side would reach out and find historically and religiously-related 
(not ideological) allies, respectively in Germany, Russia and the Arab-Muslim world. 
Individuals like the Ba’athist Saddam Hussein increasingly played the Islamic card 
during the Gulf Wars. Others like the agnostic Geert Wilders regularly speaks about 
Islam as a threat to Judeo-Christian Europe. Or debates in France where the problem of 
integrating immigrants who happen to be Moroccan, Algerian, Senegalese, or Arab and 
African becomes instead a “Muslim” problem about whether “Islam” is compatible with 
French values and institutions.  
 
Such cultural shifts have often very real material manifestations and 
consequences, and important implications for social and political practices. Places of 
worship are built others burned down, money is collected and spent, communities are 
included or excluded, people are converted, attacked, resettled, killed, saved, and so on, 
according to the types of labels and identities they are given by others or subscribe to 
themselves. 
 
Since no definition aptly captures this dual social and cultural process that I 
identify as constituting the resurgence of religion, I will propose my own. I define the 
global resurgence of religion in IR as the growing political salience of religion 
conceptualized as: i) social processes whereby religions, theologies, and religious actors 
(individuals, non-state actors, communities) become more publicly and politically 
engaged; and ii) cultural changes whereby religious beliefs,11 identities,12 discourses, 
practices, 13  symbols and objects,14  and actors acquire growing political weight and 
meaning. These two sets of processes – which have taken place in multiple and complex 
ways across space and over the past four or five decades – can be seen as occurring 
independently and/or as mutually reinforcing of each other.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For example: theologies, doctrines, norms, beliefs, interpretations, and so on. 
12 For example: Judeo-Christian, Confucian, Shi’a/Sunni, Jewish Orthodox/Reformer, Baha’i, Muslim, 
Protestant Evangelical, Mormon, and so on. 
13 For example: reading holy texts, knowing religious verses by heart, praying, attending service, carrying 
out religious duties, and so on. 
14 For example: holy texts, religious symbols and garments, places of worship (churches, mosques, temples, 
synagogues, shrines), holy sites, and so on.  
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I have amply discussed in the earlier parts what I mean by the social and cultural 
changes associated with the growing political salience of religion in domestic and 
international politics (either/or in terms of politicization of religion and religionization of 
politics). There are two further issues that this definition raises and which have not yet 
been addressed. In particular what is mean here by “global” resurgence of religion, and 
by “independent” and/or “mutually reinforcing” processes.  
 
First, the term “global” has both descriptive and analytical content. It is 
descriptive in terms of the resurgence being global in its spatial diffusion. That is, 
occurring worldwide across geographic areas and peoples from the United States, to East, 
Central and Southern Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa – in uneven and 
distinctive ways according to complex international and domestic dynamics and local 
histories and context. Analytical, in the sense that it is mainly taking place at the world 
society level-of-analysis (Buzan 2004). That is, occurring largely at the level of non-state 
actors and in civil societies within, across and beyond states – indeed most religions and 
religious communities are transnational in character – rather than at the state and inter-
state levels (see also: Thomas 2005, pp.27-29; Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011, p.24). 
 
Second, the social and cultural processes of resurgence may be occurring 
“independently” of each other. For instance, in the case of Italy religious and related 
actors have always been rather active politically, from the Catholic Church to the 
Christian Democratic Party to other faith-based organizations such as Comunione e 
Liberazione or the Comunità di Sant’Egidio. In this case we cannot speak of a social 
process of resurgence. However, cultural processes of resurgence are detectable to the 
extent that the xenophobic Lega Nord has responded to growing immigration by 
campaigning loudly for the defense of Italy’s “Christian identity” and the presence of the 
Crucifix in public schools.  
 
Social and cultural processes may be “mutually reinforcing”. The more religious 
actors become engaged in politics, the more religious identities, ideas, and discourses 
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permeate the public sphere. Conversely the more non-religious actors adopt and refer to 
religious tropes and dynamics the more attention is bestowed upon religious actors and 
authority. For instance, the more Islamists participate in domestic or international politics, 
the more Islamic ideas, identities and practices become relevant. Simultaneously the 
more Islamic identities, practices and ideas become accepted as relevant the more 
authority those speaking in the name of Islam (religious dignitaries, clerics or religiously-
inspired organizations) gain. 
 
The causes of the global resurgence of religion are many and complex, depending 
on locality, history and what kind of process of resurgence scholars have been interested 
in investigating. As Jeffrey Haynes aptly points out, when it comes to explaining the 
resurgence: “no simple, clear-cut, one-size-fits-all, reason or theoretical explanation 
coverers all cases” (2011, p.5). Rather than the causes, however, this thesis is concerned 
with exploring the effects of the resurgence. In particular in analyzing and teasing out the 
impact this global religious revival is having on: a) changes to American foreign policy in 
particular; and b) on exposing the contested nature of the secular in international relations 
practices and theory, more broadly.  
 
The Secular and Desecularization  
 
The growing emphasis over the past decades on religion across the social sciences has 
contributed to shedding a reflexive light on its opposite and partner concept: “the secular”. 
Indeed the resurgence of religion has generated scholarly and critical attention, 
particularly within sociology, towards long unexamined assumptions regarding processes 
and theories of “secularization” (Casanova 1994; Gorski 2003). Peter Berger, a leading 
proponent of secularization theory in the 1960s (1969), would humbly recognize in the 
late 1990s that:  
“The world today […] is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some 
places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by 
historians and social scientists loosely labeled “secularization theory” is 
essentially mistaken.” (1999, p.2) 
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This literature, however, does not discredit entirely notions that processes of 
secularization can and have ostensibly occurred around the world. In his recanting, Peter 
Berger recalls that, even if much of what was commonly understood as secularization 
theory in the 1950-80s may be outdated today, when contributing to this literature at the 
time: “I was in good company – most sociologists of religion had similar views, and we 
had good reasons for holding them [emphasis added]” (1999, p.2). In other words, 
processes of secularization seemed to be taking place at the time (hence the theories), 
although the generalized predictions made from some particular instances, mainly 
European ones, may have now not all proven correct. Overall, then, what this recent body 
of work does undermine is the taken-for-granted, universal, homogenizing, unidirectional 
and teleological understanding of secularization as a constitutive element of modernity 
and modernization.  
 
Hence attention has been increasingly directed, by scholars such as José Casanova, 
towards unpacking the conceptually distinct processes of “secularization”, understood 
alternatively as: a) the decline of religious beliefs in the private sphere; b) the 
privatization and marginalization of religions from the public sphere; and C) the 
functional differentiation of religious institutions and authorities from secular institutions 
(such as the state) and other spheres of social life and knowledge (such as law, science, 
economics, and so on). These distinct processes may occur at different historical times, 
with different intensities, in multiple ways, and in separate places independently of, as 
well as in parallel to, each other (Casanova 1994, p.11-39; see also: Berger, Davie, and 
Fokas 2008) 
 
These intellectual developments have led to a growing cross-disciplinary effort – 
in sociology (Casanova 2011), anthropology (Asad 2003), social theory (Taylor 2007), 
and IR (Hallward 2008) – dedicated to exploring the boundaries and multiple 
arrangements of “the secular” across political, social and cultural milieus. Likewise, a 
reflexive light has been progressively directed towards examining the ideological, rather 
than supposed neutral and impartial, nature of “secularism” (Connolly 1999), and to 
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exploring the role of agency and the complex normative structures that underpin 
secularizing processes and secularist projects (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and 
VanAntwerpen 2011b; Hurd 2008; Kuru 2009).  
 
A focus on the multiple and historically contingent nature of processes and 
theories of secularization, the meaning and formations of the secular, and the norms and 
practices associated with secularism, has revealed their contested as well as reversible 
character. A space is opening up for thinking about and exploring how social and 
political challenges to secular arrangements, norms and practices by actors – whether 
scholars in the ivory tower, activists on the ground or practitioners in the halls of power – 
can lead to the re-negotiation of previously established boundaries between “the religious” 
and “the secular” – as the concept of desecularization rather unequivocally suggests.  
 
Berger was the first to introduce the term “desecularization” in 1999. When he did 
so, however, it was mainly to highlight the continued persistence and in some cases 
revival of religious beliefs in the modern world, rather than exploring their societal 
impact in terms of processes that ran counter and against secularizing trends and forces – 
as the term implies. Vyacheslav Karpov has done most than any to advance framework 
that coherently defines and operationalizes the concept of desecularization. For Karpov 
desecularization is a: “process of counter-secularization, through which religion reasserts 
its societal influence in reaction to previous and/or co-occurring secularizing processes” 
(2010, p.250). In other words, desecularization can be understood as a process of 
contestation, reaction and pushback against secular, secularized and secularist structures 
and forms of authority.  
 
Overall, while the two concepts and phenomena of religious resurgence and 
desecularization may be related, they should nevertheless be kept analytically distinct. 
The former refers more generally to the multiple causes, manifestations and effects of 
religion’s expanding influence on politics and societies domestically and internationally. 
The latter instead concentrates more specifically on explaining and understanding a 
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particular type of social change: when, why and how boundaries between “the secular” 
and “the religious” shift and change in favour of the latter rather than the former. 
 
 
Empirical and Conceptual Contributions of the Thesis  
 
 
A comprehensive and theoretically laden empirical focus on explaining and tracking the 
intellectual shifts occurring within the American foreign policy establishment and the 
development of policies and bureaucratic designs with an inherently religious content is 
in many senses a novelty. The only other publication, I am aware of, which has attempted 
something somewhat similar, but in an overwhelmingly descriptive way, is a Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report in 2007.  
 
Along with a rich investigation into the new ways in which the resurgence of 
religion and American foreign policy are mixing, this thesis adds to ongoing 
investigations and debates about religion and the secular across different research 
programs.  It stands at the crossroads of a series of important scholarly investigations that 
rarely, if ever, talk to each other. By engaging with these discussions and attempting to 
bring them into fruitful dialogue, this thesis seeks to make a number of original 
contributions to ongoing empirical and conceptual debates on: the role of religion in 
American foreign policy; the impact of the resurgence of religion on international 
relations practices, in general, and states foreign policies, in particular; and the causes and 
effects of processes of secularization and desecularization in the sociology of religion.  
 
First, this research lies at the crux of two sets of scholarly enterprises on religion 
and international relations broadly defined. One is a vibrant literature, discussed earlier, 
that has emerged over the past-decade or so charting the implications of the global 
resurgence of religion for IR theories and practices. The other is a flourishing literature 
on the role of religious actors, ideas and forces – note, not of processes of resurgence in a 
global sense – on American foreign policy. Indeed, and I would argue not coincidentally, 
	   32 
interest in the intersection between religion and American foreign policy has recently 
exploded. This ranges from normative debates about what the role of religion and 
morality should be in informing American foreign policy (Chaplin and Joustra 2010; 
Hehir 2004), to exploring the impact of religion on multiple domestic sources of foreign 
policy, for example: on public opinion (Guth 2009); on the beliefs of presidents and high 
level policy-makers in historical perspective (Inboden 2008) and recent periods 
(Bacevich and Prodromou 2004); on in the emergence of new religious movements such 
as the Christian Right (Marsden 2008); the increasingly politically active role of 
protestant Evangelicals  (Mead 2006) and other Christian denominations and groups  
(Rock 2011); or the exponential growth in religious advocacy and lobbying in 
Washington (Abrams 2001).  
 
These two scholarly enterprises investigating (a) the resurgence of religion in IR 
and (b) the impact of religion on American foreign policy, scarcely talk to each other 
however. The former (a) could gain much in understanding how processes of resurgence 
affect state behavior by mining the wealth of empirical knowledge produced by the latter 
(b). Indeed there is a recurrent narrative in the literature on the resurgence that tends to 
see this process as transformative as the end of the Cold War was or globalization 
dynamics are for international relations. Religious resurgence is described as possibly 
having the power to profoundly “challenge”, “transform” or “revolutionize” IR theory, 
the Westphalian order and how states behave internationally.15  
 
Yet little substance is added to explain how, when and whether the international 
system, or states’ foreign policies are actually changing as profoundly under the force of 
new religious dynamics as at times the literature implies. A closer attention to empirical 
cases and actual changes in states’ foreign policy practices, and institutional and 
normative structures, which this research is committed to investigating, could shed more 
light on what appear to be somewhat premature and unfounded statements of possibilities 
of radical international change within the IR literature on religious resurgence. Indeed as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See: Hatzopoulos and Petito (2003b, pp.2-3); Mendelsohn (2012); Philpott (2002, pp.83-92); Thomas 
(2005, pp.1-20); Shani (2008) 
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Eva Bellin has argued: “IR scholars interested in exploring the impact of religion on 
international affairs need to focus more on developing empirically grounded middle-
range theory than on pursuing paradigm wars” (2008, p.346). By bringing together grand 
abstractions on religious resurgence with close empirical study of American foreign 
policy, this research responds to Bellin’s calls. 
 
On the other hand, the issue with the religion and American foreign policy 
literature (b), is that it tends to be quite self-contained. While the ambitions of the 
religious resurgence scholarship need “scaling down” (Bellin 2008, p.346), those of the 
religion and American foreign policy could benefit by being “scaled up”. In fact, it seems 
that this scholarship (b) could travel much further and gain in theoretical sophistication if 
it was more explicitly contextualized in, and put in direct conversation with, the religion 
and IR literature (a). This thesis moves in this direction by linking empirical research on 
American foreign policy with ongoing IR debates about the mechanisms and processes 
by which the boundaries of the religious and the secular are constructed, maintained and 
re-negotiated.  
 
Secondly, this thesis lies at the crux of another set of debates within the social 
sciences. Between the burgeoning literature on the resurgence of religion in IR and the 
flourishing scholarly investigation in the sociology of religion on the constitutive, 
multiple and contested nature of the secular, processes of secularization, and secularist 
norms. Indeed, work on desecularization takes place within the discipline of sociology. 
By bringing the concept of desecularization in IR, this thesis opens up new avenues for 
research in international politics, while also adding to ongoing debates in the sociology of 
religion. I will now expand on how sociological insights may add to IR discussions and 
vice versa. 
 
IR scholarship generally focuses on very non-religious outputs of religion’s 
revival. That is its role, among others, in: promoting violence and conflict,16 fostering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See: Hasenclever and Rittberger (2003); Fox and Sandler (2006); Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011, Ch 5-
6); Thomas (2005, Ch. 5); Toft (2007) 
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peace,17 spurring processes of democratization,18 or challenging liberal hegemony and 
actors. 19  Likewise, literature charting how old and new religious factors influence 
American foreign policy tends to focus overwhelmingly on political and military 
outcomes. For instance, scholars have explored how religious actors and factors have 
affected, among others, the Bush administration’s decision to go to war with Iraq in 
2003.20 More broadly attention has been paid to the relationship between religious 
variables and America’s preference for – or lack thereof – military solutions to 
international problems,21 public attitudes towards and U.S. support for international law 
and organizations,22 or America’s support for Israel.23  
 
As a result, much of what is specific or sui generis about the increasing mixing of 
“the religious” – whether norms, beliefs, or actors – with “the political” is often crowded 
out in IR research focused on types of outcomes which any actor, norm, identity or 
interest could produce such as conflict, military interventions, democratization, support – 
or lack thereof – for a particular country or international institution. It is here, I argue, 
where the analytical implications of subscribing to a substantive definition of religion 
become apparent and the import of sociological concepts is of great value. Particularly 
with regards to sociologists’ focus on the multiple and context specific processes of 
secularization and desecularization.24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See: Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011, Ch. 7); Sandal (2011); Thomas (2005, Ch.6)  
18 See: Philpott (2007); Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011, Ch.4) 
19 See: Adamson (2005); Barbato and Kratochwil (2009) 
20 See: Froese and Mencken (2009); Marsden (2008, Ch. 3); Prodromou (2008) 
21 See: Guth (2009); Rock (2011, Ch. 3) 
22 See: Croft (2007, pp.702-705) 
23 See: Croft (2007, pp.705-707); Mead (2006, pp.39-41); Mearsheimer and Walt (2007); Rock (2011, Ch. 
5) 
24 This point is in line with recent efforts by Sheik (2012) to explicitly tease out “how does religion matter” 
to IR theory and practices. She concludes that religion is distinctive: as a “belief community” (a point 
emphasized also by Schott Thomas (2005, p.98)); as a distinctive source of “power”, “authority”, and 
“legitimacy” vis-à-vis the state (a point made also by Daniel Philpott (2009, p.193)); and as a particular 
kind of “speech act”. Cecilia Lynch (2009) has further argued that a particular characteristic of religious 
actors is that they act out of ethical considerations about the common good, while Michael Horowitz (2009) 
for instance has suggested that military campaigns with a religious dimension, and which include 
religiously motivated actors, tend to last longer than otherwise expected by rationalist and materialist 
explanations of war duration. Important as they are, most of these efforts are geared towards teasing out 
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Injecting novel sociological insights about the interaction and dynamics of 
religious and secular forces, the way actors give meaning and seek to redesign the 
boundaries between the two, which lies at the very heart of the concept of 
desecularization, is a promising way to unpack social and political dynamics, across time 
and space, which are distinctively associated with religion and the resurgence of religion. 
In terms of this research, for example, the lens of desecularization magnifies inherently 
religious institutional and normative/cultural changes in the predominantly secular 
structures of American foreign policy-making, and points towards the emergence of a set 
of policies that (directly or indirectly) all share a religious content. What current literature 
on the resurgence in IR often leaves out are the implications and effects that the growing 
mixing of religion and politics is having, not simply in causing this war or that peace; but 
also in bringing about more religion itself in international relations discourses and 
practices, and examining the ways in which this process creates new power structures, 
incentives and possibilities of action.  
 
Additionally, by using desecularization as a conceptual tool and lens to explore 
changes in American foreign policy, this thesis moves forward the nascent research 
program on “the secular” in IR. So far most conceptual and empirical attention has been 
dedicated to exploring the ways in which the secular is defined and deployed in IR 
scholarship, how it colors understandings of “the religious”, in general, and “Islam”, in 
particular, and the way it informs Western attitudes and policy-makers’ practices in 
international politics and foreign policy (Hallward 2008; Hurd 2008). Conversely, barring 
some highly theoretical and normative-oriented discussions (Barbato and Kratochwil 
2009), IR scholars have paid less conceptually robust empirical attention to when and 
how challenges and contestations of secularized and secularist norms and practices, 
which processes of religious resurgence are engendering, can lead to a re-negotiation of 
the boundaries of the secular.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
what is distinctive about “religion” rather than the “resurgence of religion” as such in international relations 
practices, which instead is a key concern of this thesis.  
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At the same time, sociologists of religion would benefit greatly from IR insights – 
especially when it comes to the role of politics, power, interests and normative 
contestations among social actors – in explaining and understanding secularizing and 
desecularizing dynamics. Much of sociology has tended to treat the secular and processes 
of secularization as a by-product of agentless apolitical abstract forces of differentiation, 
rationalization, or disenchantment brought about by modernity. Some point at rising 
income, education, safety and wealth as reasons that obviate the need for supernatural 
sources of security and compensation (Norris and Inglehart 2004, pp.13-17). In order to 
account for different trends and levels of secularization one would simply explain these 
by referring back to different levels of modernization and/or economic development. 
Likewise the persistence and revival of religion in the private and public sphere in some 
circumstances, and the lack of secularization in others, has been explained in terms of 
multiple ways of being modern (Eisenstadt 2000), as a by-product of globalizing forces 
(Roy 2010), or  as a seamless transition towards a post-secular reality (Habermas 2008).  
 
Overall, in most sociological accounts there is little space for the political and 
normative struggles among and across religious and secular actors and institutions 
inherent in the Wars of Religion (Nexon 2009), the Spanish Inquisition of Medieval 
Europe, or the French Revolution (Kuru 2009, Ch.5), to use some of the most extreme 
examples. In such instances the place of religion in public life and politics becomes 
highly, and often violently, disputed and power dynamics come brutally to the fore. 
These dynamics, with different intensities, occur daily today. As such, opening up the 
sociology of religion to insights from IR in particular, and political science in general, 
would introduce a more nuanced understanding that processes of secularization and 
desecularization are not simply the product of agentless impersonal macro-forces that just 
happen “out there”. Instead these result from power struggles and deep normative and 
political contestations among actors at the micro-level taking place right in front of us.  
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There is, in the sociology of religion, an emerging attention on secular/religious 
change emphasizing the role of agents and their beliefs.25 These are, in many respects, 
what Philip Gorski terms the “sociopolitical perspective” on secularization, which 
focuses on conflict and competition between religious and nonreligious elites and 
movements, and the “religiocultural perspective” on secularization, which focuses on the 
relationship between religious and nonreligious values and worldviews for control of 
particular sectors and institutions (2003, p.110). Both perspectives involve studying the 
“ebbs and flows of secularity” across time and “examining the interactions between 
religious and nonreligious actors and institutions” (2003, p.111). They treat secularization 
not as a universal undifferentiated force, but as an episodic, uneven and at times 
reversible process dependent on the social and political conflicts between actors and 
worldviews who would enhance and maintain, or reduce and undermine, religion’s 
significance in the public sphere. Hence secularization is not simply a “historical process” 
but also the product of secularizing “historical projects” (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and 
VanAntwerpen 2011a, p.28). This thesis further adds an international perspective to an 
emerging sociological research agenda, which has tended to be largely domestic or 
comparative in character. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For example Christian Smith builds on ideas of the sociology of revolutions and social movements, to 
theorize “issues of agency, interests, mobilization, alliances, resources, organizations, power, and strategy” 
in social transformations involving secularization (2003, p.29). For Smith the secularization of American 
public life between 1870 and 1930 was not simply the by-product of “modernization”, but more like an 
intentional “revolution”: the result of ideological and power struggles among cultural and intellectual elites 
(scientists, academics, and literary intellectuals) seeking to gain control of social institutions, marginalize 
religion, and increase their own cultural authority. The role of agency in processes of secularization is 
articulated in Peter Berger, Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas’ (2008) comparative analysis of religious change 
in Europe and America, which emphasizes among others intellectual elites’ orientations and differences in 
Enlightenment ideologies. Elena Lisovskaya and Vyacheslav Karpov (2010) have explored how the 
restoration of religious education in Russia and the consequent desecularization of Russian public schools 
following the end of the Soviet Union, was the outcome of an explicit policy and purposive alliance among 
top religious and political elites to reintroduce religion in the social fabric of Russia. 
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Theoretical Framework: A Historical Sociological Approach to Foreign Policy 
Analysis 
 
 
Unpacking processes of American foreign policy desecularization and explaining 
them in terms of the purposive actions of domestic actors embedded in and reacting to the 
global resurgence of religion is not as theoretically straightforward as it seems 
empirically intuitive. To carry out such an investigation I develop a Historical 
Sociological (HS) approach to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) that draws from the 
burgeoning field of HS in IR (Lawson 2007) and builds upon the work of scholars like 
Fred Halliday (2005, pp.41-72), Brian Mabee (2007), and Chris Alden and Amnon Aran 
(2012, pp.63-7, 113-16), who have already used a HS lens in FPA.  
 
Such a theoretical framework allows me to understand and explain why, how and 
when changes and trends across history in the wider social and international context lead 
to deep changes in foreign policy practices and policy-making structures (in terms of 
institutions and norms). It also proves to be an invaluable tool to reconcile the ongoing 
above-mentioned debates between the resurgence of religion in IR and the domestic 
religious sources of American foreign policy, and encourage cross-disciplinary dialogue 
between IR and sociology on issues of religious/secular change. Furthermore, a HS lens 
can advance in new and original theoretical ways the broader study of religion in IR. I 
will now briefly expand on the claims made here. 
 
First, this thesis is not simply an empirical study of the new ways in which 
American foreign policy and religion are mixing, or a conceptual one about how the 
resurgence of religion in IR is reconstituting the secular. At its core this is a study into the 
mechanisms of foreign policy change brought about by the complex interaction of 
domestic actors at the micro-level, embedded and responding to macro-processes of 
global change during a specific historical period and time-frame that goes from the end of 
the Cold War to the present (2012). Much of FPA tends to present a relatively static or 
snapshot depiction of foreign policy. One which, as Chris Alden and Amnon Aran (2012, 
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p.92) argue, reflects the field’s primary concern for policy- and decision-making 
processes, where the state and its foreign policy institutions are seen essentially as given 
and timeless entities. In contrast, a HS approach to FPA introduces a deeper 
understanding of change into analyses of foreign policy. One that accounts for its impact 
in relation not only to individual policy-makers, but also state institutions and structures 
of policy-making, integrating these with the wider historical context and social forces – 
such as those investigated here in terms of global religious resurgence – within which 
foreign policy change – in my case processes of desecularization – occurs.  
 
Second, it seems to me that the scholarly enterprises on “religious resurgence in 
IR” and “religion and American foreign policy” talk past each other not solely because 
they address different types of questions and puzzles. The lack of communication appears 
in part due to deeper and theoretically problematic rifts within the discipline of IR. These 
are the theoretical divisions that have increasingly come to exist between the broader 
field of IR theory – largely conceived as a theory of macro-structures and international 
systems – and the particular sub-field of FPA – largely conceived as a micro-oriented, 
agent-centered and actor-specific theory explaining human actions and state behavior. By 
adopting a HS approach to FPA, this thesis attempts to build a possible framework that 
reconciles the widening gap that has come to exist between IR and FPA theories, in order 
to productively bring together debates on religious resurgence in IR and religion in 
American foreign policy 
 
Third, IR scholars and sociologists generally talk past each other because of 
obvious disciplinary boundaries and silos. Yet it not need be so. A HS framework can be 
a fertile interdisciplinary middle ground on which to bring together debates on the 
resurgence of religion and the secular in IR with those in sociology and vice versa. On 
the one hand, it allows to rigorously introduce into IR the sociological attention to issues 
of “desecularization” as part and parcel of a research agenda that focuses on particular 
types of dynamics engendered by the resurgence of religion in international politics. On 
the other hand, such a theoretical framework applied from an IR perspective speaks to 
sociology’s need to explore in more detail the context and historical-specific political and 
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normative contestation between religious and nonreligious agents and worldviews 
involved in processes of secularization and desecularization. Indeed, by using a HS lens 
this research provides theoretical and empirical ammunition to Philip Gorski’s (2003) 
quest, carried out through a comparative HS perspective, for a greater focus in the 
sociology of religion to “sociopolitical” and “religiocultural” models in the study of the 
secular.  
 
Fourth, the proposed HS framework advances in a number of ways theoretically 
the study of religion in IR. Much of the nascent scholarship on religion in the discipline 
has been divided between those suggesting that religion’s return poses a fundamental 
challenge to IR theory such that new and alternative paradigms should be developed 
(Hatzopoulos and Petito 2003b, p.3; Kubalkova 2003; Thomas 2005, pp.72-77). And 
those who instead have more recently argued that the study of religion in IR does not 
require a revolution, but rather an evolution in the theoretical frameworks currently at our 
disposal (Nexon 2011; Sandal and James 2010). By adopting a HS framework to the 
study of religion, this thesis falls squarely in the latter camp. It does so also by adding an 
original contribution. Indeed the field has yet to fully and substantially engage with 
alternative theoretical perspectives beyond more mainstream Realist, Liberal and 
Constructivist paradigms.  
 
Moreover, a HS lens expands IR’s understanding and study of religion by opening 
the discipline’s doors to the wealth of research and knowledge produced within 
sociology’s longstanding tradition of research on religion. This is a tradition that dates 
back to the latter discipline’s founding moments with Max Weber (1930) and Emile 
Durkheim (1915),26 and which is currently undergoing a process of revival (Clarke 2009; 
Smith 2008). IR scholars interested in religion and the secular would do a great disservice 
if they sealed their discipline off from this time-honored and newly reinvigorated wealth 
of knowledge and research. A HS approach promises to be a fruitful theoretical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Cecilia Lynch (2009), for example, is engaged in such an enterprise recently proposing from the pages of, 
the purposefully multidisciplinary, International Theory a neo-Weberian approach to religion in 
international politics. 
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framework for a thorough and rigorous exchange with sociology, as opposed to IR’s 
tendency towards shallow conceptual raiding parties into cognate disciplines.27 
 
 
Methodology and Thesis Structure 
 
 
A HS theoretical framework is quite distinctive in its pluralist ontological, 
epistemological and methodological commitments (Lawson 2007, p.355; see also: 
Hobson and Hobden 2002, part II). Overall my project situates itself within the 
boundaries defined by neo-Weberian historical sociologists like Fred Halliday, John 
Hobson and George Lawson in IR. Epistemologically this position charts a middle 
ground between the positivist (or better neopositivist) insistence on scientific progress via 
hypothesis testing and falsification, to the detriment of any form of interpretation, and the 
post-positivist (or also post-modernist) embrace of description and understanding seen as 
diametrically opposite to the possibility of producing any form of causal inference and 
explanation.  
 
Ahistorical law-like generalizations are here eschewed, both at the macro-
structural level, typified by discussions of anarchy in neorealism, or at the micro-human 
one, typified by the rational-choice approaches of much FPA. What is being proposed 
here is a form of social scientific “knowledge-production” enterprise about world politics 
(Jackson 2011, p.19),28 which is not anchored to a neopositivist methodology and 
research design. In terms of formulating hypothetical models about foreign policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For a similar critique see: Lawson and Shilliam (2010) 
28 Jackson has done more than anyone in recent years to advance a pluralist understanding of “science” 
within IR which is not solely limited to “neopositivist” methodologies (hypothesis-testing, empirical 
generalization, etc.), but includes also “analytical”, “critical realist” and “reflexive” understandings of 
“science” and ways of approaching IR inquiry and research. This decoupling of the notion of “science” 
from, but that includes also, neopositivist methodologies leads Jackson to define science, following Max 
Weber, in broad terms as “the careful and rigorous application of a set of theories and concepts so as to 
produce a “thoughtful ordering of empirical actuality”” (…p.193). A scientific enquiry in IR needs to have 
three qualities be “systemic, public, and intended to produce worldly knowledge” (p.195), something which 
“neopositivst”, “analytical”, “critical realist” and “reflexive” methodologies legitimately pursue in their 
specific ways.  
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desecularization which are tested and falsified through empirical observation or statistical 
regression to produce general propositions and law-like generalities. I largely work 
within what Patrick Thaddeus Jackson calls a “critical realist” methodological framework 
(2011, pp.72-111), very much in line with Lawson’s understanding of Historical 
Sociology as based on a deep “ontological realism” (2007, p.357-58).  
 
Yet this does not prevent HS (and a HS FPA) from explaining social facts, 
processes and actions “allowing concepts, categories and causal regularities to be 
properly assessed over time and space, and in the process generating workable, 
theoretically compelling taxonomies and classificatory schemas” (Lawson 2007, p.353). 
While trying to explain the complex and multiple causes of things historical sociologists 
do not shy away from using rich description to narrate historical events along with 
exploring how human agents understand and give meaning to and act within the 
constrains and possibilities imposed by the social and historical context they operate in.  
 
The risk of falling into complete indeterminacy is real: the un-impressive “the 
world is complex” conclusion. Hence a variety of mid-range analytic tools tend to be 
employed by historical sociologists to properly unpack the causal process and 
mechanisms under examination. In this thesis I will focus on issues of “timing and 
sequencing” to explore the way events are related, the role of “historical contingencies” 
(political elections, exogenous shocks) and “macrosocial dynamics” (long term trends 
such as the resurgence of religion), “critical junctures” (when historical contingencies and 
macro-trends come together) and “path dependency” (George and Bennett 2005, pp.9-10, 
145-48, 212-13; Lawson 2007, pp.356-60; Nexon 2012). These tools are employed as a 
way to tease out why, when and how changes in practices, institutional designs, and 
cultural/normative structures come about, reproduce and evolve to influence subsequent 
developments. 
 
The thesis is broadly divided in two parts. The first part is theoretical and 
conceptual/historical. The second part is largely empirical. In Chapter 1, I develop the 
historical sociological theoretical infrastructure, the bones on which I then add the 
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conceptual muscles in Chapter 2, and then the empirical meat in Chapters 3-4-5-6. I use a 
wide range of methods to interpret, explain and conceptually unpack foreign policy 
change and desecularization. In Chapter 2 I use methods of concept formation and 
operationalization, and historical narrative and historicization. As David Collier, Henry 
Brady, and Jason Seawright argue in their call for a more pluralist and stronger 
qualitative research agenda: “assessing causes and consequences emphatically calls for 
careful attention to concept formation and operationalization [emphasis added]” (2010, 
p.3). Indeed, much of what this project does is “concept formation and 
operationalization”. Classifying knowledge, creating typologies and categories is part and 
parcel of understanding and explaining social reality.  
 
What does it mean for the American foreign policy establishment and American 
foreign policy to be “secular” and/or “desecularizing”? Most of Chapter 2 will be 
dedicated to unpacking the meaning, and constituent parts, of concepts such as: the 
secular, secularization, secularism, and desecularization. It will present a conceptual 
framework to investigate processes of desecularization, especially as they apply to issues 
of foreign policy, which will then be operationalized throughout the case studies. The 
focus on concept formation is accompanied by the method of historical narrative and 
historicization, to describe and contextualize in time and space processes of 
secularization, the emergence of secularist ideational constructs, and the birth and 
development of scholarships on secularization theory.  
 
The methodology used in the empirical part of the thesis (Chapters 3-4-5-6) is 
qualitative and case study based. The lager case study of American foreign policy is 
divided into three plus one sub-cases. The “plus one” case, presented in Chapter 3 is 
somewhat distinct from the remaining three. It focuses mainly on mapping developments 
across time in the research agendas of individuals (scholars, pundits, out of office policy-
makers) and institutions (universities, think tanks, research and polling institutes), which 
form the foreign policy intellectual milieu in Washington D.C. within which international 
relations issues and policies are debated. This milieu of civil society-based individuals 
and institutions is what I will call the American foreign policy establishment. The 
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remaining three sub-case studies analyze changes in American foreign policy practices 
and policy-making structures (institutions and culture/norms) along three areas of 
American diplomacy and statecraft (Chapter 4), foreign humanitarian and development 
assistance (Chapter 5), and national security strategy (Chapter 6).  
 
Overall the changes explored across the case studies involve a shift from previous 
research programs (Chapter 3), and foreign policy practices and bureaucratic structures 
(Chapters 4-5-6) largely identified as secular, secularized and secularist where religious 
actors and issues are ignored, purposely avoided, and/or stereotyped as problematic. To 
research programs, and practices and bureaucratic structures that instead are more open, 
entangled and favorable to articulating, investigating, promoting and engaging with 
religious actors and issues.    
 
I will use a range of methods to interpret, explain and conceptually unpack 
foreign policy change in Chapters 4-5-6: process tracing, discourse and content analysis, 
and within-case cross-temporal comparison. Process tracing in conjunction with 
discourse and content analysis are used as the main vehicles to establish and infer 
causality within each case between trends of religious resurgence and American foreign 
policy change. This thesis sees understanding actors’ perceptions, preferences and 
interests through discourse analysis as a fundamental part in explaining actors’ behavior 
through process tracing. Understanding and explaining are thought of as essential in 
providing a richer and more complete causal story of social change (Klotz and Lynch 
2006).  
 
I further employ the method of process tracing, less so to “uncover evidence of 
causal mechanisms at work”, but more to investigate the chain of events that “explain 
outcomes” (George and Bennett 2005, pp.8-9). In particular process tracing will be used 
to convert a “historical narrative into an analytical [sic.] causal explanation [emphasis in 
original]” couched in an explicit theoretical form (George and Bennett 2005, p.211). One 
that accounts for the complex sequence, chain of events and interactions between 
historical junctures, macro-trends of religious resurgence, and shifting perceptions and 
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behavior of desecularizing actors at the micro-level: to unpack the specific conditions 
under which policy and bureaucratic change at the meso-institutional level occurs across 
time and cases.  
 
In order to structure clearly the chain of events and analyze the proximate who, 
how and why now mechanisms of desecularization, I divide the narrative of the three sub-
cases into four stages, which I then closely trace, and link in a step-by-step logical way 
through evidence-based rich description and causal inferences. The first step, at T1, will 
generally establish and present the predominantly secular character of the practices and 
bureaucratic structures under examination at a time when processes of religious 
resurgence were hardly detectable. The narrative here is generally temporally situated 
within a Cold War context and its immediate aftermath.  
 
The second step, at T2, is to trace how processes of religious resurgence and 
specific historical events come together to open up the space for particular desecularizing 
actors and worldviews at the public and elite level to emerge and mobilize. Here the 
relationship between the changing macro historical social context, and the relationship of 
actors on the ground and the meanings they give to these macro-events events is 
unpacked through discourse and content analysis. I identify and specify the emergence of 
discourses in which different types of domestic individual or organizational actors 
articulate, in loose terms, two broad sets of “principled” and “strategic” beliefs about the 
problematically secular status of American foreign policy and that something needs to be 
done to make American foreign policy more attuned to religion.  
 
Principled beliefs generally take the following argumentative form: “American 
foreign policy is too secular and has long unjustly neglected the concerns [X, Y, or Z] of 
domestic and/or international religious actors [broadly defined]. As such, American 
foreign policy ought to take these concerns more seriously and act upon them because it 
is the right thing to.” Strategic beliefs, generally take the following argumentative form: 
“Unlike previous historical periods [X, Y, or Z], religion [broadly defined] increasingly 
matters in international politics [broadly understood] and hence also to the American 
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national interest. As such, American foreign policy, which is overwhelmingly and 
problematically secular [broadly defined], needs to take this new religiously-fervent 
reality into account and act/react upon it by integrating more religion [in a wide variety of 
ways] in its practices and bureaucracies.” At this stage, which depending on the chapter is 
temporally situated between the end of the Cold War up to 9/11, beliefs and policy 
preferences of desecularizing actors are publicly articulated. It is expected that foreign 
policy practices and policy-making structures have not experienced much substantial 
change yet.  
 
The third step, at T3, will focus on policy and bureaucratic changes that start to 
occur between the second Clinton (1996-2000) and the first Bush administration (2000-
2004). It draws on detailed empirical research as well as discourse and content analysis to 
trace the links between desecularizing actors’ actions, the principled and strategic beliefs 
articulated by these actors, and the emergence of new official policy discourses, practices, 
offices and appointees with a parallel religious content at critical points in time. The 
fourth step, at T4, mainly coinciding with the Obama administration, explores processes 
of “path dependency”. It unpacks how new inherently religious foreign policies and 
institutional designs which came about in T3, evolved over time: decaying or developing, 
and in some instances acquiring a life of their own. All along the narrative maps out, as a 
way to further infer causality, the broadening, thickening and deepening connections that 
may come to exist between desecularizing actors and governmental institutions. 
 
A further method employed in each of the three sub-cases is within-case cross-
temporal comparison. This temporal comparative approach focuses on teasing out the 
changes that have occurred between a secular “before” (at T1) and the eventual 
desecularized “after” (at T4) within the different foreign policy areas under examination: 
diplomatic, development aid assistance, and national security practices and policy-
making structures. The sub-cases are not selected with the view of comparing among 
them (cross-case comparison), in a sense each case is self-contained. They are 
investigated to provide a deeper understanding and more holistic perspective on the 
implications that broad macro social and cultural processes of change across time and 
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space can and do have on multiple and specific aspects of American foreign policy 
practices and bureaucracies. Overall, much in line with the spirit of HS these empirical 
chapters seek to “refine and refute, engage with, and accumulate knowledge” by adopting 
a methodology that constantly carries out a conversation “between empirical data, 
conceptual abstractions, and causal explanations” (Lawson 2007, p.409). 
 
The principal motivation guiding this investigation into processes of boundary 
formation and re-negotiation between “the secular” and “the religious” in American 
foreign policy is chiefly theoretical and analytical, not normative or policy-oriented. 
Hence, in the final concluding chapter – and for that matter, also in the preceding 
empirical ones – I will not argue in favor or against processes of desecularization, 
whether these are a positive or negative development, whether they should be welcomed 
or resisted, or whether more or less is needed. The conclusion will chiefly limit itself to 
critically assess and tease out the most salient implications of the case studies under 
examination for our understanding of American foreign policy, in particular, and the 
broader conceptual and theoretical debates on the “resurgence of religion” and “the 
secular” in IR and sociology.  
 
A final note on data. Data was gathered and analyzed from three main sources. 
First, from primary sources: speeches by high-level political decision-makers, such as: 
Presidents, Secretaries of Departments, and presidential advisors; and high-level 
bureaucrats, such as: directors of departments and offices across the executive branch. I 
also analyzed the discourses and content of government and congressional documents, 
such as Presidential, NSC, State Department and USAID memorandums and reports, 
strategy documents, Wikileaks files and congressional bills and testimonies. I closely 
monitored the websites of the White House, State Department, USAID, as well as leading 
universities, think tank, research institutions and FBOs to trace programmatic and 
institutional developments and changes. I also collected data through mailing list 
subscription to universities and think tanks centers and programs on religion and faith-
based NGOs. 
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Second, data was gathered from elite interviews and participant observation 
conducted during my field research in the United States, mainly Washington D.C., in 
June 2010 and June-July 2011. Here I collected unpublished documents and interviewed 
officials, scholars and pundits in and out of office during the Clinton, Bush and Obama 
administrations which were directly involved in the policies and events under 
investigation. I further interviewed independent academics, think tank researchers, NGOs 
directors and leading religious figures and advocates. A list of people I spoke to is 
provided in the annex. I also participated as an observant in conferences (as well as audio 
conferences), events, and roundtables in Washington D.C. on issues relating to the 
subject of my thesis. Thirdly, information was gathered through secondary sources such 
as books and journal article, but above all think tank and research institutes reports and 
online articles covering a wide range of topics as they relate to the entanglement between 
religion and American politics and foreign policy.  
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1. EXPLAINING FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: A HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGICAL 
APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework within which much of the following 
conceptual and empirical work will take place. This thesis argues that the gradual yet 
discernible emergence of inherently religious policy frameworks – such as the promotion 
of “religious freedom”, attention to “religious engagement”, the creation of “faith-based 
initiatives”, and the emergence of a bundle of “Muslim” specific policies – along with the 
development of new institutional arrangements designed to manage these policies, 
constitute an important departure from older and overwhelmingly secular American 
foreign policy practices and policy-making structures. These disparate developments all 
seem to suggest a progressive desecularization in terms of policies implemented and the 
institutional and cultural/normative settings that underpin policy-making. I argue that we 
cannot understand and explain these desecularizing changes if we do not contextualize 
American foreign policy within the broader international environment and historical 
period of the past forty-fifty years, one that has been marked by among others important 
global processes of religious resurgence. 
 
A number of questions come to the fore. Why and how has the worldwide 
resurgence of religion, in its multiple domestic and international manifestations, led to 
foreign policy change and desecularization? And why, even if macro-processes 
associated with the resurgence have been taking place at least since the early 1970s, we 
have seen the first substantial shifts in American foreign policy only towards the second 
half of the 1990s and thereafter? Raising similar questions about the causes of American 
foreign policy desecularization and its relationship to the wider religiously fervent global 
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social and cultural context within which such development occurred, is to invite a deeper 
theoretical reflection about explaining and understanding change in the field of Foreign 
Policy Analysis (FPA).  
 
In fact, at its theoretical core, this thesis explores multiple and complex processes 
of foreign policy “change”. First changes to state practices, such as policies implemented, 
norms promoted, initiatives launched and so on. Secondly changes to policy-making 
structures, both in terms of institutional design, and the culture and norms prevailing 
within bureaucracies and among policy-makers. Multiple “changes” which are all 
brought about by wider international social and cultural developments across time and 
space. As Chris Alden and Amnon Aran point out:  
“Understanding and integrating “change” into analyses of foreign policy 
requires accounting for its impact in relation to individual decision makers, 
institutions and structures of decision making as well as the wider socio-
political and external context within which such change occurs” (2012, 
pp.11-12).  
 
Unfortunately, in its current state, the extent to which the subfield of FPA has the 
theoretical tools to adequately address the empirical puzzles and complex causal 
relationships outlined above is somewhat limited. With its primary concern for unpacking 
the deepest intricacies of the decision-making process, the exploration of how shifts and 
developments to the “international” context across time and space leads to changes in 
policies along with those very same decision-making processes – by bringing in new 
actors and forces, influencing policy-makers’ perceptions, changing the normative and 
institutional structures within which policy-making takes place – is somewhat under-
theorized territory for FPA. 
 
As it stands today FPA theories seem to lack the tools to appropriately 
conceptualize and effectively integrate in their frameworks that “wider socio-political and 
external context” within which foreign policy change occurs. I argue that this under-
appreciation of change is, in large part, the result of an impoverished theoretical status the 
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subfield of FPA has relegated itself to. Over the decades, FPA scholars’ overwhelming 
focus on agency and the domestic sphere has led them to shun greater engagement with 
broader IR theoretical debates and IR theories, often seen as too structural and antithetical 
to the FPA project itself.  
 
This has stifled theoretical innovation in the subfield. Especially as IR scholars 
have increasingly recognized their theoretical structural biases and have sought to bring 
agency and the understanding of change more squarely within their scholarship. I suggest 
that a promising avenue for integrating the international in explanations of foreign policy 
change is to foster a closer dialogue between FPA and Historical Sociology (HS). As 
Andrew Linklater has framed it: “the plain desire to understand social and political 
change is often the primary motivation for pursuing historical-sociological inquiry” (2009, 
p.137). Paraphrasing Linklater, one can argue that the desire to understand foreign policy 
change, and its relationship to international transformations, is a primary motivation for 
pursuing a HS FPA enquiry.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. I first begin by investigating why, despite the 
numerous calls to integrate a better understanding of the international in explaining 
changes to foreign policies and policy-making structures, such a research agenda has 
been slow to develop in the subfield of FPA. I then argue for a greater dialogue between 
FPA scholarship and IR theory in general, and HS in particular, in order to build a more 
theoretically robust research program on change. The second half of the chapter is 
dedicated to teasing out the advantages of a historical sociology-informed approach to 
FPA in providing: i) a ‘pluralist’ and ‘historicist’ concept of the international; and ii) a 
‘mutually constitutive’ understanding of foreign policy and international politics. In these 
sections the theoretical discussion will regularly relay back to the empirical objective of 
the thesis by unpacking how a HS FPA contributes to explaining American foreign policy 
desecularization in light of global processes of religious resurgence.  
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Understanding and Explaining Change in FPA: An Incomplete Research Agenda 
 
 
Understanding and explaining change has often been a bone of contention within 
the broader field of IR as well as the subfield of FPA. For most of IR’s history, especially 
during the Cold War, IR scholars were concerned – if not obsessed – with issues of order, 
stability and teasing out the fundamental long-term regularities of the international 
system. The surprising collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of globalization, 
however, prompted important debates during the 1990s and thereafter on the ability – or 
rather inability – of IR theories to understand, let alone predict, change (Gaddis 1992).  
 
These real world events spurred important theoretical developments. They 
brought about the emergence, revival and introduction of theoretical paradigms beyond 
the neo-realist / neo-liberal dichotomy, that sought to robustly integrate, explain and 
accommodate change in their midst: such as Constructivism (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998), the English School (Buzan 2001), and Historical Sociology (Hobson and Hobden 
2002).29 Indeed over the past decades constructivists, historical sociologists, and English 
School theorists have all developed a robust research program exploring the material and 
normative evolution and development of international societies, state structures and 
international organizations across geographical areas and historical periods.  
 
The monumental international events of the 1990s prompted a similar self-
reflective exercise within FPA. FPA scholars increasingly recognized their field’s scarce 
interest in the wider and international context within which states acted as well as their 
own theoretical frameworks’ limited ability to integrated these developments when 
investigating, explaining, and analyzing foreign policy change (Carlsnaes 1993; Hermann 
1990; Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson 1994). For instance Joe Hagan and Jerel Rosati 
concluded back in 1994 that it is the complex “political interplay between the 
government, society, and global environment that generates and affects foreign policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 With much foresight, but little mainstream following, scholars such as Robert Cox (1981), and Barry 
Buzan and Barry Jones (1981) called for a deeper engagement with issues of change in IR well before the 
end of the Cold War. 
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continuity and change” (1994, p.322). Walter Carlsnaes has long sought to bring the 
wider structural and social context back in FPA by building an explanatory theory of 
foreign policy change that dynamically links structures and agents. “Foreign policy 
analysis” – noted Carslnaes in the early 1990s –“is unable to address a crucial aspect of 
empirical reality itself: that the policies of states are a consequence of, and can hence 
only be fully explained with reference to, a dynamic process in which both agents and 
structures causally condition each other over time” (1992, p.256).  
 
Calls for a more dynamic integration of the ‘international’ in building 
explanations of change in FPA have persisted since (Webber and Smith 2002). For 
Christopher Hill, ongoing historical and international transformations – such as the end of 
the Cold War, power shifts, loosening ideological straightjackets, the rise of globalization, 
the spread of human rights norms – have a “significant impact on the nature of 
contemporary foreign policy, on its relationship with domestic society and the means by 
which it is conducted” (2003a, p.16). Hill argues that these are all substantive qualitative 
changes to international politics, which foreign policies have to, and FPA scholars should, 
take into account.  
 
Despite these appeals, there is not much in the way of a consistent, theoretically 
conscious, and clearly identifiable research agenda exploring the complex dynamics 
between the international and the domestic that may lead states to gradually or suddenly 
substantively shift their foreign policy practices and adjust their institutional frameworks. 
A cursory glance at the (rather thin) literature on foreign policy change reveals that FPA 
scholars regularly downplay or ignore links to the wider international and historical 
context. The key variables which explain change then are the choices of entrepreneurial 
leaders and decision-makers (Barnett 1999; Daalder and Lindsay 2005; Stein 1994; 
Welch 2005), domestic cultural (Barnett 1999) and regime (Gorjão 2002; Mansfield and 
Snyder 2005) changes, or the endogenous development of new domestic forces, interest 
groups and ideas (Khong 2008). No doubt there are some important exceptions, which 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section, but by and large they have been few 
and far between. 
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Overall then, historical and international events have prompted a theoretical and 
empirical interest in issues of foreign policy change. However, to this day, much FPA 
research has tended to disregarded calls for a more integrated cross-level approach to 
explaining change.30 As Alden and Aran note, within FPA scholarship there is a general 
lack of appreciation of the wider “sources and conditions giving rise to significant 
alteration to state foreign policy” (2012, p.11; for a similar critique see also Mabee 2007). 
Few look beyond the nation-state’s borders for clues. When, and if, FPA scholars 
examine change, this tends to be portrayed as an endogenous process to the state 
generally sealed off from, or only very marginally influenced by, larger international 
events or historical forces at work. Leaders, bureaucracies and interest groups appear to 
exist in a vacuum, with the broader political, economic or ideological environment 
having little or no influence on policy-making structures and process, and foreign policy 
outcomes.  
 
 
Why the Under-theorization of Change in FPA 
 
 
Why this under-theorization of change in FPA? And especially, why is there little 
sustained theoretical and empirical attention towards exploring how the wider 
international and historical context relating to changes in state practices and policy-
making institutions and processes? Taking a step back, these shortcomings appear to be 
rooted in the theoretical development and history of the subfield itself. Overall FPA, as a 
theoretical project, has been painstakingly built over the decades on an often one-sided 
focus on the domestic sphere of the state to the detriment of exploring the broader 
environment within which human and state states agents exist and act. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Indicative of this lack of interest, for instance, is the fate that Carslnaes’ 1992 article has had over the 
past two decades within the respective IR and FPA scholarships. The article, which partly seeks to push 
FPA scholars to think outside the (state) box, has nevertheless become widely cited and referenced in the 
context of the structure-agency debates in IR theory. It has instead received comparably little sustained 
theoretical and empirical attention from FPA scholars themselves.  
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Indeed, the central and critical premise on which much of the FPA edifice is 
erected, is that the system-level international structures – whether material (Nye 1988; 
Waltz 1979) or social (Bull 1977; Wendt 1999) – which mainstream IR theorists spend 
significant time conceptualizing, have very limited causal power when it comes to 
explaining actual states’ behavior.31 FPA scholars adamantly argue that international 
structures do not determine nor explain states’ international behavior, and that only 
agent-oriented and actor-specific theories can satisfactorily account for the great variety 
of states’ foreign policies (Hill 2003b; Hudson 2005). 
 
The key insight of much FPA scholarship is then to open the “black box” of the 
state, and to focus on the domestic sphere and the policy-making process as the central 
starting point for analyzing how states act internationally. States’ foreign policies are then 
explained by unpacking the rational choices (McGinnis 1994) or cognitive biases (Jervis 
1976) of individual policy-makers, as well as the role played by state bureaucracies and 
institutions (Allison and Zelikow 1999), domestic pressure groups (Skidmore and 
Hudson 1993), or the public at large (Holsti 1992). Domestic political and constitutional 
structures (Risse-Kappen 1991) or domestic culture and identity (Duffield 1999) are also 
called upon to explain states’ international behavior and actions. All of these variables are 
generally treated as independent forces, often taken in isolation and with little attention to 
anchoring them within the broader international system and environment in which human 
and state agents exist and act.  
 
FPA scholars’ critique of the overly structural nature of mainstream IR theory, 
and their call to bring human and state agency into the equation, is an important and 
sound one. A focus on human agency and initiative, as opposed to rigid a-historical 
international structures neo-realists theorize, for example, is clearly necessary if one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Some structural IR theorists have openly acknowledged that their theories are not geared nor intended to 
explain every particular instance of a state’s international behavior. As Kennet Waltz (1996) himself has 
explained, his intellectual efforts have been geared towards developing a theory of international politics, 
which focuses on the international pressures that lead differing states to adopt similar international 
behaviors, and not a theory of foreign policy, which focuses on how domestic politics explain why states 
similarly placed in a system behave in different ways.  
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wishes to explain and account for change and variability in international politics and, of 
course, foreign policy. Unfortunately though, this meticulous empirical and theoretical 
insistence on the domestic-level, the individual decision-maker and the micro-processes 
of decision-making, has become somewhat of a stifling straightjacket for FPA 
scholarship.  
 
In the long run, FPA scholars’ self-imposed confinement to the domestic has 
unproductively isolated the subfield from engaging with a number of important 
developments within IR theory. Some, like David Patrick Houghton, have acknowledged 
that their subfield has become “a kind of free-floating enterprise, logically unconnected 
to the main theories of international relations” (2007, p.24). This has undermined 
theoretical innovation. Hence if FPA is to be revitalized and reinvigorated, Houghton 
argues, it desperately needs to “hitch its wagon to some of the critical substantive debates 
going on in IR theory today” (2007, p.24). 
 
This theoretical impoverished condition, I would argue, affects also FPA scholars’ 
ability to explore the dynamic relationship between shifts in the international context and 
foreign policy change. Repeated calls for multi-level explanations of foreign policy 
change therefore ring hollow also because the field of FPA has a limited range of 
theoretical and meta-theoretical tools to, first, effectively conceptualize the 
“international”. And, secondly, to explore to what extent and in which ways historical 
context and international developments link up with domestic factors to cause foreign 
policy change. In other words, there needs to be a more sustained theoretical effort from 
FPA scholars in understanding what constitutes the wider international context within 
which states and human agents exist and act, and why, how, and when this environment 
gives rise to significant alteration to state foreign policy.  
 
There are, of course, some important exceptions. For instance, an interesting 
research agenda has emerged linking FPA to globalization theory – a theoretical 
framework which has largely developed outside of the customary confines of IR (see: 
Held and McGrew 2000, 2007). Scholars have explored the nexus between a variety of 
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globalizing phenomena and processes – the rise of transnational capitalism and 
Multinational Corporations, the growth of non-state actors above and below the state, the 
shrinkage of space and time brought about by new information technologies, and so on – 
and states foreign policies. Some investigate how globalization is changing the nature of 
states’ foreign and national security policies (Rosenau 1997; Singh and Shetler-Jones 
2011; Webber and Smith 2002). Others explain how states’ foreign policies and 
globalizing processes are deeply intertwined and “mutually constitutive” with (Western) 
states’ security policies enabling and constraining processes of economic globalization, 
and vice versa (Alden and Aran 2012, pp.78-91). These are important developments. Yet 
they have only begun to scratch the surface of how FPA can benefit from a more active 
and self-conscious engagement with theoretical frameworks that concentrate on 
unpacking the changing features and contours of “the international” within which state 
and human actors operate.   
 
 
Bringing More IR Theory into FPA 
 
 
While FPA scholars have over the decades generally eschewed a direct engagement with 
IR theories and paradigms, IR theorists have gradually paid attention to their critics and 
progressively acknowledged their overly-structural biases. IR scholars, across theoretical 
paradigms, have moved beyond the structural determinism of much Cold War era IR. 
They have sought to reconcile and bring human and state agency back in their theorizing, 
especially in order to explain change and variance in international politics. Many have 
looked at FPA to capture agency and change. Yet they have done so by steering clear 
from embracing full-heartedly the actor-centered reductionism of many FPA approaches. 
As a result some of the most interesting theoretical developments within FPA, 
particularly when it comes to exploring the relationship between international 
developments and specific foreign policy changes, is coming from scholars working 
within IR theoretical paradigms. And conversely from FPA scholars willing to 
substantively engage with IR theory.  
	   58 
 
For example, within the broad tent of Realism, a new generation of Neoclassical 
Realists is coming to the fore (Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009; Rose 1998). 
Neoclassical Realists attempt to bring together the structural insights of Neo-realists on 
the anarchical features of the international system, with the human dimension of 
decision-making emphasized by Classical Realists (and much FPA). They do so to 
explain, in a theoretically rich way, variations in states’ grand strategies and foreign 
policies by focusing on the interaction between system-level independent material 
variables (anarchy and polarity), with domestic intervening variables. These intervening 
variables can either be the role of elites, institutions, pressure groups, and party politics, 
or ideational factors such as culture, identity, and ideas, or even a mix of both. As system 
level variables stay constant or change, so a number of options open up or close down for 
domestic-policy makers to pursue their differing foreign policy preferences.  
 
Constructivism has also been a fertile environment, since its development in the 
early 1990s, for scholars seeking to build multi-level explanations of foreign policy 
change across time and space. A classic example is Thomas Risse-Kappen’s (1994) 
groundbreaking study on the impact that internationally shared ideas, transnational actors, 
domestic agency and politics, had on Michael Gorbachev’s “new thinking”, which lead to 
policy changes that partly precipitated the end of the Cold War (see also: Checkel 1993). 
Similarly Kathryn Sikkink (1993) has explored how international human rights norms 
entered domestic debates in Western countries, progressively shaping and becoming an 
integral and legitimate part of European and American foreign policy in the aftermath of 
World War II. While this was a promising start, constructivists largely moved on from 
investigating foreign policy puzzles and are increasingly focusing on issues of global 
governance and international institutions (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Risse 2004).  
 
IR theory’s engagement with FPA is a welcomed move. It is a particularly 
promising one when it comes to exploring the broader conditions that give rise to foreign 
policy change. This is prompting FPA scholars to bring in the “international” and IR 
theory more self-consciously within its mist. As a result a more concerted effort is taking 
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place in recent years to reconcile and integrate the study of FPA with Constructivism in a 
more systematic and conceptually rigorous way (Checkel 2008; Houghton 2007). 
Although these developments are less concerned to theorize the waysin which 
developments in the international normative context constrain or enable new foreign 
policy options and outcomes, other constructivist-oriented FPA scholars are increasingly 
travelling that road (Hook 2008; Singh 2011).   
 
Outside of recognizable IR theoretical schools, FPA scholars Stephen Walker, 
Akan Malici and Mark Schafer (2011) have proposed a “neobehavioral IR”. This 
theoretical framework is built around a “social-psychological” approach that integrates 
theories of FPA and IR by linking leaders’ internal world of beliefs and the external 
world of events in which states operate. Quite emblematically, leading FPA theorists like 
Valerie Hudson and Amelia Hadfield are starting, as of 2012, to give more thought to the 
issue of bridging the “IR structure/FPA-agent theoretical divide”.32  
 
“Hitching” FPA to HS – a theoretical framework which has experienced an 
exponential growth in IR in recent decades – is an underexplored and highly promising 
theoretical avenue when it comes to integrating international and historical 
transformations with foreign policy changes, and vice versa. More concretely, what are 
the implications of applying a HS theoretical framework to FPA? Also, what does a HS 
approach add that Neoclassical Realists or FPA-Constructivists do not already bring to 
the debate? I argue that bringing FPA into a dialogue with HS moves forward the study 
of foreign policy change in two ways.  
 
First, a HS approach to FPA would produce a more explicit, complex and eventful 
conceptualization of the international environment, something that FPA theories often 
lack. Indeed, how can we integrate “the international” if we only have a faint idea of what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 At ISA 2012 San Diego, Valerie Hudson and Amelia Hadfield were supposed to present a paper which 
on the conference programme had the suggestive title: “Neo-Classical Realism and Behavioral IR as 
Recent Attempts to Bridge the IR Structure/FPA-Agent Theoretical Divide: Walking Towards, or Past, the 
Other.” During the actual panel, however, Hudson and Hadfield presented instead a paper comparing 
European American perspectives on FPA rather than the one listed on the ISA program. 
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it looks like? A HS FPA does so by advancing an analytical and ontological “pluralist” as 
well as “historicist” understating of the international that, in many respects, complements 
and adds to those offered by Neoclassical Realists and Constructivists.  
 
FPA theories, very much influenced by their subject matter – explaining state 
behavior – and an implicit theoretical association – at least in the United States – with 
classical Realism (Barkin 2009), mostly see the international as an unchanging anarchical 
system dominated by the state. The international is inter-state relations. Yet this rather 
material and a-historical picture of the international space as rooted in an a-social, bleak 
and unchanging struggle for survival between states, has come relentlessly under scrutiny 
over the past decades by scholars. Both among IR theorists, such as historical sociologists, 
English School theorists and Constructivists, as well as FPA scholars themselves, 
particularly those engaging with globalization theory and others such as Christopher Hill 
(2003a, pp.160-62) who has engaged  with the English School.  
 
Indeed, along with states there are a number of international and transnational 
actors – such as corporations, NGOs, transnational terrorist and criminal organizations, 
international and regional institutions, and not least religious movements and 
organizations – which exist. Likewise there are numerous material and ideational forces – 
such as economic globalization, the spread of norms and political ideologies, climate 
change, and not least the expansion of religions and the global process of resurgence – 
which work their way through the international system. Both non-state actors and forces 
seem also to be an ever more prominent feature of the international environment and 
cannot be simply reduced to the state or the domestic sphere. Yet they do have a bearing 
on, and are themselves influenced by, states’ foreign policies across time and space.  
 
On the one hand, much of this diversity and complexity falls through the cracks in 
Neoclassical Realism and FPA-inspired Neobehavioral IR, both of which subscribe to a 
rather materialist, state-centric and a-historicist view of the international. On the other 
hand, Constructivists have advanced a more dynamic and historical sensitive view of the 
international (Reus-Smit 1999), along with a less state-centric one (Keck and Sikkink 
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1998). However, constructivists’ interpretivist penchant for norms and ideas tends to 
somewhat reorient FPA away from a more pluralist ontology that seems to suit the study 
of foreign policy making and implementation best. Moreover Constructivism is more of 
an “analytical framework” (Reus-Smit 2009, p.226) rather than a coherent theory of IR. 
As such it ends up not developing a fully-fledged concept and picture of the international 
that FPA scholars can clearly and distinctively rely upon.  
 
Finally, it is worth stressing that pushing for a more explicit concept of the 
“international” within FPA is not the same as suggesting the need to reconcile foreign 
policy explanations across level-of-analysis. In fact, this mode of thinking largely 
remains anchored to a state-centric view of the whole – with a clear separation between 
international, regional, state, and sub-state levels (Jervis 1976, Ch. 1; Singer 1961). Once 
more, there would be little space for bringing in the non-state and transnational elements 
of international relations. Likewise what I am arguing here is not simply to reconcile 
structures and agents, as important as this project may be. Indeed social structures of all 
kinds (material and ideational) can be found at all levels-of-analysis (Wight 2006, p.112). 
Hence just by referring to the structure-agency problem (Carlsnaes 1992), still does not 
solve the issue of what structures should we be paying attention to and how does the 
international environment, within which human and state agents interact, look like. 
 
A HS perspective instead provides FPA with a complex and eventful (contra 
Neoclassical Realism), yet also more realistic and explicit picture (contra Constructivism), 
of the constituent parts of the international environment. HS’ analytical pluralism is able 
to capture the diversity of state and non-state actors (contra Neoclassical Realism), which 
constitute the international. Its ontological pluralism gives substantially equal weight to 
material (contra Constructivism) and ideational (contra Neoclassical Realism) forces. Its 
historicism allows for this plurality of actors and forces to change and evolve, and their 
influence and power over sates’ foreign policies to wax and wane across historical 
periods and geographical areas. The following section of this chapter will look at these 
issues in more detail.  
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There is a second advantage of “hitching” FPA to HS. That is the ability of 
producing theoretically robust complex causal stories of foreign policy change that 
dynamically integrate, in a two way street, international structures and events with 
domestic pressures on policy-making processes and policy outcomes. A HS approach to 
foreign policy develops a framework geared towards appreciating the “mutually 
constitutive”33 nature of international politics and foreign policy. A HS FPA does not 
treat “the international” as a side issue, as epiphenomenal, but rather as complementary to 
any account of foreign policy. Two key insights from HS are instrumental in building a 
“mutually constitutive” understanding of international politics and foreign policy.  
 
First, as Brian Mabee (2007) suggests, a HS FPA would emphasize the centrality 
of dynamically linking in a two way street human agency and behavior at the domestic 
micro-level (which FPA scholars tend to look at in isolation) with macro-changes 
occurring across time and space at the international and world social levels. This 
theoretical move opens the door to conceptualizing processes of foreign policy change in 
terms of both historical and structural possibilities and human choice. 
 
Second, as Halliday (2005, p.46), and Alden and Aran (2012, pp.63-6) point out, a 
HS approach would bring to the subfield of FPA a more explicit theory of the state, 
something that oddly tends to lack, and is sorely needed, in much FPA literature. In 
particular, HS’ concept of the “institutional state” leads to the following two conclusions. 
First, state foreign policies cannot be fully explained without taking into consideration 
domestic state-society relations, the institutional underpinnings of the state, and the 
pressures exercised by the international forces and structures within which the state exists. 
Second, by examining how state institutions and bureaucracies with foreign policy 
functions develop and adapt, provides a tangible meso-level site in which to explore the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The expression of a “mutually constitutive” relationship between foreign policy and international politics 
is borrowed from Alden and Aran (2012, pp.85-9). These scholars use the expression mainly in light of 
research that situates itself at the intersection of FPA-Globalization Theory debates. It seems to me that, 
seen through a HS perspective, this notion of mutual constitution applies well beyond issues of 
globalization. 
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interplay of social action at the micro-level and international historical change at the 
macro-level.  
 
The following two sections will unpack in more detail the theoretical and 
empirical value added of a HS approach to foreign policy change building on these two 
insights: a clearer conception of the international and a mutually constitutive 
understanding of foreign policy and international politics. The vital import of developing 
a HS FPA for reconciling IR debates on religious resurgence and those taking place in 
FPA on the impact of religion on American foreign policy will be teased out at the end of 
each section. Here I will also identify how integrating HS into FPA substantially 
contributes to understanding and explaining in a conceptually robust way why and how 
American foreign policy is changing and adapting to processes of global religious 
resurgence.  
 
 
HS and FPA I: Towards a Pluralist and Historicist Conceptualization of the 
International in FPA 
 
 
HS offers an analytically and ontologically “pluralist” concept of the international, one 
that is not fixed in time but rather is historical and eventful. It takes change and historical 
development, in other words “historicity”, not as background noise or simply as a locus 
to mine empirical data from, but as part of the explanatory story. I will take these issues – 
analytical and ontological pluralism, and historicity – in order and expand on them.  
 
Analytical and Ontological Pluralism 
 
By analytical pluralism, I mean to capture historical sociologists’ understanding of the 
international environment as constituted by both states, on the one hand, and social forces 
and non-state actors, on the other. HS is an approach that conceptualizes the international 
in terms of “states” and “society/ies”. The international is a space where states are not 
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treated as timeless entities or ontological givens, as Realists of all strides and much 
mainstream FPA scholarship tend to do. International relations are not simply inter-state 
relations. For historical sociologists non-state actors and social forces exist and have a 
dynamic of their own beyond, and which may impact and are itself impacted by, the state.  
 
Yet, historical sociologists are also careful not to reify “the social”. States are not 
simply an expression or derivative of some underlying non-state social forces and 
structures as world-systems (Wallerstein 2004), neo-Gramscian (Cox 1987) and globalist 
(Cerny 1995; Scholte 1999) social and IR theorists tend to suggest. States are seen as 
historical developments and relatively autonomous units. These stand in complex 
relationship between each other, but also with a range of economic, military, and cultural 
structures and forces at the domestic, international and global/transnational levels 
(Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg 2010, pp.2-4).  
 
Anthony Jarvis, in somewhat materialist-realist terms, captures neatly the 
multilayered nature of the international from a historical sociological perspective with the 
expression “societies, states and geopolitics” (1989, p.281). John Hobson frames it as 
“societies, states and international systems (both political and economic)” (1998, p.288). 
The international hence is a place where “states stand in complex relationships to a range 
of forces and all these relationships – to the system of states, to the world and domestic 
economies, and to their own and other societies – must be considered” (Jarvis 1989, 
p.285). None of the levels (the international, the domestic or the global/transnational), 
structures (inter-state system or social forces), agents (states or non-state actors), or 
relationships (inter-state, inter-society or between states and society), is in principle the 
defining one. The level, the structures, the agents and the kind of relationships one wishes 
to start from to explain world politics is considered an analytical choice not an 
ontological one. 
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The English School, a theoretical paradigm that shares much with HS,34 offers a 
similar and somewhat more elegant concept of the international as a multilayered space. 
The English School is well known for its sophisticated theorization of inter-state relations 
as constituting an “international society”. Yet scholars from this tradition have long 
acknowledged that the international society of states exists alongside, and overlaps with, 
a broader web of social relations: a “world society” which includes NGOs, international 
organizations and other global social actors and relations (Bull 1977, pp.266-271). 
According to Barry Buzan the concept of world society is a way to “capture the non-state 
side of the international system, and therefore as the complement/opponent to the already 
well-developed idea of international society” (2004, p.2). For Buzan international society, 
which captures the distinctiveness of the state in modern times or more generally of any 
sort of “independent political community” throughout history, and world society, which 
captures the complexity of non-state transnational and human relations, exist 
simultaneously as objects of discussion and as aspects of international reality (2004, p.87-
89). Neither supersedes the other. 
 
Historical sociologists are ontologically pluralist in the sense that they view the 
international largely as constituted by both material and ideational structures and forces.35 
Ontological pluralism allows for economic, military, and cultural logics all to operate in 
the international system at the inter-state and world-social levels impacting on, and 
influenced by, states’ foreign policies. This pluralist ontology, particularly when it comes 
to unpacking the forces within world society, which include the role of ideas and culture 
alongside material factors, fits with recent attempts by FPA scholars to chart an equally 
ontologically pluralist field between rationalists and cognitivists, materialists and 
interpretivists (Hill 2003a, p.30; Mintz 2003; Stein 2008).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See for example: Buzan and Little (2002); Buzan and Lawson (fortcoming). 
35 For a comprehensive overview of HS’ ontological pluralism see: Hobson and Hobden (2002, especially 
Part II); Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg (2010, p.18); Lawson (2007, p.355). 
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Historicism and Eventfulness 
 
HS has a diachronic rather than synchronic understanding of the international (Lawson 
2006, p.415). Mainstream IR sees history very much as a “scripture” (Hobson, Lawson, 
and Rosenberg 2010, p.8), where historical changes and historical discontinuities are 
ironed out by creating isomorphic transhistorical categories, such as: the undifferentiated 
state (across units and time), the logic of anarchy or balance of power. History is assumed 
to have a timeless quality with the past regularly “ransacked in order to explain the 
present” (Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg 2010, p.11).36  
 
This “continuist mystique”, which seems to grip much of mainstream IR, is 
considerably present in FPA. While FPA scholars are well versed in history, using and 
referring to it abundantly, they seem to take discontinuity, temporality and historicity less 
seriously however. Recognizing the potential contribution that HS’s attention to 
temporality carries for the way FPA understands change, Alden and Aran argue: 
“International societies do change. Norms are contingent and reinterpreted 
by state and non-state actors over time. Foreign policy decision-making is 
a process that evolves and responds to changing conditions within the 
halls of policy and the wider society. FPA should recognize as formative 
these conditions of change affecting the mutually constitutive relationship 
between foreign policy and international politics [emphasis in original].” 
(2012, p.115) 
 
Along with bringing an understanding of the long term processes and trends 
shaping and structuring the international society and world society, within which foreign 
policies are formulated and executed, bringing historicity in would also lead to a more 
“eventful” understanding of world politics. This opens up the door to exploring and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Hence Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg argue: the contest between Athens and Sparta is transplanted to 
the Cold War in order to elucidate the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union; all wars, 
whether they be guerrilla insurgencies or total conflicts, are explicable by the basic fact – or permissive 
context – of anarchy; and all political units – city-states, nomadic tribes, empires, nation-states and 
transnational alliances – are functionally undifferentiated (2010, p.11).  
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explaining how and when “historical events enable social formations to emerge, 
reproduce, reform, transform and break down [emphasis in original]” (Hobson, Lawson, 
and Rosenberg 2010, p.25). I argue that we can look at states foreign policy practices, 
and the policy-making institutional and normative structures that sustain them, as “social 
formations” that change and evolve at critical moments in time. Here history not only 
“matters”, but time and sequencing of events directly shape policy processes and 
outcomes. 
 
Hence a better appreciation for this temporal dimension of international politics 
moves FPA away from seeing history simply as a place where timeless lessons are drawn 
or theories are tested. A HS FPA brings into the study of foreign policy change an 
understanding of the international marked by processes of change and continuity. Here 
the contingent and disruptive impact of events, and the particularities and discontinuities 
within the flows, patterns and trends of world history have a profound causal effect on a 
state’s international behavior and policy-making structures.37  
 
From Theory to Empirics  
 
A pluralist and historicist concept of the international – which reconciles state and society 
levels of analysis, materialist and ideational ontologies, and takes temporality and change 
seriously – has a number of important implications for the study of change in foreign 
policy as well as for my research. First of all, it is worth pointing out that a conventional 
state-centric and non-diachronic understanding, albeit one that holds a pluralist ontology, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 I would like to emphasize that the analytically and ontologically pluralist concept of the international 
proposed here is not entirely new within FPA. Christopher Hill is among the few who explicitly theorizes 
and conceptualizes foreign policy-making and implementation as taking place both at a state-to-state level, 
but also at a world society to state, and state to world society level. Drawing from the English School, Hill 
conceives of the international arena as that “milieu in which every state is located and which is in part made 
up of states, but also of economic, political and cultural forces which transcend frontiers” (Hill 2003a, 
p.159). For Hill, “The world of governments and the world of peoples have always co-existed, overlapped 
and interfered with each other” (2003a, p.187). Here the international is seen as “never wholly dominated 
by states” but also “significantly transnational” in character (2003a, p.208). While Hill develops a more 
complete concept of the international system than most FPA scholars do, the research implications of 
theorizing foreign policy in the anarchical society are mostly alluded to, but not fully fleshed out by him or 
other scholars. Also Hill is less concerned with theorizing change across time, hence does not bring in ideas 
of temporality and historicity, which instead a HS framework emphasizes.  
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of foreign policy is not necessarily antithetical to capturing and explaining the role of 
religious ideas and institutions in foreign policy. Recently developed frameworks for the 
analysis of religion in foreign policy, for instance, fall squarely within FPA’s theoretical 
mainstream (Haynes 2008; Warner and Walker 2011). These frameworks make a clear 
distinction between the domestic state and international spheres and rarely attempt to 
reconcile the two.  
 
Likewise most scholars interested in exploring the role and impact of religion on 
American foreign policy have not pushed the FPA theoretical envelope that far either. 
Scholars have dug, very much in line with standard FPA frameworks, into the domestic 
sphere of the U.S. to explain how the religious convictions of presidents and policy-
makers have recently (Bacevich and Prodromou 2004) or historically (Inboden 2008) fed 
into American grand strategy. They have explored the impact on particular foreign 
policies, for instance, of: religious advocates and interest groups (Rock 2011), the 
demographic growth of Evangelicals (Mead 2006), and the increased political clout of the 
Christian Right (Croft 2007; Marsden 2008). Others have explored how religious 
convictions inform public attitudes towards American foreign policy (Guth 2009).  
 
Theories of religion and foreign policy, and empirical investigations into the 
American case, overall do a good job in illuminating the different ways in which 
domestic religious actors, ideas and identities may and do influence foreign policy-
making process and outputs. They nevertheless suffer a number of important limits when 
it comes to the puzzles this research seeks to unravel. They do not advance a framework 
that effectively links international and domestic pressures across time and space to 
changes in foreign policy practices and institutional designs.  
 
First, they generally take a snapshot in time and space of the individual or 
domestic religious influences that have led to this or that policy decision and foreign 
policy output. There is an interest in investigating different historical periods, yet there is 
much less attention paid towards unpacking how in different historical moments the 
impact of religion on foreign policy took different forms and intensities, for example. 
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Secondly, current theories and empirical investigations do not analytically take into 
consideration religious forces and dynamics that have an impact on foreign policy beyond 
the domestic sphere. For example, in the case of American foreign policy there is little 
attention, from a religious-theoretical lens, in investigating how and what effects the 
international rise of non-state actors such as political Islamic movements or the growing 
transnational ties American religious actors are developing with co-religionists across 
state boundaries, are having on American foreign policy.38  
 
Hence much of what has been done so far would not allow me to appropriately 
contextualize, theorize, and flesh out the apparent growing domestic, transnational and 
international salience of religious forces in American foreign policy that appears to be 
occurring within a context of global religious resurgence. A HS approach to foreign 
policy instead provides a more explicit and complex concept of the international which 
includes the international society of states and the world society of peoples, while also 
retaining that very same pluralist ontology on which FPA has always thrived upon. Such 
an explicit, multilayered and ontologically pluralist concept of the international allows 
me then to locate the global resurgence of religion, as a social and cultural process, not 
only domestically or externally, but more broadly at the world social level. And then 
explore simultaneously its domestic, transnational and external impact across time on 
American foreign policy. 
 
A HS FPA leads one to view states and their foreign policies as taking place on 
and influenced by two overlapping and deeply entangled international levels: the world of 
states but also the world of peoples. This framework would not privilege necessarily 
social forces over the state, or vice versa. In terms of this research, even if analytically 
one is to locate the explanan of foreign policy changes (such as desecularization) at the 
world social level (as is the case with the resurgence of religion), this is not equivalent to 
endorsing the notion that states increasingly count less and non-state actors and forces 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 In the case of transnational influences, an interesting exception is Timothy Byrne’s (2011) recent work 
which explicitly seeks to tease out how American Catholic actors and orders holding a transnational 
religious identity that overlaps with their national one, have sought to influence American foreign policy to 
favour their co-religionists abroad. 
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more in IR. A HS theory of foreign policy would then caution us from reflexively 
accepting, without attentive empirical investigation, the idea that the resurgence of 
religion at the world social level may be making states less relevant, leading to a post-
Westphalian international order.39 At the same time, this analytical pluralism would open 
up the possibility of investigating not only how world social processes affect states, but 
also how the latter affect the former. An interesting question then opens up: how and to 
what extent, given the preeminent role that America has in the international system, do 
processes of American foreign policy desecularization interact, sustain and reinforce 
worldwide processes of religious resurgence? 
 
Lastly, attention to historicity and temporality means taking the resurgence of 
religion and historical events that are somewhat connected to this trend, such as the end 
of the Cold War, the election of President G.W. Bush, the events of 9/11, not simply as 
background noise. These domestic, transnational and international trends and events 
become instead an integral element and critical junctures in understanding and explaining 
foreign policy change, in general, and the new ways in which religion and American 
foreign policy are mixing over the past decades, in particular. 
 
 
HS and FPA II: Towards a Mutually Constitutive Understanding of Foreign Policy 
and International Politics 
 
 
The second contribution of “hitching” FPA to HS is to produce a theoretically richer 
account of foreign policy change that dynamically integrates the broader international 
and historical context with the domestic policy-making process and vice versa. A HS 
approach to foreign policy develops a framework that does not treat “the international” as 
a side issue, as epiphenomenal. Instead it builds a foreign policy theory that is geared 
towards appreciating the mutually constitutive nature of international politics and foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Much of the current debate about religion’s growing political salience in international relations tends to 
suggest, more or less explicitly, the notion that such processes may be leading to a post-Westphalian order. 
See discussion in the introduction. 
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policy. In particular two HS insights are key in developing a mutually constitutive 
understanding of international politics and foreign policy. First, is historical sociologists’ 
insistence on linking macro-level social and historical processes and trends with social 
action and actors at the micro-level. Second, is their particular concept of the state that 
emphasizes the state’s institutional underpinnings, which stands both at the cross roads 
between the international and domestic spheres as well as acting as a meso-level ligature 
between macro-level processes and micro-level decisions.  
 
Linking Macro Processes and Micro Social Action 
 
So far I have used HS insights to conceptualize the contours of the international 
environment within which foreign policy is formulated and conducted. When it comes to 
the nitty-gritty of explaining foreign policy-making, however, HS may appear a rather 
inhospitable theoretical resource. In fact, HS research in IR generally focuses on macro-
social forces and long durée historical analysis of change and continuity, often leaving 
out agency and social action at the micro-level, which are the bread and butter of FPA. 
Witness, for instance, the theoretically rich and empirically substantive, but also rather 
sweeping and generalized, historical sociological-informed accounts of: the origins and 
varieties of international systems over time and space (Buzan and Little 2000; Spruyt 
1994; Watson 2009); the non-Western origins of the contemporary world system 
(Hobson 2004); the rise, spread and international structuring power of capitalist modes of 
production across different historical periods (Gills 2002); and explorations into the 
international dimensions and complexities of modernity and globalization (Rosenberg 
2005). These theoretical and empirical enquiries, often spanning centuries, surely do not 
appear to bode well with studding the minutiae of foreign policy decision-making and 
implementation. 
 
Although HS has tended to focus on large-scale macro structures and processes of 
change and continuity within IR, original proponents of HS have always maintained that 
a historical sociological perspective allows, and can be employed to, investigate the 
relationship between grand structures and everyday life (Skocpol 1984, Ch. 1; Smith 
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1991, p.3). Likewise, historical sociologists in IR have emphasized that HS studies of 
macro-scale and long-term structural, international and historical trends and shifts in 
world politics that do not explore human agency and social action at the micro-level that 
produce and reproduce those patterns of continuity and change in larger political systems, 
are partial at best or incomplete at worst (Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg 2010, p.3; 
Lawson 2006, pp.398-402). Indeed, some have paid attention to the co-constitutive 
relationship between the international realm and state–society relations in revolutionary 
processes of radical change (Halliday 1999; Lawson 2005).  
 
Similar insights can be applied to the co-constitutive relationship between the 
international realm and domestic state–society relations in processes of foreign policy 
change. In fact, when it comes to foreign policy, George Lawson has noted how much of 
the analysis offered by neoclassical realists bears a “family resemblance” to historical 
sociology (2006, p.408). Particularly in the way that, similarly to Neoclassical Realism, 
“historical sociology aims to unravel the complexity that lies behind the interaction 
between social action (both deliberate and unintentional) and structural forces (socially 
constructed but with an enduring authority and dynamic of their own)” (2006, p.408). In 
both theories “international factors are conjoined with domestic variables in order to find 
patterns that explain central social processes such as wars, alliances, and the rise and fall 
of great powers” (p.408). 
 
Brian Mabee (2007) has sought to recapture HS’ awareness of the micro-
dimension of social life in order to provide a useful complement to the current 
concentration in HS on macro-analysis. What is most interesting here is that Mabee has 
done so by adopting a foreign policy lens. He builds on the key sociological insight of C. 
Wright Mills that “no social study that does not come back to the problems of biography, 
of history, and of their intersections within a society, has completed its intellectual 
journey” (quote from: Mabee 2007, p.432). Mabee then argues that FPA’s focus on 
“biography” (i.e. human agency) is a perfect site to advance a micro-historical 
sociological approach to IR that concentrates on smaller scale processes and 
contingencies occurring within, and reproducing, large-scale social structures in a 
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historical context. This point gives further theoretical depth to the multiple calls by FPA 
scholars for a more thorough engagement with multi-level causal explanations.  
 
It is important to stress that the focus on the macro-level in current HS scholarship 
is not the product of previous ontological commitments, but rather an analytical choice 
on the part of scholars. That is, micro or macro analysis in HS is the product of particular 
research problems and questions, and not of a meta-theoretical commitment to either. In 
this sense the micro-domestic and macro-international levels that FPA and HS scholars 
respectively tend to investigate in isolation, should be seen as complementary rather than 
conflicting (Mabee 2007, pp.432-33; see also: Lawson 2006, pp.399-414).  
 
What does all this mean in terms of foreign policy? Macro social and historical 
changes within the international society of states and the world society of peoples are 
filtered through the domestic micro-level and relayed back into the foreign policy-making 
processes, by influencing the individual perceptions or collective ideas, the identities and 
interests of: decision- and policy-making elites in the executive; domestic actors such as 
interest lobbies, principled advocacy groups, political parties; or public opinion more 
broadly.40 International changes can be protracted lasting years, decades and centuries, or 
instantaneous events and exogenous shocks.  
 
In terms of trends, for instance, the recent evolution towards an international 
society where most major powers possess nuclear weapons, economies are increasingly 
interconnected, and norms of state sovereignty and self-determination are well 
entrenched, seems to have made the recourse to major war “obsolete” (Mandelbaum 
1998). This new international environment, compared say to just before the second World 
War, has likely repercussions on the intersubjective understandings as well as individual 
perceptions and incentives of domestic policy-makers when deciding how to resolve a 
major foreign policy crisis. Long term normative (such as the rise of human rights norms), 
economic (the growth of market economies), environmental (processes of climate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 These are processes and mechanisms that both neoclassical realists (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 
2009) and FPA-constructivists (Hook 2008; Singh 2011) have similarly investigated in line with their own 
ontological and epistemological commitments.  
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change) or technological (the development of the internet) trends and processes at the 
world social level, can likewise shift and influence the perceptions and calculations of 
foreign policy elites and the mass public at large.  
 
These global social ideational and material developments also generate new 
domestic and transnational actors and groups – such as human rights NGOs, business 
lobbies and labor unions, environmental NGOs and parties, netizens – with a 
commitment to or vested interest in influencing states foreign policies according to their 
normative or strategic preferences.  Sudden exogenous events can take place at the inter-
state level (such as the end of the Cold War), at the social level (the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008), or at the social and state levels (the attacks on the U.S. state by a 
transnational terrorist actor such as al Qaeda in 2001). These events create new, or 
reinforce and undermine existing, perceptions, ideas, calculations and interests of 
domestic policy-makers, specific political actors, and public opinion at large. In turn how 
states themselves act, given the inputs of policy-makers, can influence long-term 
historical processes or sudden shocks at the international and world society levels.  
 
From this perspective, conciliating HS and FPA is not only analytically possible, 
but also theoretically and empirically desirable.41 The view of a mutually constitutive 
relationship between foreign policy and international politics that a HS FPA promotes 
contributes to producing richer investigations into how the identities and actions of 
individuals and groups at the domestic micro-level sustain and transform, and are 
themselves sustained and transformed by, macro-level international, social and historical 
processes of continuity and change. Such an approach leads to constantly exploring the 
interaction and linkages between the micro-oriented analysis that centers on the interests, 
beliefs, identities, behaviors and roles of actors, with the broader international and 
historical context that constrains and enables certain kinds of actions (for a similar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For example Hobson, Lawson and Rosemberg argue that: “it is possible to combine domestic level 
processes with the “international” in such a way that we can generate a “rich parsimony” – one that is able 
to provide a succinct definition of the international, albeit one that develops and changes over time, while 
also situating the domestic realm within its core area of concern. In this way we hope to affect a balance 
between parsimony and complexity while also combining theoretical strength and empirical richness”. 
(2010, p.28). 
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perspective see: Halliday 2005, p.40; Mabee 2007, p.433) 
 
The Institutional Concept of the State  
 
The second important contribution of a HS FPA towards a mutually constitutive 
understanding of foreign policy and international relations, is to problematize the state 
and the theories of the state implicitly assumed by FPA scholars. Indeed, historical 
sociologists in IR can rely on a long tradition within HS that has spent much time in 
conceptualizing and theorizing the state. Mainstream IR paradigms that are chiefly 
preoccupied with international systems and structures, end up having little time to fully 
unpack and theorize the state.  
 
While this may be a rather curious oversight on the part of IR theorists, even more 
paradoxical is the silence on the issue by much FPA scholarship, which instead looks in 
depth at how states function and why they adopt particular foreign policies. As Chris 
Brown and Kirsten Anley, among others, have noted: “most accounts of foreign policy do 
not relate back to a theory of the state”, something that decidedly goes, “to their 
disadvantage” (2009, p.76). What seems to dominate in FPA literature is an implicit 
liberal view of the state as a relative passive set of institutions that reflect and merely 
serve as an arena for competition among different interests and a plurality of civil society 
groups.  
 
Scholars such as Halliday (2005, p.46), and Alden and Aran (2012, p. 63-66) have 
brought into FPA the concept of the “institutional state”, drawn from the work of neo-
Weberian historical sociologists such as Theda Skocpol and Michael Mann. Broadly 
speaking, such theory conceptualizes the state as a distinct institutional entity, with its 
own internal institutional and organizational logics, simultaneously rooted in the 
domestic society and external international realms, yet with the capacity to act with 
relative autonomy with respect to both spheres.42  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Neoclassical realists have likewise chastened the field of FPA for not making explicit, or even lacking, a 
clear theory of the state. Compared to Marxian or liberal influenced FPA and IR theories, neoclassical 
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The institutional concept of the state has a number of important implications for 
the study of international relations, in general, and foreign policy, in particular. First, the 
institutional concept of the state, which emphasizes the state’s relative autonomy and 
institutional underpinning, is fairly distinct from structural IR’s understanding of the state 
as simply a territorial unitary actor, in terms of the old-fashioned “billiard ball” or the 
more contemporary notion of “person” (Wendt 2004), whose actions are determined by 
the logics of the system or social whole. To understand international relations in general 
and explain states’ behavior in particular, historical sociologists claim, it does not suffice 
to pay attention solely to international structures. Scholars also need to explore in more 
detail the domestic institutional context and state-society relations (see: Halliday 2005, 
pp.41-50; Hobson 1998, pp.291-95).43  
 
This insight resonates well with FPA’s broader critique of mainstream structural 
IR. The concept of the institutional state further overlaps with a number specific tools 
developed by FPA scholars to investigate the institutional frameworks, topologies of state 
structures, the nature of state-society relations, and the role of domestic societal 
influences, on foreign policy. The concept of the institutional state can accommodate 
investigations into the rational choices or cognitive biases of individual decision-makers 
in leadership positions (Stein 2008), and those that look at the role of bureaucratic 
influences (Allison and Zelikow 1999), in the formulation and implementation of foreign 
policy.  
 
HS attention to state typology resonates well with foreign policy inquiries into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
realists do not see “states as simply aggregating the demands of different societal interest groups or 
economic classes” (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009, p.25). Neoclassical realists advance, similarly to 
historical sociologists, a Weberian view of the “institutional state” epitomized by the national security 
executive, seen as sitting autonomously at the juncture of, but also influenced by, the international system 
and domestic politics (p.24-26).  
43 As Hobson frames it: “states need to be differentiated in terms of their embedded relations with society in 
order to understand foreign policy and international relations. Therefore the state–society relationship is 
crucial to understanding international relations, which in turn implies the use of “second image” theory – 
something which Waltz, in his insistence on third image theory, expressly warns against…[a] conception of 
state power/autonomy, enables us to bring the state and state–society relationship into the analysis of 
international relations” (1998, p.295) 
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nature of state political institutions and regimes, and the institutional arrangements 
linking state and society channeling societal demands into the political system and 
foreign policy outcomes (Neack 1995; Risse-Kappen 1991; Rummel 1995). Indeed 
Halliday (1999) has explored from a HS perspective the foreign policies of 
“revolutionary states”, as well as those of “different forms” of Middle Eastern 
authoritarian states (2005). Alden and Aran use HS’s insights into the nature of the state, 
and expand the concept of the institutional state to include two new categories of quasi-
states and clustered-states. The intent is to reflect, in an ideal typical way, the variety of 
state structures in the international arena. Alden and Aran then explore the links between 
these different typologies of states and their foreign policies (2012, pp.62-77).44 
 
The concern for state-society relations in HS overlaps with FPA’s pluralist 
approaches to the domestic sources of foreign policy, which explore the beliefs and 
interests of sub-state and non-state actors within society and their efforts to exert 
influence over state institutions and domestic policy-making processes. Here we have, for 
instance, the wide-ranging FPA literature on: interest groups such as business lobbies and 
ethnic groups, advocacy and non-governmental organizations, epistemic communities 
and think tanks, political parties, and public opinion and the media (for good overviews 
see:Hill 2003a, Ch.10; Hudson 2007, Ch. 5).  
 
While the institutional concept of the state opens up the space for adopting many 
theoretical tools already developed by FPA scholars, at the same time and contra much 
FPA, a HS FPA maintains that states have a degree of autonomy from domestic societal 
pressures. This means that states and, above all, the state elites and bureaucracies in 
charge of formulating foreign policies, do and can pursue courses of action that are 
“above the everyday private interests of its members” (Hobson 1998, p.292). Likewise a 
HS FPA would see states as constantly subject to important international pressures and 
constraints, which cannot be discounted: the structure of military, economic and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  For example Alden and Aran look at the available foreign policy tools, source of state autonomy in the 
context of foreign policy, and inputs from the external environment that influence quasi-states, institutional 
states, and clustered states’ international behaviour (2012, p.72). 
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ideological power within international society and the impact of ever-changing non-state 
and material and ideational forces within world society.  
 
The idea of the state’s relative institutional autonomy from domestic society and 
its simultaneous rootedness in the international sphere, prevents HS approaches to foreign 
policy from reducing the state and its international actions solely to its constituent parts 
or as a simple expression of some determinant internal factor: be it class structures, 
special interests, culture, or the whims and wishes of leaders, as much FPA tends to do 
(Alden and Aran 2012, p.65; Halliday 2005, p.42). Hence from a HS perspective, the 
state’s relative autonomous character as well as the pressures and constraints exercised by 
the international environment should always be kept in consideration in order to have a 
full picture of a state’s foreign policy.  
 
To summarize: the institutional state, and the leaders and bureaucracies 
controlling it, have a considerable level of autonomy from the society within (contra 
mainstream FPA theories) and other states and social structures without (contra structural 
IR theories) when it comes to formulating foreign policy. Yet this autonomy is not equal 
to complete independence as it is limited “by both internal and external forces: states and 
leaders cannot do what they want in foreign policy”, their choices are always “framed by 
the domestic and international contexts” (Halliday 2005, pp.42-43). The logical 
conclusion for Halliday of such a theory of the state for international politics is a natural 
“reconciliation of two distinct analytic approaches, those of historical sociology and of 
foreign policy analysis” (2005, p.43).  
 
The institutional concept of the state generates a second key insight for the study 
of foreign policy and especially foreign policy change. As already discussed, an 
institutional theory of the state sees state agency in the international realm as mediated by 
the institutional structures of the state itself. State institutions set the context for human 
and bureaucratic actors within the state and domestic actors and social forces without the 
state to affect foreign policy. FPA has long recognized the role of institutions and 
bureaucracies in foreign policy making and output. It has nevertheless rarely seen them as 
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important objects of enquiry and analysis in their own right, exploring their origins, 
change and evolution at different points in time (Mabee 2011). 
 
Focusing, rather than solely on how institutions function, but also on the way they 
originate at particular historical moments, how they reproduce and evolve over time, is 
seen as an important component of historical institutionalism (HI) a particular meta-
theoretical approach within the larger HS framework (Lawson 2006, pp.410-14; Nexon 
2012; for a good overview of HI, but one that somewhat distances it from HS, see: 
Fioretos 2011). Institutions are considered the meso-level locus and tangible site, the 
“ligatures” (Nexon 2012), that join together in a two way street: the interplay between 
micro-level analysis that centers on the actions and roles of individuals and organizations, 
with the broader historical context and social processes at the macro international level. 
Here institutions become the analytical focal point for translating processes at different 
scales and in different domains into historically specific outcomes. Institutions are the 
“points at which structure and agency, material and ideational factors, conflict and 
cooperation, intentional action and unintended consequences, continuity and disjuncture 
come together” (Lawson 2006, p.414).  
 
Unpacking how, when and why state institutions and bureaucracies “with 
international functions” (Mabee 2007, p.443), originate and evolve becomes a fruitful 
way to link the domestic and international, the micro and macro, within a HS oriented 
FPA enterprise committed to explaining foreign policy change. Tracing the sequence of 
institutional development at particular moments in time provides the causal focal point to 
explain how long-term macro-trends and specific events, become the “critical junctures” 
that open the space for competing domestic actors to affect foreign policy change. Once 
new institutions and designs become locked-in at a specific point in time, their path-
dependent nature is likely to yield interesting causal explanations for opening or closing: 
the opportunities for domestic actors to access the state and influence foreign policies; the 
possibility for officials within bureaucracies to affect policy-making processes; or the 
direction of future institutional developments and foreign policy trajectories. Brian 
Mabee breaks new ground, for instance, with his historically sensitive and sociologically 
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informed study of the development and reproduction of the National Security Council 
(NSC) in the United States (Mabee 2007, 2011).  
 
From Theory to Empirics  
 
What are the implications of this theoretical discussion, in terms of a mutually 
constitutive understanding of international politics and foreign policy, for my empirical 
research? I will start with the theoretical insight into the linkages between macro-level 
social and historical processes and trends with the interests, perceptions, and identities of 
actors at the micro-level. The social process of global religious resurgence at the world 
social level has brought to the fore new domestic actors in American politics. A growing 
and thickening number of religious advocacy groups are emerging, especially among 
Protestant evangelicals, but also across a wide range of religious denominations and 
traditions within and beyond Christianity (Hertzke 2012). These religious advocates, 
many of whom hold institutional links with and concerns for the health and wellbeing of 
fellow co-religionists outside the United States, are increasingly attempting to influence 
the practice and conduct of American foreign policy in favor of their transnational 
religious community.  
 
At the same time, both the social and cultural processes of resurgence seem to be 
affecting the perceptions of foreign policy elites within and outside the government, as 
well as elected political leaders. The rise of political Islam, the appearance post-Cold War 
conflicts which often seem to pit warring parties along sectarian lines, and the events of 
9/11, have all in one way or another contributed to the impression among scholars, 
pundits, policy- and decision-makers that religion matters more out there and that the 
United States needs to take these development strategically into account in its foreign 
policy.  
 
Secondly, the concept of the institutional state makes two important analytical 
contributions. First, the idea of the state as a “relatively autonomous” entity from both the 
domestic and external sphere sits easily with a central tension identified in the research. 
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The distinction, which was alluded to in the introduction and which will be unpacked 
more thoroughly in the next chapters, between America as a secular state – especially in 
terms of its foreign policy practices, bureaucracies and bureaucrats – and Americans as a 
religious people. From a HS perspective this is a perfectly possible occurrence.  
 
Moreover, the notion of the state as a relatively autonomous entity adds an 
important note of caution against falling pray to reductionism when looking at the impact 
of religious forces and actors on foreign policy. For instance, some Marxian and Liberal 
approaches tend to reduce a state’s foreign policy to the preferences of particular 
domestic groups and forces. Without an concept of the state as relatively autonomous 
from domestic social forces, which HS alerts us to, little would prevent us from arguing, 
in somewhat essentialist undertones, that a particular state’s foreign policy is simply the 
reflection of its society’s religious orientation (for a similar point see also: Halliday 2005, 
pp.46-47).  
 
Thirdly, and finally, the concept of the institutional state opens the door to the 
insights of historical institutionalism. This perspective allows me to unpack the complex 
sequence and causal mechanisms between: a) large-scale social and cultural processes of 
global religious resurgence; b) the identities, beliefs/interests and actions of domestic 
actors embedded and responding to these trends; c) the role of specific events, such as 
presidential elections, the end of the Cold War, 9/11, in creating the political opening, at 
the time they did; that d) lead to the emergence at the meso-level of novel American 
foreign policies and bureaucratic structures with a religious content. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The chapter started by arguing that, in its current state, FPA theories do a poor job in 
understanding and accounting for the wider international and historical context in their 
explanations of foreign policy change. This theoretical limit leaves me in a rather difficult 
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position when trying to empirically investigate why, when, and how global social and 
cultural processes such as the resurgence of religion are affecting, and may be themselves 
influenced by, American foreign policy desecularization. This chapter argued that a 
theoretical reconciliation between HS and FPA is a promising way forward. A HS FPA 
offers a story of the making of foreign policy rooted in the co-constitutive role played by 
material and ideational factors, by economic, social, and political processes, and by 
international and domestic forces, that is only latently recognized within the FPA 
lexicon.45 Conceptually bringing together FPA with HS allows to build explanations of 
foreign policy change that dynamically integrate, in a two way street, international 
structures and events with domestic pressures on policy-making processes and policy 
outcomes.  
 
First, a HS provides FPA with a more explicit and complex concept of the 
international than what much FPA scholarship tends to work with. HS advances an 
analytically and ontologically pluralist, and a historicist concept of the international 
environment. This understanding of international relations allows me to locate the global 
social and cultural processes of religious resurgence – occurring over the past four 
decades, in multiple forms and locally specific ways – at the world social level. And then 
unpack how and in which ways such developments interact with American foreign 
policy. 
 
Second, an HS approach to FPA leads to a reading of foreign policy and 
international politics as mutually constitutive. This analytical move rests on two 
theoretical assumptions that come with taking a HS lens: i) an insistence on linking 
macro-level social and historical processes and trends with actors and social action at the 
micro-level; and ii) a particular concept of the state that emphasizes its autonomous 
institutional underpinnings that lie at the intersection between the international and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The sentence is borrowed and paraphrased from George Lawson, who argues that what HS brings to IR 
theory is a “story of the making of the modern world rooted in the co-constitutive role played by material 
and ideational factors, by economic, social, and political processes, and by international and domestic 
forces – [which] is one that is only latently recognized within the IR lexicon [emphasis added to highlight 
modified parts above]” (2006, p.405). 
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domestic spheres, acting as well as a meso-level ligature site between macro-level 
processes and micro-level decisions. This is a theoretical move that, rather than leaving 
the particular FPA scholar with the choice of whether or not to include macro-
international structures and historical events, builds a framework that treats these as an 
integral and essential part to any account of foreign policy change.  
 
In my case, I will explore how global macro changes associated with religious 
resurgence give rise to a number of different actors who, at the micro-domestic level, 
seek to influence and take part in the process of foreign policy-making. I will then unpack 
how domestic actors, some which are domestically embedded in as well as others who 
are responding to, the global processes of religious resurgence, mobilize to mainstream a 
set of inherently religious concerns and issues within American foreign policy. Both in 
terms of policies implemented, as well as institutional and normative changes in 
bureaucracies with international functions, such as the NSC, the White House, the State 
Department, and USAID.  
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2. THE SECULAR AND DESECULARIZATION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a conceptual framework for exploring the 
desecularization of American foreign policy in the rest of the thesis. In order to define 
what desecularization is and explain why, how, when it occurs, it is indispensable 
however to have a clear grasp of its symmetrical opposite: secularization. The core of this 
chapter is dedicated to the task of defining and historicizing the multiple component parts 
of “the secular”. The focus will be, in particular, on its two cognate terms: secularization 
and secularism. It will explore the multiple meanings and diverse historical processes 
associated with “secularization”. Likewise it will conceptually unpack and trace across 
time and space the emergence and codification of “secularism” as an ideational construct.  
 
This effort has three crucial purposes. First, is allows me to conceptualize and 
historicize how secular forces – secularization/s as historical process/es and secularism/s 
as ideational construct/s – have shaped for most of the XXth century domestic and 
international politics worldwide and the type of knowledge that has been produced in the 
social sciences, with a particular focus on IR. These secular processes and ideational 
constructs have, by reflex, also structured the practices, institutions, ideas, and norms that 
underpin American foreign policy.  
 
Second, this effort sets the secular stage on which processes of global religious 
resurgence would then progressively take place over the past four to five decades across 
regions and religions. The central part of this chapter will be dedicated to teasing out and 
historicizing how processes of resurgence have brought about substantial social and 
political changes in the domestic and external environments within which American 
foreign policy-making and implementation take place. These changes have shed not only 
a reflexive light on the secular in the social sciences. They have provided as well the 
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context for the rise of new domestic forces and actors in Washington who, particularly 
from the 1990s onwards, would find the secular nature of American foreign policy 
problematic and would mobilize to desecularize it. 
 
Third, mapping out the secular, is vital to anchoring the meaning of 
desecularization and tease out its constituent component processes in relation, and more 
specifically opposition, to secularization and secularism, especially as they relate to 
American foreign policy. In this section of the chapter I will present a taxonomy of those 
actors, which I will call desecularizing actors, that mobilize to challenge the secular 
status quo in foreign policy. These actors constitute the causal link between broad 
processes of religious resurgence, within which they are either embedded or reacting to, 
and specific desecularizing changes in American foreign policy. 
 
 
Conceptualizing and Historicizing the Secular, Secularization and Secularism  
 
 
Terms like “the secular”, “secularization” and “secularism” are complex, inevitably 
contested, and often confused and misused interchangeably. I argue, along the lines of 
Casanova (2011), that it is important to keep them conceptually distinct. For example, 
while Daniel Philpott (2009, p.185) captures perfectly the multiple nature of these terms 
when he presents nine different definitions for the secular, he nevertheless includes and 
subsumes under this category also definitions of secularism and secularization without 
making a clear-cut analytical separation between the three terms. Yet, it seems more 
appropriate to kept them distinct.  
 
Broadly speaking “the secular” is understood here as “a central modern epistemic 
category [used] to construct, codify, grasp, and experience a realm or reality 
differentiated from “the religious.”” (Casanova 2011, p.54).46 In this sense the secular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 It is important to note that the notion of “the secular” as opposed to “the religious”, or better “the 
religious” as not being “secular” is largely a modern post-Enlightenment construct and a contraposition 
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denotes a particular condition and a set of norms, institutions and practices that structure 
that very same condition and are not religious. This is distinct from secularization that 
instead, as other terms ending in –ization, identifies a process, and secularism that, like 
other –isms, identifies a particular worldview or ideology. The secular comes about and is 
sustained by processes of secularization and the emergence of secularism. In the two 
following sub-sections I attempt to tease out more explicitly the concepts of 
secularization and secularism, and historicize them in terms of events occurring in 
Europe and around the world over the past two centuries.  
 
Secularization: Concept and History 
 
Secularization suggests a trend, a general historical tendency toward a world in which 
religion matters less in the private life of individuals as well as in the public sphere, and 
where various forms of secular reason and secular institutions matter more. José 
Casanova (1994, 2011) has probably been one of the most consistent and clearest 
scholars over the past decades when it comes to defining our contemporary understanding 
of the concept of secularization. Casanova highlights three, largely independent and 
unintegrated, processes that are generally associated with the concept of secularization 
(1994, pp.19-23; 2011, pp.60-66).  
 
First, secularization is most commonly, especially in popular discourses, 
understood as the decline of religious beliefs and/or practices in modern societies often 
postulated as a universal, human, developmental process. Second, secularization refers to 
the privatization of religion and the declining authority of religious norms and institutions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
which may even have little meaning beyond the West (Asad 2003). Going back to Patrick Jackson’s (2011) 
typologies of methodologies, by virtue of being non neo-positivist my inquiry accepts that the status of 
knowledge claims is often value-laden and understands the stakes involved when we use and naturalize 
certain concepts. This said however, this thesis does not adopt a fully “reflexive” methodology on the issue 
of the secular and the religious. It is not chiefly concerned with the genealogies of concepts and 
deconstructing meanings and hegemonic knowledge structures. This inquiry is carried out from a “critical 
realist” standpoint, as such it takes the use and deployment of categories, even if modern constructs, such 
as “the religious” and “the secular”, in the discourses and practices of actors in world politics as important 
objects of study in and of themselves. As Mona Kanwal points out “People do in fact use the distinctions 
between secular and religious, fill these categories with distinctive content, and engage in disputes over 
them” (2012, p.373), and hence it becomes vital to investigate the political implications of processes of 
category and boundary formation and maintenance. 
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in the public sphere understood as a general modern historical trend. Thirdly, 
secularization is associated with the functional differentiation and emancipation of the 
secular in terms of institutions (mainly the state), and spheres of life and knowledge 
(politics, law, economics, science) from religious institutions and norms. With the idea of 
differentiation referring to the transfer of persons, things, meanings, and authority from 
ecclesiastical or religious to civil or lay use, possession, or control and the concomitant 
specialization of religion within its own newly found religious sphere. This third 
definition is generally the core component of classical secularization theories.47 
 
In light of worldwide processes of religious resurgence, scholars across the social 
sciences are today revisiting the idea of secularization particularly understood as a 
universal, teleological and homogenizing process. This debate, I argue, does not 
necessarily discredit the notion that, depending on historical periods and social context, 
processes of secularization in its various component forms (decline, privatization, and 
functional differentiation), can and have ostensibly occurred. Religious beliefs, traditions 
and practices may have not disappeared across the modern world as often assumed 
(Inglehart and Norris 2007), nevertheless their hold on the lives of (Western) Europeans, 
for example, seems to have declined in the past centuries. Whereas Europe was thought 
to be the norm, it may now appear more of an exception. Yet an exception that 
nevertheless needs adequate explaining as Peter Berger, Grace Davie and Effie Fokas 
point out (2008, see Ch.2).  
 
Casanova’s critique of secularization is centered mainly on the idea of 
privatization, rather than notions of decline of personal faith or functional differentiation 
between secular and religious institutions and norms for example. Also, while Casanova 
disputes the notion of privatization as a universal constant, it does not necessarily imply 
that processes of privatization have never occurred throughout history. Mark Regnerus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Jurgen Habermas, rather than making a clear distinction between secularization as differentiation and 
privatization links the two together. He defines secularization for example with the “functional 
differentiation of social sub-systems, the churches and other religious organizations lose their control over 
law, politics, public welfare, education and science; they restrict themselves to their proper function of 
administering the means of salvation, turn exercising religion into a private matter and in general lose 
public influence and relevance.” (2008, p.17) 
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and Christian Smith have explored (1997), for example, how patterns of religious 
withdrawal (privatization) and engagement (deprivatization), can and have taken place 
across time and religious traditions.  
 
Moreover, while the universal logic of private religious decline and privatization 
are increasingly disputed, secularization as differentiation and emancipation of the 
secular from the religious sphere – albeit as a process which varies in shapes and forms 
across history, societies and states – appears to be more generalizable than others. This is 
something which Casanova himself recognizes (1994, p.6).48 Historically, for example, in 
Medieval Europe religion (and in particular the Catholic Church) exercised a great deal 
of authority over political institutions, and social life and knowledge. Temporal and 
spiritual power were deeply intertwined. The rise of the modern state during the 16th and 
17th centuries, however, progressively weakened the power of religious actors in 
international and domestic politics. Following the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the 
principle of cuius regio, eius religio, which laid the groundwork for the principles of 
nonintervention and state sovereignty, also substantially curtailed the transnational 
authority of the Catholic Church (for excellent accounts on the relationship between 
religion and Westphalia see Nexon 2009; Philpott 2001).  
 
As states emerged and consolidated to be the most powerful and efficient way of 
organizing polities and economic resources for security purposes (Buzan and Little 2000, 
pp.241-344), these would also conduct “massive expropriation and appropriation…of 
monasteries, landholdings, and the mort-main wealth of the church after the Protestant 
Reformation and the ensuing religious wars” (Casanova 1994, p.13). Many of the 
education and healthcare services that religious institutions used to provide during 
medieval Europe were likewise increasingly taken over during the 17th and 18th centuries 
by specialized state-financed and state-run institutions. The end result, once more, was a 
net decrease in the temporal power of religious institutions and authorities within 
European societies and politics. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Casanova argues: “I do not share the view that secularization was, or is, a myth. The core of the theory of 
secularization, the thesis of the differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres from religious 
institutions and norms, remains valid” (1994, p.6). 
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As Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen suggest, over the centuries 
“there has been an enormous expansion in the construction of institutions for this-worldly, 
nonecclesial purposes….much of social life is organized by systems or “steering 
mechanisms” that are held to operate independently of religious belief, ritual practice, or 
divine guidance” (2011a, p.10). Markets are an example where “participants may have 
religious motivations; they may pray for success or form alliances with coreligionists. 
Nonetheless, economists, financiers, investors, and traders understand markets mainly as 
products of buying and selling” (2011a, p.10). Like markets other institutions have been 
created to organize and advance secular projects – such as schools, welfare agencies, and 
armies – which “all operate within the terms of what might be called a secular imaginary” 
(2011a, p.10).  
 
Alexis de Tocqueville already more than a 150 years ago indirectly touched upon 
the multiple and complex aspects of secularization. While comparing the New with the 
Old Worlds, Tocqueville would dispute the conventional Enlightenment wisdom of his 
times that modernity and progress spelled the end of religious beliefs:  
“The philosophers of the eighteenth century explained the gradual decay 
of religious faith in a very simple manner. Religious zeal, said they, must 
necessarily fail, the more generally liberty is established and knowledge 
diffused. Unfortunately, facts are by no means in accordance with their 
theory. There are certain populations in Europe whose unbelief is only 
equaled by their ignorance and their debasement, whilst in America one of 
the freest and most enlightened nations in the world fulfills all the outward 
duties of religious fervor” (Tocqueville 2000, pp.357-358). 
 
Upon his arrival to America “the religious aspect of the country was the first thing 
that struck my attention” Tocqueville argues (2000, p.358). He would point at the deep-
seated link between America’s puritan origins and the establishment of democratic values 
and institutions within the country. Yet he also observed how, even though American 
peoples were both modern and highly religious, their state was nevertheless more secular 
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than European ones. In other words, Tocqueville’s account suggests that while 
secularization as religious decline did not seem to fit America well, secularizing as a 
processes of functional differentiation instead did.  
 
Compared to his own country, “in the United States religion exercises but little 
influence upon the laws” (2000, p.353) and “takes no direct part in the government of 
society” (2000, p.355). Unlike France, the United States exhibited a clear “separation of 
Church and State” (2000, p.358). In the new American world compared to the old 
European one, clergy and politics rarely mixed:  
“I learned with surprise that [the clergy] filled no public appointments; not 
one of them is to be met in the administration […] And when I came to 
enquire into the prevailing spirit of the clergy I found that most of its 
members seemed to retire of their own accord from the exercise of power, 
and that they made it the pride of their profession to abstain from politics” 
(2000, pp.358-359). 
 
 Processes of functional differentiation have occurred well beyond the West. Take 
the Middle East, for example, a region that is generally assumed to experience little 
separation between state and mosque. In recent decades there has been an obvious growth 
in religious politics. Even here however “processes of secularization”, Sami Zubaida 
argues, “in the sense of differentiation and separation of institutions and spheres of 
knowledge and culture from religion and its authorities have been features of modernity 
in most “Muslim societies”” (2005, p.440). Indeed, he adds that, “from the nineteenth 
century, the world of Islam had undergone processes of modernity which included 
extensive secularization in all spheres of life” (2005, p.440). According to Fred Halliday, 
the modern Middle Eastern states that were born in the 19-20th centuries following 
European colonization differed fundamentally from their pre-modern cousins: “in the 
range and extent of their power: their control of territory, economy, society and culture, 
including religion, [which was] far greater than their predecessors” [emphasis added] 
(2005, p.45).  
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Overall, then secularization is understood here not as a unitary and teleological 
phenomenon, but as three conceptually distinct, broadly unintegrated and to some extent 
historically, geographically and context specific processes. Seen through this light, as a 
complex and multifaceted phenomenon, there is indeed a “reality” to processes of 
secularization (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 2011a, p.10). Particularly, 
in terms of differentiation and decline in the power of religion in the public sphere of 
Western and non-Western countries across the past centuries. 
 
Secularism: Concept and History 
 
A particular feature of, and closely intertwined with, processes of secularization is also 
the emergence of “secularism”. Secularism does not refer to a process or trend, but rather 
to a kind of ideational construct or belief system. In IR it has invariably been described as 
a discursive tradition (Hurd 2008), an ideology (Hallward 2008), or a doctrine (Sheikh 
and Wæver 2012). For Casanova, secularism refers to either a: “whole range of modern 
secular worldviews and ideologies that may be consciously held and explicitly elaborated 
into philosophies of history and normative-ideological state projects, into projects of 
modernity and cultural programs”; or “an epistemic knowledge regime that may be 
unreflexively held and phenomenologically assumed as the taken-for-granted normal 
structure of modern reality, as a modern doxa or as an “unthought”” (Casanova 2011, 
p.55). 
 
Either way, as an explicitly held worldview or implicitly assumed doxa, 
secularism takes on a number of different forms. Overall I distinguish between three 
broad typologies of secularisms, each with its own internal and geographical specific 
differences: epistemic, ideological, and state-normative secularism/s. These modern 
secularist ideational and knowledge constructs are very much the product of the 
intellectual revolution occurred during the European Enlightenment in the 17-18th 
centuries. These, as will be discussed shortly, then spread globally, and were absorbed, 
resisted, adapted, remodeled, rejected – at different times, in different places, in uneven 
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and culturally and geographically specific ways – during the age of European 
colonization and encounter with other societies.  
 
Starting with epistemic secularism. Secularism in this sense is a form of 
knowledge held consciously or unconsciously by individuals, movements and 
organizations which reproduce the idea that religion, rather than an intrinsic feature of 
human nature across time, is instead epiphenomenal and a product of some underlying 
condition such as underdevelopment, ignorance, insecurity, economic malaise, and so on. 
It does not take a normative or ethical stance towards or against religion, it just sees it as 
inevitably declining or as increasingly irrelevant to social and political life when 
processes of modernization set in (such as rising wealth, living standards and education 
for example).  
 
Such an assumption about the inherently secular character of modern life and 
politics is most explicitly articulated in a bulk of knowledge that has come to be known 
as “secularization theory”. Secularization theory refers to the actual (or increasingly 
alleged) empirical-historical patterns of transformation brought by modernity (in its 
different forms), causing a general tendency towards a world in which religion matters 
less in the personal lives of individuals as well as in social and political life.  
 
It is an ideational construct to the extent that secularization theory, rather than 
based on extended empirical investigation (as Tocqueville already noticed a century and a 
half ago), instead sought to universalize from events taking place in Europe, which to 
some extent later seemed occurring around the world, to produce a general teleological 
and progressive account of human and societal development from the primitive “sacred” 
to the modem “secular”. Secularization theory has a long pedigree and intellectual roots 
in the work of towering (European) social theorists and philosophers such as Weber, 
Durkheim, and Marx. It was then most explicitly articulated in the 1960-70s (Berger 
1969; Martin 1978). Not coincidentally this was a time when processes of secularization 
and secular ideologies, as will be discussed in a moment, did appear to have universal 
validity and appeal.  
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Epistemic secularism is not only articulated and codified explicitly in a body of 
theory that carries its name. It can be held as an un-reflexive “common sense” within the 
wider social scientific enterprise as well as among individuals and groups belonging to 
particularly secular cultural milieus that assume that religion has become irrelevant in the 
modern world. When IR scholars, for instance, are accused of ignoring, overlooking or 
disregarding religious forces and dynamics it is this epistemic secularist bias that is 
unveiled. The following passage by Daniel Philpott neatly captures the essence of this 
bias:  
“The dominant theories in this field assume that the states, nations, 
international organizations, parties, classes, businesses, interest groups, 
nongovernmental organizations, and lobbies that carry on politics pursue 
ends that include power, conquest, freedom, wealth, redistribution of 
wealth, welfare provision, human rights, justice, environmental cleanliness, 
and other goals, but they do not pursue religious ends and are not 
influenced by religious actors. Such theories reason as if religion has 
disappeared from politics” (2009, p.187). 
 
The step from secularism as an analytical theory or naturalized assumption of 
religious decline, privatization and differentiation to a normative commitment towards 
marginalizing religious actors and beliefs, or eliminating them altogether, has often been 
a small one. Enter ideological secularism. The distinction between epistemic secularism 
and ideological secularism is that, while the former has a rather neutral stance towards 
religion seeing its demise as an inevitable by-product of modernization (broadly defined) 
the latter instead sees it in many ways as necessary precondition for modernity to exist. 
Ideological secularism develops certain assumptions of what “the religious” and “religion” 
is or does – mainly with pejorative connotations. 
 
Ideological secularism is no longer an explicit theory seeking to explain historical 
processes that appear underway, or an implicit worldview that simply relegates religion 
to a superseded stage. Ideological secularism has many shades, but generally takes 
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religion as an abstract category that has a particular and problematic essence – non-
rational, primordial, particularistic, intolerant, dangerous, illiberal, and so on – and 
produces certain undesired effects and outcomes – violence, backwardness, and so on. 
Hence religion should be excluded or marginalized from politics, the public sphere, and, 
in some extreme forms of secularist ideologies, extinguished in the consciousness of 
individuals. Secularization (as secular differentiation, privatization of religion, and 
religious decline) becomes an indispensable condition, if not a precondition, for ensuring 
peaceful coexistence among people and nations, promoting economic growth and social 
progress, or for rational political practices and discourse to be sustained. In this view the 
secular is largely seen “not just as one way of organizing life, not just as useful in order 
to ensure peace and harmony among different religions, but as a kind of maturation. It is 
held to be a developmental achievement” (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 
2011a, p.20; see also Cavanaugh 2009). 
 
Ideological secularism takes many shapes most of which, somewhat like 
epistemic secularism, can be broadly divided into explicit and implicit forms. Explicit 
ideological secularisms are openly visible ideologies that, to various degrees and in their 
various local characteristics, attempt to separate faith from politics and public life. To use 
Ahmed Kuru’s distinction, some forms of explicit secularism more “assertively” seek to 
“exclude religion from the public sphere and confine it to the private domain” (2009, 
p.11). Examples of these are laicité in France, laicismo in Italy or Kemalism in Turkey 
which, with their own local specificities, are distinctively anti-religious and anti-clerical 
doctrines aiming at controlling and abolishing most religious expressions and symbols 
from politics and the public sphere. Other forms of explicit secularism are less assertive, 
demand simply “that the state play a “passive” role by allowing the public visibility of 
religion” (Kuru 2009, p.11). This is the case for instance in places like the U.S. and India. 
Secularists in these countries seek to uphold a strict separation between state and 
religious institutions, however they are more tolerant and accommodating of religious 
expressions in the social and public domains then for example French or Turkish laicists.  
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Explicit secularist ideologies have an impact on political life. In places like 
France laicité is generally seen as a constitutive element of the country’s national identity. 
It is a distinctively anti-clerical and catholic sentiment born out of the French revolution, 
which today is increasingly reinforced in the context of Muslim immigration with debates 
about headscarf bans. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk drew upon French concepts of laicité to 
model the newly created Turkish Republic at the beginning of the 20th century around 
strongly secularizing principles. The vestiges of the Ottoman Empire – the caliph, the 
sultan, the Sharia, the Islamic institutions and schools – were replaced by European-
inspired secular political, legal, and educational systems. As a secularist ideological 
framework Kemalism has increasingly been contested with the rise of the moderate and 
conservative Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). In the United States, argues 
Christian Smith, the secularization of American public life, culture, educational system 
and judicial institutions that occurred particularly between the 1870s and 1930s, was the 
“successful outcome of an intentional political struggle by secularizing activists to 
overthrow a religious establishment’s control over socially legitimate knowledge” (2003, 
p.1). This process has come under attack in recent decades by parts of the American 
Religious Right in its polemics against “secular humanism”.  
 
In each of the cases described above secularism “takes on its own meanings, 
values, and associations; in no case is it simply a neutral antidote to religious conflicts” 
(Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 2011a, p.9). The point here is that 
secularism is a deeply political force, a form of “political authority” as Hurd labels it 
(2008), which demarcates the appropriate place of religion and religious institutions in 
the public sphere. 
 
By implicit ideological secularism, I refer to what William Connolly has 
described as: “several variants of secularism kill two birds with one stone: as they try to 
seal public life from religious doctrines they also cast out a set of nontheistic orientations 
to reverence, ethics, and public life that deserve to be heard” (1999, p.5). In other words 
implicit ideological secularism, not only identifies the category of “religion” and assigns 
it a particular place in society and politics (like explicit secularism), but becomes 
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elaborated as a foundational ideational brick in distinct secular political philosophies, 
cultural programs and ideologies. Implicit ideological secularism is part and parcel of 
political ideologies born out of the Enlightenment such as socialism, communism, 
liberalism, nationalism, and fascism that construct non-religious social and political ends 
for citizens and societies.49 These channel loyalties away from God and, depending on the 
ideology, toward the creation of egalitarian societies, the fulfillment of individual 
liberties, the unity of a nation or the supremacy of a race. Each of these political 
ideologies has its more assertive or passive take on the appropriate place of religion in 
society and politics.50  
 
From the late 18th century the ideologies and political movements with the 
greatest momentum in Europe and then across the world were mainly secular: American 
and French republican revolutionaries in the 1700s; the European nationalist revolutions 
of the 1800s; and the rise of Fascism and Nazism in Italy and Germany, the Bolshevik 
revolutionaries which brought Communism to Russia, and the early Zionist movement, 
chiefly conceived in secular and socialist terms, which propelled the modern state of 
Israel into existence, all in the 1900s. When European colonialism reached its limits in 
the 19th and 20th century, most anti-colonial struggles for equality and self-determination 
in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were largely inspired by secular liberal, nationalist 
or socialist principles.51 Post-colonial states while rejecting European domination, they 
nevertheless often sought to emulate the Western secular path – what was then thought as 
the only path – to modernity. Regimes in the post-colonial period were by en large 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 For a similar understanding of secularism in IR see: Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011, p.74) 
50 For instance, ideologies like political liberalism are generally tolerant of religion as long as it is 
disestablished from the state, separated from politics and (in some circumstances) privatized. Communist 
ideologies perceive religion as an oppressor of the people, hence communist movements and regimes have 
tended to forcefully abolish religion within their societies – for instance in the former Soviet Union, Maoist 
China and Fidel Castro’s Cuba (Marsh 2011). Nationalism which is to a great extent the ideology of the 
state, has led nationalists often to curtail more cosmopolitan forms of shared religious identity as well as 
transferring forms of legitimation for rulers from god to the people (Juergensmeyer 2008). Fascist 
ideologies have often used all the trappings of religions, its symbols and rituals, to build however new 
secular divinities around their leaders, the nation and its peoples (Gentile 1990). 
51 This is a generalized story and of course there were exceptions, for example the case of Ghandi’s non-
violent anti-colonial struggle in India against the British Empire.  
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secularist in ideology and orientation as in Chiang Kai-Shek’s China, Shah’s Iran, 
Nehru’s India, Nasser’s Egypt, and Sukarno’s Indonesia. 
 
In the Middle East, for example, the development of modern states in the mid-20th 
century was heavily influenced by Western secular paradigms (Tamimi 2000, pp.88-89; 
Zubaida 2005). John Esposito highlights how at the time few in the region “questioned 
the accepted wisdom that modernization meant the progressive Westernization and 
secularization of society” (2010, p.51). Parliamentary governments, political parties, 
capitalist or socialist economies, and modern European and American school curricula, 
became the norm in the region. As a result, Islam’s role in the state and society as a 
legitimating source for rulers, states, and government institutions was greatly curtailed as 
state elites often used secular frameworks to organize their states and societies. In 
Communist regimes in Russia and around the world in Eastern Europe, China, Vietnam, 
and Cuba, for instance, “tremendous amounts of resources were allocated to erasing 
religious faith and promoting atheism in its stead” (Marsh 2011, p.2). As Toft, Philpott 
and Shah point out: “during most of the period between 1789 and 1967, political 
secularism put religious actors and ideologies on the defensive in much of the world” 
(2011, p.79).  
 
Since implicit ideological secularist influences underpin particular political 
philosophical systems and ideologies rooted in the Enlightenment such as Liberalism and 
Marxism, these influences may filter through to cognate IR theoretical paradigms. 
Marxian and Liberal approaches to IR hence, not only tend to ignore religion, but see it as 
a problematic force when mixed to international politics. Either as an obstacle to the 
triumph of liberal democratic forms of politics (Fukuyama 1992, pp.45-46) or as an 
epiphenomenal force that leaders instrumentally appropriate in so far as it is useful to 
selfishly legitimize their political choices and mobilize masses (Shaffer 2006).  
 
More generally, much of IR scholarship’s focus on issues related to security, 
conflict and terrorism when it comes to exploring the impact of religion in international 
politics seems to suggest a generalized lingering implicit ideological secularist bias 
	   98 
within the discipline as a whole.52 This is not to say that the authors investigating the 
nexus between religion and security see religion as inherently problematic or conflict 
prone. Indeed most actually suggest that a rather complex relationship between religion 
and violence exists. Yet the fact that such a broad and flourishing research program, 
probably more so than in other areas, on religion and security issues has developed – 
even simply to disprove those very same facile assumptions linking religion and violence 
– indirectly underscores the discipline’s inbuilt ideological secularist bias. 
 
Thirdly I identified a third secularist form of knowledge structure. This is what I 
called state-normative secularism. State-normative secularism is premised, drawing from 
Casanova’s definition of secularism as statecraft doctrine, on the need to “maintain some 
kind of separation between “church” and “state,” or between “religious” and “political” 
authorities” (2011, p.69). The functional differentiation between state and church that 
secularization theories take as a natural evolution, is in great part the result of “political 
negotiations surrounding a broad array of regulatory laws affecting religion” within states 
(Gill 2001, p.132). Secularism as a state-norm broadly entails two principles: on the one 
hand it involves the principle of separation between “religious” and “political” authorities, 
on the other the principle of state regulation and control of religion in society.  
 
States’ constitutional and legal regimes approach religion, and the secular, in 
different ways. For instance, in the United States the first amendment, introduced in 1791, 
dealt explicitly with religion stating that: “congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” and was intended to 
regulate state meddling into religion and vice versa. France’s norms of church and state 
separation were officially codified in the 1905 Law on the Separation of Churches and 
State. With the end of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s 1937 constitution identifies, in 
Article 2, “The Republic of Turkey” as a “democratic, secular and social State”. The 
1949 Indian constitution declares in the opening lines India to be “a Sovereign, Socialist, 
Secular, Democratic Republic”.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The literature on this topic is virtually infinite, see among many: BISA Working Group, Durward and 
Marsden (2009); Fox and Sandler (2006); Hasenclever and Rittberger (2003); Horowitz (2009); Philpott 
(2007); Toft (2007). 
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As recent scholarship convincingly argues (Kuru 2009; Sheikh and Wæver 2012), 
historical events and specific ideological and political negotiations surrounding these 
principles, rather than the particular stage of “modernization” states and societies find 
themselves at, largely determines the wide range of constitutional and legal arrangements 
delineating the relationship between religious authority and the state which countries 
exhibit worldwide (Fox 2006b). Secularist state-norms in their multiple forms are 
premised upon the particular institutional arrangements, social forces, religious 
authorities and the types of secularist ideology (explicit and implicit) that permeate the 
social fabric and political context of the state at the time of their codification. What this 
literature suggests is that the degree to which these norms are then upheld or reinterpreted, 
enforced to a greater or lesser extent, or even redesigned and re-articulated depends very 
much on the configuration of relations between religious and secularist forces at different 
historical junctures.  
 
Overall then for much of the past two centuries social, political, ideological and 
normative secularizing trends and secularist projects did appear to marginalize and 
undermine religious authority from multiple facets of private and public life around the 
world. Likewise, during most of the 20th century, the pressing international security and 
political issues of the day seemed to mostly exclude religion as a source of influence and 
power in international politics. Countries and peoples were preoccupied with the real and 
present danger of states committed to fighting highly destructive wars in the name of 
secular projects. The ideological lines and military competition during the World War II 
were drawn between secular systems and regimes: fascist, communist and market-
oriented democratic ones. During the Cold War regions and countries worldwide were 
parceled according to secular idioms such as: first, second and third worlds; Western, 
Eastern and Non-Aligned blocs; free and un-free world; imperialists and anti-imperialists; 
and so on.   
 
Stalin’s quip in the 1930s, “The Pope? How many divisions has he got?”, 
symbolically captured the idea that religions’ social and political power in the 20th 
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century had become virtually negligent. “Is God Dead?” tellingly asked the Times on a 
1966 cover. That very same year the secular Arab Nationalist government of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser in Egypt was executing Sayyid Qutb, one of the founders of modern 
Islamism. It is no coincidence then that key texts explicitly outlining the theory of 
secularization were written at the height of the Cold War during the 1960-70s. Likewise, 
ever since E.H. Carr’s seminal work on The Twenty Years Crisis (Carr and Cox 2001),  
much of IR’s development as a discipline took shape within this international context. 
The understanding by social scientists that the world was on a relentlessly secularizing 
trajectory was clearly not only naïve or the product of blind hope, but reflected real-world 
historical events and secular regimes that seemed to prove their theories and assumptions 
right.  
 
 
American Foreign Policy as a Secular Practice  
 
 
The international context described above influenced not only the development of 
secularization theory and IR theory, but also the environment within which American 
foreign policy would be formulated and executed. Indeed this was, and still is in many 
respects, the secular historical and intellectual context within which much of the 
American foreign policy establishment, its institutional architecture, and practices 
developed over most of the second half of 20th century. Indeed, a central claim of this 
thesis is that, at least up until the end of the 1990s, American foreign policy practices and 
policy-making institutional and cultural structures were largely secular, in the multiple 
ways identified earlier.   
 
It is important to be clear about what exactly I am claiming here. The cornerstone 
of my argument is premised on an important distinction. One that separates the 
management and execution of foreign policy by state officials and bureaucracies, which I 
argue has overwhelmingly been secular, from the significant influence religion has 
regularly had on the history, politics, character and identity of Americans, whether 
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ordinary people or presidents (for a good overview see Guth, Smidt, and Kellstedt 2009). 
In the latter case, religious influences have spilled over into foreign policy especially by 
molding presidents’ character and by articulating a religiously-infused sense of mission 
and exceptionalism ever since Puritan pilgrims stepped on America’s shores (McDougall 
1997; Preston 2012). This is the propensity by Americans to construct their nation’s 
identity around notions of providential destiny and by presidents and high-level 
policymakers to publicly adopt or use religious discourses to frame, explain, and 
legitimize foreign policy choices.  
 
Yet, while presidents, from the Cold War (Inboden 2008) to more recent times 
(Bacevich and Prodromou 2004; Marsden 2011b), may have regularly called upon 
religious language and beliefs to explain and justify individual decisions or grand 
strategies, rarely, if ever, were religious concerns and norms seen to inform entire policy 
frameworks or underline specific institutional structures. For instance, throughout most of 
the second half of the 20th century American efforts to promote human right norms were 
largely carried out within a secular framework of civil and political rights. There was 
sporadic attention to issues of religious freedom, as was the case with the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment of 1974 against the Soviet Union’s curbs on Soviet Jewish emigration to 
Israel. Nevertheless little structured and systematic policy attention was given to the state 
of religious individuals, minorities and groups more broadly around the world. Likewise 
for most of its existence since the 1960s up until the late 1990s, the way the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) would design its programs and distribute its 
funds was largely carried out in a secular fashion. Foreign aid resources would 
overwhelmingly be distributed to secular NGOs and implementing partners. Likewise 
most developmental theories and paradigms informing aid policies at the time largely 
discarded the role of religion, if not even seeing as a major stumbling block, on the road 
to development.  
 
National security policy discourses and practices were deeply secularized during 
the Cold War as well. Surely did Presidents, like Truman, Eisenhower and Reagan, rely 
on religious language and idioms to frame the Cold War. However, policy discussions 
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were largely a secular affair between nuclear deterrence and détente, great power 
management, and competition between two broad secularist political and economic 
projects. The National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), considered the forefather of 
recent National Security Strategies (NSSs), did have a rather religious tone and messianic 
streak and Soviet Communism was referred to as dangerous “faith”, yet religious issues 
and actors were never mentioned as an important security concern in and of themselves. 
Catholic Popes, from Pius XII to John Paul II, and Islamist groups, such as Afghan 
Mujahidin, were called upon by Presidents to fight against the common atheist enemy. 
Yet most of this activity was carried out in an episodic and undercover fashion, rather 
than publicly or as part of a coherent long-term strategy of engaging with religious actors.  
 
Similarly, at least up until the late 1990s, institutions with international functions 
– such as the White House, State Department, and USAID – were organized in strictly 
secular terms. They had no major departments that were purposively assigned to either 
systematically producing and disseminating knowledge and norms that related to religion, 
or overseeing policies with a religious content. Religious and religious related actors 
were not called upon in any structured and systematic way to participate, manage or 
deliver foreign policy. The overwhelming culture in many of these bureaucracies, as well 
as among the civil servants and policy-makers staffing them, was a deeply secularist one 
(either in epistemic or ideological terms).  
 
Capturing both the use of religious rhetoric as a political tool and simultaneously 
its comparable absence from policy discourses and practices, former Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright recalls how:  
“During my adult years, western leaders gained political advantage by 
deriding “godless communism;” otherwise I cannot remember any leading 
American diplomat (even born-again Christian Jimmy Carter) speaking in 
depth about the role of religion in shaping the world. Religion was not a 
respecter of national borders; it was above and beyond reason; it evoked 
the deepest passions; and historically, it was the cause of much bloodshed. 
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Diplomats in my era were taught not to invite trouble, and no subject 
seemed more inherently treacherous than religion.” (2006, p.8) 
 
The education that American foreign policy-makers (diplomats, development 
professionals and national security officials) received, the universities they would attend 
and the international relations (Shah, Philpott, and Toft 2011) or development theories 
(Deneulin and Bano 2009, Ch.2) they were socialized in, rarely if ever mentioned religion 
as a relevant or unproblematic factor in world politics. “People in our government”, 
Berger has argued in the wake of 9/11, “are trained to think of the world in terms of a 
giant ivory chessboard where states make highly rational moves to checkmate their 
opponents and there is no room for cultural forces” (quoted from Morgan 2001, 
webpage).53 In other words there is an important distinction to be made between political 
elites (presidents and members of congress), and intellectual and policy elites. As Peter 
Berger has put it: “In the U.S. political elites tend to be religious, they are a reflection of 
the American population at large. Intellectual and cultural elites instead are 
overwhelmingly secular” (2011, author’s participant observation). 
 
Moreover, the domestic normative environment, for most of the second half of the 
20th century, greatly discouraged American foreign policy bureaucracies and bureaucrats 
to openly and directly include, engage and support religious actors. The constitution’s 
Establishment Clause in the First Amendment (an expression of what was earlier labeled 
as state-normative secularism) was overwhelmingly interpreted in strict separationist 
terms. This strongly prohibited most forms of institutional and financial entanglement 
between church and state (PEW 2009c, p.11), and created a culture among foreign 
policy- and decision-makers where engagement with religious issues and actors was 
overwhelmingly discouraged and avoided.54 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Much of Hurd’s theoretically sophisticated work exposes the secularist assumptions that colour American 
policy-makers attitudes and practices towards religion in general and Islam in particular (2008, see 
especially Ch.6). 
54 For a good overview of how establishment clause norms have affected the worldview and practices of 
American foreign policy officials see: CSIS (2007, pp.3, 39-47). 
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Yet events domestically in the United States and internationally from the 1970s 
onwards progressively seemed to challenge secular processes and assumptions as 
religious actors, affiliations, identities and discourses gradually became ever more public 
and politically significant. The following section explores and historicizes how trends 
over the past fifty years have recast religious forces and factors as an important element 
of American domestic as well as international politics. 
 
 
Historicizing the Global Resurgence of Religion 
 
 
Secularization processes and secularist ideational knowledge structures came to define 
much political life and social scientific scholarship worldwide, along with American 
foreign policy practices and decision-making structures, for most of the past century. 
Simultaneously, however a slow, progressive and discernible shift in the political salience 
of religion has occurred in the United States and round the world. This section briefly 
historicizes processes of religious resurgence, as defined in the introduction in terms of 
the politicization of religion/s and the religionization of politics. This part is mainly 
descriptive and empirical, as opposed to the discussion about resurgence of religion in the 
introduction that largely focused on definitional and conceptual issues.  
 
The mixing of politics and religion has a long history in America ever since the 
first Pilgrims stepped off the Mayflower. Likewise, religious individuals and leaders have 
taken part in many social progressive or conservative movements in the past century or so 
to abolish slavery, prohibit alcohol, or promote civil rights for African Americans. Yet 
since the 1970s a “diminishing divide” (Kohut et al. 2000) between religion and politics 
has been observed as religious actors and discourses started to enter the American public 
sphere in qualitatively new and increasingly assertive ways compared to preceding 
decades. First of all, the growing numerical weight and political activism from the 1970s 
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onwards by previously disengaged Protestant Evangelicals around social and values 
issues,55 has led to a remarkably close intertwining of religion and politics in past decades.  
 
In 1976 Jimmy Carter was the first Southern Baptist “born again” president to be 
elected. In 1979 the televangelist Jerry Falwell founded the Moral Majority, which gave 
birth to the modern American Christian and Religious Right movements. This was the 
first ever grass-roots movement with the explicit goal of rallying religious conservatives 
across the board in support of conservative candidates and encouraging church goers to 
register as voters. Ronald Reagan actively courted conservative Christians’ votes and was 
elected in 1981 thanks in part to the open support of Falwell’s Moral Majority. Many 
prominent conservative Christian political action and advocacy organizations aimed at 
influencing politics and public policy still active today, took shape during these 
decades.56 The growing entanglement between Protestant Evangelicals, the Religious 
Right movement, and the Republican Party, has been a fixture of American politics ever 
since then and has successfully propelled the “born again” Governor of Texas George W. 
Bush into the presidency during the 2000s.57  
 
More widely, there has been a generalized and an unparalleled growth in the 
degree of organized religious lobbying and advocacy in Washington D.C. Not just by 
Christian conservative organizations, but across the Christina and non-Christian religious 
and theological spectrum. Allen Hertzke, the scholar who most closely has traced this 
trend, points out that: “for most of the nation’s history, religious interest group activity 
was episodic, not institutionalized” (Hertzke 2009, p.300). Herzke (2012, p.24) has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This activism was spurred by what Protestant Evangelicals perceived as the moral decay of the 1960-70s, 
exemplified by: the abolition of school prayer, the feminist and anti-Vietnam war movements, the 
legalization of abortion in Roe v. Wade and the Watergate scandal. 
56 For instance: James Dobson’s Focus on the Family in 1977 and his Family Research Council in 1981; 
Robert G. Grant’s Christian Voice in 1978, Ed McAteer’s Religious Roundtable in 1979 and with Tim 
LaHayne the Coalition for Religious Freedom in 1982; Beverly LaHaye’s Concerned Women for America 
in 1979; Louis P. Sheldon’s Traditional Values Coalition in 1980; and Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition 
in 1988. Some have dissolved, others mutated, and others are still active today. 
57 The literature addressing the politicization of Evangelicals, the birth of the Christian and Religious Right 
movements in America, and their relationship to the Republican Party is huge. For good places to start, see: 
Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2007, Ch.8); Wilcox (1992); Wilcox and Larson (2006). 
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counted that in the 1940-50s there were roughly 30 religious advocacy groups58 with a 
permanent office and paid employees in the greater Washington, D.C. area. By the 1970s, 
the number had more than doubled to 67 and by 2011 roughly 216 religious advocacy 
groups were operating in and around Washington D.C. Herzke, aptly captures the social 
process of religious resurgence when arguing that the “growth in the number of religion-
related advocacy organizations appears to have kept pace with – or even exceeded – the 
growth in some other common types of advocacy organizations [emphasis added].” (2012, 
p.14) 
 
Moreover, scholars have found that the policy concerns of religious activists have 
widened exponentially over the decades. In terms of domestic politics, religious activists 
have sought legislation on issues from regulating personal morality, combating social 
injustice, addressing immigration problems. They have attempted to influence Supreme 
Court appointments and have articulated broad policy frameworks on the role of the 
government in domestic politics and economics (Green, Jones, and Cox 2009). 
 
In parallel, a qualitative and quantitative shift has occurred in recent decades in 
the attention and engagement by religious activists and groups to international issues 
(Abrams 2001). Once again a caveat is in order here. I am not suggesting that activism 
and interest on the part of religious actors on international issues in the past was absent, 
indeed this was not the case. 59  This activism, however, was largely sporadic and 
tokenistic. A watershed and groundbreaking moment in the direct and overt engagement 
by church and denominational-based organizations in American public life on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Ranging from un-affiliated religiously-based organizations, to organizations officially representing the 
interests of a particular religious institution, denomination or tradition, to issue-specific coalitions. 
59 Historically American religious interest groups have focused periodically on international and foreign 
affairs issues (Ribuffo 2001). American Christian organizations have carried out missionary work in 
developing countries, reporting back to parishioners about conditions abroad, since the 19th century. 
Mainline Protestant churches had a pivotal role in pressing for the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948 (Nurser 2005). Churches also were central in the anti-Vietnam protests. Likewise 
conservative Christian activists have long been fervent anti-communist since the 1950s. During the Reagan 
years Christian conservatives – encouraged by the state department – were offering ideological and 
financial support to anti-communist forces in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (Martin 
2003). Much of this past activism was, however, often very specific and ad hoc rather than the 
professionalized, wide-ranging and systematic lobbying campaigns of recent decades by religious actors 
across groups and denominations. 
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international issues, according to the well-known sociologist of religion Robert Bellah 
(1986, pp.53, 56-57), was the U.S. Catholic Bishop’s “Pastoral Letter War and Peace” of 
1983. Bellah was noticing in the 1980s what by the 1990s and thereafter has become ever 
more apparent, the growth in religious lobbying on foreign policy concerns.  
 
By 2004, exemplifying these important shifts, the National Association of 
Evangelicals (NAE) released its most comprehensive ever policy document offering 
theological justification for religiously-based activism on an extensive number issues. 
The document was a turning point particularly in expanding Evangelicals’ agenda beyond 
a narrow focus on abortion and family values domestically, towards a much wider policy 
interest especially on international economic, humanitarian and security issues (NAE 
2004). Hertzke (2012, p.47) found that religious advocacy groups in Washington are 
addressing something like 300 different policy issues. Four-fifths out of the 216 groups 
surveyed, either focus on both domestic and international issues, or in a smaller 
percentage solely on foreign concerns.  
 
Processes of religionization of politics have occurred as well. Religion has 
progressively become a central component of how Americans think about political 
candidates and policy issues. While until Jimmy Carter, “presidents had largely declined 
to discuss their personal beliefs”, in past decades, however, scholars have noted that 
“now […] every ambitious politician does so” (Kohut et al. 2000, p.1). Confirming this 
trend some have found that the use of religious references and language in presidential 
speeches has increased exponentially from the Reagan years up to the Bush presidency 
(Domke and Coe 2007; see also Balmer 2008).60 In the footsteps of conservatives, 
Democrats across the board have in recent years increasingly spoken about their faith 
more openly and engaged with religious voters more directly (ABC 2007).  
 
Barack Obama has often expressed publicly and with ease his own faith. Ever 
since his 2006 speech at Sojourners’ Call to Renewal conference, Obama embraced the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Elizabeth Prodromou argues: “American Presidents have always been, to some degree, religious and 
praying. What is different is that now religion is politicized – I pray therefore vote for me!, I pray therefore 
I am a Republican! I pray therefore I vote! and so on” (2011, author’s interview).  
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notion that religion had an important role to play in the public sphere and that Democrats 
should not shy away from it. He has been eager to engage with evangelicals (Broder 
2008) and explain how his administration’s economic and tax policies are informed by 
faith and religious beliefs (Riley 2012). The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 
America’s preeminent foreign affairs think tank, has launched a “Campaign 2012 blog” 
scrutinizing the foreign policy dimensions of the presidential race. One of its posts, 
noting how issues of religion and faith have become hot topics over the years, 
suggestively argues that:  
“Questions on religion are no longer limited to the quizzing of candidates 
on their beliefs, but now include hard hitting inquiries into how each 
candidates’ views on religion and religious freedom will shape his policy 
overseas.”61  
 
Simultaneously over the past four-five decades processes of religious resurgence 
have occurred worldwide. Starting from the Middle East, Shah and Toft (2006, p.40) 
have argued, religious politics has been on the rise ever since Israel’s victory against 
Arab nationalist regimes in the 1967 Six Day War. On the one hand, Israel’s capture of 
the Old City of Jerusalem and the West Bank spurred a revival of religious Zionism 
within the country itself. This further led to the creation of the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the 
Faithful), the first movement committed to establishing Jewish settlements in the 
occupied Palestinian territories – or as they saw it, in the biblical Land of Israel (see also 
Weissbrod 1982). With time religious settlers and parties – such as Mafdal and Shas – 
have emerged as important contenders to secular forces in Israeli politics itself. Quite 
symbolically, in past decades, the secular socialist kibbuz has been replaced by the 
religious settlement in the Israeli geography and collective imagery.62  
 
On the one hand, the defeat of Arab armies in 1967 progressively eroded the 
attractiveness of secular Arab nationalist ideologies and gradually opened up an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 For the quote and link to the blog post see: http://www.cfr.org/about/newsletters/archive/newsletter/n563 
(accessed 18/08/2012) 
62 See for example: Cohen and Susser (2000); Sandler (1996).  
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ideational vacuum increasingly filled by rising Islamist movements in the region (see 
also: Ajami 1992, pp.60-73). The longed for peace agreement between the Israelis and 
Palestinians reached by the Israeli Labor Government and Arafat’s Fatah secularist 
nationalist movement in 1993 (i.e. the Oslo Accords) was short lived. It was promptly 
jettisoned with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by Yigal Amir, a right-wing religious 
Zionist, and by an intense suicide bombing campaign led by Islamist Palestinian 
organizations such as Hamas (formed in 1987-88). When in 2000 the second intifada, 
also known as the Al Aqsa intifada, broke out religious actors and issues had become 
entangled in the conflict more so than ever before (Nyroos 2001).  
 
 Over the past decades all across Northern Africa, the Middle East, and in parts of 
Central, Southern and South Eastern Asia, Islam and politics have progressively and 
unexpectedly mixed in multiple ways and with different intensities according to local 
context.63 The 1979 Iranian revolution was an important turning point for secular regimes 
in the Middle East. A new Islamic Republic, at whose helm stood the Supreme Leader 
and Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, replaced the Western-backed secularizing monarchy of 
the Shah. Ever since 1982-85 Hezbollah has become a fixture of Lebanese politics. In 
1991 the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front went on to win the first round of elections, 
then cancelled by a military coup that led to a bloody civil war. Around the mid-1990s, 
the Taliban took control of Afghanistan. In 2003 the moderate Islamist party AKP in 
Turkey won the elections and Recep Teyyip Erdogan became the country’s first non-
secularist Prime Minister. In 2006 it was Hamas’ turn to gain a majority at the ballot box. 
By 2012 the Arab spring is sweeping Islamists at the forefront of political activity from 
Tunisia to Egypt.  
 
The 1980-90s were another major turning point in the fortunes of secularizing 
regimes and ideologies worldwide as Soviet Communism withered. While the Pope 
surely had long lost its military divisions, the Catholic Church and the Solidarity 
movement played a pivotal role in the complex protest cycles that toppled the Communist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The literature on political Islam has exploded over the years, for good places to start see: Ayoob (2008); 
Eickelman and Piscatori (2004). 
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regime in Poland. A protest movement that grew ever since Pope John Paul II made his 
first symbolic and highly political visit to Poland in 1979 (the same year of the Iranian 
revolution and the founding of Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority). Overall, Catholics had 
already become more socially and politically engaged ever since the Second Vatican 
Council in the 1960s – an event which some partially credit for the “third wave” of 
democratization that began in the 1970s (Huntington 1991, pp.76–85; Philpott 2007, 
pp.510-13).  
 
In Russia, since the 1990s, a rapprochement has occurred between the Orthodox 
Church and the state (Lisovskaya and Karpov 2010). In the aftermath of the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, the former-Yugoslavia imploded. Here the overarching Communist 
ideology and identity, which was already in disrepair in the 1980s, was then finally 
abandoned and local populations re-constituted around ethnic and religious lines among 
Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Muslim Bosniaks. Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish 
Islamist movements soon filled the post-Soviet Central Asian space left empty by the 
collapsing empire, among others with the scope to Islamize local societies, promote 
sharia law and create Islamic states (Adamson 2005). China is currently experiencing a 
revival of Confucianism, promoted in the past decade by President Hu Jintao as a way of 
filling the vacuum left by withering Maoist state ideology and identity (Hu 2007). In 
India, Hindu nationalists have been on the rise since the 1960s, winning national 
elections in the 1990s with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Buddhism generally thought 
of as a religion of introspective withdrawal, has become increasingly engaged in social 
and political issues starting in the 1960s in Vietnam and then across parts of Asia from 
Thailand, to Myanmar, and Sri Lanka (Queen and King 1996).  
 
Even in supposedly secularized Western Europe religion has become a more 
significant political issue in recent decades. This is apparent in debates about the place of 
Christianity in Europe’s political identity – either promoted by the Catholic Church or by 
Right Wing populists such as Geert Wilders in Holland – and about the EU’s apparent 
unease towards integrating “Muslim” immigrants within its borders and Turkey at its 
periphery (see Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006). Bastions of European Enlightenment 
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philosophy such as Jurgen Habermas (2006) have recognized the need to engage in a less 
prejudicial way with religious discourses and actors.  
 
From an international relations and American foreign policy perspective, the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, were a pivotal moment. These events seemed to bring 
together many loosely connected trends connected with the global resurgence of religion 
across religions and countries. Since then, the newfound political salience of religion 
moved decisively beyond domestic and regional politics into the international sphere. 
Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda’s terrorist act brought abruptly to the fore, not just the 
violent dimension, but also the global and globalized character of political Islam and 
Muslim politics (Mandaville 2005; Roy 2004). American exceptionalism and Bush’s 
personal religious faith seemed to converge in his administration’s crusading and 
missionary zeal to spread freedom and democracy around the world (Judis 2005; Monten 
2005).  
 
Discourses following 9/11 in the U.S. and around the Middle East increasingly 
acquired the religiously charged and vitriolic language of “good” versus “evil”, 
“crusaders” versus “jihadists”, “Muslims” versus “Christians”. Thereafter the United 
Nations (UN) would declare itself committed to fostering, not only peace among nations, 
but also a “Dialogue Among Civilizations”. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair has, 
rather surprisingly, set up an impressive Faith Foundation upon leaving 10 Downing 
Street in 2008 geared towards fostering interreligious understanding and dialogue.  
 
American news channels like CNN64 and international ones like the BBC or Al 
Jazeera, have all become saturated with reports and debates about religion: from the 
status of sectarian conflicts and religious minorities in America, the Middle East or 
Africa; to the attempts of communities and government to re-define the place of religion 
in the public sphere in places like the U.S., France or Turkey; controversies about 
building mosques in Switzerland or Islamic centers in New York; attacks on churches in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Since the 2000s, CNN.com has a specialized blog exploring and reporting on the role of faith and 
religion on all sorts of facets of domestic and international life: religion.blogs.cnn.com 
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Nigeria, Egypt and Iraq; Buddhist monks protesting in Tibet and Myanmar; the political 
and often violent repercussions of Korans burned either in Florida, in Guantanamo or 
Kabul; and the place of Judeo-Christian, Muslim, or Confucian values in modern politics. 
 
Compared to the high-water mark reached in the 1960s by the secular, in its 
multiple forms, processes and ideational constructs, the historical trends of religious 
revival described above all amount to a substantial shift in the domestic and international 
social and ideational context within which American foreign policy is formulated and 
executed. Investigating and explaining how the developments associated with the 
resurgence of religion have contributed to changing, and in particular to progressively 
desecularize, American foreign policy is the main scope of the following empirical 
chapters. The next and final section of this chapter is dedicated to defining and providing 
a conceptual framework to explore processes of foreign policy desecularization.  
 
 
Desecularization in Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework 
 
 
The global resurgence of religion over the past decades, most vividly manifesting itself in 
international politics following 9/11, has not only led scholars to revisit their secular 
theories and biases within the social sciences. It also brought to the fore in Washington 
D.C., particularly since the end of the Cold War, a wide variety of actors that have sought 
to challenge the secular consensus and status quo underpinning much of American 
foreign policy-making processes and practices. This challenge is so profound that, this 
thesis argues, American foreign policy has been subject to important desecularizing 
pressures and processes. This section conceptually defines and analytically unpacks the 
concept of desecularization. Building and expanding upon the work of Peter Berger and 
Vyacheslav Karpov, it applies this concept to issues of foreign policy, in general, and 
American foreign policy, in particular.  
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Defining Desecularization  
 
Peter Berger was the first to use and coin the term “desecularization”. Berger’s intent was 
more descriptive rather than to develop a clear framework to study and theorize processes 
that ran counter and against secularizing trends and forces, as the term desecularization 
suggests. When speaking about desecularization Berger sought chiefly to capture the idea 
that religions were going through a period of revival across the world and that this 
process was severely undermining a whole body of literature loosely labeled as 
“secularization theory” (Berger 1999, p.2).  
 
As Christopher Marsh succinctly notes: “it is more the persistence of religion that 
he [Berger] is highlighting, not so much the religicization (sic.) of a secularized world, 
which the term seems to imply” (2011, p.11). Likewise Karpov points out that Berger’s 
desecularization thesis in 1999 “focused more on the nature and social origins of 
resurgent religions than on their societal impact” (2010, p.238). Clearly the two 
phenomena of religious resurgence and desecularization are linked, if not even mutually 
reinforcing in many respects, yet they should be kept analytically distinct. The former 
relates more generally to the multiple causes, manifestations and effects of religion’s 
expanding influence on politics and societies. The latter instead concentrates more 
specifically on a particular type of social change: when, why and how boundaries 
between “the secular” and “the religious” shift and change, especially in favour of the 
latter rather than the former.  
 
Karpov has advanced a conceptual framework that analytically defines and 
operationalizes the concept of desecularization. For Karpov desecularization is a “process 
of counter-secularization, through which religion reasserts its societal influence in 
reaction to previous and/or co-occurring secularizing processes” (2010, p.250). In this 
definition desecularization is not just another way to describe the resurgence of religion, 
but entails a clear process whereby there is a pushback and reaction against secularizing 
trends and secular forces.  
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Taking different concepts of secularization, Karpov conceptualizes 
desecularization as the symmetrical opposite of these processes. He outlines five distinct 
processes of counter-secularization, all of which are quite generic and mostly applicable 
to social phenomena that do not relate directly to foreign policy. He identifies and 
distinguishes between the following cases of desecularization: a) a rapprochement 
between formerly secularized institutions and religious norms; b) a resurgence of 
religious beliefs and practices; c) a return of religion to the public sphere; d) a revival of 
religious content in culture and science; e) religion-related changes in society’s 
substratum (including religiously inspired demographic changes, redefinition of 
territories and their populations along religious lines, reappearance of faith-related 
material structures, etc.) (2010, p.250). 
 
This is a good starting point, but one that has a number of limitations for the 
purposes of my research. First, Karpov focuses nearly exclusively on processes of 
counter-secularizations as in the case of (a), (b) and (c), but does not unpack as clearly 
instances of counter-secularisms, which are somewhat folded in his definition of 
desecularization as (d). My earlier discussion about the secular emphasized that attention 
to secularization/s, as historical process/es, should be complemented by an equal 
attention to secularism/s, as ideational construct/s, a distinction that is less explicit in 
Karpov’s work. I suggest that the concept of desecularization be enlarged to include 
broader phenomena of contestation of the secularist status quo. That is a contestation of 
the contours, practices, assumptions and norms associated with secularist ideational 
constructs. Desecularization in this expanded sense becomes a phenomenon by which 
secularist epistemic knowledge, ideologies and state-norms are not only exposed and 
questioned but their influence and power is eroded. I hence expand upon Karpov’s 
definition of desecularization as (d) to include a more explicit reference to the constituent 
processes that relate to three counter-secularist phenomena.  
 
Second, Karpov’s framework is a broad and general take on desecularization 
which encompasses multiple levels and units-of-analysis from individuals, to religious 
communities, domestic societies, state institutions, and ultimately even civilizations 
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(2010, pp.259-62). My concern though is more specific, namely with a state’s foreign 
policy practices and policy-making structures. As such I will go through Karpov’s five 
component processes of desecularization, unpacking whether and how they may or may 
not relate to issues of foreign policy – with a particular focus on American foreign policy.  
 
Desecularization and Foreign Policy 
 
Taking the notion of secularization as functional differentiation, Karpov argues that 
desecularization happens when there is a rapprochement and growing entanglement 
between secular spheres and religious norms and institutions (a). Given that this 
component process of desecularization largely identifies the shifting and increasingly 
overlapping boundaries between state institutions and policies, and religious norms and 
actors, it has great import here. Especially in terms of investigating how religious norms 
and actors become ever more entangled with a state’s foreign policy practices, and 
policy-making institutions and processes. Karpov then identifies desecularization with 
both a resurgence of religious beliefs and practices (b), and a return of religion to the 
public sphere (c) both as a reaction to previous processes of secularization. Since my 
object of analysis is the state and changes to its foreign policies and institutions, it is 
difficult to include processes (b) and (c) which largely focus on the individual and non-
state level of analysis. As such they will not be included in this and following analysis.  
 
Karpov’s concept of desecularization as (d) builds upon the idea of secularization 
as affecting the type of ideas and knowledge which are produced in the social world in 
terms of a “revival of religious content in a variety of culture’s subsystems, including the 
arts, philosophy, and literature, and in a decline of the standing of science relative to a 
resurgent role of religion”. In other words, what he is indirectly suggesting is that 
desecularization is also a process by which secularist ideational constructs are challenged 
and lose their uncontested power over different forms of knowledge and norms. Building 
on the classification of secularism proposed earlier it is possible to identify processes of 
epistemic, ideological and state-normative desecularization.  
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When it comes to foreign policy, epistemic desecularization means that 
(conscious or unconscious) secularist worldviews of policy-makers and the secularist 
culture of institutions with international functions are eroded. Policy-makers and 
institutions stop viewing international politics as if religion was irrelevant and simply 
epiphenomenal. In its mild forms epistemic desecularization leads to treating religious 
actors and factors as serious and important issues in world politics and foreign policy. 
Hence data is collected, research conducted, knowledge produced and content 
disseminated on a wide variety of issues linked to religion. In deeper forms of epistemic 
desecularization, religion becomes perceived as the primarily constitutive element of 
actors’ (whether individuals, organizations or states) identities, and social and political 
behaviour, to the point that religious actors and identities become reified as 
spokespersons and representative for entire countries and people. Epistemic 
desecularization, for example, may shift how policy-makers see the international 
environment, the way foreign policy is conducted on a day-to-day basis, and the content 
and form of policy initiatives.  
 
Ideological secularism views the mixing of religion and politics as problematic, 
either as a source of conflict, an impediment to development and progress, as a recipe for 
intolerance, and so on. Hence ideological desecularization erodes the notion among 
policy-makers that religion is “the problem” and instead creates an awareness of religion 
as “the solution” to the issue at hand. This is reflected in foreign policies that are not 
reluctant to engage with religious actors and issues. They are instead purposively 
designed, to a greater or lesser extent, to either utilize religious and religious-related 
actors or moulded around religious norms in order to produce hoped-for outcomes, such 
as resolving conflicts, fighting terrorism, reducing poverty, eradicating HIV/AIDS, and 
so on.  
 
Finally, processes of desecularization of state-normative secularism revolve 
around the reinterpretation, and in the most extreme cases redrafting, of norms of church 
and state separation in less stringent and separationist ways. In the case of the United 
States, the opening lines of the Constitution’s First Amendment address the issue of 
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church-state entanglement by stating that: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”. Both the 
“Establishment Clause” and the “Free Exercise Clause” are generally thought of as 
operating not only to protect the State from religious interference, but also the religious 
liberty and freedom of conscience of Americans from state interference. Quoting Thomas 
Jefferson, the Supreme Court stated in the 1947 landmark decision Everson v. Board of 
Education that the Establishment Clause was intended to erect a “wall of separation” 
between church and state.  
 
How thick and impermeable or thin and porous this “wall” is, depends very much 
on the extent to which the Establishment Clause is interpreted across time. During 
heightened periods of secularization and when secularist ideologies are powerful it is 
likely that a strict separationist interpretation of the establishment clause dominates the 
Supreme Court as well as among foreign policy-makers (i.e. the wall is a firewall). In 
periods of religious resurgence or when epistemic and ideological secularisms are 
vibrantly contested the expectation is that the clause is interpreted in more 
accommodationist terms (i.e. the wall is more like a porous net).65 
 
Overall, foreign policy desecularization, especially in the case of American 
foreign policy-making and implementation, is expected to manifest itself as a 
combination of some, or all, the following component processes.66 
 
In terms of counter-secularization: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The terminology used here of “separationism” and “accommodationism” when it comes to interpretations 
of the Establishment Clause, is taken from Christian Smith (2003). According to Smith a strict separationist 
interpretation generally “privileges the secular over the religious by excluding religion from whole spheres 
of public life” (2003, p.ix). Accommodationist interpretations instead are those who want the “state to 
advantage one or all religions in public life because of the benefits for democracy and civic life that 
religion is said to provide” (2003, p.ix). Among accommodationist there are exclusivists and pluralists: the 
former tend to privilege one religion over others, the latter tend to privilege all religions over non-religion. 
66 Karpov identifies a further process of secularization and counter-secularization. This deals with declining 
and resurging religious influences on society’s material substratum such as religiously inspired 
demographic changes, the redefinition of territories and their populations along religious lines, 
reappearance of faith-related material structures such as buildings, and so on. This is a process less 
immediately applicable to foreign policy and hence will be overlooked here. 
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a) A rapprochement and/or growing entanglement between religious and religious-
related norms and concerns with a state’s foreign policy, which can lead to the 
development of short- and long-term policy frameworks and practices with a 
religious content;  
b) A rapprochement and/or growing entanglement between religious and religious-
related actors and the state, whereby the former are increasingly engaged and 
systematically called upon to deliver foreign policy objectives; 
c) A rapprochement and/or growing entanglement between religious and religious-
related norms and concerns with a state’s policy-making process. This can lead to 
the short- and long-term creation of new institutions, departments, offices and 
positions outside or within existing bureaucracies to accommodate and manage 
foreign policies with a religious content; 
d) A rapprochement and/or growing entanglement between religious and religious-
related actors and the state, whereby the former are increasingly and 
systematically included in and gain influence over the foreign policy-making 
process; 
 
In terms of counter-secularism: 
e) A loosening grip of secularist epistemic knowledge over policy-makers 
worldviews and institutional culture. As a result religious dynamics and factors 
are no longer ignored, but taken seriously if not even, in the most extreme cases, 
considered as the principal force animating specific international events. This 
affects and shapes the kind of knowledge that is produced, policies that are 
implemented, and actors engaged.  
f) A loosening grip of ideological secularism over policy-makers worldviews and 
institutional culture. As a result religious dynamics and factors are no longer 
considered solely as a source of problems (antithetic to peace, security, 
development, growth, prosperity, wellbeing, etc), but also as part of the solution 
to a wide range of issues. This affects and shapes the kind of knowledge that is 
produced, policies that are implemented, and actors engaged. 
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g) The reinterpretation, informally by policy-makers and more formally by Supreme 
Court judges, of previously strict secularist state-norms of church and state 
separation towards a more accommodationist view. One that allows for a closer 
entanglement between church and state, and support by the state to religious 
actors and norms.  
 
It is important to emphasize that these processes of desecularization are not 
necessarily correlated. They may actually be weakly integrated, if at all. Casanova keeps 
the processes of secularization (as secular differentiation, privatization of religion, and 
religious decline) analytically distinguished in order to capture diverse historical patterns 
and on-going processes. The same applies for counter-secularizing processes. Karpov 
explains the un-integrated nature of desecularization as follows: “counter-secularization’s 
component changes may develop incongruently, be differently paced, and coexist with 
secularizing trends” (2010, p.248). 
 
As such, processes of desecularization as rapprochement of religious and secular 
institutions may be occurring in one area of foreign policy (say foreign aid assistance) 
while not occurring in others (for example in economic statecraft). A surge in politically 
expedient religious rhetoric by presidents does not necessarily imply a weakening of 
secularist epistemic knowledge among foreign policy-makers and within institutions. 
Even if a rapprochement between secular and religious institutions may be occurring at a 
particular place in time, if there is not an equal weakening of secularist state-norms 
towards a more accommodationist position, for example, this rapprochement may be 
short lived and soon declared unconstitutional and rolled back. This means that generally 
desecularization should be talked about in the plural, i.e. desecularizations or processes of 
desecularization, rather than in the singular. 
 
Desecularizing Actors: A Taxonomy  
 
As outlined in the previous theoretical chapter, proposing a Historical Sociological (HS) 
approach to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), one cannot presume that macro social and 
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cultural trends across time and space, themselves cause processes of foreign policy 
change. Hence, in order to understand and explain how the global resurgence of religion 
can lead to changes in American foreign policies and decision-making structures, it is 
essential to look at the role of agency. It becomes vital then to explore the identities and 
perceptions, and how these inform the actions, of individual and group actors who by 
virtue of being embedded in, or responding to, the macro-process of religious resurgence, 
mobilize to change the secular status quo in the foreign policy domain.  
 
A HS approach to FPA hence requires a focus on agency to explain foreign policy 
change, something which is perfectly compatible with Karpov’s suggestion that:  
“…students of desecularization need to embrace the agency-focused 
perspective. This involves a view of counter-secularization as the work of 
“desecularizing activists,” and, more broadly, specific social actors with 
specific interests, ideologies, and levels of access to resources [emphasis 
in the original].” (2010, p.252) 
 
Depending on the social actors involved, desecularization of social institutions 
and culture, according to Karpov, can be initiated and carried out “from below” and/or 
“from above.” He explains: 
“When the activists and actors involved are grassroots-level movements 
and groups representing the masses of religious adherents, we are dealing 
with a desecularization “from below.” When the activists and actors 
largely include religious and secular leadership, a desecularization “from 
above” is taking place.” (2010, p.254) 
 
Karpov’s discussion here is somewhat confusing and limiting. Confusing because 
it is not clear what the real difference and analytical import of having a distinction 
between desecularizing actors, as passive supporters, and activists, as active 
implementers, of desecularization is. Why not focus specifically on the latter for example? 
Furthermore, can we really call secular leadership “activists”, a terminology that captures 
grass-roots mobilization well, but less so agency at the elite political level. Do “religious 
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leaders” necessarily desecularize from above? Are not they supposed to be representing 
the “masses of religious adherents”? Maybe there is a great distance between religious 
leadership and masses, but this may not always be the case. Indeed, while Karpov may 
have in mind mainly Russia here (see Lisovskaya and Karpov 2010), in the United States 
for instance religious leaders are more likely to be desecularizing “from below” or at best 
“from the side”.  
 
Here is also where Karpov’s distinction from below and above is limiting. Indeed 
I argue desecularization may as well happen “sideways” by denominational leaders, 
policy experts and scholars who are neither representing grass-roots movements, nor part 
and parcel of political elites, but who still may have access from times to time to the 
highest levels of government and policy-making.  
 
Starting from Karpov’s insights I propose to use the term desecularizing actors as 
a more general category encapsulating an expanded and more specific taxonomy of 
agents. By desecularizing actors I intend to capture a great variety of individuals – 
religious, religious-related and even secular, in or outside government, operating either 
on their own or as members and spokespersons for broader organizations, movements or 
groups – and organizations – religious, religious-affiliated, and even secular (as in the 
case of some think tanks). These individual and organizational actors believe and 
perceive, or come to believe and perceive, for a variety of reasons that American foreign 
policy-making and implementation are too secular, that is too secularized and/or too 
secularist. They mobilize – from below, side and above – for the adoption of inherently 
religious policies and to promote desecularizing changes in the institutional and cultural 
structures of American foreign policy-making.  
 
I will now be more explicit about my taxonomy of desecularizing actors, which 
includes: activists, policy elites and political elites. First, there are desecularizing activists. 
These are religious and religious-related individuals – clerics, laypeople, religiously 
affiliated or unaffiliated campaigners and lobbyists – and organizations – faith-based 
organizations, church and denominational organizations, domestic or international 
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religious NGOs, and faith-based lobbies and advocacy networks. They are organized at 
the domestic or transnational civil society level and actively and directly lobby to include 
inherently religious concerns in American foreign policy. A religious leader, or faith-
based organization, or religious advocacy group is or becomes a desecularizing activist 
when, and only when, they advocate for inherently religious foreign policies, such as 
international religious freedom or faith-based initiatives. Not when they mobilize, 
motivated by their religious beliefs, for international policies with secular goals, such as 
support for Israel, promoting democracy, fighting climate change, and so on. In this latter 
case, activists are simply religious advocates and not desecularizing actors.  
 
Desecularizing activists are similar to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s 
(1998) “norm entrepreneurs”, but of a religious kind. Their intent is to promote, instead 
of secular liberal policies and norms, a bundle of inherently religious policies and norms, 
like attention to religious persecution and freedom, faith-based development, and 
abstinence only HIV/AIDS programs. Desecularizing activists are linked to the expansion 
of religious advocacy that has occurred in both American domestic politics and 
transnationally since the 1970s. In other words, desecularizing activists are not free 
floating agents but embedded in, sustaining and reproducing, the processes and structures 
of global religious resurgence. Activists, since they are organized at the civil society level, 
promote foreign policy desecularization “from below”. When and if activists are 
successful in their desecularizing efforts, they may be called upon to participate in 
making and implementing policies.  
 
A second category of desecularizing actors is members of what can be loosely 
defined as the policy elite. Part and parcel of this desecularizing policy elite are 
individuals and organizations that make up the American foreign policy establishment. 
These are the pundits, academics, scholars, and policy-makers working for research 
institutes, think tanks and universities in Washington, or with close connections to 
Washington and the government. In a sense they make up what Emanuel Adler and Peter 
Haas (1992) have called “epistemic communities”. Desecularizing policy elites have a 
recognized knowledge and expertise in a particular issue area, which they use to frame 
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international issues through religious lenses or in religious terms and persuade decision-
makers “from the side”, rather than “from below”, to adopt policies with a particular 
religious content. These pundits, scholars, advisors, and policy-makers are not elected 
officials and do not take part in Washington’s active political life, although they can be, 
and often are appointed, to specific policy-making positions within bureaucracies.67  
 
Members of the policy establishment can be divided in two kinds of 
desecularizers: principled and strategic. Principled desecularizing policy elites are 
“principled” by virtue of either acting out of deep religious convictions or in support of 
particular religious causes. They may be espousing similar religious-related norms and 
policies advocated by desecularizing activists. For example in the case of religious 
freedom there are grass-roots activist organizations as well as pundits and scholars that 
advocate American action on behalf of these norms internationally. In this sense, 
principled desecularizing policy elites are embedded and part and parcel of the process of 
religious resurgence.  
 
Strategic desecularizing policy elites are “strategic”, instead, because they 
perceive and believe that in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world, religious actors, 
identities, discourses and practices have become more salient to international affairs, and 
to America’s national interest. They are not “principled” because they do not necessarily 
seek to desecularize American foreign policy according to deeply felt religious beliefs 
and or in support of particular religious convictions. Hence, strategic policy elites tend 
not to be directly embedded in the social process of religious resurgence. They are, 
however, responding to the emerging structures of politicized religion (for example the 
rise of political Islam) and religionized politics (such as identity conflicts) beyond 
America’s shores. They conclude that an overly secularized foreign policy misses this 
new religious and cultural dimension of world affairs at America’s own expense, if not 
peril. As a result strategic desecularizing policy elites advocate for a retooling of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Karpov does recognize a specific role for “counter-secularizing intellectual vanguards” taking an active 
part along with “activist groups” in processes of secularization and counter-secularization (2010, p.253). 
Yet he does not fully tease out and specify, as instead is done here, this group as a distinct category of 
desecularizing actors.  
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secular premises on which American foreign policy rests so that it starts taking seriously, 
and acting upon, this new religiously fervent international reality.  
 
The third broad category of desecularizing actors is desecularizing political elites. 
I am referring here to presidents, as well as members of Congress, who out of their own 
initiative, or in response to successful lobbying pressures by activists, or persuaded by 
scholars, pundits and members of the policy establishment, take an active and crucial role 
in allowing or promoting counter-secularizing and counter-secularist changes. Whether 
political leaders decide to do so out of “principled” sincerely felt beliefs, or “strategic” 
political expediency or national security imperatives, is probably ultimately unknowable. 
The issue though is that without a level of political elite consent or initiative “from 
above”, new inherently religious foreign policies that revert the secular status quo would 
hardly come into existence.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
When it comes to the salience of religious forces and factors to domestic and 
international politics, the context within which American foreign policy is formulated and 
conducted has dramatically changed over the past 40 years. What appeared for most part 
of the 20th century as, and in many senses was, a secular or at least relentlessly 
secularizing world, over the past decades has instead gone through a worldwide process 
of religious resurgence. In response to these changing conditions IR scholars have started 
to revise their secular theories to include religion. Global processes of religious 
resurgence are imposing similar pressures on the secular practices, institutions, and 
norms that for the most part structure American foreign policy-making process and its 
execution.  
 
The following chapters will trace how, to what extent, and when a variety of 
desecularizing actors embedded within, or responding to, macro-processes of religious 
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resurgence have emerged to successfully renegotiate the boundaries between the secular 
and the religious in three broad foreign policy areas diplomacy and statecraft (Chapter 4), 
foreign assistance (Chapter 5), and national security (Chapter 6). Before doing so, 
however, the next chapter takes a closer look at cultural and institutional changes 
occurring within the largely secular foreign policy establishment in Washington D.C. It 
explores how the very same elite institutions and organizations – the universities which 
churn out graduates that end up staffing foreign policy positions, the think tanks which 
influence so much of the discourse and thinking in Washington – have gone through their 
own process of desecularization over the past decades.  
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3. THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT: EXPLORING THE 
NEXUS BETWEEN RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS 
 
 
 
 
 
With the end of the Cold War gone were the old debates in Washington D.C. about the 
Soviet threat, containment, balance of power, and mutually assured destruction. The 
American foreign policy establishment was left in search of new paradigms and 
perspectives that would help interpret and explain the world ahead. One was of course 
Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) optimist account of the “end of history” and the emergence 
of a peaceful and prosperous era driven by the triumph of economic and political 
liberalism. Another was Samuel Huntington’s famous “clash of civilizations” thesis 
(1993), which from the influential pages of Foreign Affairs, the leading journal among 
American foreign policy elites, offered a rather different vision of world politics.  
 
Huntington’s reference to civilizations, which he largely defined around religious 
identity and history, did much more for policy debates than just offer an alternative 
narrative to liberal cosmopolitan optimism. At a time when the former-Yugoslavia was 
imploding along ethnic-religious lines and Islamist movements were spreading across the 
Middle East, it abruptly brought center-stage within the halls of American punditry two 
sets of distinct, but interrelated, discussions about the role of “religion” in international 
affairs. On the one hand, Huntington indirectly shed attention to the vastly unexplored 
and seemingly ever-growing relevance of cultural and religious forces in international 
politics. On the other hand, his thesis cast a long shadow over the place of “Islam” in 
international politics, in general, and to American security, in particular.  
 
This chapter maps to a great extent these two broad sets of debates – about the 
role of “religion” and about the place of “Islam” in international affairs – which have 
progressively become a pervasive topic of research and discussion within the American 
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foreign policy establishment. I define the American foreign policy establishment as those 
individuals – scholars, pundits, out of office policy-makers – and institutions –
universities, think tanks, research and polling institutes – which form the intellectual 
milieu within which international relations issues and policies are analyzed and debated 
in and outside Washington D.C.  
 
The following section explores how the foreign policy establishment has 
progressively come to see international religious dynamics and religious-related issues 
like, among others, religious conflicts, persecution, peacemaking, and freedom as a 
constituent part of what international relations in a post-Cold War are about. It traces how 
“religion”, in a broad and general sense, from being largely ignored during the Cold War 
has become an ever more pressing interest and concern of the American foreign policy 
establishment. The second part is closely related to the first. But rather than looking at 
religion, it maps out instead how the religious categories of “Islam” and the “Muslim 
world” have relentlessly entered the everyday lexicon of scholarly and policy elites and 
shaped the research programs of numerous institutions and think tanks.  
 
The chapter contextualizes a number of changes in the institutional arrangements 
and intellectual climate of key international affairs think tanks and universities in relation 
to the global process of resurgence and historical events such as the end of the Cold War 
and 9/11. In particular it investigates desecularizing processes among foreign policy elites 
and within their institutions. It maps out counter-secularizing and counter-secularist 
trends and seeks to explain why they occurred when they did.  
 
In terms of counter-secularization: it highlights, on the one hand, the institutional 
changes such as the emergence of previously inexistent new centers, research programs, 
initiatives, dedicated to the study of “religion” or “Islam” in world politics. On the other 
hand, it maps out the growing practice among elite research institutes of including and 
engaging domestic and foreign religious actors in research programs and events. In terms 
of counter-secularism: it explores the progressive erosion of strict secularist 
understandings of international relations, in terms of believing that religious issues where 
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either overwhelmingly unimportant or singularly problematic in world politics,68 which 
largely permeated the foreign policy establishment’s intellectual climate during the Cold 
War. It traces how, since the 1990s onward, these elites are increasingly enquiring into, if 
not even reifying, the international political salience of “religion”69 and “Islam”.70 Along 
with mapping developments in institutions, research programs and university courses, I 
infer causation by tracing and exploring discourses within the foreign policy 
establishment that explain these changes in light of processes of religious resurgence.  
 
 
Religion, Religious Resurgence, and the Foreign Policy Establishment 
 
 
Before and During the 1990s  
 
Around the time Huntington developed his thesis, Douglas Johnston was working on the 
“Religion and Conflict Resolution Project” at the Center for Strategic & International 
Studies (CSIS). The project, which according to Jonhston, was at the time “a complete 
novelty for a think tank devoted to hardnosed strategic issues and known for its realist 
Cold War mentality” (2011b, author’s interview), culminated in the 1994 co-edited 
volume with Cynthia Sampson Religion: the Missing Dimension of Statecraft. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 I am here referring mainly to what I call epistemic and ideological secularism permeating the intellectual 
landscape. I am not talking about state-normative secularism since I am not looking in this chapter at state 
institutions and practices. 
69 Considerable generalisation is involved in using the term “religion”, hence the use of quotation marks at 
this point, which will be later omitted. Foreign policy establishment actors use the term “religion” in a 
number of ways. The word is often used either as an abstract analytical category which identifies religious- 
beliefs, identities, traditions, institutions and actors; or in the sense of a set of forces which relate to socio-
political dynamics such as religious- conflicts, violence, persecution, democratization, resurgence, and so 
on. My scope here is not to define, say, what a “religious belief” or a “religious conflict” actually is as 
opposed to the ways in which these terms are adopted by the foreign policy establishment. My intent is to 
explore how the notion of, say, “religious conflict” becomes increasingly a meaningful, uncontested, and 
accepted category of analysis in Washington structuring the type of debates and research which is 
conducted.   
70 Once again, like the case of religion, considerable generalisation is involved in using the terms “Islam” 
and “Muslim world”. Hence the use of quotation marks at this point, which will be omitted in what follows. 
I adopt this terminology, without however necessarily endorsing it, but just because it is what increasingly 
comes to be used by foreign policy elites – whose debates I hereby trace. 
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volume, produced under the auspices of a major Washington think tank, was among the 
first scholarly research and policy-oriented books to directly address the nexus between 
religion and American foreign policy.  
 
Johnston, linking the publication of the volume to processes of worldwide 
religious resurgence, recalls the impetus behind the research project as follows:  
“I had thought about such a book back in 1982. By 1987 when I was 
executive Vice President of CSIS I was able to start turning my ideas into 
reality. During the Cold War security environment, however, it was very 
difficult to think about religion and politics and we could find scarce 
funding for the project. But after 1989 – with Communism crumbling, 
having seen the role of the Polish Pope and Walesa in the process, and 
ethnic conflicts blossoming everywhere – five foundations came forward 
and we were able to move ahead.” (2011b, author’s interview) 
 
While Huntington brought indirect attention to religion, Johnston and Sampson’s 
intent was to push for an explicit intellectual paradigm shift by exposing both the 
epistemic and ideological secularist bias of the foreign policy and diplomatic 
establishment. Articles throughout the volume complained that in a world increasingly 
abuzz with religious fervor, the intellectual traditions and statecraft practices American 
diplomats and policy-makers were steeped in were stubbornly secularist. American 
statecraft suffered from an “enlightenment prejudice” some suggested (Luttwak 1994, 
p.9), or “dogmatic secularism” others lamented (Burnett 1994, p.286). This secularist 
bias, the book argued, was problematic for two reasons. First it led scholars, 
policymakers and diplomats to discount the growing salience of religion in international 
affairs. Secondly if religion was to be brought back into the study and praxis of 
international diplomacy, it should not be seen solely as a cause of conflicts, but also as a 
way to foster nonviolent change, and preventing or resolving conflicts. While the book 
was groundbreaking and received positive reviews, among others, by Francis Fukuyama 
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on the pages of Foreign Affairs,71 it remained however largely a lonely voice in an 
overwhelmingly secularized intellectual panorama.  
 
In the same decade, some started to notice the growing impact that religiously 
based advocacy groups, especially conservative evangelical ones, were having on 
American foreign policy. This was a time, as the previous chapter highlighted, of 
growing activism by domestic faith-based organizations and movements on international 
issues. This revolved, among others, around concerns for alleged religious persecution of 
Christians in the Middle East and remaining Communist countries (more on this in 
Chapter 4), as well as worldwide poverty and development (more on this in Chapter 5). A 
work that aptly captured these changes was the edited volume The Influence of Faith: 
Religious Groups and US Foreign Policy by Elliott Abrams (2001).  
 
Abrams, a prominent neoconservative pundit and policymaker, was at the time of 
preparing the volume in the late 1990s president of the Ethics and Public Policy Center 
(EPPC)72 and a member of the United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom (USCIRF).73  The volume was the first of its kind that extensively explored the 
role of faith-based groups such as missionary and relief organizations in the formulation 
and implementation of U.S. policy. It featured essays by scholars interested in religion 
and politics like Samuel Huntington and Allen Hertzke, as well as Andrew Natsios, a top-
level director within the faith-based NGO community.74 Elliot Abrams, explaining the 
intellectual environment giving birth to the project, argues:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71  See: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49927/francis-fukuyama/religion-the-missing-dimension-of-
statecraft (accessed 17/08/2012) 
72 EPPC was established, according to its website, in 1976 to “clarify and reinforce the bond between the 
Judeo-Christian moral tradition and the public debate over domestic and foreign policy issues”. The EPPC 
is largely inter-religious think tank bringing together conservative Catholic, Evangelical and Jewish 
intellectuals and pundits that straddles between secular and religious research. For more information see: 
www.eppc.org/about/ (accessed 17/08/2012) 
73 Abrams is, at the time of writing (Summer 2012), a Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at CFR. He 
also served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser in the administrations 
of President G. W. Bush, where he supervised U.S. policy, particularly democracy promotion, in the 
Middle East (more on this in Chapter 6). 
74 Natsios was later appointed by G.W. Bush as director of USAID (more on this in Chapter 5). 
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“Some of us had read Peter Berger’s re-canting of the secularization 
theory in 1990s. What hit us the most was his claim that intellectual elites 
had become uniquely secularized and did not understand that the world 
around them continued to be, if not was becoming even more, religious. 
We felt that his arguments gave intellectual legitimacy to exploring issues 
related to religion in foreign affairs.” (2010, author’s interview)75 
 
At Freedom House, a prominent research and advocacy institute for the promotion 
of democracy and human rights internationally, a group of researches and scholars were 
focusing increasingly on issues of religious freedom. Nina Shea, driven partly by her 
Christian faith, funded and directed the Center for Religious Freedom in the late 1980s. 
She, along with Paul Marshall, have been at the forefront among American policy elites 
in advocating a closer attention by the U.S. government not only to the whole gamut of 
secular human rights, but also to international religious persecution and freedom (more 
on this in Chapter 4).  
 
With some exceptions, few established think tanks during the 1990s were paying 
serious and sustained attention to the nexus between religion and foreign policy. The 
Council on Foreign Affairs (CFR), America’s leading think tank on international affairs, 
was instrumental in kicking-off the debate from the pages of its widely read journal 
Foreign Affairs. Aside from Huntington’s article, however, there was little systematic 
scrutiny of the role of religion internationally. The Brookings Institute, one of 
Washington’s major think tanks, started to focus from the second half of the 1990s on 
domestic religious issues and how these intersected with American politics. There was 
yet little interest on foreign policy. CSIS did have a rather path-breaking project on 
religion and conflict, but this closed down once Doug Johnston left the organization in 
the mid-1990s.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Indeed Peter Berger’s edited volume The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World 
Politics (1999), was sponsored by the EPPC itself.  
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Although leaving CSIS, Johnston went on to found in 1999 the International 
Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD). This was an important turning point for the 
deeply secularized foreign policy institutional and intellectual landscape of Washington. 
ICRD was mainly created to practice what Johnston had preached in his edited volume 
The Missing Dimension. That is: “prevent and resolve identity-based conflicts that exceed 
the reach of traditional diplomacy by incorporating religion as part of the solution”.76 
ICRD started to work on ‘track-two’ faith-based diplomacy in the context of the 
Sudanese civil war between the North and the South – which faith-based actors, like 
Johnston, tended to see in great part as a religious conflict between northern Muslims and 
southern Christians. Since then Johnston and ICRD have been at the forefront of debates 
about the necessity to mainstream religion and integrate faith-based approaches within 
American statecraft and diplomatic practices.  
 
International relations courses and foreign affairs programs at major universities 
were equally deeply secularized during this time. Courses in places like Harvard as well 
as Georgetown, which churn out the graduates staffing Washington’s internationally-
focused think tanks and bureaucracies, paid scarce attention to religion. As Madeleine 
Albright recalls about her time at Georgetown:  
“In the early 1980s, I became a professor at Georgetown University. My 
specialty was foreign policy, about which such icons as Hans Morgenthau, 
George Kennan, and Dean Acheson theorized almost exclusively in 
secular terms.” (2006, p.8) 
 
Boston University was somewhat of an exception. Here Peter Berger was 
directing The Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs (CURA) since 1985. 
Largely interdisciplinary – with a particular focus on sociology and anthropology, rather 
than political science and IR – the center nevertheless produced research that had 
resonance among policy circles in Washington (as Elliott Abram’s quote above suggests). 
Peter Berger himself cultivated in the 1990s relationships with the neoconservative think 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See: http://icrd.org/ (accessed 17/08/2012) 
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tank American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and prominent conservative Christian public 
intellectuals, such as Michael Novak and Richard John Neuhaus. 
 
Overall, with the end of the Cold War, clearly something was changing among the 
foreign policy establishment. The 1990s saw an initial, albeit even if sporadic and 
unorganized, interest in religious actors and factors when it came to U.S. foreign policy.  
This reflected a changing domestic and international environment where according to 
scholars with a policy audience like Huntington and Berger, and pundits like Johnston 
and Abrams, the salience of religion appeared on the rise. This was evident from an 
emerging number of initiatives, articles and books paying attention to the nexus between 
religion and international affairs. A new religious-based “think and do tank”, ICRD, was 
created with the explicit scope of using religious resources to promote peace and 
reconciliation while also persuading American diplomats to employ similar faith-based 
techniques. Then came the election of an avowedly and publicly religious President such 
as G.W. Bush in 2000, and the tragic events of 9/11. 
 
Following 9/11 
 
The highly publicly religious Bush presidency, Al Qaeda’s use and abuse of Islam to 
explain and justify its terrorist attacks in 2001, and the religiously charged discourses that 
surrounded international politics thereafter, had a dramatic effect on the foreign policy 
establishment’s largely secularized perceptions of foreign affairs. Desecularizing changes 
– both in terms of a rapprochement between secularized institutions and religious actors 
and norms, as well as a weakening of secularist epistemic and ideological assumptions – 
became ever more discernible within the policy intellectual and institutional landscape 
from the 2000s onwards.  
 
Think tanks and university courses that had long ignored or just sporadically 
explored how domestic and international religious forces affected American foreign 
policy, started to pay more systematic attention to the phenomenon. That the intellectual 
mood among policy elites was changing, was evident from Madeleine Albright’s (2006) 
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autobiographical reflections on how the “Mighty and the Almighty” were surprisingly 
relevant to international relations and America’s security at the dawn of the 21st century. 
 
CFR has embraced and partly led this counter-secularizing trend within the policy 
community. From 2003 to 2006 it launched a “Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy Project” 
lead by Walter Russell Mead, a historian and scholar of American foreign policy, and 
Timothy Samuel Shah. The project was designed to address “one of the most important 
challenges facing U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century: the growing importance of 
religion in world politics.”77 During this period CFR became active in engaging the 
evangelical community and its leaders, such as Richard Land, of the Southern Baptist 
Convention, and Rick Warren pastor of Saddleback Church on international issues.78  
Mead’s article God’s Country?, which appeared in 2006 on the pages of Foreign Affairs 
charting the growth and influence of Evangelicals in American foreign policy, grew out 
of these initiatives.  
 
That same year, in 2006, CFR established a full “Religion and Foreign Policy 
Initiative”. Its stated scope was, and still is, to provide a much more structured “forum to 
deepen the understanding of issues at the nexus of religion and U.S. foreign policy”.79 
The initiative does so by connecting with, and serving as a resource for, religious and 
congregational leaders, scholars, and thinkers on religion “whose voices are increasingly 
important to the national foreign policy debate”. 80 Irina Faskianos, CFR Vice President 
for National Program & Outreach and coordinator of the initiative, recalls CFR’s thinking 
at the time of the launch as follows: 
“Richard Haass [President of CFR] took the lead because we realized that 
there were more religious voices in foreign policy debates than ever before. 
Hence as part of the Council’s efforts to engage “non-traditional” elites in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 www.cfr.org/projects/religion-and-politics/religion-and-us-foreign-policy-project/pr421 (accessed 17/08/2012) 
78 See the following links: www.cfr.org/projects/world/evangelicals-and-foreign-policy-roundtable/pr1287; and 
www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/christian-evangelicals-us-foreign-policy/p11341 (accessed 17/08/2012) 
79 www.cfr.org/about/outreach/religioninitiative/mission.html (accessed 17/08/2012) 
80 ibid. 
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its programs and projects we sought to open up the discussion and reach 
out to religious leaders.” (2011, author’s interview) 
 
In terms of connecting religious groups to the foreign policy community the 
initiative organizes an annual “CFR Religion and Foreign Policy Summer Workshop” 
that brings religious leaders from across the US to the Council’s headquarters in New 
York to discuss international issues such as: Darfur, conflict in the Middle East, 
democracy and the promotion of religious freedom, the Arab Spring, and religious 
demography trends around the world. In terms of providing content the initiative has a 
dedicated website that collects articles, books and analysis which either have a religious 
slant or may be of interest to the religious and scholarly community.81 It sends out to 
“more than 15.000 and growing subscribers” (Faskianos 2011, author’s interview), a 
“Religion and Foreign Policy Bulletin” highlighting CFR resources of interest to the 
religious community. Most importantly it hosts a “Religion and Foreign Policy 
Conference Call Series” where a prominent scholar or religious leader discusses with 
other religious and congregational leaders, scholars, and thinkers key global issues of 
interest.  
 
Podcasts of these audio conferences are posted online,82 with topics ranging from: 
Middle Eastern experts discussing sectarian divides and religious minorities in Middle 
Eastern countries, Scott Thomas debating the global resurgence of religion; Walter 
Russell Mead or Robert Putnam looking at religion in American politics; American 
Orthodox church leaders explaining the relationship between the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the Kremlin; conversations about international religious freedoms led by key 
religious advocates; Sudanese religious leaders discussing conflict in Sudan; to debates 
about inter-religious conflicts and dialogues.  
 
A “Religious Advisory Committee” provides guidance for all aspects of the 
initiative. Along with boasting the presence of Madeleine Albright, it includes a great 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 www.cfr.org/about/outreach/religioninitiative/index.html (accessed 17/08/2012) 
82 www.cfr.org/about/outreach/religioninitiative/audio.html (accessed 17/08/2012) 
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number of prominent religious and congregational leaders and scholars from across the 
United States.83 It comprises well-known scholars and pundits on religion such as: Peter 
Berger, Boston University; Father Bryan Hehir, Harvard University; Luis Lugo, Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life; Scott Appleby, at Joan B. Kroc Institute for 
International Peace Studies at Notre Dame; Reza Aslan, University of California 
Riverside; Mark Noll, University of Notre Dame; and Paul Marshall, Hudson Institute. 
Among the religious leaders and activists it counts: Richard Land, Southern Baptist 
Convention; Eboo Patel, Interfaith Youth Core; Feisal Abdul Rauf, Cordoba Initiative; 
David Saperstein, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism; Chris Seiple, Institute for 
Global Engagement; Richard Stearns, World Vision; Jim Wallis, Sojourners; and Robert 
Wood, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.84  
 
Other major secular think tanks have increasingly focused on religion and world 
politics, although maybe somewhat less broadly and systematically compared to CFR. 
This is a noticeable trend both among think tanks dedicated exclusively to international 
issues such as the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), CSIS and the Chicago Council 
on Foreign Relations; as well as those with a broader research agenda on domestic and 
foreign policy such as The Brookings Institute, AEI and the Hudson Institute.  
 
USIP has a growing research program that, for over a decade, has sought to 
identify best practices on religion and peacebuilding, develop new peacebuilding tools for 
religious leaders and organizations, and support conflict resolution programming with 
religious leaders in conflict zones. Its work started with a Program on Religion in 
Identity-based Conflicts in the late 1990s. The initiative was then institutionalized and 
broadened with the creation of the Religion and Peacemaking Center in 2001. According 
to the website, the creation of the center “reflects the development of the larger field of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 For more information see: www.cfr.org/about/outreach/religioninitiative/advisory_board.html (accessed 
16/08/2012) 
84 As will be clearer in the current and following chapters, many of these scholars, pundits, policymakers 
and activists all regularly contribute to the public discourse on religion and world affairs through a wide 
variety of other organizations, enterprises and outlets.  
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religious peacebuilding.” 85  Among its numerous activities, the center has a well-
developed “Women, Religion and Peace Initiative”, it prepares countless briefs and 
reports on issues of religious conflict and violence, it provides an online “Course on 
Interfaith Conflict Resolution”, and carries out multiple interfaith dialogues and 
workshops in the field.  
 
AT CSIS, religious-related initiatives are less well institutionalized. The Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Project86 started hosting events on religion in conflict settings 
and produced a groundbreaking 92-page long report entitled “Mixed Blessings: U.S. 
Government Engagement with Religion in Conflict-Prone Settings” (2007). The report, 
which opens with a quote by Peter Berger on the “explosive, pervasive religiosity” of the 
contemporary age (2007, p.1), extensively surveyed U.S. government approaches to 
religion abroad. Finding them “improving”,87 but still somewhat “wanting”, it provided 
concrete policy guidelines on how to use better government resources to account for the 
power of religious actors and dynamics in international and local conflicts.  
 
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs has released a major report addressed to 
the newly incoming Obama administration titled “Engaging Religious Communities 
Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy” (2010). The report obtained 
widespread resonance in Washington and was widely covered by major media outlets.88 It 
argued that “despite a world abuzz with religious fervor […] the U.S. government has 
been slow to respond effectively to situations where religion plays a global role” (2010, 
p.21). The report urged President Obama and his National Security Council to make 
religion and engaging with religious communities around the world “an integral part of 
our [American] foreign policy” (2010, p.13). The document was the result of a task force 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 www.usip.org/programs/centers/religion-and-peacemaking (accessed 16/08/2012) 
86 At the time of writing (2012) the project was renamed the Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation 
(C3) 
87 The report recognized and spotted initial signs of what I argue in the following three chapters are 
processes of desecularization. 
88 It further generated a lively and at times somewhat heated debate among the social scientific community 
on religion on the webpages of the Immanent Frame blog. See: blogs.ssrc.org/tif/category/religious-
freedom/page/2/ (accessed 16/08/2012) 
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of thirty-two “experts and stakeholders” – former government officials, religious leaders, 
heads of international organizations, and scholars. The task force was co-chaired by Scott 
Appleby, a leading scholar on religion and fundamentalism, and Richard Cizik, president 
of the New Evangelical Partnership for the Common Good and former Vice President for 
Governmental Affairs of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). 89 
 
Other think tanks covering both domestic and foreign affairs started to pay 
growing attention to how religion affects American foreign policy and international 
politics. The Brookings Institute, ever since the early 2000s, moved slowly beyond 
exploring the intersection of religion in domestic politics and widened its outlook towards 
international affairs since, it argued, “religion and faith […] increasingly influence public 
policy and political questions” both in “America and across the globe”.90 In 2003 it 
organized a major conference on religion and American foreign policy, which then 
became an edited volume Liberty and Power: A Dialogue on Religion and U.S. Foreign 
Policy in an Unjust World (Hehir 2004). Through the work of scholars and fellows such 
as E.J. Dionne, on American religion, Justin Vaisse, on Islam and Europe, and Ömer 
Taşpinar, on religion and secularism in Turkey and the Middle East: Brooking’s 
engagement with religious actors and issues has expanded considerably over the past 
decade.  
 
The AEI hosts discussions and commentary by Michael Novak and others on 
religion and American politics ever since the 1980s. Their frequency noticeably increased, 
as a quick glance to AEI’s webpages reveals, during the 1990s.91 Following 2001, a 
growing attention was directed towards international issues with a particular focus on the 
religious character of America and Middle Eastern politics (Israel and political Islam). 
The Hudson Institute, another conservative think tank, hosts since 2007 the Centre for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The task force included prominent scholars and pundits with great influence over debates on religion in 
Washington, such as: José Casanova, Thomas F. Farr, Timothy Samuel Shah, Douglas Johnston, William 
Inboden and Katherine Marshall. It also included a number of leading “Muslim” researchers and activists, 
such as: Radwan A. Masmoudi, Dalia Mogahed and Eboo Patel. 
90 www.brookings.edu/research/topics/religion-policy-and-politics (accessed 18/08/2012) 
91 www.aei.org/policy/society-and-culture/religion/ (accessed 18/08/2012) 
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Religious Freedom once at Freedom House.92 The Centre, which is directed by Nina Shea, 
produces ample research and regularly advocates for the integration of religious freedom 
as a central American foreign policy concern. 
 
A groundbreaking desecularizing development within the intellectual and policy 
scene in Washington was the creation of the well-funded Pew Forum on Religion & 
Public Life in 2001.93 The PEW Forum on Religion is one, and among the largest (Lugo 
2010, author’s interview), of seven projects that make up the PEW Research Center, a 
non-partisan research institute which conducts extensive public opinion polling and 
research on a wide range of social, political, cultural and media issues. The Forum, as the 
name suggests, started as a place for bringing religious leaders across traditions (mainly 
Christians, Muslims and Jewish) to engage in dialogue and interfaith discussions in the 
tense post-9/11 atmosphere. When Luis Lugo joined as director in 2004, he turned the 
forum into a research center that, as the website states, seeks to “promote a deeper 
understanding of issues at the intersection of religion and public affairs”. It does so 
through two main programs on “Religion and American Society” and “Religion and 
World Affairs”. Its ever growing pool of reports, data and figures on worldwide religious 
demographics and trends, religious freedom, religious lobbying have become widely used 
and cited by religious activists, scholars, policy-makers and political leaders across 
Washington D.C..94  
 
Louis Lugo, explains the rational behind turning the PEW Forum into primarily a 
research center on religion, as follows: 
“When I took my Ph.D. in political science at the University of Chicago most 
social scientific theories I was taught assumed the world to be secularizing. 
But already since the late 1970s with the Iranian revolution and Likud 
winning its first election in Israel I realized then that some kind of religious 
resurgence was occurring in the world… Peter Berger’s admission that he was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 crf.hudson.org/ (accessed 18/08/2012) 
93 www.pewforum.org/ (accessed 18/08/2012) 
94 For example Brian Grimm, who compiles PEW’s Global Restrictions on Religion reports was invited to 
testify before Congress at a June 3, 2011, hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
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wrong about secularization in the 1990s was another turning point. Things 
were happening, religion was everywhere, but no one was noticing. With the 
Forum we attempted to fill that knowledge vacuum with solid social scientific 
research.” (2010, author’s interview) 
 
The expansion of old faith-based “think and do tanks”, and the development of 
new ones, is contributing to deepening the desecularization of the foreign policy 
establishment’s secular milieu. Following 9/11, Johnston’s ICRD expanded its “track-two” 
faith-based diplomacy projects and operations in places like Afghanistan, Iran, Kashmir, 
Pakistan, the Palestinian occupied Territories, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Johnston has 
continued his scholarly output with new books (2003, 2011c), which have all championed 
the same cause: understanding better and including more proactively religion in 
American state-craft. From 2011, ICRD started publishing “Forum Policy Reports” on 
countries and issues of concern as they related to conflict, peace and religion.  
 
The Institute for Global Engagement (IGE) was founded in 2000, and is today 
directed by Chris Seiple.95 Along with ICRD, IGE has become a pivotal faith-based 
institution in Washington at the nexus between religion and world affairs. The 
organization mixes advocacy and practical work on religious freedom, with in an in-
depth attention to research on religion in international relations. Its “Center on Faith and 
International Affairs”, in particular, hosts a thriving research program, one that is 
increasingly influential in policy and scholarly circles and debates. 96  The Center 
publishes, since 2002, a quarterly journal, The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 
which by the time of writing (Summer 2012) is the only peer-reviewed scholarly journal 
explicitly dedicated to issues of religion and world politics.97 Since 2010, The Review is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 www.globalengage.org/about.html (accessed 18/08/2012) 
96 According to its website, the Center seeks to equip “scholars, practitioners, policymakers, and students 
with a balanced understanding of the role of religion in public life worldwide”. See: 
www.globalengage.org/research/about.html (accessed 18/08/2012) 
97 It counts among its contributing editors prominent scholars and pundits on religion who are directly or 
indirectly involved in shaping the debate on faith and global affairs in Washington such as: Peter Berger, 
Akbar Ahmed, Thomas Farr, Allen Hertzke, Douglas Johnston, Paul Marshall, Mark Noll, Daniel Philpott 
and Elizabeth Prodromou. 
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published by Routledge/Taylor & Francis, giving it a further seal of scholarly approval 
along with making it more widely available through the publisher’s indexes.  
 
Dennis Hoover, The Review’s editor, recalls the idea of creating the journal as 
follows:  
“There was always quite a lot [of scholarship] out there on religion and 
domestic politics, but not much in comparative perspective nor in IR. 
Given that today religious actors are increasingly global players we 
thought important to have a journal that explored these issues and bridged 
the academic, policymakers and religious worlds. When we started there 
was not much. The Review has become part of a growing trend towards 
examining the role of religion in the context of foreign policy.” (2011, 
author’s interview) 
 
IGE further contributes to academic and policy debates by hosting and organizing 
conferences, and editing a growing number of books, such as Religion and Security: The 
New Nexus in International Relations (Seiple and Hoover 2004). Most recently Hoover, 
form IGE, and Johnston, from ICRD, co-edited a major volume entitled Religion and 
Foreign Affairs: Essential Readings (2012). The book collects a wide-range of seminal 
articles in the field that have appeared over the past decades,98 if not even millennia in the 
case of excerpts by Thucydides and St. Augustine. The EPPC would organize a series of 
conference discussions following 9/11. These culminated in the edited volume Religion, 
Culture, and International Conflict: A Conversation (2005), featuring contributions by 
Samuel Huntington, Bruce Hoffman, Christopher Hitchens, Gilles Kepel, Philip Jenkins, 
and David Brooks. 
 
As attention to religion and international affairs expanded during the 2000s, 
universities started to open centers and offer new courses discussing the complex and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The volume includes articles or excerpts by, among others: Madeleine Albright, Scott Appleby, 
Benjamin Barber, Peter Berger, Timothy Byrnes, José Casanova, Thomas Farr, Jonathan Fox, Jeffrey 
Haynes, Allen Hertzke, Samuel Huntington, Mark Juergensmeyer, Paul Marshall, Vali Nasr, Daniel 
Philpott, Timothy Shah, Chris Seiple, and Scott Thomas. 
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apparently ever rising influence of religion in international politics. This section does not 
present a comprehensive list of all new courses and developments across American 
universities,99 but will focus on a number of important changes in leading scholarly 
institutions with strong links to the Washington foreign policy establishment.  
 
Probably the single most important change in the academic panorama was the 
inauguration of the “Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs”, at Catholic-
based Georgetown University (GTU) in Washington D.C. 100  GTU has long been 
recognized as a leading training ground for America’s security experts, diplomats and 
foreign policy decision-makers. Quite emblematically, the center was launched in 2006, 
the very same year that Madeleine Albright’s book the Mighty and the Almighty came out 
complaining about the secular nature of the international affairs education she received at 
GTU. With the Berkley Center things were now going to change substantially.  
 
The center is organized around an ever-expanding number of programs that carry 
out research, organize conferences and workshops, and design university courses. By 
June 2012 the center featured programs on: Globalization, Religions, and the Secular 
(lead by José Casanova); Religion and US Foreign Policy (lead by Thomas Farr); the 
Religious Freedom Project (lead by Thomas Farr and Timothy Samuel Shah); Religion 
and Global Development (lead by Katherine Marshall); Religion, Conflict, and Peace 
(lead by Eric Patterson); and Islam and World Politics (lead by Jocelyne Cesari). From 
2011, the Berkley Center offers, in collaboration with GTU’s Edmund A. Walsh School 
of Foreign Service, an optional “Religion, Ethics, and World Affairs” certificate for 
interested students. Just a cursory glance at the Berkley Center’s website reveals the 
deeply connected nature of the center and its scholars with the Washington policy circles 
and governmental institutions such as the State Department, USAID, or the Pentagon.101  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 For a good overview of courses in the United States see: www.globalengage.org/research/syllabi.html 
(accessed 18/08/2012) 
100 berkleycenter.georgetown.edu (accessed 18/08/2012) 
101 Thomas Farr, for instance, was in the Foreign Service for over 20 years. He was also the first Director of the 
Office of International Religious Freedom in the State Department. The close links between the centre and 
policy-makers in government are evident by the events the centre organizes which are often explicitly targeted to 
engage this community: berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/events (accessed 19/08/2012) 
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The Belfer Center, Harvard University’s center for international affairs, in 2007 
launched “The Initiative on Religion in International Affairs”. The initiative, lead by 
Monica Duffy Toft and aimed at policy-makers, scholars, and students, has generated 
over the years courses, seminars, executive training sessions, and research projects 
“focusing on the study of religion as it bears on international relations and foreign 
policy”.102 Research on religion and world affairs conducted by scholars at The Kroc 
Institute for International Peace, housed in the Catholic-based University of Notre Dame 
(Indiana), has made substantial inroads into the intellectual scene in Washington. The 
Kroc Institute was founded in 1986 out of a deep concern for nuclear weapons and the 
arms race. Here in 2000 the Program on Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding was 
launched hosting scholars such as Scott Appleby and Daniel Philpott. Timothy Shah was 
a visiting fellow in 2010.  
 
Boston University has long hosted Peter Berger’s CURA. As the discussion thus 
far amply reveals, the sociologist’s influence on the thinking of sections of the foreign 
policy establishment when it comes to religion has been rather substantial. Yet, during 
the 1980s and 1990s, Boston University had no courses explicitly addressing the issue of 
religion from an IR perspective. This changed with the integration of religious issues in 
the IR curriculum by Elizabeth Prodromou from the mid 2000s onwards. Today the 
university boasts an “IR & Religion” MA program jointly coordinated by the departments 
of International Relations and the Division of Religious and Theological Studies, in 
cooperation with CURA.103 
 
Johns Hopkins’ School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in the heart of 
Washington D.C., labeled the 2009-10 academic year “The Year of Religion” hosting 
seminars, workshops and events geared towards examining the role of religion in 
international affairs.104  In 2012 the school launched a major “Global Politics and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/57/religion_in_international_affairs.html (accessed 19/08/2012) 
103 www.bu.edu/ir/graduate/programs/irrn/ (accessed 19/08/2012) 
104 www.sais-jhu.edu/religion/index.htm (accessed 19/08/2012) 
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Religion Initiative” (GPRI) to incorporate the study of the interaction between religion 
and politics into the school’s existing graduate-level international relations program. The 
initiative promotes new master’s degree courses, faculty and community research 
seminars and executive education training sessions. GPRI’s goal is to “foster an 
appreciation and deeper understanding of religion and international affairs among 
students, scholars and practitioners who will shape and influence future policymaking.”105  
 
Overall this section traced how, in the 1990s a noticeable albeit still sporadic and 
patchy interest emerged in exploring the ways religious actors and factors appeared to 
increasingly “matter” in a post-Cold War world. Establishment-oriented journals such as 
Foreign Affairs, think tanks such as CSIS and Freedom House, centers such as EPPC, 
and newly created organizations such as ICRD were highlighting how the salience of 
religion was growing in world politics and reflexively also for American foreign policy. 
The first timid critiques towards the secularized and secularist nature of the foreign 
policy establishment were advanced at this time. The events of 9/11 were yet another 
turning point. From then on, both a qualitative and quantitative explosion of terms of new 
centers, initiatives, programs, and courses occurred seeking to explore the complex and 
multiple facets at the nexus of religion and international politics. As a result of these 
changes, the Washington foreign policy establishment’s institutional and intellectual 
milieu has undergone over the past twenty years a profound process of desecularization. 
Talking about religion, it seems, is no longer taboo among intellectual and policy elites. 
 
 
Islam, the Muslim World and the Foreign Policy Establishment 
 
 
Before and During the 1990s 
 
Scholarship on Islam in the U.S. was largely the domain of Islamic or area specialists up 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105  www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/functional-studies/global-theory-history/global-politics-and-religion-initiative.html 
(accessed 19/08/2012) 
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until the 1990s according to John Voll (2007). During the 1960-80s international studies 
and politics scholars identified Islam mainly as a religion or a particular regional socio-
cultural complex, hardly as a geopolitical category or an international actor. If not 
considered a dying force under the pressures of modernization and secularization, what 
generally caught the attention of some were then the most extreme forms of “Islamic 
fundamentalism” that were gaining ground in places like Iran (Voll 2007, pp.38-39). 
 
Then came the end of the Cold War and Islam was no longer simply represented 
as a set of religious practices and beliefs, either waning or being perverted by 
fundamentalists. Islam for some actually started to appear on the horizon as a new 
monolithic and dangerous geopolitical agent and as such was portrayed on the pages of 
leading journals in the policy community. Huntington’s Foreign Affairs 1993 article, not 
only conceptualized an international reality where religious identities increasingly 
structured political conflict worldwide, but also carved out Islam as the new post-Soviet 
“other”. Similarly to Huntington, Middle East area specialists such as Bernard Lewis 
(1990) were identifying from the pages of The Atlantic, Islam as a particular social and 
political complex resentful of and in opposition to the West and the modern democratic 
values it espoused. As Voll has argued, in the 1990s “the most prominent interpretations 
of the role of Islam in the world involved a conceptualization of global relations in terms 
of the “clash of civilizations”” (2007, p.40). Another major and caustic critique of Islam 
and political Islam was Daniel Pipes, a Washington pundit close to the neoconservative 
movement, who in 1990 founded the Middle East Forum.  
 
Against this double narrative of Islam as a monolith and of an international 
environment consigned to a set of new post-ideological cultural rivalries, other area and 
Islamic studies scholars started to offer alternative interpretations of Islam’s role in 
international politics. John Esposito (1992) would emphasize the complexity and local 
variances of Islam as a religion and above all of political Islam as a socio-political force. 
Esposito and Voll (1996), pointed out that Islam and democracy were not inherently 
incompatible. These scholars would also go on to found the Center for Muslim-Christian 
Understanding at GTU one of the first of its kind in the Washington policy and scholarly 
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community. Although Huntington did much to set the tone of the conversation, during the 
1990s it was mainly area and Islamic studies experts – such as Bernard Lewis, Daniel 
Pipes, John Esposito and John Voll – who chiefly engaged in heated debates about the 
political significance of Islam in the Middle East in particular, and in the modern world in 
general. These authors set much of the intellectual parameters within which the 
conversation following 9/11 on Islam among the larger foreign policy establishment 
would occur.  
 
Within policy circles, few of the major D.C. research institutes had research 
programs with a religious slant that focused on “Islam”, “Islamism”, “Muslim world” or 
“West-Islam relations”. Attention was clearly shifting from the old confrontation with the 
Soviet Union to local and regional crisis such as Iraq, Somalia, the Balkans and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When looking at the outside world, the secular human and 
geographical categories of the Arab and the Middle East, however, still loomed large in 
the mind of policy elites and think tanks’ research programs. Area specialist institutes, 
had secularized names such as: the Middle East Policy Council, founded in 1981, the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), founded in 1985, as well as Daniel 
Pipes’ anti-Islamist Middle East Forum.  
 
Following 9/11 
 
In the wake of 9/11, discussions about Islam spilled outside the area and Islamic studies 
scholarly box, where they had till then been mostly confined to, and into the foreign 
policy mainstream. Debates roughly split along the lines identified above. On the one 
hand, particularly among conservative pundits and scholars, the terrorist attacks clearly 
revealed that something was endogenously wrong with or within “Islam”. On the other 
hand, particularly among liberal pundits and scholars, great efforts were taken to unpack 
the Islamist phenomenon and dispel ideas of an impending clash of civilizations. No 
matter the ideological orientation, however, long adopted and established secular idioms 
progressively turned religious within foreign policy discourses. Arabs increasingly 
became “Muslims”, Moroccans and, say, Indonesians became “Muslim peoples”, and the 
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geographically specific Middle East turned into a broader, wider, and amorphous 
“Muslim world”. All of a sudden, 9/11 generated within the Washington foreign policy 
community a cottage industry of “Islam” and “Muslim world” experts, conferences, 
events, and policy papers.  
 
Within the conservative research universe, RAND produced some of the most 
prominent reports parceling international geography into a distinct space comprising the 
so-called 1.5 billion people-strong Muslim world which followed its own specific internal 
dynamics. In a report on “The Muslim World After 9/11” (RAND 2004) – co-edited by a 
team of scholars with close ties to the Bush administration of the time –106 Muslims (even 
secular ones) across the globe were all divided into five distinct ideological orientations 
that cut across countries, regions and societies. “Radical and dogmatic interpretations of 
Islam have gained ground in many Muslim societies” – the report argues – “The outcome 
of the “war of ideas” under way throughout the Muslim world is likely to have great 
consequences for U.S. interests in the region” (RAND 2004, p.xxii) 
 
The report proposed a set of policies to influence these ideological struggles. The 
cornerstone of this strategy, reiterated by similar RAND-sponsored reports in 2003 and 
2007, was to win the war of ideas by promoting reform within Islam and assisting with 
the development of “liberal” and “moderate” Muslims across the globe. The task ahead 
was daunting, argued one of the reports, yet necessary: “It is no easy matter to transform 
a major world religion. If “nation-building” is a daunting task, “religion-building” is 
immeasurably more perilous and complex. Islam is neither a homogeneous entity nor a 
simple system” (Benard 2003, p.3). The United States, can find “partners in the effort to 
combat Islamist extremism”, according to the 2007 report, in “secularists; liberal 
Muslims; and moderate traditionalists, including Sufis” (RAND 2007, p.70) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Cheryl Benard, who co-authored the 2004 and other RAND reports cited above, is the wife of Zalmay 
Khalidzad, former National Security Council (NSC) official and U.S. ambassador to Afghanistana and Iraq 
during the Bush administration. Khalidzad was, among others, a signatory to the neoconservative-inspired 
Project for the New American Century. 
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The notion of a war of ideas within Islam resonated across the neoconservative 
policy establishment. AEI pundits Joshua Muravchik and Charlie Szrom (2008) have 
attempted to identify what a “moderate Muslim” looks like and provide strategies 
designed to encourage the silent “Muslim majority” to mobilize “against the acts and 
ideology of the terrorists”. AEI posts an extensive list of articles and commentary by 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali refugee and former Dutch Member of Parliament, on – or 
better against – Islam since 2005.107 A search, on AEI’s website, for religiously-laden 
hash-tags such as “Islam”, “Muslim nation” or “Islamic Jihad” reveal a burgeoning list 
with hundreds of pages, but only a couple of references before 2001.  
 
The Hudson Institute launched in 2006 a Center on Islam, Democracy and the 
Future of the Muslim World.108 The center’s mission is to: “research and analyze political, 
religious, social and other developments within Islamic countries and Muslim minority 
populations around the world”; “analyze the ideological dynamic of Islam around the 
world and to examine how the political and theological debate within Islam impacts both 
Islamist radicalism as well as the Islamic search for moderate and democratic 
alternatives”; and to encourage the development of “moderate Muslims” by influencing 
American foreign policy.109 Its flagship publication is a report on the “Trends in Islamist 
Ideology”, which as of 2012 was at its 12th edition. 
 
More liberal-oriented think tanks in the aftermath of 9/11 would shy away from 
reifying the most extreme voices among violent Islamist groups as representative of an 
entire community of people or countries. Nevertheless they also started to progressively 
rely on the religious categories of Islam and Muslim world in their analysis and policy 
prescriptions, either by emphasizing the nuances of Islamist movements within the 
“Muslim world” as well as seeking to foster a better understanding between the “West 
and Muslims”. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 www.aei.org/scholar/ayaan-hirsi-ali (accessed 19/08/2012)  
108 www.currenttrends.org (accessed 19/08/2012) 
109 www.currenttrends.org/mission (accessed 19/08/2012)  
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Institutional developments at the Brookings Institute are particularly 
representative of this trend. In 2002 Brookings inaugurated a new center for the Middle 
East, the Saban Center, which in 2003 launched the “Project on U.S. Relations with the 
Islamic World”. The project was conceived to “respond to some of the profound 
questions that the terrorist attacks of September 11 have raised for U.S. policy”. Its intent 
is to conduct policy-relevant research and convenes briefings, panel discussion, and 
major international conferences with scholars and policy-makers “designed to educate, 
encourage frank dialogue, and build positive partnerships between the United States and 
the Muslim world”.110  
 
Its signature event is the yearly “US-Islamic World Forum” launched in 2004, at a 
moment when there was a “virtual absence of dialogue between leaders of the United 
States and the Muslim world”.111 In other words, it was created when (neo)conservative 
voices and clash of civilization narratives where dominating policy discourses in 
Washington and within the Bush administration. The forum, which is held in Doha Qatar 
annually, brings together political, business, media, academic, civil society and religious 
leaders “from across the Islamic world (including Muslim communities in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and the Middle East) and the United States” to bridge this perceived cultural and 
political chasm.112  
 
Stephen Grand, the program’s director, explains as follows the role religion plays 
in the initiative: 
“The program and the forum are not explicitly centered on issues of faith, 
it is not about interfaith dialogues. Yet it does recognize that religion in 
general and Islam in particular have come to play a growing role in 
international affairs. Jim Steinberg, Shibley Telhami and Martin Indyk, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 www.brookings.edu/about/projects/islamic-world/about  (accessed 19/08/2012) 
111 www.brookings.edu/about/projects/islamic-world/us-islamic-world-forums (accessed 19/08/2012) 
112 Participants have included prominent political leaders and policy-makers such as: President Bill Clinton; 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey; former Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright; President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan; General David Petraeus; the Grand 
Mufti of Bosnia-Herzegovina Dr. Mustafa Ceric; Secretary General of ASEAN Surin Pitsuwan; and 
Secretary General of the OIC Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu. 
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who thought of the initiative, were building upon Brookings long tradition 
of looking at the intersection between religion and domestic politics led by 
people like E.J. Dionne and Bill Galston.”  (2011, author’s interview) 
 
Over the years as Brookings produced regular events, commentary, and a growing 
string of research and reports on a great variety of “Islamic world” issues, it has 
reinforced and upheld also among the liberal intelligentsia the shift towards a less secular 
understanding of international relations. Among the scholars linked to the initiative 
feature Peter Mandaville, a political Islam expert at George Mason University and former 
Policy Planning fellow at the State Department, and Akbar Ahmed, Ibn Khaldun Chair of 
Islamic Studies at American University and a foremost public intellectual on Islam-West 
dialogue in D.C. policy circles.  
 
Following 9/11 through the work of David Smock , USIP has likewise been active 
in exploring the how Islam relates to issues of democracy, interfaith-dialogues and peace-
building.113 In 2006 it launched a major “Muslim World Initiative” that attempted to 
bridge conservative and liberal concerns. The initiative was designed to help “mobilize 
moderates, marginalize militants [i.e. the conservative agenda], and bridge the 
U.S./Muslim-world divide [i.e. the liberal agenda]”.114 It culminated with the release of 
the USIP book, “Conflict, Identity and Reform in the Muslim World” (Brumberg and 
Shehata 2009), as well as a report by its USIP Study Group on Reform and Security in 
the Muslim World (USIP 2010). The declared scope of the initiative was to “make sense 
of the diverse peoples, cultures and societies that constitute the Muslim world, [who are] 
all animated by a common ethical and religious heritage. From Jakarta to Cairo, from 
Dakar to Paris, Muslims sense that they form one grand community, or umma”.115 In 
2010, USIP co-sponsored with the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy a major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 www.usip.org/experts/david-r-smock (accessed 19/08/2012) 
114 www.usip.org/programs/initiatives/muslim-world-initiative (accessed 19/08/2012) 
115 ibid.  
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conference with public intellectuals, scholars, think tank pundits and government officials 
to assess the progress of “US-Muslims relations in the Obama era”.116 
 
CFR and CSIS did not develop specific centers or initiatives dedicated to Islam. 
They have nevertheless joined the chorus with a string of events, talks, reports, and 
commentary exploring, among others: conflicts between “Christians and Muslims” 
(CFR),117 and the Muslim world’s struggle to democratize and modernize (CSIS 2004). 
The Washington D.C.-based NGO Search for Common Ground convened in 2007 a 
Leadership Group on U.S.-Muslim Engagement composed of “34 American leaders, 
including 11 Muslim Americans, in the fields of foreign and defense policy, politics, 
business, religion, education, public opinion, psychology, philanthropy, and conflict 
resolution [emphasis added]”.118 The group released in 2008 a major report that, as will 
be discussed in Chapter 6, had wide resonance in the Obama administration (US-Muslim 
Engagement Project 2009). Once again the report reiterated the theme of an American 
and Muslim world deeply suspicious of each other and provided policy recommendations 
to bridge this divide between Muslims and non-Muslims.  
 
Esposito and Voll’s Georgetown center was revitalized and renamed in 2005 the 
Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (ACMCU), after 
having received a $20 million dollar gift from the Saudi prince. Boston University 
opened and Institute for the Study of Muslim Societies & Civilizations in 2006. Peter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116  The conference brought together worldwide public intellectuals such as Oxford professor Tariq 
Ramadan, scholars known in Washington policy circles such as Peter Mandaville and Erik Patterson, and 
US government officials such as Farah Pandith, Special Representative to Muslim Communities and 
Rashad Hussain U.S. Special Envoy to the OIC (more on Pandith and Hussain in Chapter 6). 
www.usip.org/events/us-relations-the-muslim-world-one-year-after-cairo (accessed 19/08/2012) 
117  www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/exploring-religious-conflict-between-christians-muslims-
audio/p23099 (accessed 19/08/2012) 
118 Among which featured: Madeleine Albright; Richard Armitage, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State; 
Thomas Dine, former Executive Director, American Israel Public Affairs Committee; Richard Land, 
President, The Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission, Southern Baptist Convention; Dalia Mogahed, 
Executive Director, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies; Vali Nasr, Professor of International Politics, The 
Fletcher School, Tufts University; Feisal Abdul Rauf, Imam, Masjid al-Farah in New York City; Founder 
and Chairman, Cordoba Initiative; Dennis Ross, former U.S. Special Middle East Envoy and Negotiator; 
Mustapha Tlili, Director, Center for Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West, New York University; 
Ahmed Younis, Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies; former National Director, Muslim 
Public Affairs Committee. See: www.usmuslimengagement.org (accessed 19/08/2012) 
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Mandaville directs the new Ali Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies at George 
Mason University inaugurated in 2009.  
 
In the 1980s early 1990s, think tanks were created to study and influence U.S. 
policy in the “Middle East, such as the Middle East Policy Council and WINEP. In the 
late 1990s 2000s, a number of new institutes were launched instead to improve 
understanding of and policy towards “Islam” and “Muslims”. One of these was the 
liberal-leaning Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID), founded in 1999, 
dedicated to studying and exploring the relationship between “Islamic and democratic 
political thought”. 119  The center produces research and commentary on issues of 
democracy and freedom in the Muslim world, it conducts seminars and lectures at 
mosques, churches and think tanks around the country, it carries out international 
workshops on “Islam & Democracy” in Muslim countries, and hosts a major annual 
conference bringing together specialists, activists and policymakers.120  
 
The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) was founded in the 
wake of 9/11 in Detroit, Michigan and by 2010 it moved its headquarters to Washington 
DC. ISPU, a self-described nonpartisan think tank that conducts policy-relevant research 
on foreign policy and national security with a particular “emphasis on those issues related 
to Muslim communities in the U.S. and abroad”.121 Likewise over the years organizations 
and initiatives with a religious slant dedicated to interfaith and intercultural dialogues 
have mushroomed including the Rumi Forum (part of the Gulen movement and founded 
in Washington D.C. in 1999), the Cordoba Initiative (founded by Imam Feisal Abdul 
Rauf in New York in 2002), and the Buxton Initiative (co-founded by Akbar Ahmed and 
Douglas Holladay, an Evangelical businessman, in Washington D.C. in 2004).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 www.csidonline.org (accessed 19/08/2012) 
120 Akbar Ahmed and Peter Mandaville are on CSID’s board of directors. John Esposito was a former vice 
chair of the centre. 
121 Akbar Ahmed, John Esposito, and James Piscatori are among the scholars on Islam and political Islam 
who make up its board of advisors. See: ispu.org (accessed 19/08/2012) 
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Quite importantly polling and research institutes such as PEW and, especially, 
Gallup increasingly started monitoring what “Muslims” thought about a wide variety of 
international issues from terrorism, to the war in Iraq, to relations with America or the 
West, and the place of religion in public life. Highly influential and often quoted by 
pundits and policymakers, surveys of this kind have contributed greatly to shift 
perceptions away from past secular categories of Arabs and individual nationalities 
(Slade 1981; Suleiman 1988), to religious ones of Muslims. Gallup would open a Center 
for Muslim Studies, which under the direction of Dalia Mogahed has released a number 
of high profile reports and surveys, such as the influential: Who Speaks for Islam? What a 
Billion Muslims Really Think (Esposito and Mogahed 2007). PEW regularly reports on 
perceptions about “how great the divide between Islam and the West” (2006)122 is and on 
the state of “Muslim-Western tensions” (2011).123  
 
The following (polemic) quote from Daniel Pipes tangentially captures much of 
the desecularizing process that occurred over the past two decades among the foreign 
policy establishment:  
“Books on “The Arabs,” “the Arab world,” “Arab politics,” “Arab 
nationalism,” and “Arab socialism” flew off the press during my student 
years [1960s-1970s]. With time, however, the hollowness of this modern 
concept of Arabs became evident. I was one of those who argued for Islam 
as the real defining factor, devoting myself thirty years ago to proving that 
“Islam profoundly shapes the political attitudes of Muslims.” Met with 
skepticism back then, this understanding has now become so blindingly 
self-evident that Amazon.com lists no fewer than 3,077 items in English 
on jihad. ” (2011a, webpage) 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122  www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Islam-and-the-West-How-Great-a-Divide.aspx (accessed 
19/08/2012) 
123 www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/21/muslim-western-tensions-persist (accessed 19/08/2012) 
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Conclusion  
 
 
Shah, Philpott and Toft recall as follows the secularized education received during their 
political science classes at top U.S. universities back in the 1980-90s: 
“All of our Harvard [and University of Chicago] classmates … who 
entered, say, the State Department had lots of political economy, or 
political sociology, or international security, or theories of democratization, 
crammed into their heads, and were well prepared to analyze almost any 
conceivable global political problem. But the one thing they did not have 
crammed into their heads was any understanding of religion, or even any 
expectation that religion might be an important factor in shaping global 
politics.” (2011, webpage) 
 
Times have considerably changed since then. Shah, Philpott, and Toft, and 
universities such as Harvard, Notre Dame and Georgetown, which these scholars are 
associated with, have been at the forefront of profound intellectual shifts towards a less 
secularist understanding of international politics over the past two decades. Their co-
authored book God’s Century (2011) is a key text in the burgeoning literature exploring 
the multiple dimensions of the global resurgence of religion in international relations. All 
this amounts to rather important intellectual shifts, as Chris Seiple suggestively argues: 
“If you compare courses in the academy on religion in 1991 to 2011, 
you’ll notice a huge difference. You know something is happening among 
secular elites when universities start changing. Intellectual elites formerly 
steeped in a secularist mindset are now increasingly awakening to 
religious variables.” (2011, author’s interview) 
 
This chapter argued that long-term processes of resurgence both domestically and 
internationally, along with major historical events such as the end of the Cold War and 
9/11, have had a profound desecularizing influence on America’s largely secularized 
foreign policy establishment. Along with universities, desecularizing institutional and 
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ideational changes have taken place across think tanks and research centers as they 
sought to conduct and accommodate research on the seemingly ever more profound 
entanglement between “religion” or “Islam” and world affairs. Indeed the notion of a 
“global resurgence of religion” has become conventional wisdom in leading research 
institutes such as CFR, CSIS, USIP, Brookings, or PEW. Progressively the idea that a 
clearly recognizable religiously defined Muslim world “out there” is either in religious 
and ideological turmoil (according to conservative scholars) or deeply misunderstood by 
policy-makers (according to liberal scholars), has taken deep intellectual and institutional 
roots across the entire foreign policy establishment. New “think and do tanks” such as 
ICRD, IGE, CSID have emerged providing policy-relevant international research on the 
nexus between religion and American foreign policy but from a faith-based perspective.  
 
Often ignored or shun in the past, Evangelical, Jewish, Catholic, Mormon, and 
Muslim religious leaders, as well as lay activists, are invited by secular think tanks to 
become fellows, sit on advisory boards, deliver talks, take part in conferences and attend 
events. They are called upon to provide their insights and perspectives on how faith, 
religious issues and theological matters are interwoven with modern understandings and 
practices of international politics and American foreign policy. The perception that 
religion has come to “matter” more to American interests is unmistakably reflected by the 
wide resonance that Huntington’s thesis of civilizational clashes, despite its crude and 
rather unsophisticated argument, has held among policy debates over these past two 
decades. Quite indicatively, in 2010/2011 Foreign Affairs was luring in readers by 
offering free copies of The Clash Of Civilizations? The Debate (Hoge 2010) to all its new 
subscribers.  
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4. AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT: ADVANCING RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND RELIGIOUS ENGAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
Stemming “religious persecution” and “religiously-based violence”, while also promoting 
“religious freedom”, mitigating “religious conflicts” and engaging with “religious 
communities” around the world, are increasingly part and parcel of what American 
policy-makers think about and do. This was not always the case. The scope of this 
chapter is to trace in particular how “international religious freedom” and worldwide 
“religious engagement” 124  have become over the past two decades two broad inherently 
religious policy frameworks that shape American foreign policy discourses and practices. 
This development has contributed to the progressive desecularization of American 
foreign policies and the normative and institutional structures underpinning the policy-
making process.  
 
The protection and advancement of “international religious freedom” norms is not 
a new issue for the United States. These norms are intimately ingrained in the country’s 
conscience and history. Domestically, they are tied with the country’s founding moments 
by persecuted Puritans fleeing England and then codified in the Constitution’s First 
Amendment in the wake of America’s independence (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof [emphasis 
added]”). Yet, when it comes to foreign policy, attention to these issues was for the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Considerable generalization is involved in using terms such as “international religious freedom” and 
“religious engagement”, hence the quotation marks. My interest is to trace how these discourses, and the 
foreign policy practices associated with them, have become ubiquitous and institutionalized in American 
foreign policy. The quotation marks will be used in the introduction and in the final more analytical 
sections, they will be omitted in the more descriptive and historical part. It is important to stress that religious 
freedom and engagement are complex and highly contested concepts and policy frameworks, see the following 
debates appeared on the Immanent Frame on “religious freedom” (http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/the-politics-of-
religious-freedom) and “religious engagement” (http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/tag/chicago-council).  
	   157 
part of America’s history sporadic to say the least. A first major exception was when 
Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment at the height of the Cold War in 1974 
against the Soviet Union’s curbs on Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel. Indeed, this piece 
of legislation may be considered a precursor to more recent and structured attempts 
through Congress to fully institutionalize religious freedom norms in American foreign 
policy. This chapter will partly explore and unpack these recent changes.  
 
Similarly, “religious engagement” was hardly a buzzword in foreign policy circles 
for much of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. By religious engagement I do not 
just mean the ad-hoc practice by American diplomats and foreign policy institutions of 
connecting and reaching out to religious groups when necessary to national security. This 
is something that has happened in the past. For instance, during the Cold War succeeding 
U.S. administrations often reached out to and formed covert alliances with Popes such as 
Pius XII and John Paul II to balance the “God-less” Soviets. During this period the U.S. 
did support, for example, actors that had a religious dimension to them like Christian 
Democratic parties in Western Europe and the Catholic Union Solidarity in Poland, or 
Islamists groups such as the Mujahidin in Afghanistan. Often, however, operations would 
be undercover and chiefly conducted through a secular prism of security and Soviet 
containment.  
 
What I mean by “religious engagement” here is instead the emergence in the past 
decade or so of a much broader, structured, and increasingly bureaucratized policy 
framework than the practices described above. It is a framework that ranges from 
growing efforts by foreign policy-makers and institutions to understand and map 
worldwide religious dynamics and movements deemed to be of increased salience to 
American foreign policy. It also involves growing systematic and public efforts by the 
White House or the State Department to include religious communities and actors in the 
formulation and delivery of American foreign policy, particularly though religiously-
based practices such as inter-faith dialogues and other programs geared towards 
promoting religious tolerance and understanding.  
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The central claim of this chapter is that the lack of sustained interest in 
international religious freedom and engagement before the 1990-2000s made the conduct 
and implementation of American foreign policy more secular. The introduction of these 
two inherently religious policy frameworks is instead making it less so today. These 
desecularizing changes should be understood as taking place within a context of 
worldwide processes of religious resurgence. And they can be explained by paying 
attention to the activities of a wide range of desecularizing actors responsible for 
promoting and pushing ahead with the implementation of these two broad inherently 
religious policy frameworks.  
 
The next section looks at a number of desecularizing actors that have emerged –
particularly following the end of the Cold War – campaigning, advocating and in some 
cases legislating for the adoption of these foreign policies. As will be shown later, many 
of those championing the cause of “international religious freedom”, have also taken an 
interest in “religious engagement” and vice versa. That is why these two issues are 
brought together in the present chapter. The sections that follow historically trace the 
efforts by these multiple actors to introduce and mainstream international religious 
freedom and engagement within diplomatic discourses and practices over the past two 
decades. The final sections will assesses the multiple foreign policy desecularizing 
process brought about by these developments and conclude.  
 
 
Desecularizing Actors in Context 
 
 
Two broad constituencies of desecularizing actors emerged during the 1990s, expanding 
considerably following September 11, advocating for the explicit adoption of a more 
religious-sensitive approach to foreign policy. The first constituency was, and still is, 
largely composed by religious activists who, with the help of scholars and pundits among 
the foreign policy establishment and members of Congress (often highly religious 
themselves), formed an eclectic but well organized advocacy network campaigning 
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against what they perceived was the growing persecution of Christians and other religious 
groups worldwide. The second constituency of desecularizing actors revolved around, 
and still does, a set of intellectual and foreign policy-making elites within universities and 
think tanks. These have expressed growing concerns for what they described as a 
dangerously “secularized” American foreign policy apparatus unable to adequately 
respond to an international environment where religious dynamics were becoming ever 
more salient to America’s interests. 
 
Activists, Principled Policy Elites and Political Elites Promoting International Religious 
Freedom Norms 
 
Throughout their history, American Christian groups have often been concerned with the 
state of Christianity abroad. American Protestant churches for instance have a long 
history of missionary work around the world (Hutchison 1987). During the Cold War 
organizations such as Voice of the Martyrs (founded in 1967) and Open Doors (founded 
in 1955) were consistently smuggling bibles across the “iron curtain”, documenting the 
harassment, arrest or killing of fellow believers, and lobbying the U.S. government to 
take initiative when local priests and pastors would be detained or jailed by Communist 
regimes.  
 
Because of important social and historical changes over the past decades, these 
interests and efforts have multiplied. First, there has been a demographic expansion of 
Protestant Evangelicals – a group of Christians particularly concerned with missionary 
work and proselytization – both domestically within the United States (Mead 2006) and 
across the globe (Jenkins 2007). Secondly, the end of Cold War rivalries, the emergence 
of information technologies, the growth of cheaper means of travel have all allowed for 
an expansion of missionary work. This has led to growing and deepening transnational 
connections and solidarity between thriving and well-organized American churches at 
home and Christians around the world (Hertzke 2004; Wuthnow 2009).  
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As a consequence of these changes, there has been a growing domestic awareness 
within the U.S. of fellow Christians suffering from conflict and poverty abroad. Many 
saw the violence and lack of opportunities directed towards co-religionists in developing 
and authoritarian countries often as religiously motivated. In the late 1980s early 1990s of 
particular concern was the perceived persecution of Christians and the curbs set on 
evangelization and proselytization in remaining Communist countries (such as: China, 
North Korea and Vietnam) and increasingly so in Muslim majority countries (such as: 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Sudan). The 1983-2005 Sudanese civil war between the North, 
seen as the Muslim aggressor, and the South, seen as the Christian victim, became an 
important catalyst for action. 
 
A coalition emerged in the first part of the 1990s among grass-roots religious 
activists and Washington insiders with the goal of making the plight of persecuted 
Christians a specific aim of American foreign policy (Hertzke 2004; McAlister 2008). 
One flank of the movement were Christian organizations, largely Protestant Evangelical, 
such as the older Voice of the Martyrs and Open Doors, and newer ones such as 
International Christian Concern, Persecution Project Foundation, Christian Freedom 
International, and Compass Direct. The other flank was constituted by conservative 
policy elites in Washington. The issue of Christian persecution reached widespread 
notoriety among foreign policy circles following a 1995 Wall Street Journal editorial by 
Michael Horowitz (1995), a conservative think tank pundit, accusing “Muslims” of 
attaching “Christians” in Africa and the Middle East. Others in the human rights 
community such as Nina Shea, a conservative Catholic, and Paul Marshall, a committed 
Anglican, both at Freedom House at the time, joined the anti-persecution campaign 
(Marshall and Gilbert 1997; Shea 1997).  
 
As the movement grew it also became more mainstream by moving away from 
the sectarian language of Christian persecution towards the broader concept of religious 
freedom. This was a less contentious idiom and one more closely linked to human rights 
discourses, which during the 1990s were becoming increasingly powerful. This shift 
widened the campaign’s appeal to a broader spectrum of human rights NGOs, as well to a 
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host of other religious communities such as Jews, Mormons, Buddhists, Baha’is, and 
Sikhs who equally feared persecution around the world (Hertzke 2004, p.36). 
 
The campaign drew upon growing number of supporters within Congress where 
“many members themselves, and their staffs, are enmeshed in religious life and thus 
predisposed to sympathy for the cause” (Hertzke 2001). In 1996 Congressman Chris 
Smith (R-NJ), took up the agenda and in a Congressional hearing called witnesses to 
discuss religious freedom and the persecution of Christians. By 1997 two major bills 
were making their way in the House and Senate aimed at securing American government 
action in the face of international religious persecution. The first was The Freedom from 
Religious Persecution Act, co-sponsored by Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA) and 
Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA). The bill demanded immediate action against any nation 
found guilty of egregiously persecuting religious communities and employed blunt 
measures designed to hold the president accountable if he waived automatic sanctions 
against such nations. Because of the Clinton administration’s and the State Department’s 
opposition to it, a second more watered-down bill that contained a broader definition of 
persecution and that gave the president greater leeway in deciding whether to respond 
was introduced by Senators Don Nickles (R-OK) and Joe Lieberman (D-CT). 
 
These bills were combined into the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act 
(IRFA), which passed unanimously in both houses and then signed into law by President 
Clinton. The act intended to “express United States foreign policy with respect to, and to 
strengthen United States advocacy on behalf of, individuals persecuted in foreign 
countries on account of religion; to authorize United States actions in response to 
violations of religious freedom in foreign countries…”.125 With the passage of the 1998 
IRFA, a network of desecularizing actors – activists, Washington pundits and scholars 
and Congressional political leaders – had made the provision of international religious 
freedom a key component of American foreign policy to be monitored and promoted by 
the State Department. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 www.state.gov/documents/organization/2297.pdf (accessed 20/08/2012) 
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After this initial activist phase, religious freedom issues have become ever more 
established and institutionalized within the Washington D.C. scholarly and policy 
community. Nina Shea and Paul Marshall moved the Center for Religious Freedom from 
Freedom House to the conservative think tank Hudson Institute.126 Thomas Farr, at 
Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Politics, has 
written extensively about these issues for major policy journals such as Foreign Affairs 
(Farr 2008a) and Foreign Policy (Farr 2010). Since 2011 he directs a Religious Freedom 
Project with the objective to conduct and advance policy-relevant research on the topic.127 
Brian Grim, at PEW, has led research on a number of highly influential and widely cited 
reports detailing international restrictions on religious belief and practices (PEW 2009b, 
2011) 
 
Faith-based “think and do tanks”, such as the Institute for Global Engagement 
(IGE) and The Institute on Religion and Public Policy (The Institute) emerged in the 
2000s producing research, carrying out programs, and mobilizing in favor of international 
religious freedom. Chris Seiple, who is president of IGE is as well the co-founder of the 
“IRF Roundtable”, a Washington-area consortium of international religious freedom 
(IRF) NGOs. The roundtable meets bi-monthly to discuss how best to promote religious 
freedom in American foreign policy, Washington policy circles and across countries 
worldwide.128  
 
The events of 9/11 gave a further impetus to this agenda, as scholars and pundits 
sought to securitize it. They increasingly framed religious freedom not solely as a human 
rights issue, but also as an important part of strengthening international peace, promoting 
democracy and countering terrorism (Farr 2008b; Grim and Finke 2010). This line of 
argument is evident when Joseph Grieboski, founder of The Institute, frames the 
importance of religious freedom policies with the following rhetorical question: “What 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 See: crf.hudson.org (accessed 20/08/2012) 
127 See: berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/rfp (accessed 20/08/2012) 
128 See: www.aicongress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/IRF-Roundtable-Web-Update.pdf (accessed 20/08/2012) 
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would the world look like if we really understood the Taliban’s thinking when they 
destroyed the two statues of Buddha at Bamiyan?” (2011, author’s interview).129  
 
A caveat is in order. Religious freedom is not solely, or not strictly, a religious 
norm. Indeed it is a norm that is also deeply rooted in secular and enlightenment political 
philosophy. It is a norm, however, that has an inherently religious content. Elizabeth 
Prodromou, from Boston University, succinctly captures this point as follows: “Religious 
freedom is a norm designed to create the possibility for religious outcomes, by promoting 
institutions and fostering regulatory frameworks which create an enabling environment 
for religion” (2011, author’s interview). Saba Mahmood similarly notes: 
“The right to religious liberty is widely regarded as a crowning 
achievement of secular-liberal democracies that guarantees the peaceful 
co-existence of religiously diverse populations. While all members of a 
polity are supposed to be protected by the right to religious liberty, 
religious minorities are understood to be its greatest beneficiaries in the 
protection it accords them to practice their beliefs freely without fear of 
state intervention or social discrimination.” (2012, webpage)  
 
The actors most concerned with international religious freedom norms – whether 
campaigners, pundits or members of Congress – are largely religious themselves. “The 
motivation for much of this ecumenical activism”, Allen Hertzke remarks, “appears to 
flow from authentic religious conviction and conscience” (2004, p.4). Furthermore the 
activists and organizations involved in promoting these norms internationally are 
overwhelmingly faith-based. Their interest is driven by a desire to stem persecution of 
religious people and communities, while allowing for the free expression of religious 
beliefs and practices. As a corollary, it is a norm that is sympathetic to proselytizing 
religions and traditions that wish to “spread the word” freely and unhindered, such as the 
Evangelical one in the United States.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 See also the June 2011 congressional testimonies by Grieboski, Grim and Farr on international religious 
freedom policies: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2011/06/us-house-holds-two-hearings-on.html (accessed 
20/08/2012) 
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Principled and Strategic Policy Elites Promoting Religious Engagement 
 
In parallel, during the 1990s, a small pool of scholars, pundits and policymakers in 
Washington would start making the case that American foreign policy was 
problematically culturally and institutionally too “secular”. This left it at a lost in 
appreciating how religious actors and identities were becoming, in the post-Cold War 
world, increasingly salient to American national security. Around the time Huntington 
(1993) published his controversial clash of civilizations thesis, Douglas Johnston and 
Cynthia Sampson (1994) were co-editing under the auspices of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) a groundbreaking volume making the case that religious 
knowledge and engagement were a dangerously “missing dimension” in American 
“statecraft”. 
 
Articles throughout the volume complained that American statecraft suffered 
from an “enlightenment prejudice” (Luttwak 1994, p.9) and “dogmatic secularism” 
(Burnett 1994, p.286), which led policy-makers and diplomats to discount the growing 
salience of religion in international affairs. Authors in the volume also complained that 
American statecraft under-appreciated how religious forces and actors themselves could 
be employed in the post-Cold War world to enable democratic transitions and contribute 
to resolve conflicts along ethnic and sectarian lines around the world.  
 
The volume was an isolated intellectual precursor to debates that became more 
widely and forcefully advanced following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In fact, ever since 
2001 a growing number of high profile books, reports and initiatives have come to the 
fore pushing for the American foreign policy apparatus to revisit its secular intellectual 
and normative assumptions, institutional structures, and policy practices. In Madeleine 
Albright’s reflections about “America, God, and world affairs” (2006), she would 
complain about the secularized nature of IR theories and much of the culture within the 
American diplomatic corps (2006, p.8). American foreign policy-makers’ secularity was 
ever more jarringly out of touch with a world marked by processes of religious 
resurgence. Albright has not been alone in her critique of American statecraft. Pundits 
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and former policy-makers like Thomas Farr (2008a), major scholars on religion and 
international relations such as Timothy Shah, Daniel Philpot, and Monica Duffy Toft 
(2011), and faith-based advocates and researchers such as Chris Seiple (2007) and 
Douglas Johnston (2011c), have all advanced similar claims.  
 
A Chicago Council for Global Affairs report “Engaging Religious Communities 
Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy” (2010), has crystallized much of the 
post-9/11 policy thinking on the subject. The report’s task-force was co-chaired by Scott 
Appleby, a leading scholar on religion and religious fundamentalism, and Richard Cizik, 
president of the New Evangelical Partnership for the Common Good and former chief 
lobbyist for the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). The task-force included a 
wide range of prominent religious leaders, scholars, and former government officials, 
such as: José Casanova, William Inboden, Timothy Samuel Shah, Thomas Farr, Douglas 
Johnston, Martin Indyk, Dalia Mogahed, and Eboo Patel. The report was intended to 
provide recommendations to the newly installed Obama administration. The close ties 
between the Obamas and the Chicago Council further reinforced its policy significance. 
Michelle Obama sits on the think tank’s board of directors and Barack Obama gave here 
his first major presidential campaign foreign policy speech in April 23, 2007.  
 
The Chicago Council report argued that “despite a world abuzz with religious 
fervor”, the American government “has been slow to respond effectively to situations 
where religion plays a global role” (2010, p.21). The causes of such failures lay in a mix 
of “political context that did not require as great an appreciation for the religious fabric of 
societies, a fear of treading too far over a set of unclear domestic legal lines separating 
church and state, and what some observers view as a secular bias in U.S. foreign policy” 
(2010, p.21).  
 
Douglas Johnston’s provocatively suggests: “Once Cold War-era international 
relations Realists ignored religion. If we are to be Realist today, we need to recognize the 
role of religion in international affairs” (2011b, author’s interview). Desecularizing actors 
within the American scholarly and policy community, complain that the national security 
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fall-out of this pervasive epistemic, ideological and state-normative secularism within the 
foreign policy apparatus is dire, especially on two accounts.  
 
First, it prevents policy-makers to adequately understand and predict how 
religious dynamics and actors may affect national security. Here the failure to foresee the 
events of 9/11, or Iraq’s sectarian conflict in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, are 
regularly held up as an example of this secularist blind spot. For instance, Seiple makes 
the case that:  
“Because of our inadequate understanding of religion, we missed the 
Salafi interpretation of Islam and the events leading up to 9/11, such as the 
1993 World Trade Center bombings and Osama Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa 
declaring holy war against America” (2011, author’s interview).  
 
Second, these secularist biases are seen as undermining the smooth operation of 
American foreign policy itself. Some argue America is hampered when it comes to 
resolving conflicts that have a religious element to them. In “places where religion 
becomes politicized like the Israeli-Palestinian one”, Johnston explains “America needs 
to come up also with a religious framework for peace” (2011b, author’s interview). 
Desecularizing actors tend to see a world where religion is important both privately and 
publicly for the great majority of people. In such circumstances, they argue, policy-
makers cannot remove religion from the table if American diplomacy is to be effective. 
Grieboski’s words perfectly capture this logic:  
“The State Department’s ultra-secularism, finds it perfectly normal to send 
ambassadors to Pakistan, China, Nigeria that have no understanding of 
religion. How can we even think of sending someone to a place like Saudi 
Arabia who doesn’t know anything about Islam? Islam informs the basic 
structures of that country’s society and identity.” (2011, author’s 
interview) 
 
America can take concrete steps to correct course, desecularizing actors argue. 
Most subscribe – often implicitly, at times explicitly (Farr 2008a, p.118) – to the idea that 
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American foreign policy should undergo some sort of process of “desecularization”. 
These scholars, pundits and former policy-makers, advance a wide range of proposals, 
which can be categorized into three broad overlapping camps. These proposals largely 
constitute what I call the policy framework of “religious engagement”.  
 
First, policy-makers need to have a better knowledge and understanding of 
international religious dynamics. Hence, in order “to anticipate events rather than merely 
respond to them, American diplomats will need to…think more expansively about the 
role of religion in foreign policy and about their own need for expertise” (Albright 2006, 
p.99).130 Bureaucracies can assist this process by bringing in experts on religious matters 
and expanding training on religion and world affairs for its diplomats and foreign policy-
makers (Chicago Council 2010, p.10; Farr 2008a, p.123)   
 
Second, policy-makers must reach out and engage more directly with religious 
leaders and communities in order to advance American interests. Back in the 1990s, 
Edward Luttwak proposed that “religion attaches” be put in place in diplomatic missions 
in “countries where religion has a particular salience, to monitor religious movements 
and maintain contact with religious leaders, just as labour attaches have long been 
assigned to deal with local trade unions” (1994, p.16). The Chicago Council report’s first 
recommendation was to “build internal capacity to engage religion and religious 
communities” more “effectively overseas” (2010, p.8). 
 
Third, church and state separation norms should at least be “clarified”, if not even 
reinterpreted in a more accommodationist way when it comes to international matters. 
Thomas Farr, William Inboden, and Timothy Samuel Shah, among others, have 
questioned in a dissenting note in the Chicago Council report (2010, p.84), the extent to 
which a strict separationist interpretation of the Constitution’s Establishment Clause is 
relevant and applicable in the context of foreign policy. “In the past ambassadors could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Mrs. Albright suggestively argues: “When I was secretary of state, I had an entire bureau of economic 
experts I could turn to, and a cadre of experts on nonproliferation and arms control…I did not have a 
similar expertise available for integrating religious principles into our efforts at diplomacy. Given the 
nature of today’s world, knowledge of this type is essential” (2006, p.112).  
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not mention issues of religion for fear of breaching the Establishment Clause in the First 
Amendment”, Elliot Abrams, a prominent neoconservative policy-maker and pundit, 
explains and then adds, “it was absurd and a wrong reading of the first amendment, as 
times change so should our interpretation of it” (2010, author’s interview).  
 
Over the past two decades a wide range of principled and strategic desecularizing 
actors have mobilized to include international religious freedom and religious 
engagement issues in American foreign policy. Some, like Thomas Farr, Joseph 
Grieboski, and Chris Seiple, straddle comfortably between the two issues. Others have 
been more focused on one or the other policy framework. The next section will trace and 
map out the extent to which they have been successful in mainstreaming their agendas 
within American diplomatic practices and policy-making structures.  
 
 
Institutionalizing Religious Freedom within American Foreign Policy  
 
 
Before Congress passed IRFA in 1998, religious freedom advocates were already gaining 
some traction within the foreign policy bureaucracy. This was evident when in 1996 then 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher established an “Advisory Committee on Religious 
Freedom Abroad” in the State Department.131 The Advisory Committee was composed of 
religious campaigners (such as Nina Shea) and American leaders across religious 
traditions (such as Evangelical and Mainline Protestants, Orthodox, Mormons, Jewish 
and Muslim). It was tasked with advising the Secretary of State on enhancing the 
protection and promotion of religious freedom abroad as a key human right concern. By 
1998 the Committee produced an “Interim Report” addressed to the Secretary and the 
President focusing on two areas of concern: religious persecution and conflict 
resolution.132  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/press_statements/9611/961112ps2.html (accessed 15/07/2012) 
132 www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/980123_acrfa_interim.html#presidential (accessed 15/07/2012) 
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Language on religious persecution, which was absent from President Clinton’s 
National Security Strategies (NSSs) up to the mid 1990s, started to appear thereafter. The 
NSS 1998 makes three such references in the document. The State Department’s 
longstanding Human Rights reports also started to pay more attention to these issues. The 
1997 report would explain that:  
“A disturbing aspect of the post-Cold War world has been the persistence, 
and in some cases the intensification, of religious intolerance, religious 
persecution, and the exploitation of religious and ethnic differences for 
narrow and violent ends. In 1996 many religious groups around the world 
continued to face persecution and other difficulties in practicing their 
faiths and maintaining their cultural loyalties.” (State Department 1997, 
webpage) 
 
The congressional passage of IRFA in 1998 was a groundbreaking moment 
however. The act more fully institutionalized the promotion of religious freedom norms 
in American foreign policy. Soon after signing the 1998 IRFA, President Clinton 
authorized the first official delegation of religious leaders from the U.S. to visit China to 
confront its leaders on the issues of religious freedom and religious persecution.133 The 
1999 NSS was no longer simply peppered with references to religious persecution, but 
would also now highlight that:  
“[The] Promotion of religious freedom is one of the highest concerns in 
our foreign policy. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is a 
bedrock issue for the American people” (1999, p.27).  
 
Most importantly IRFA mandated the creation of an Office for International 
Religious Freedom (OIRF) within the State Department directed by an Ambassador-at-
Large. IRFA also required the publication of an annual report on the status of religious 
freedom around the world designed to set into motion presidential actions against 
violating countries. It further mandated the creation of an independent United States 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133  www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/reid-and-clinton-announce-appointment-of-dr-don-argue-to-the-
united-states-commission-pn-international-religious-freedom-58323922.html (accessed 20/08/2012) 
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Commission for International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), to further monitor religious 
freedom violations and hold policy-makers in the executive accountable for their 
response – or lack thereof. 
 
The OIRF was situated in the State Department’s bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor (DRL) and was tasked with the explicit mission of “promoting religious 
freedom as a core objective of U.S. foreign policy”.134 The Ambassador-at-Large heading 
the OIRF was charged with “making sure that this issue [religious freedom] is woven into 
the fabric of U.S. foreign policy”.135 Along with the Ambassador, a director is selected 
from the Foreign Service to oversee the office’s day-to-day activities. Thomas Farr was 
OIRF’s first director from 1999 to 2003. OIRF carries out its mission by: 
o Monitoring religious persecution and discrimination worldwide,  
o Recommending and implementing policies in respective regions or countries, and  
o Developing programs to promote religious freedom.  
 
In terms of “monitoring” (i), the office releases an “Annual Report on 
International Religious Freedom”.136 A member of staff in embassies across 198 countries 
is tasked with collecting and feeding back to the office information on the status of 
religious freedom, and local governments’ policies towards religious belief and practices 
of groups and individuals. Secretaries of State are then invited to designate countries 
where “systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom” as Countries of 
Particular Concern (CPCs) and possibly levy economic sanctions upon them. The first 
IRF Report (2001) included the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, 
Sudan, and the Milosevic regime in Serbia as CPCs. As of 2012 the CPC list comprises 
Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan. Out of 
these countries, Eritrea is explicitly sanctioned for religious freedom violations. China, 
Burma, Iran, and North Korea have “double-hatted” sanctions - these countries all had 
previous sanctions which are now designated also to apply for abuses to religious liberty. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 www.state.gov/g/drl/irf (accessed 20/08/2012)   
135 www.state.gov/www/about_state/biography/seiple.html (accessed 20/08/2012) 
136 For more information on OIRF’s reports see: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf (accessed 20/08/2012) 
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Countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which are close U.S. allies, have wavers on 
sanctions.  
 
OIRF fulfills its mandate to “recommend and implement policies” (ii) by 
promoting in-country norms and policies supporting religious freedom, economic 
wellbeing, political empowerment and security of religious minorities. For example in 
Iraq OIRF works in close coordination with the Department of Defense (DOD), the 
National Security Council (NSC) and intelligence agencies to reduce violence against 
Christians and other minority groups.  It provides local direct grants to religious 
communities for economic development projects requiring cooperation across religious 
lines. The office is further involved in supporting a minorities caucus in Iraq that has 
proposed the first pro-Christian legislation to help save and secure churches and Christian 
groups from persecution (OIRF Official 2011).  
 
Similarly, OIRF officials have held among others meetings with delegations of 
Coptic Christians to help guide their thinking on Article-2 of the Egyptian constitution.137 
The Ambassador-at-Large during his/her travels and OIRF staff in local U.S. embassies 
actively encourage interfaith discussions and meetings among religious community 
leaders in countries where there are growing sectarian tensions, such as Indonesia, 
Nigeria and Turkey (Banks 2011; CSIS 2007, p.13). For instance, in Turkey OIRF staff 
have brought together Jewish and Alevi leaders – who had never met or spoken to each 
other before – to jointly lobby the Turkish government to change discriminatory 
regulation, policies and behavior towards these religious minorities (OIRF Official 2011). 
Concerns regarding religious freedom have been raised at the bilateral meetings and 
consultations with China, Central Asian countries, Morocco and Jordan (OIRF 2011a). 
 
Ever since 9/11, OIRF has sought to securitize and expand the religious freedom 
agenda by moving it beyond solely a human rights issue. As an aptly designed brochure 
on religious freedom and security states:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Article-2 of the Egyptian constitution states: “Islam is the Religion of the State. Arabic is its official 
language, and the principal source of legislation is Islamic Jurisprudence “. 
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“…the suppression of religious freedom and expression can lead to 
violence and extremism.  An open marketplace of ideas is the best way to 
promote religious freedom and moderation…our national security strategy 
must include promoting respect for religious pluralism in society.” (OIRF 
2011b)  
 
In terms of “developing programs” (iii), OIRF has been given a growing portfolio 
of grants to deliver projects that promote religious freedom and tolerance, and reduce 
sectarian and religious violence around the world. As of 2011, these amounted to over 
$10 million of the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund (OIRF 2011a). 
These grants are distributed to US-based NGOs working with local partners. They are 
generally distributed on a standard regional or country-by-country basis. Some are, 
however, targeted, under the euphemism of “global programs”, mainly towards a 
transcontinental and transnational category of “Muslim” countries and peoples who share 
a particular religious identity or faith.138  
 
Grants have been awarded, among others, to organizations to: “promote and 
advocate freedom of religion” through mainstream print and online media across the Near 
East, South Asian, and East Asian regions; “strengthen the capacity” of religious leaders 
to “promote mutual respect and prevent violence” in Nigeria; promote “sustainable in-
country capacity building for religious freedom” in East Asian countries; reform 
education policies in Indonesian Islamic boarding schools away from “extremism and 
towards religious freedom and appreciation for religious pluralism”; improve “tolerance 
towards Islam” in Azeri media; “reform how Israeli and Palestinians are respectively 
portrayed in each other’s school books”; increase the “appreciation for the diverse 
religious heritage” of Iraq; carry out “community development projects to encourage 
religious tolerance” in Lebanon;  “bring together interfaith leaders” in India; or work to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 The concern with targeting a distinct category of countries and people, such as the “Muslim world” 
sharing a particular religious identity and faith has become a recent and ubiquitous practice in American 
foreign policy. This issue is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.  
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“encourage peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding” of religious minorities in 
Muslim majority Pakistan.139 
 
As of 2011 OIRF was spending $1.9 million on “global” programs, that is 
programs targeting Muslim people and countries. Organizations are financed in the Near 
East and Southeast Asia to “promote international religious freedom norms” in specific 
professional demographics (legal, media, and human rights professionals, religious and 
secular leaders). Another organization is financed to “promote religious tolerance and 
freedom” through mainstream print and online media across the Near East, South Asian, 
and East Asian regions. A further initiative centers on global journalists reporting on 
religion. In particular the project supports “Muslim and other journalists” with the 
resources to “promote fair and balanced reporting on religion” and aims to improve 
“understanding” among journalists “of all faiths who live in and cover the Muslim world” 
of the different ways Islam is practiced and integrated into political and social life around 
the globe.140 
 
Along with OIRF, the 1998 IRFA also created the USCIRF, an independent 
commission equally assigned to monitoring religious persecution and promoting religious 
freedom norms internationally. USCIRF has benefitted from a considerable budget of 
more than $4 million a year (considerably more than the OIRF) up until 2011 and 
somewhat curtailed since 2012 to $3 million (Feddes 2011). It also drafts an “Annual 
International Religious Freedom Report” and assigns CPC status to religious freedom 
violating countries.141 Given its independent status, USCIRF is less hamstrung to official 
diplomacy than OIRF. This gives it more latitude in naming and shaming CPCs; indeed it 
has a longer CPC list than OIRF’s and in 2011 it included countries important to U.S. 
national interests such as Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan and Vietnam for example. The 
Commission is also tasked with making policy recommendations to the President, the 
Secretary of State and Congress. “USCIRF and OIRF are both concerned with religious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 This list is based on a 2011 internal State Department document I was given access to.  
140 Ibid.  
141 See: http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-and-briefs/annual-report.html (accessed 20/08/2012) 
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freedom and American diplomacy, with USCIRF playing bad cop, to OIRF’s good cop” 
(USCIRF Official-1 2010, author’s interview). 
 
USCIRF is headed by a team of commissioners who are selected: “for their 
knowledge and experience in fields relevant to the issue of international religious 
freedom, including foreign affairs, direct experience abroad, human rights, and 
international law”.142 Over the years commissioners have included prominent religious 
leaders143 and lay religious activists,144 along with recognized experts on religion,145 
human rights activists and law scholars.146 Commissioners have lead multiple delegations 
to assess conditions for religious freedom in countries such as: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Egypt, Eritrea, Laos, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. In collaboration with Douglas 
Johnston’s ICRD, USCIRF (2011) released its first-of-a kind study monitoring religious 
discrimination both in Pakistani public schools and madrassas textbooks. 
 
With time religious freedom has filtered through a number of Presidential foreign 
policy documents and initiatives. George W. Bush’s NSS 2006 (pp.6-7) framed religious 
freedom as a key pillar of the President’s freedom agenda. The fact that religious freedom 
made it so squarely into the document was partly due to the President’s personal faith and 
appreciation for the issue, but also thanks to the presence of Elliot Abrams and William 
Inboden among the NSC staff drafting the NSS. Elliott Abrams, before joining Bush’s 
NSC in 2002 as an advisor on democracy promotion, had been USCIRF Commissioner 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142  http://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/commissioners.html (accessed 20/08/2012) 
143 Such as: Don Argue, former president of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE); Richard 
Land, president of the Southern Baptist Convention; William J. Shaw, former president of the National 
Baptist Convention; and a number of other religious figures such as Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, Most 
Reverend Charles J. Chaput, Rabbi Davidz Saperstein or Imam Talal Y. Eid. 
144 Such as: Nina Shea, Director of the Center for Religious Freedom at the Hudson Institute; Robert Seiple, 
founder of IGE; Michael Cromartie, Vice President of the Ethics and Public Policy Center; and Dr. Firuz 
Kazemzadeh, a leading Baha’i advocate and in the United States and Professor Emeritus of History at Yale 
University. 
145 Such as: Elliott Abrams, former Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy Strategy under 
G.W. Bush and currently at CFR; and Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Professor at Boston University. 
146 For a list of current commissioners see: http://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/commissioners.html; for past 
commissioners see: http://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/former-commissioners.html (accessed 20/08/2012) 
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(1999-2000) and Commissioner Chair (2000-2001). William Inboden, before joining the 
NSC in 2004, had been a Special Advisor to the OIRF at State.  
 
Obama publicly discussed religious freedom during his so-called Speech to the 
Muslim World in Cairo (2009b). Here he listed “religious freedom” as one of the seven 
main issues that needed to be confronted head-on in relations between the U.S. and 
Muslim communities around the world. At the first U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue 
under the Obama administration in 2010, religious freedom was designated as one of the 
three main agenda items (OIRF 2011a). The President would return on the theme of 
religious tolerance in his speech on the Arab Spring (2011b) as sectarian tensions 
between Christians, Sunnis and Shias’ appeared to boiling up across the region.  
 
A Broadening Agenda  
 
In addition to monitoring and promoting religious freedom within countries and societies, 
the institutional actors concerned with these norms have turned their attention 
increasingly towards international organizations. Over the past decade the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC), has attempted annually to pass a Defamation of 
Religions resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Council (in Geneva) and 
General Assembly (in New York). The stated objective of the resolution was to curb 
perceived growing international criticism of Islam and rising levels of Islamophobia. 
OIRF and USCIRF have been at the forefront since the mid-2000s of lobbying efforts 
against the resolution, believed to be an attempt to promote blasphemy laws around the 
world and stifle freedom of speech. As a State Department IRF Report argues:  
“While the United States deplores actions that exhibit disrespect for 
deeply held religious beliefs, including those of Muslims, we do not agree 
with the “defamation of religions” concept because it can be used to 
undermine the fundamental freedoms of religion and expression.” (2010, 
webpage) 
 
OIRF and USCIRF are joined in their efforts by a wide network of religious 
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NGOs, secular human rights organizations, and a large number of Congressional 
representatives – particularly those from the International Religious Freedom Caucus in 
Congress (The Economist 2010).147 “At the core of the anti-defamation campaign”, a 
USCIRF official explains, “are oftentimes the same organizations and people involved 
with international religious freedom advocacy” (USCIRF Official-2 2011). 
 
Secretary Hilary Clinton has been personally involved in negotiations and 
diplomatic attempts to counter the resolution. During a visit to Turkey, Clinton (2011) 
gave probably the most high profile remarks on protecting religious freedom and fighting 
religious intolerance made by a Secretary of State since IRFA passed in 1998. Practice 
has overwhelmingly seen Secretaries of State directly addressing these issues publicly 
mostly when presenting the yearly IRF reports and not much beyond that. In Turkey 
Clinton committed the U.S. to the Istanbul Process along with OIC countries. The 
Istanbul Process is an attempt through the UN to downplay the institutionalization of 
defamation of religion norms within international bodies, while simultaneously 
advancing concrete measures and specific policies to fight intolerance, discrimination and 
violence on the basis of religion or belief internationally.  
 
Furthermore, the protection of religious minorities is emerging since 2011 as a 
particular policy concern. This concern is especially surfacing in response to rising 
sectarian tensions, such as the state of Christian Copts in Egypt, in the wake of the Arab 
Spring across the Middle East and North Africa (USCIRF Official-1 2011, author’s 
interview)  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 For instance, I was given access by a USCIRF official to a 2010 petition signed by 42 members of 
Congress sent to over 150 countries urging them not to support OIC’s defamation resolution at the UN. 
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Religious Engagement and the Growing Nexus Between Religion and Foreign Policy  
 
 
Along with the deepening and broadening religious freedom agenda, under the Obama 
administration there has been a further push towards developing a better understanding of 
international religious dynamics and to structure more robustly U.S. engagement with 
religious communities around the world. Obama inherited from the Bush administration 
an Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives in the White House (which I will call 
the White House Faith-Based Office: WHFBO). The office was created in 2001 to assist 
faith-based organizations to bid for federal funding to deliver social programs at home 
and abroad (more on this in Chapter 5). What is relevant here is that with the Obama 
administration the WHFBO was given a bigger and broader foreign policy mandate.  
 
As an enthusiastic WHFBO Official explained at a time when Obama had just 
reconstituted the office:  
“Although it should be in our national interest to have a better grasp of 
religious dynamics internationally, we have done a poor job at it so far…. 
In many places the only civil society that works effectively is religious. 
We as government need to understand this and work with them better. 
President Obama gets it and is moving in the right direction by expanding 
the office’s responsibilities.” (2010, author’s interview) 
 
Joshua DuBois, a pastor and Obama’s 2008 campaign faith-based outreach 
director, was appointed to head the WHFBO. Mara Vanderslice, a progressive faith-based 
political campaigner, was specifically appointed to head the WHFBO’s international 
portfolio. She was the main liaise between the WHFBO and bureaucracies with 
international functions such as the NSC, State and USAID on matters of religion. She 
was assigned to coordinate a newly appointed 25-member Advisory Council to the 
President on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships made up mainly by a diverse 
group of religious leaders and advocates (more on this in chapter 5). A first of its kind, 
the Advisory Council was tasked to provide policy advice on a wide range of issues: 
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deepening the engagement with the Muslim world, improving faith-based partnerships 
and assistance, strengthening interreligious cooperation, and promoting religious freedom 
(White House 2010). 
 
Mapping Out and Institutionalizing Religious Engagement  
 
One of the first priorities for Obama’s WHFBO was to “take a step back and 
survey what [was] already going on within the U.S. Government in terms of our 
interaction and engagement with religious leaders aboard”, according to its director 
Joshua DuBois  (2010). OIRF was tasked to map the State Department’s entire range of 
religious and community engagement activities. Information was received from 138 
Embassies around the world and a Religious Engagement Report was produced in 2010. 
The report was the first-ever detailed survey of U.S. government ongoing collaboration 
with religious organizations and communities around the world (OIRF 2011a; DuBois 
2010).  
 
DuBois highlights how the report – which has been presented to Congress but has 
not been made public yet – showed “a growing trend” when it came to “engaging 
religious and community-based actors” internationally (2010). Yet, as DuBois points out, 
the report also underscored how much of this engagement was taking place in a “sporadic 
and ad hoc” way. In particular much of the staff reported that they “did not understand 
the critical legal guidelines regarding the engagement of religious organizations” and 
“did not feel that they had adequate knowledge and training to effectively reach out to 
religious leaders to advance non-religious goals” (2010). As a result the WHFBO would 
start to work “with the White House National Security Staff and the State Department” to 
increase the “government’s capacity and training to allow for ongoing relationship 
building with diverse religious and community leaders across the globe” with the scope 
of reducing, among others, violence and conflict (2010). 
 
Part of this overall coordination effort was a new interagency working group on 
“Religion and Global Affairs”, set up in 2009 (OIRF 2011a). Members of the working 
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group included, among others: staff from the NSC; Joshua DuBois and Mara Vanderslice 
from the WHFBO; Judd Birdsall, Special Assistant to the Director of Policy Planning on 
detail from the OIRF at State;148 and staff from USAID. The working group was designed 
mainly for “sharing religion-related information and analysis and for connecting officers 
who are thinking creatively about new strategies for effectively engaging religious ideas, 
actors, and communities in the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives” (OIRF Official 
2011, author’s interview). The working group would host high profile speakers that 
explored “the significance of religion and religious freedom in world affairs” (OIRF 
2011a). For example, Douglas Johnston was invited to speak and help the White House 
think through how to better integrate and understand religion into American foreign 
policy.  
 
Many of these efforts seem to have fed into the creation of the “Religion and 
Foreign Policy” working group, as one of the five key thematic working groups, 149 within 
the State Department’s wider “Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society” initiative launched 
in 2011. The Strategic Dialogue, which is still ongoing at the time of writing (2012), is 
designed to elevate and strengthen the U.S. Government’s engagement with and support 
to a wide range of civil society actors, among which also religious ones. The “Religion 
and Foreign Policy” working group includes four task forces: Religion in Foreign Policy 
and National Security; Religious Engagement and Conflict Prevention/Mitigation; 
International Religious Freedom: Advocacy to Combat Religious-Based Violence and 
Human Rights Abuse; and Faith-Based Groups and Development and Humanitarian 
Assistance.  
 
Directing the religion working group are three government officials and two civil 
society representatives. The three government co-chairs are Joshua DuBois, Suzan 
Johnson Cook, who is Obama’s Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 
Freedom, and Maria Otero, the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Before joining State, Birdsall was managing editor of IGE’s journal The Review of Faith & International 
Affairs. 
149 The other four thematic groups are: Governance and Accountability; Democracy and Human Rights; 
Empowering Women and Girls; and Labor. 
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Human Rights. The two civil society chairs are Chris Seiple, from IGE, and William 
Vendley, Secretary General of the World Conference for Religions of Peace. Overall the 
group is seen as an effort to consider ways in which to provide a framework for religious 
civil society involvement in policy-making and equip its Foreign Service officers to 
better engage religious communities overseas (IGE 2011a). It does so by facilitating 
regular dialogue and interaction between the U.S. foreign policy establishment and 
religious leaders (across faiths), scholars, and practitioners worldwide.  
 
Its objective is to come up with proposals for Secretary Clinton on how to build 
and improve partnerships with religious groups on issues relating to conflict prevention, 
humanitarian assistance, religious freedom, and national security (IGE 2011b).150 In May 
2012 a first set of official recommendations were presented to Secretary Clinton. These 
included, expanding training on “religious engagement” and “religious freedom” issues 
for diplomats. It also called for further guidance on the extent to which the Establishment 
Clause applies to foreign policy issues and to develop clearer legal guidelines on what 
State Department officials can and cannot do when reaching out and supporting religious 
actors and communities abroad (IGE 2012). 
 
Expanding Training and Knowledge on Religious Issues 
 
Developments are gradually taking place to raise awareness among Foreign Service 
officers and ambassadors about international religious issues through newly developed 
training opportunities. Over the years the OIRF has increasingly worked closely with the 
State Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI), which is the primary training 
institution for officers and support personnel of the U.S. foreign affairs community, to 
integrate courses with an inherently religious content into the wider FSI curriculum. 
OIRF officers cover topics in the FSI program ranging from: “the international basis and 
standards for the right to freedom of religion”, the “theological beliefs of different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 A first live webchat in October 2011 included co-chairs of the group Chris Seiple, Suzan Johnson Cook, 
and William Vendley along with other faith-based activists such as Joseph Grieboski and State diplomats 
such as Miguel Diaz, U.S Ambassador to the Holy See. A further 30 different consulates and embassies 
around the world tuned in to participate.  
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religious groups”, “involvement of religious groups in politics”, “diplomatic tools used 
by the United States to promote respect for religious freedom”, and the “relationships 
between religious freedom, democracy, and national security”.151 
 
Maryann Cusimano Love, from the Catholic University of America, has drafted a 
number of training materials and case studies for the FSI that examine the importance of 
religious actors and factors in international affairs.  One of the case studies investigates 
then-Ambassador Tracey Jacobson’s decisions on how to integrate religious freedom 
concerns into her negotiations with the government of Turkmenistan.152 During her time 
in Central Asia, “Ambassador Jacobson”, according to Cusimano Love, “developed a real 
appreciation for religious issues and dynamics” (2011, author’s interview). “Which she 
then”, Cusimano Love adds, “sought to mainstream within FSI’s curriculum” when 
occupying a number of directorship roles at the FSI between 2009-2011. As of 2011 a 
new three-day course on “Religion and Foreign Policy” for career officers and diplomats 
was in the FSI’s pipeline (OIRF 2011a).  
 
More generally, with time OIRF has become a repository of knowledge and 
information on a broad range of issues at the nexus between religion, American foreign 
policy and international politics. OIRF, for example, appears to be the only office across 
the foreign policy bureaucratic apparatus that regularly collects data and information on a 
wide range of international religious issues. The Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has 
relied on OIRF data and information regarding religious persecution and the state of 
religious minorities in preparation of her visits to the Middle East during and in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring. An OIRF Official explains, when referring broadly to the 
State Department as an institution:  
“We are becoming more aware that religion is, or maybe has always been, 
the lifeline of the great majority of people in the world. All of which does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 The FSI is also offering a growing range of courses on “Islam”, with a decidedly religious twist, such as 
“Islam, Institutions, Modernity and Reform”, and “Islam the Rise of Religion in Eurabia”. For more 
information see: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148653.htm (accessed 20/08/2012) 
152 Jacobson was Ambassador to Turkmenistan from 2003-2006. For more information on Cusimano 
Love’s case studies see: isd.georgetown.edu/publications/casestudies/ (accessed 20/08/2012) 
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have an influence on their economic and political life and should be taken 
better into account.” (2011, author’s interview)  
 
 
Assessing Desecularization 
 
 
As these bundles of inherently religious policies such as “international religious freedom” 
and what I have called “religious engagement” have been mainstreamed within the 
foreign policy apparatus, a parallel process of desecularization has occurred. In this 
section I explore first counter-secularizing processes in terms of a rapprochement and 
growing entanglement between religious and religious-related norms and actors, and 
foreign policy practices and decision-making institutions. I then look at counter-secularist 
processes, whereby dominant secularist knowledge and normative structures among 
policy-makers and within bureaucracies become contested and weakened.  
 
Foreign policy practices are becoming desecularized as human, monetary and time 
resources within the federal government and in local embassies is increasingly devoted, 
within the context of the religious freedom and engagement agendas, to monitoring 
international religious dynamics and developing initiatives with an inherently religious 
content to them. Whether it is curbing religious-based violence and persecution, 
conducting interfaith dialogues, promoting religious tolerance through media, economic 
projects or government reforms, supporting local advocates for religious freedom, and so 
on.  
 
A process of desecularization is discernible when it comes to the norms and practices 
America is committed to spreading internationally under the rubric of “international 
religious freedom”. Desecularizing activists themselves like Grieboski, recognize that a 
qualitative and quantitative change compared to before the 1990s has occurred:  
“Up until recently, religious freedom was mainly done in a case by case way, 
there was no systematic approach. What the 1998 IRFA did was to look at 
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religious freedom following the end of the Cold War in more systemic way and 
institutionalize the issue within the U.S. government” (2011, author’s interview).  
 
Religious freedom is not exclusively a religious norm, but one also rooted in secular 
enlightenment thinking and part of the larger human rights discourse. Yet rather than 
being promoted within a human rights framework, the “religious freedom” agenda has 
become a separate and distinctive aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Hence a process of 
desecularization in terms of practices is discernible particularly as a separate space has 
been opened to directly monitor and promote norms that are overwhelmingly advocated 
by faith-based actors and designed to produce outcomes favorable to religions. This 
distinction between non-religious and religious human rights is even more apparent when 
one considers that a IRF Report now flanks the well-known State Department Human 
Rights Report. USCIRF also compiles its own IRF report. No other human right seems to 
have its own distinctive government mandated report, let alone two of them.  
 
Reaching out to and partnering with foreign religious leaders and groups is not a 
new practice in American foreign policy. Yet it appears that over the decades, according 
to a mapping exercise conducted by the Obama administration, there has been “a growing 
trend” when it came to “engaging religious and community-based actors” around the 
world (DuBois 2010). This growing entanglement between American foreign policy 
practices and religious actors is not only noticeable, but also explicitly promoted under 
Obama’s emphasis on “engagement” with civil society actors – which actively includes 
religious individuals, organizations and communities. Under what I have identified as the 
“religious engagement” agenda, the State Department and embassies around the world 
are systematically encouraged to establish links and reach out to religious actors abroad 
in an ever more consistent and systematic way. Indeed, as a USAID Official who until 
2010 was a member of Obama’s NSC explains, “today there is a more open attitude than 
ever before towards engaging religious actors” (USAID Senior Official 2011, author’s 
interview). 
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In terms of policy-making structures, processes of desecularization are evident in 
the institutional changes that have occurred in the White House and the State Department 
to manage and coordinate these inherently religious policy frameworks. Most 
prominently, within the State Department a new Office and Ambassador-at-Large 
position for International Religious Freedom were created in the late 1990s. An 
independent commission, the USCIRF, was established as a separate entity in charge of 
advancing religious freedom in American foreign policy. While in 2011 the number of 
commissioners and resources available to USCIRF was partly curtailed, OIRF instead 
seems to be growing in terms of staff and resources. A CSIS (2007, p.14) report found 
that by the mid-2000s OIRF had a staff of 22. By 2012, according to my calculations the 
office was employing at least 60 people (between civil servant staff, consultants, and 
interns).153  
 
Obama inherited from the Bush administration a small Office for Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives in the White House (the WHFBO), which the Democratic 
President then revamped by giving it also a broader foreign policy mandate. The 
WHFBO became one of the leading policy-making voices in the “religious engagement” 
agenda. As an effort to create networks among policy-makers involved and interested in 
managing and promoting policies with an inherently religious content and interagency 
group on Religion and Global Affairs was created during Obama’s first term. This 
continuing and expanding processes of bureaucratization of inherently religious agendas 
suggest a deepening process of desecularization within the institutional architecture of 
American foreign policy-making since the late 1990s.  
 
A parallel surge has occurred in the involvement of religious and religious-related 
actors in the policy-making process. Desecularizing activists and pundits such as Nina 
Shea, Joseph Griebosky, Douglas Johnston and Chris Seiple are included and consulted 
by policy-makers in the State Department and the White House. Thomas Farr has served 
as director of the OIRF. Hillary Clinton’s working group on “Religion and Foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 This number was reached by counting the individually named OIRF employees acknowledged in the July-
December 2010 International Religious Freedom Report. See: www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168439.htm 
(accessed 20/08/2012) 
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Policy” is a way of bringing the concerns of religious leaders closer to American 
diplomacy and statecraft. Such an effort, according to Suzan Cook, “may not be the first 
time it’s ever happened, but it’s the first time that it’s institutionalized” (quoted from 
Banks 2011). According to Chris Seiple, the working group creates a “safe space…where 
religious and governmental leaders of all political and theological stripes can gather and 
discuss how best to work together” (quoted from IGE 2012). USCIRF commissioners are 
mainly selected among religious leaders and lay religious activists, along with a host of 
other experts on religion, human rights activists, and law scholars.  
 
An interesting trend, suggesting a deepening level of desecularization across time, 
is further discernible. President Clinton and President Bush chose deeply religious but 
laypeople as IRF Ambassadors-at-Large.154 President Obama however has appointed 
Doctor Suzan Johnson Cook an ordained minister to fill the position. Likewise, President 
Bush appointed lay individuals to head the WHFBO.155 President Obama appointed 
Joshua DuBois once again an ordained minister. Moreover, Obama’s novel Advisory 
Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships in the WHFBO, was 
overwhelmingly staffed with lay and religious civil society leaders.156  
 
Counter-secularist processes are discernible too. Overall the strong epistemic 
secularist culture which many desecularizing actors identified as hegemonic within the 
diplomatic establishment and its institutions appears to be weakening. The idea that 
international religious dynamics and factors “matter” to American foreign policy is 
increasingly becoming common sense. For example the Secretary of State and her office 
find it useful to consult OIRF, which at present (2012) appears to be the only bureau that 
systematically collects international religious data. Most importantly, FSI is developing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 President Clinton chose Robert Seiple, who was Ambassador between 1999-2001. At the time Mr. 
Seiple was president of World Vision, an Evangelical humanitarian organization and one of the largest 
international NGOs in the world. Robert Seiple is also the founder of IGE, which his son Chris Seiple 
directs. President Bush appointed John Hanford, who was ambassador between 2002-2009. Mr. Hanford, 
holds a Master of Divinity degree, and at the time of his appointment was a Congressional Fellow on the 
staff of Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) who was closely involved with passing the 1998 IRFA. 
155 Respectively: John Dilulio, Jim Towey, and Jay F. Hein.  
156 See: www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp/about/council (accessed 20/08/2012) 
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and delivering new courses and training material for all Foreign Service staff and 
ambassadors with the scope of creating an environment that is more predisposed towards 
understanding and appreciating the role of religion in international affairs. These changes 
are described as a turning point by desecularizing actors themselves. “It is a sure 
indication of “desecularization””, Brian Grim points out, “if the system allows for such 
courses to take place” (2011, author’s interview). Dennis Hoover, from IGE, argues that: 
“such trainings were something unthinkable just a decade ago” (2011, author’s interview). 
 
While in the past, talk of religion was considered beyond the pale for most 
diplomats today the cultural and intellectual boundaries of what is permissible are slowly 
shifting and desecularizing. There is a growing sense that the U.S. cannot conduct 
effective policies without an understanding of global religious dynamics. At times the 
pendulum seems to have swung far to the other side. A tendency is noticeable in the IRF 
reports, for example, of reifying religious causes and effects. These documents minutely 
report all sorts of attacks and restrictions that people with a religious identity and belief 
are subject to. “Christians” are persecuted in one place, “Muslims” are attacked in 
another, “Sunnis” and “Shi’as” are clashing across the Middle East, “Baha’is” and 
“Ahmadis” are tortured everywhere, and so on. Clearly, there are few people in the world 
who do not have a religious identity or belong to some sort of religious group. However 
an image and narrative are often produced where violence towards faith communities or 
across sectarian lines is taking place almost entirely on religious grounds. Local context 
and history, along with actors’ political activism, party allegiance, political ideology, 
social grievances, and economic interests, for example, are all but absent as explanatory 
factors. The religious dimension tends to be instead elevated and reified as the primary 
cause of abuse.157  
 
For instance IRF reports regularly highlight the plight of persecuted Afghan 
converts to Christianity (see for example IRF Report 2010). Such cases often have a wide 
resonance across the American public. Yet little or no context is provided about the not-
so-religious reasons why such events may be taking place. Little context is provided on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 For a similar perspective see: Hurd (2012) 
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the role played by the presence of largely Western (and Christian) military forces in 
Afghanistan, the impact of embedded Christian proselytizers within American military 
forces,158 or the impact of Western military personnel wearing controversial “infidels” 
and “pork eating crusaders” patches on their uniforms. 159  Surely these issues all 
contribute to making conversions to Christianity not simply a matter of religious freedom, 
but also a deeply political and controversial one. Reports give little space to exploring 
such nuances and dynamics.  
 
Likewise the Sudanese civil war is generally portrayed as a religiously based 
conflict by much of the religious freedom community. The 2011 USCIRF Report argues 
that the independence of Southern Sudan was a “stunning triumph for the right to 
freedom of religion or belief”, particularly after a, “20-year north/south civil war which 
had been triggered by the Khartoum regime’s militant attempts to impose its radical 
version of Islam on southern Sudanese Christians and animists” (2011, p.1). Surely there 
was a religious divide between South and North, but one wonders whether the conflict 
was singularly caused by attempts to impose religious law. Where would Darfur, which is 
mainly Muslim, fit in this picture? Little attention is given to whether sectarian fault-lines 
may just be the proxy for wider struggles for political or economic power. 
 
Ideological secularist assumptions among practitioners are partly retreating as 
well. The very same idea underpinning the policy frameworks of international religious 
freedom and engagement are presupposed on overcoming ideological secularist biases. 
Religious norms and actors in these instances are not seen as dangerous and inimical to 
U.S. interests. These are instead mobilized in support of American foreign policy goals. 
The case for overcoming ideological secularist assumption in foreign policy, was made 
clearly by Under Secretary Maria Otero when launching the working group on “Religion 
and Foreign Policy”: 
“Religion can be as dangerous as it is powerful when carried with zeal and 
fervor. We see every day how religion is used by human rights advocates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/weekly-watch/12-12-08/travel_the_road.html (accessed 20/08/2012) 
159 www.thedaily.com/page/2012/03/18/031812-news-infidel-gear-1-2 (accessed 20/08/2012) 
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and terrorists alike to defend their actions. But, for those of us in this room 
today, we believe in religion as a force good in the world [emphasis 
added].” (2011) 
 
A stringent separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause is being 
contested, rethought and relaxed in its applicability to foreign policy. Policy-makers have 
privately argued that “back in the 1990s those skeptical of the religious freedom agenda 
would cite concerns regarding the separation of church and state, today instead such 
objections are rarely if ever raised” (USCIRF Official-1 2011, author’s interview). 
Operations involving religious groups during the Cold War were kept secret and 
undercover, partly also for fears of infringing on church-state separation norms. Today 
the normative environment has changed, engagement and support of faith-based actors 
abroad is more public and visible. Indeed, “a consensus is emerging within State and the 
White House that there should be some leeway abroad in the interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause, especially when it comes to engagement with religious actors” 
(Cusimano Love 2011, author’s interview). Given these shifting normative grounds and 
the growing entanglement between American foreign policy and faith-based actors, the 
State Department’s legal office is in the process (as of 2012) of preparing a set of 
guidelines on what officials can and cannot do in the engagement of religious 
communities and the protection/promotion of religious freedom abroad (IGE 2012). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Ever since the late 1990s two broad policy frameworks structured around issues of 
“international religious freedom” and “religious engagement” have been progressively 
mainstreamed within American foreign policy. Concerns with the persecution and 
imprisonment of religious actors abroad, especially Christian or Jewish, is not new 
among American religious activists and political leaders. Likewise diplomatic contacts 
with and support to religious groups abroad have extensively occurred during much of 
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the Cold War. Yet the breath and depth with which these respective concerns and 
practices have been institutionalize in the past decades in American foreign policy and its 
decision-making structures is.  
 
Indeed ever since the 1990s, two distinct, yet overlapping, domestic 
constituencies of actors, what I identify as desecularizing actors, have emerged driving 
these qualitatively and quantitatively new policy developments. The first constituency 
comprises a number of different actors. At the core are faith-based activists, largely 
Protestant Evangelical, but also from other Christian traditions as well as non-Christian 
groups highly concerned for the state of their co-religionists abroad. These have been 
supported by prominent intellectual and policy elites, on the one hand, and political elites 
in Congress (often all highly religious themselves), on the other, forcing from “below”, 
“above” and “sideways” the State Department to pay closer attention to monitoring and 
promoting “international religious freedom” norms. The second constituency of 
desecularizing actors revolves around a set of intellectual and policy elites, largely based 
in think tanks and universities in the Washington D.C. area, with very close ties to the 
foreign policy-making community. These actors, who also tend to be highly religious 
themselves, perceive American statecraft as problematically culturally and institutionally 
secularized. They mobilize “sideways” to mainstream through the catchall concept of 
“religious engagement” a better appreciation for the role that international religious 
actors and dynamics play in world politics and America’s security.  
 
These different constituencies did not emergence in a social and historical 
vacuum but are part and parcel, and responding to, larger process of religious resurgence. 
Some are deeply anchored in, and others responding to, macro social and cultural 
changes taking place at the domestic and international level over the past decades, such 
as: the growing demographic and political clout of Protestant Evangelicals both 
domestically within the United States and globally, the emergence of political Islam in 
the Middle East and America’s growing foreign policy entanglement in the region, and 
the perception of declining secular forces and the surge in the political salience of 
religious identities, beliefs and institutions when it comes to conflicts. Religious freedom 
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and engagement actors have also respectively relied upon a foreign policy environment 
fertile to the promotion of human rights norms and the empowerment of civil society 
actors. The end of the Cold War especially 9/11, provided important historical moments 
of change and crisis for the articulation and implementation of their religiously based 
foreign policy programs. 
 
As a result, gradual yet discernible processes of America foreign policy 
desecularization have occurred. In terms of practices, for example, America increasingly 
promotes norms that favor religious outcomes, monitors religious restrictions, sanctions 
religious freedom violating countries, advances interfaith dialogues, curbs international 
anti-defamation law campaigns, and provides programmatic and economic support to 
religious minorities overseas. Foreign policy-makers and officials are ever more regularly 
and openly reaching out to actors and groups exclusively because of their religious 
identity or beliefs.  
 
Decision-making structures are changing too. New offices, appointees, working 
groups, and independent commissions, have emerged within and outside the foreign 
policy apparatus dedicated to managing and coordinating inherently religious policy 
frameworks and agendas. Religious experts, advocates and clergy are progressively 
included in the policy-making process in the State Department and the White House. The 
fact that knowledge is produced and programs are implemented with an inherently 
religious content, mirrors an ongoing process whereby epistemic and ideological 
secularist assumptions are loosing their taken for granted status in the minds of individual 
officials and the wider cultural milieu of the foreign policy establishment. In the process, 
norms of church-state separation are being contested and revisited in a more 
accommodationist light. 
 
The depth and extent of these counter-secular trends across levels is hard to gauge. 
It is important not to overestimate nor underestimate their significance. In the latter case, 
as religion and foreign policy are increasingly mixing, some have warned of the possible 
perils of an American theocracy (Phillips 2006). The State Department and the White 
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House have not become, however, overwhelmingly religious institutions. They still 
remain profoundly secular state bureaucracies. Both are huge and complex governmental 
machines that respond to a great number of interests and deal with an infinitely vast array 
of foreign policy and security concerns. Reducing them only to the pressures exercised by 
religious actors and factors, both domestically and internationally, would be a gross 
oversimplification, if not downright incorrect.  
 
On the other hand, if one takes at face value what desecularizing actors say, it 
seems that not much has changed in the past decades. They argue that, albeit there have 
been important institutional shifts, offices and the officials responsible for dealing with 
religious issues are overwhelmingly marginalized within the bureaucracy and have had 
little policy impact (Farr 2012). Although there are new FSI courses with a religious 
content to them, some complain that the (all too) few existing ones are only “elective” 
(i.e. optional) rather than “required” (i.e. compulsory) (Cusimano Love 2011, author’s 
interview). People like Douglas Johnston argue that there is still an overwhelming 
secularist resistance to religion within foreign policy bureaucracies (2011c).  
 
When all is said and done, it is however undeniable that desecularizing actors 
have been successful in moving the boundaries between “the secular” and “the religious” 
ever more so slightly in favor of the latter. It would be incorrect to argue that there is no 
separation between church and state when it comes to American foreign policy. What is 
not incorrect, though, is to point at processes of desecularization. For example at changes 
in practices and institutions that increasingly include religious agendas, a systematic 
surge of religious actors in the delivery and making of policies, and cultural and 
normative shifts more accommodating to religion than before. All of which are occurring 
in very circumscribed, yet unprecedented, places within the foreign policy apparatus.  
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5. AMERICAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: INTERNATIONALIZING THE FAITH-
BASED INITIATIVES 
 
 
 
 
 
Charity and religion have always been closely associated. In Islam, for instance, 
Mohammed initiated the practice of Zakat (giving a set proportion of one’s wealth to 
charity), which constitutes one of the five Pillars of the faith. In Christianity, the parable 
of the Good Samaritan in the Gospel of Luke has inspired countless selfless acts and 
charitable organizations throughout history. No surprise then if some trace the roots of 
modern-day humanitarianism in the West to Christian missionaries treading the globe 
intent in meeting the (alleged) spiritual and physical needs of non-Europeans during the 
colonial period (Thaut 2009, p.322; Clarke 2006, p.843) 
 
Yet, the modern day international humanitarian and development sector, which 
has experienced an exponential growth in the post-World War II era, has had to say the 
least a difficult relationship with religion. When in the United States USAID was created 
by the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s, development theories underpinning 
much government assistance programs were deeply rooted in modernization theory with 
its embedded secularist assumptions. Within this paradigm religion was perceived as a 
hindrance, at best, and as the antithesis, at worst, to social and political progress. 
Development was largely seen as a material process of economic growth, which had little 
to do with the spiritual and moral dimensions of poverty that faith organizations instead 
often emphasized and focused on (Clarke 2007, p.79) 
 
In parallel, in the U.S., government support to faith-based organizations 
domestically increasingly became a contentious issue. From the 1940s up to the 1990s, 
the Supreme Court gave a strict separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
in the Constitution’s First Amendment (PEW 2009c, p.2). Under a separationist 
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interpretation most, if not all, funding of religion is seen as unconstitutional. From the 
1970s the Supreme Court, which till then had allowed some government aid to flow 
unhindered to religious entities, started scrutinizing even more carefully the practice 
(Rogers and Dionne 2008, p.5). The Court increasingly distinguished between 
pervasively sectarian organizations – organizations that would hire according to religious 
beliefs and regularly mix social services with religious messages – and those that were 
merely religiously affiliated but acted and delivered social services as if they were secular. 
If an organization was deemed to be pervasively sectarian and religious, its opportunities 
to receive government aid became much more limited. These domestic normative 
developments also constrained government support for religious organizations when it 
came to foreign aid. 
 
Here Laura Thaut’s (2009) taxonomy of Christian faith-based organizations 
(FBOs), which distinguishes, among others, between “Synthesis Humanitarian” and 
“Evangelical Humanitarian” agencies, comes in handy. The former are churches and 
religious charities which, in order to access government and USAID resources, have 
diluted their religious rhetoric and effectively function as secular organizations (2009, 
p.335). Organizations belonging to mainstream churches, with a more ecumenical and 
humanitarian theology such as Catholics and Mainline Protestants, have been willing to 
tone down the religious content of their programs in order to meet government concerns 
about supporting religion. For example, their religious roots inspire FBOs such as 
Catholic Relief Services, Episcopal Relief and Development, or Mercy Corps to serve as 
Christian witness through their service, yet their primary concern is humanitarian and do 
not actively infuse their assistance programs with religious messages engaging in 
missionary and proselytizing work. Such organizations also tend to reflect, and at times 
appear indistinguishable from, secular organizations in their hiring practices, 
humanitarian goals, and operations.160 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Quite interestingly some of the most well known NGOs today such as the International Red Cross, 
Oxfam, or Care have religious origins. These non-profit organizations however do not qualify as faith-
based having even more so gone down a “secular route” and are no longer “guided by any theological 
statement or denominational commitment in hiring staff and carrying out their work” (Natsios 2001, p.191). 
Thaut (2009) calls these organizations “Accommodative Humanitarian” agencies, which aside from their 
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In “Evangelical Humanitarian” agencies instead, religion plays a pervasive role at 
all levels, with “evangelism not only incorporated into [their] humanitarianism but also 
[their] most important objective” (Thaut 2009, p.346). Evangelical FBOs generally come 
from more theologically conservative Protestant denominations and churches, and tend to 
hire strictly according to religious beliefs. What makes these Evangelical FBOs 
distinctive is “the way they combine humanitarian and development activities with a 
fervent commitment to winning converts to the faith” (Clarke 2007, p.83). Indeed many 
of these organizations that engage in international development, are also ‘‘church 
planting organizations who engage in relief and development as an ad hoc peripheral 
activity’’(Kniss and Campbell 1997, p.100). Some may emphasize mission over 
humanitarianism, others may put the two on the same plane. The point here is that 
mission is an integral part of an Evangelical FBO’s humanitarian activity. Given the 
danger of blurring church-state lines when supporting such types of organizations, for the 
most part until the late 1990s USAID avoided funding Evangelical-inspired, as well as 
other explicitly proselytizing FBOs, to carry out international aid activities.  
 
As Mark Brinkmoeller, a Catholic faith-based advocate, argued at the time he was 
leading the ONE Campaign’s faith-based relations and outreach strategy:161  
“When it comes to USAID engagement with FBOs, Catholics and 
Episcopal groups have always been involved to some degree, Evangelicals 
less so. That’s because Catholic and Episcopalians use the language of 
natural law and can speak in secular terms about religious issues. 
Evangelicals instead speak in an explicitly religious language they do not 
have the same complex theological thought and are less inclined to use 
secular terminology. Catholics and Episcopal are comfortable not to talk 
“God speak”, Evangelicals are not” (2011, author’s interview).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
religious roots are completely indistinguishable from secular organizations like Save the Children or 
Medicins San Frontieres. 
161 Mark Brinkmoeller left the ONE Campaign and joined USAID in February 2012. Before being at ONE,  
Brinkmoeller was Director of Church Relations at Bread for the World, a leading FBO in the fight against 
global hunger.  
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This engagement between the American government and mainstream FBOs, albeit 
limited, makes U.S. foreign aid practices and institutions less fully secularized than 
American diplomacy and statecraft (discussed in the previous chapter). The environment 
within USAID compared to the overall State Department, for example, is somewhat more 
permissive towards religion. Andrew Natsios, former administrator of USAID and former 
vice-president of World Vision U.S. (the largest faith-based non-governmental 
organization in the world), explains the differences as follows:  
“While American ambassadors and civil servants at State have always 
been reluctant to engage with local religious actors, USAID staff has long 
realized that to be effective on the field around the world it needs to work 
with local religious groups and leaders, whichever the religion” (2011, 
author’s interview)  
 
Overall, even though there has been a limited engagement with religious groups, 
it is fair to say that since the 1960s up until the late 1990s American humanitarian and 
development assistance has, for the most part, been secular in character. USAID, and 
other aid delivering bureaucracies, largely had a secular institutional structure. Great care 
was taken to avoid excessive entanglement among church and state by sticking to the 
Supreme Court’s strict separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause. The 
development theories and practices that donors and implementing NGOs drew upon were 
overwhelmingly based on a modernization paradigm of rational economic progress where 
religion was often associated with backwardness and tradition (Deneulin and Bano 2009, 
see especially Ch.2). Within this context there was scarce space for religious norms and 
religious actors, unless they somehow secularized themselves, in partnering with the 
American government to provide international aid. For most of the second half of the 
XXth century the intersection between religion and the American international 
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development sector may be thought of as “fragile and intermittent at best, critical and 
confrontational at worst”.162  
 
From the late 1990s onwards, however, a progressive movement from 
“estrangement to engagement” (Clarke 2007, p.79) between faith and foreign aid has 
occurred. Following the 2000, elections George W. Bush launched and institutionalized a 
series of now faith-based initiatives. When Barack Obama came into office, rather than 
scaling-back on the many Bush era initiatives, he retailored a few and overall continued 
and expanded many of them by building on the institutional and regulatory frameworks 
left in place by his Republican predecessor. All of this has led to a gradual and consistent 
desecularization of American foreign assistance practices and decision-making structures 
in just over a decade.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. It first outlines the key desecularizing actors 
who have had a major role in pushing forward the faith-based development agenda in 
American foreign policy. The section also starts by placing these actors in the wider 
historical and social context of the time. The two sections that come after are historical 
and contemporary accounts of how religious norms and actors became increasingly 
entangled with American foreign aid, first during President Bush’s two terms and then 
evolving during the (first) Obama administration. An analysis of processes 
desecularization at multiple levels (in terms of practices, institutional design and 
cultural/normative shifts) then follows.  
 
 
Desecularizing Actors in Context  
 
 
This section starts by unpacking a number of trends as they relate to the resurgence of 
religion, the overarching historical and normative context, and important critical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 I borrow this expression from Katherine Marshall and Lucy Keough (2004, p.1) who do not talk directly 
about U.S. foreign aid, but make a more general point about the relationship between the international 
development sector (UN, World Bank and other organizations), and religion and religious-based actors. 
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junctures that explain the progressive rise, and thereafter, success of desecularizing actors 
in implementing and institutionalizing their faith-based agendas. It looks first at domestic 
political developments within the United States and then at the larger context within 
which the field of development studies evolved in the aftermath of the Cold War.  
 
First, the expansion of conservative Protestant Evangelical organizations and 
agendas since the 1970s-80s onwards has been a major development in American 
domestic politics. Their concerns became ever more entangled with those of the 
Republican Party’s (Wilcox and Larson 2006). These newly politically and socially 
active religious organizations would also increasingly knock at the door of the states’ and 
federal government to access resources for the provision and delivery of services. In the 
process they gradually and successfully contested church-state separation norms that 
were barring them from accessing government finances. With time the Supreme Court’s 
strict separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause started giving way to a 
more accommodationist stance. The result of the Court’s reinterpretation was to 
“dramatically [increase] the government’s options for partnering with religious groups” 
(PEW 2009c, p.16).  
 
Correspondingly, during the 1990s a progressive rolling back of the federal 
government’s direct intervention in service and welfare provision started occurring. 
According to Elizabeth Prodromou: “the emergence of a neo-liberal consensus in the 
1990s across the political spectrum brought Democrats to think that government “could 
not” and Republicans that it “should not” provide welfare services”, adding that, “this 
was a shift which opened a vacuum faith-based organizations stepped in to fill” (2011, 
author’s interview).  
 
These social and political trends on the one hand (i.e. the rise of Evangelicals and 
their growing links to the Republican Party), and normative developments on the other 
(the weakening of Establishment Clause strict separationist interpretations and the 
emergence of neoliberalism), converged setting the context that led to the first major 
domestic faith-based reform. In 1996 Charitable Choice was introduced by a majority 
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controlled Republican Congress during the Clinton Presidency. Charitable Choice was a 
provision of a larger Welfare Reform Act designed to reduce the size of government and 
encourage active civil society participation in service delivery. The provision was 
introduced to remove obstacles and expanded the eligibility of FBOs and churches to 
secure government funding and contracts for providing welfare services domestically.163  
 
The initiative relaxed certain rules that were more stringent in the past on funding 
for religious organizations. It exempted religious groups receiving government funds 
from having to hire employees who did not share the tenets of their belief and from 
giving up their explicit religious character. This also meant that they continue to display 
religious symbols, scripture and icons while delivering government social services. In 
essence Charitable Choice removed many barriers for Evangelical, and other overtly 
religious, organizations and ministries to access state and federal resources. John 
Ashcroft, a Republican Senator from Missouri and well-known religious conservative 
from the charismatic Pentecostal Assemblies of God, was responsible for introducing the 
provision in the Welfare act. As will be discussed later, Ashcroft continued to play a 
prominent role in the faith-based initiatives a few years later when appointed by G.W. 
Bush as attorney general (2001-2005).  
 
These domestic changes need to be complemented with a number of key 
international developments. First, the end of the Cold War opened up a space, free from 
West versus East rivalries, for greater attention by developed countries to poverty-related 
issues in the so-called Global South. This was reflected in the explosion of Western 
resources poured into humanitarian and development programs and the staggering 
expansion of the NGO sector from the late 1980s onwards (Agg 2006, pp.1-2). At the 
same time globalizing pressures and neoliberal economic models were leading to a 
progressive withdrawal of the welfare state also around the rest of the world. This opened 
up a space for civil society actors to fill this vacuum. Unexpectedly for secularized 
development specialists, many of the most organized civil society actors proved to be 
religious themselves (Deneulin and Rakodi 2011, pp.46-48). This forced international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 For a first hand and comprehensive account of these developments see: DiIulio (2007) 
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development scholars and practitioners to “rewrite their secular script” (Deneulin and 
Bano 2009) and increasingly come to grips with religion’s continued and, at times, 
growing social and political presence around the world (see also Clarke 2006). Similarly 
Scott Thomas observes: “The way culture, religion, and spirituality increasingly impact 
the debate over the meaning of international development is another aspect of the global 
resurgence of religion” (2004, p.137). 
 
A first indicator that intellectual and programmatic shifts were occurring within 
the world of international development was when the World Faith Development Dialogue 
(WFDD) was launched in the late 1990s. The initiative was organized by James 
Wolfensohn, then president of the World Bank, and Dr. George Carey, then Archbishop 
of Canterbury, with the scope of bringing together a group of senior leaders across major 
world faiths to discuss the links between religion and development. The initiative spurred 
the creation of new reports and departments in the World Bank and number of dedicated 
conferences around the world.164  
 
The domestic and international trends described above set the stage for important 
changes to come in terms of American foreign policy. Two broad categories of agents 
were instrumental in pushing and expanding the domestic faith-based initiatives to the 
international level. First, internationally oriented FBOs and activists, mainly Evangelical 
in character. Second, political and policy elites, mainly Republican and conservative in 
character, motivated by a mix of principled or strategic beliefs.  
 
Principled Activists Pushing to Access Government Resources 
 
Mainline Protestant and Catholic organizations have long been important and well-
organized voices calling the United States to take an active role in fighting poverty 
abroad. Organizations such as Catholic Relief Services have been key developmental 
players and USAID implementing partners long before the 1990s. What has changed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 The WFDD continues to this very same day, in a slightly different form. Interestingly it is housed in 
Georgetown’s Berkley Center for Religion, see: berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/wfdd/about (accessed 
20/07/2012) 
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remarkably in the aid panorama in recent times is the entrance of Evangelical 
organizations and advocates who have injected a good dose of energy as well as religion 
into the humanitarian and development agenda (Mead 2006, pp.37-38). 
 
Since the 1990s, American Evangelical agencies have dramatically increased as a 
percentage of the total number of religious agencies engaged in international relief and 
development work. By 2004, Evangelical organizations accounted for 48% of the total 
number of religious humanitarian agencies and 33% of all relief and development 
agencies (compared to only 8% of Catholic organizations) in the United States (Thaut 
2009, p.322). They have become more organized and present in Washington D.C. Some 
of the key players, which I will soon discuss in more detail, are: World Vision (founded 
in 1950), NAE’s World Relief (founded in 1944), Food for the Hungry (founded in 1971), 
Franklin Graham’s Samaritan Purse (founded in 1970), Pat Robertson’s Operation 
Blessing (founded in 1978), and increasingly individual churches such as Rick Warren’s 
Saddleback (particularly since in the 1990s).  
 
During much of the 1990s and 2000s Evangelical organizations became among 
the most active campaigners to end poverty in Africa (Huliaras 2008) and among the 
most ardent advocates for vigorous action in the fight against HIV/AIDS (Burkhalter 
2004). World Vision is one of the largest providers of international relief and 
development assistance in the world, with a total annual revenue as of 2010 of over 
$1billion.165 It has over 40,000 staff members in nearly 100 countries, that is even more 
staff members than CARE, Save the Children and the USAID combined (Kristof 2010). 
The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), especially under the guidance of 
Richard Cizik, became increasingly concerned at the turn of the millennium with 
international social issues. NAE’s (2004) document “For the Health of the Nation: An 
Evangelical Call to Civic Responsibility” explicitly and repeatedly encouraged 
Evangelicals to take action on international poverty.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165  www.worldvision.org/resources.nsf/Main/annual-review-2010-
resources/$FILE/AR_2010FinancialHighlights.pdf (accessed 20/07/2012) 
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Evangelical activism on foreign aid is driven both by a growing desire to fight 
extreme poverty internationally as well as an interest in expanding their foreign 
missionary work. Many prominent Evangelical pastors, in fact, are at the forefront of a 
booming missionary-aid nexus. Examples include televangelist Pat Robertson, whose 
relief organization Operation Blessing boasts revenues on average between 2011 and 
2010 of $400million. 166  Franklin Graham’s relief and development organization 
Samaritan Purse, which had revenues in 2010 for $385million, is active (and 
proselytizing) in over 100 countries around the world.167  
 
Megachurch pastor Rick Warren has developed a P.E.A.C.E Plan to mobilize 
Christians around the world to address what he believes are the key five global problems: 
spiritual emptiness (by planting churches), self-serving and corrupt leadership  (by 
equipping servant leaders), poverty  (by assisting the poor), disease  (by caring for the 
sick), and illiteracy (by educating the next generation).168 Warren has become a central 
supporter of programs to curb HIV/AIDS. He has committed millions in royalties from 
his all-time best-selling book The Purpose Driven Life (30 million copies sold) to those 
affected by the disease in Africa through his Acts of Mercy Foundation.169 Bishop 
Charles E. Blake of the Church of God in Christ, the largest Pentecostal church in the US, 
founded Save Africa's Children in 2001 to support children affected by HIV/AIDS and 
poverty. So far SAC has assisted over 400 orphan care programs in 21 African nations, 
reaching over 200,000 AIDS-affected children.170 
 
Over the past decades major Evangelical FBOs and leaders have partnered with 
other religious and non-religious organizations in a number of high profile advocacy 
campaigns concerned with international poverty reduction, debt relief, and HIV/AIDS. 
Particularly successful were the “Jubilee 2000” and later on the 2005 “Make Poverty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 www.ob.org/press_room/annual_report/OBI_FY11_AnnualReport.pdf (accessed 20/07/2012) 
167 issuu.com/samaritanspurse/docs/4288_sp_2010_financials.final?viewMode=presentation&mode=embed  (accessed 
20/07/2012) 
168 See: www.saddleback.com/lakeforest/adults/peace/ (accessed 20/07/2012) 
169 www.purposedrivenlife.com/en-US/AboutUs/AboutTheAuthor/AboutTheAuthor.htm (accessed 20/07/2012) 
170 www.saveafricaschildren.org/pages/how_we_work (accessed 20/07/2012) 
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History” campaigns. In these instances Evangelicals joined forces with Mainline 
Protestant, Catholic, secular groups (like the ONE Campaign), and Hollywood and music 
celebrities, to push for debt cancelation for the poorest countries in the world and commit 
increasing resources for the Millennium Development Goals (Clarke 2006, pp.839-41; 
Huliaras 2008, p.165). Evangelicals were both at the forefront of these advocacy efforts 
as well as key political players. Especially because, as Tom Hart, a lobbyist for the 
Episcopal Church at the time, explains: “Evangelicals had an ease of access to the Bush 
administration that others did not enjoy as much” (2011, author’s interview).  
 
Alongside high-profile international aid efforts by leading Evangelical 
organizations and individuals there is a parallel more “invisible” (Hearn 2002), but 
equally important, movement which also combines missionary work with development 
activity. Since their origin Protestant Evangelicals, as well as other American Christian 
traditions, have carried out missions around the world in the hope of alleviating suffering 
as well as garnering new converts. However over the past five decades “missionary 
activity by Evangelical and Pentecostal congregations expanded exponentially, displacing 
mainstream denominations” who dominated the field until 1960s (Clarke 2007, p.83). In 
the late 1980s roughly nine out of 10 American Protestant missionaries were Evangelical. 
By 2002, Julie Hearn, observing Evangelicals at work in Africa, would remark that: “the 
beginning of the new millennium marks not the end of the missionary era but its high 
point” (2002, p.32). 
 
In 2001, an estimated 350.000 Americans travelled abroad with Protestant 
missionary agencies, and donations to such agencies totalled $3.75 billion, a 44% 
increase in 5 years (Clarke 2007, p.83). In 2002, the Southern Baptist Convention, spent 
$290m abroad, mainly in Asia and Africa, establishing more than 8,000 churches and 
baptising more than 421,000 converts (Huliaras 2008, p.162). In Kenya a study has 
counted at least 1,300 American Protestant missionaries, the highest concentration of any 
other African country (Hearn 2002, p.41). It is no coincidence then that American 
Evangelicals have become increasingly interested in the so-called Global South. Missions 
also serve as a conduit for information to domestic audiences about the needs of people 
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and fellow Christians in far flung countries (Wuthnow 2009). As Mark Brinkmoeller 
explains, using Haiti as an example:  
“It is not uncommon that a Haitian pastor has been first educated in the 
United States and then sent back to his home country to open a Church. 
This pastor has connections back to America. He sends congregations over 
here information about his work over there and receives direct support by 
American congregations.” (2011, author’s interview) 
 
Overall, Evangelical FBOs and churches have expanded their domestic and 
international presence. Their international missionary activism has come to dovetail with 
a growing attention to international development issues. They have formed coalitions 
with other Christian groups and secular organizations and have become key players in 
global aid campaigns. As Charitable Choice opened federal funding for the provision of 
domestic services to a wider range of FBOs, Evangelical activists increasingly came to 
demand by the end of the 1990s that similar government resources were made available 
for humanitarian and development activities abroad.  
 
Political and Policy Elites Opening Up Government Resources 
 
During this period, American political elites became increasingly sympathetic to 
Evangelicals’ calls to expand their opportunities to access government resources for 
social services. The introduction of the Charitable Choice initiative in 1996 had altered in 
a significant way the relationship between the government and FBOs domestically. 
Hence when the 2000 presidential elections came about, a virtual bipartisan consensus 
had emerged on the desirability of organizing more systematically the faith-based 
initiative domestically as well as expanding it to the international level. Both Presidential 
candidates Al Gore and George W. Bush jumped on the faith-based bandwagon. It was 
actually Vice President Al Gore who first spoke about the issue on the campaign trail in 
May 1999. Then-governor of Texas G.W. Bush addressed the issue a few months later, in 
July 1999, during his “first major policy address” as presidential candidate delivered in a 
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church in Indianapolis (Brownstein 1999). When governor of Texas, G.W. Bush, was the 
first governor to include Charitable Choice provisions at the state level. 
 
Once elected, G.W. Bush quickly moved to turn into reality many of his promises 
on the faith-based initiatives (more on this in the next section). What drove Bush 
personally to embrace the faith-based initiatives may ultimately unknowable. It seems 
like both a mix of personal beliefs and political calculations may have played a part in the 
story. Two issues seem to have had a direct influence on the President. First, Bush’s 
“born again” faith surely made him sympathetic to Evangelical position. This said, in the 
circumstance of faith-based initiatives what appears to have made him even more 
susceptible to their advocacy efforts seems Bush’s personal life story that led to his “born 
again” experience in 1986. Indeed Bush turned to faith as a way of straightening-up his 
life and move beyond alcoholism which had plagued him for most of his adult life. An 
experience that Bush (2010, pp.31-34) himself has described as instrumental in 
improving his life, saving his marriage, and possibly leading him to the presidency.  
 
Second, a number of key intellectual trends and political calculations among 
Bush’s closest advisors may have played an important role as well. The fertile 
environment for faith-based initiatives among high-level Republican political leaders, 
generally less interested than liberals in social issues of poverty and healthcare, found its 
roots in an intellectual movement among conservative intellectuals and policy-makers: 
“compassionate conservatism”. Mark Rodgers, a key player in the compassionate 
conservative movement of the 1990s and former chief-of-staff to Senator Rick Santorum, 
explains: 
“Compassionate conservatism is a philosophical stance which born in the 
1980s and developed in the 1990s. A framework which led to the 
Charitable Choice initiative and opened up space among conservatives to 
talk about poverty in the years following. Bush, who had seen the power 
of the church in changing people lives, was interested in the movement. A 
group was formed, the “Renewal Alliance”, to help give policy guidance 
to the Bush campaign on faith-based initiatives” (2011, author’s interview). 
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Simultaneously, Bush’ campaign strategist Karl Rove saw Evangelicals as a 
pivotal voting bloc. According to Michael Cromartie, Vice President of the Ethics and 
Public Policy Center (EPPC), Rove believed that “Bush’s personal faith as well as the 
promise of opening government resources for their activities by enacting the 
compassionate agenda could do much to mobilize them in the 2000 presidential elections” 
(2011, author’s interview). Scholars and intellectuals such as Marvin Olasky, the god-
father of modern compassionate conservatism, John DiIulio, a professor at Pennsylvania 
University who later became the first head of Bush’s White House faith-based office, and 
James Q. Wilson, a professor at the Christian Pepperdine University, were invited by 
Rove during the campaign to meet with Bush and discuss the faith-based initiative.  
 
 
President Bush Taking the Domestic Faith-Based Agenda Abroad 
 
 
The discernible entrance of religious-related policies, actors, discourses and norms within 
the foreign aid sector was noticeable during the Bush administration in two broad areas. 
First, in the institutionalization and expansion of the Charitable Choice provision into a 
more structured domestic and international initiative. Second, the growing role religious 
actors and norms began to have in proposing and shaping global health programs, 
especially regarding reproductive health and HIV/AIDS prevention. This section provides 
a brief historical overview of these two parallel, but often intertwined, changes that 
occurred during the Bush administration. 
 
The Faith-Based Initiative Goes Abroad 
 
In his first month as president, G.W. Bush signed Executive Orders 13198 and 13199 (on 
29 January, 2001) mandating the creation of an entirely new White House Office of 
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (what I have will call the Hite House Faith-Based 
Office: WHFBO) and establishing Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives 
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(CFBCIs) in five federal departments mainly concerned with domestic affairs. The 
initiative was intended as a “national effort to expand the opportunities for faith based 
and other community organizations and to strengthen their capacity to better meet social 
needs in America’s communities”.171 With these executive orders, Bush moved forward 
in consolidating and institutionalizing the faith-based initiatives at the domestic level 
inaugurated with Charitable Choice. John DiIulio, one of the brainchildren behind Bush’s 
compassionate agenda, was in 2001 initially assigned to head the White House office.172  
 
Along with the White House, USAID became an important target for reform. 
Andrew Natsios, a former vice president of World Vision, was appointed USAID 
administrator in 2001. With Executive Order 13280 (on 12 December, 2002) Bush 
established a faith-based center (CFBCI) also in USAID.173 Both the WHFBO and 
USAID’s CFBCI were designed to create a “level playing field”, for churches and FBOs, 
especially Evangelical ones, to compete for foreign aid funds on equal terms with non-
religious organizations (and other established and more secularized mainstream religious 
ones). The level playing field was to be achieved by identifying and reducing 
informational, normative and bureaucratic barriers for religious groups to access 
government resources which had long been precluded to them (White House 2001). 
 
In 2004, the so-called “Final Rule” on participation by religious organizations in 
USAID programs was introduced. Under the new rule USAID could not exclude 
organizations competing for funding on the basis of: a) their religious beliefs; b) their 
hiring and managing practices, even if “sectarian” (that is hiring only people of the same 
religious faith); and c) whether their development or humanitarian operations were 
combined with “inherently religious activities” such as worship, religious instruction or 
proselytization –provided however that religious activities were separated in time or 
location from their USAID-funded activities.174 The ruling transformed substantially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13198 (accessed 22/07/2012) 
172 DiIulio was succeeded between 2002-2006 by Jim Towey, a devout Catholic and former legal counsel 
for Mother Teresa. Jay Hain, a conservative policy wonk, directed the office from 2006-2008. 
173 en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13280 (accessed 22/07/2012) 
174 www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/fbci/rule.html (accessed 24/07/2012) 
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USAID policy on engagement with FBOs. By allowing FBOs that exclusively hired 
based on religious creed and who explicitly combined humanitarian work with religious 
practices and messages, the Bush administration made it easier for explicitly 
proselytizing and evangelizing religious groups to apply for funds. 
 
Major Catholic and mainline Protestant organizations already had established 
systems in place to collaborate with the U.S. Government. Hence the White House and 
USAID’s faith-based offices, the “Final Rule” and the appointment of Andrew Natsios as 
head of USAID, were all a way for the Bush administration to help Evangelical churches 
and organizations access government largess. Resources were not being set aside to 
finance specific faith-based initiatives or organizations. What the Bush administration did 
was to identify and try to eliminate barriers to the full access to existing federal resources 
by faith-based and community organizations. In other words, funds that were previously 
earmarked for development and relief activities were now increasingly available to FBOs 
and religious organizations, not solely to secular ones. FBOs gained wider access and 
non-religious NGOs had to increasingly share the available pie. In relative terms, these 
reforms and initiatives were a gain for FBOs and a loss for non-religious and secular 
NGOs.  
 
Soon the resources available increasingly started flowing to religious 
organizations. As Lee Marsden has argued: “attempting to track the money awarded to 
faith-based initiatives by the US Government has been notoriously difficult” (2011a, p.8). 
The Boston Globe conducted a survey in 2006, one of the most comprehensive 
assessments of USAID contracts with faith-based organizations during the Bush 
Administration to this day (2012). The Boston Globe found that in 2001 USAID assigned 
10.5% of its resources to religious groups and FBOs. In 2005, the amount nearly doubled, 
as the percentage rose up to 19.9% totalingg over $1.7 billion for that fiscal year (Kranish 
2006). 
 
Catholic Relief Services, a longstanding partner of USAID was the principle 
recipient of funds with over $638 million. Organizations whose lines between 
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evangelization and development are highly blurred such as World Vision and Adventist 
Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), the humanitarian arm of the Mormon Church, 
received respectively $374 and $85 million. FBOs that, even more explicitly, intertwine 
religious objectives with relief activities were handed a growing portion of government 
funds. For example Samaritan’s Purse, Franklin Graham’s humanitarian organization, 
received over $35 million. World Relief, the humanitarian arm of the NAE, received over 
$22 million. And Operation Blessing, Pat Robertson’s humanitarian organization, 
received over $390 thousand. Explicitly Christian centred and proselytizing organizations 
such as Voice of the Martyrs and Evangelistic International Ministry received funding for 
the very first time (respectively $305 and $290 thousand) (Boston Globe 2006). USAID’s 
Office of Inspector General (OIG) has calculated that between 2006 and 2007 the amount 
USAID awarded to faith-based groups continued to rise from $552 million to $586 
million. During those two years, USAID counted 512 assistance agreements with 136 
faith-based organizations (OIG 2009, p.3). 
 
Table 1: USAID funding to Faith-based Organizations Financial Year 2001 – 2007 in 
Millions of dollars (Marsden 2011a, p.9) 
FY 2001  FY2002  FY2003  FY2004  FY2005  FY2006  FY2007 Total 
247  260  420  419  375  552  586  2859 
Sources: Boston Globe (2006) and Office of Inspector General’s Audit of USAID’s 
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (2009) 
 
 
(Conservative) Religious Values and International Health Initiatives  
 
Once elected, the Bush administration also came increasingly under pressure by 
conservative religious supporters to place a set of restrictions on health programs 
financed by USAID and other departments abroad. Indeed by the end of the 1990s 
international health policies (such as reproductive health, family planning, and 
HIV/AIDS prevention) had all increasingly become contentious issues for social 
conservatives (Buss and Herman 2003). Conservative Evangelical organizations such as 
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James Dobson’s Focus on the Family and Beverly Lahaye’s Concerned Women for 
America were especially active in lobbying the White House to change well established 
policy approaches on global health issues (Kranish 2006). 
 
Soon after his inauguration, President Bush signed a directive reviving and 
expanding the Mexico City Policy, also known as the Global Gag Rule. This policy 
precluded awarding government money for international population assistance that is 
funded by USAID to NGOs of other countries that perform, counsel, or advocate for 
abortion services, even if the NGO uses money from other sources than USAID to carry 
out such activities (Kulczycki 2007, p.340). The policy was first introduced by President 
Reagan in 1984 and revoked by President Clinton in 1993.  
 
Another arena of conflict over reproductive health policy, concerned the use of 
condoms as a family planning tool and, most importantly, as a prevention method for 
sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Social and religious conservatives, who 
argue that “condoms are ineffective and that their use can result in promiscuity”, lobbied 
to constrain USAID from implementing programs that emphasized contraceptives as a 
method of family planning (Kulczycki 2007, p.340). By 2008 U.S. funding levels for 
international family planning assistance had dropped by nearly 40% (accounting for 
inflation) compared to their high-water mark in 1995. That year saw the U.S., under the 
Clinton administration, as one of the leading voices in global sexual and reproductive 
health policy during the International Conference on Population and Development in 
Cairo (Barot 2009). 
 
Religious actors and beliefs further informed Bush’s President Emergency Plan 
For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), launched in 2003. In the words of John DiIulio: “The single 
biggest program to result from born-again President George W. Bush’s push …for faith-
based initiatives has been international, not domestic: a $15 billion, five-year effort to 
address the global HIV/AIDS epidemic” (2007, p.263). In launching PEPFAR, Bush 
labeled it a “work of mercy” to save Africa and hailed what he called the “Lazarus effect” 
of anti-HIV drugs in saving AIDS patients from the brink of death. Once President Bush 
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had made up his mind, Condoleezza Rice was asked to meet with multiple church leaders 
to hem out the program.  
 
A number of actors were instrumental in advocating for the initiative. First, White 
House insiders such as Michael Gerson, “the president’s “compassionate agenda” czar” 
(DiIulio 2007, p.263), played a key role. Gerson, who at the time was also Bush’s 
speechwriter,175 is a devout Christian and Wheaton College graduate. Time nominated 
him in 2005 one of the 25 most influential Evangelicals in America. In parallel, 
Conservative Christian leaders and organizations that had long ignored the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, seen as a disease punishing prostitutes, homosexuals and drug addicts for their 
“immoral behavior”, started paying attention to the issue. Especially when it came to 
Africa. Organizations like World Vision were at the forefront in lobbying Congress and 
the Bush administration for PEPFAR. For instance, Tom Hart recalls that:  
“World Vision saw its orphanages in Africa being depleted by the disease 
and came to the realization that something had to be done and that the 
resources within the religious community, the appeal to their 
congregations and flock, were not going to be enough to fight the battle 
against AIDS” (2011, author’s interview). 
 
PEPFAR focused initially on 15 countries. By the end of 2008, 1.4 million people 
infected with HIV had received drug treatment, 3 million counselled and tested and 6.7 
million had received other care (Marsden 2011a, p.9). In 2008, before Bush left office, 
PEPFAR was reauthorized with an additional $48 billion over five years (2009 to 2013). 
Its stated aim being: preventing 12 million new infections; treating 3 million people 
living with AIDS and caring for 12 million people, including 5 million orphans and 
vulnerable children. PEPFAR represented a considerable commitment of U.S. money and 
resources, one of the biggest by any nation to combat a single disease. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Michael Gerson is also notable for having coined in 2002 the famous “axis of evil” expression referring 
to the threat of nuclear proliferation posed by Iraq, Iran and North Korea (Noah 2003). 
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Conservative religious “ideology” (Kulczycki 2007) and “politics” (Dietrich 
2007), however also had an important influence in shaping the structure of PEPFAR. 
First of all the program was designed in a way that appealed to religious conservatives by 
focusing overwhelmingly on HIV/AIDS “treatment” rather than “prevention”. Initially, 
80% of the budget was assigned to care and treatment, and other services. The remaining 
20% would go to prevention, most of which had to be carried out following the ABC 
approach: Abstinence, Be Faithful, use Condoms consistently and correctly. Moreover 
one third of the resources for prevention were specifically assigned to “abstinence-until-
marriage” programs up until 2008. This requirement that a portion of the resources be 
allocated exclusively to abstinence-until-marriage programs was lifted with the PEPFAR 
reauthorization in 2008. But the opportunity for organizations whishing to carry out 
abstinence-until-marriage prevention to apply for funding was kept intact thanks to the 
“conscience clause”.  
 
The conscience clause was introduced with PEPFAR in 2003 and extended once 
the program was re-authorized. The clause allows FBOs that, employ only A (abstinence) 
and B (be-faithful) prevention methods, but do not use C (condoms) because of their 
religious outlook, to equally qualify for PEPFAR funding. In other words, the clause 
gives the chance to organizations receiving public funding to carry out prevention 
programs based on their own religious priorities. Even if these may be in conflict with 
evidence-based approaches, which suggest that using condoms is the most secure way to 
prevent the spread of the disease. Also, organizations receiving PEPFAR funding would 
have to sign an “anti-prostitution pledge”. The pledge required organizations not to work 
with prostitutes, a critical group in the spread of HIV, because of fears of encouraging 
prostitution and sex-trafficking.176  
 
Finally, the program was housed and managed by a newly created Global AIDS 
Coordinator Office in the State Department, with funds then distributed through USAID. 
In this way it was designed to circumvent other ongoing programs partly because 
religious organizations had little access and influence over them. First, PEPFAR was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Information is retrieved from: www.pepfarwatch.org/about_pepfar  (accessed 20/08/2012) 
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created even though the Bush administration had committed to support the UN’s Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria already back in 2001. This was however 
an initiative where the U.S. would have much less leverage on deciding which kind of 
programs should be funded and which not. USAID was also circumvented. Mark 
Brinkmoeller explains this case as follows: “religion and faith played a crucial role, 
among others, in creating PEPFAR as a separate entity outside the control of USAID. 
USAID was seen as too secular, not favorable to funding non-abortion, non-condom 
initiatives” (2011, author’s interview). 
 
 
President Obama Consolidating and Broadening the Faith-Based Agenda 
Internationally 
 
 
During the 2008 presidential race, Republican and Democratic candidates disagreed on 
most things, but all shared the common goal of extending Bush’s faith-based initiatives. 
At the time of the campaign, among Republicans, John McCain signalled he supported 
the idea, especially as it related to improving educational programs for disadvantaged 
children. Mitt Romney, when governor Massachusetts, created a special state faith-based 
office. Democrats were similarly supportive of the initiatives. Hillary Clinton 
wholeheartedly supported the initiatives ever since she declared back in 2005 that she 
saw no contradiction between “support for faith-based initiatives and upholding our 
constitutional principles” (quoted from: Kuo and DiIulio 2008, online).  
 
Candidate Obama, declared in a July 1st, 2008, campaign speech in Ohio on “faith 
in America”  that he intended preserve as well as expand the faith-based agenda by 
giving it more resources and making it more pluralist and inclusive than Bush’s was. He 
described the faith-based programs as a “uniquely powerful way of solving problems”. 
He would revamp the White House faith-based office and would give it also “a broader 
role – it will help set our national agenda” (2008). During the speech he additionally 
promised to regulate better the intersection between aid and proselytization and to 
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legislate that federal grants could not go to organizations that discriminated (on sectarian 
bases) when hiring. 
 
Barack Obama had long been a leading supporter among Democrats of giving 
religious groups a greater role in social work at home and abroad ever since his “Call to 
Renewal” speech in 2006 at a Sojourners conference (Dionne 2006). A mix of personal 
conviction and political opportunism, seem to come together here as well. On the one 
hand, the then-Senator’s interest in the faith-base initiatives appears rooted in his 
community organizing days on the South Side of Chicago where he would often work 
closely with religious organizations. This experience influenced his belief that, “faith-
based organizations can be powerful catalysts for development and social action: from 
rebuilding communities ravished by natural disasters to responding to outbreaks of 
deadly disease” (DuBois 2010, online). 
 
Equally, electoral expediency cannot be ignored. Following the Bush years 
Democrats had realized they needed to close what came to be know as the “God Gap” 
with religious voters (ABC 2007). Obama more than any other candidate on the left, 
sought to address this issue. During the 2008 presidential campaign, he actively and 
publicly courted religious, especially Evangelical, voters and leaders (Goldman 2008). To 
coordinate these efforts he mobilized a network of faith-based activists, such as Joshua 
DuBois and Mara Vanderslice, to carry out much of this outreach (Luo 2008; Paulson 
2008). Furthermore, surveys were showing that 69% of Americans had a favorable 
opinion of the faith-based initiatives and using taxpayer money to support the work of 
faith-based organizations (PEW 2009a).  
 
Consolidating the Faith-Based Agenda  
 
A month after his inauguration, Obama reconstituted the White House’s faith-based 
office into a newly named Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships (which I 
will still call WHFBO), with Executive Order 13498. Joshua DuBois was assigned to 
head the office, while Mara Vanderslice was tasked with overseeing all its international 
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activities. Obama’s intent while extending the office was to make it more pluralistic and 
expand the range of religious (and nonreligious) groups it was going to engage beyond 
the Bush administration’s narrower focus on conservative Evangelicals. In parallel he 
gave the office a greater policy mandate. First the President included the office, which 
under Bush was somewhat unanchored to the policy-making process, in the White 
House’s Domestic Policy Council. Second Obama established a 25-member Presidential 
Advisory Council in the WHFBO.177 With these decisions Obama brought even “more 
religion rather than less to the decision making and implementation process” when it 
came to foreign aid (2011a, p.4). 
 
The Advisory Council comprised an overwhelming majority of faith-based actors 
across religious tradition and groups. It was tasked with providing the administration with 
policy advice from a faith-based and community perspective on international issues such 
as “inter-religious dialogue and cooperation”, “environment and climate change, and 
global poverty”, “health and development”. One of the working groups was also 
dedicated to thinking through issues that had to do with “reforming the faith-based 
office”. The result was a 164-pages strong, recommendation-rich, report (White House 
2010).  
 
The “reforming the faith-based office” taskforce’s objective was to put on a more 
stable legal footing many of the controversial practices institutionalized by the Bush 
administration, especially regarding issues of church and state separation. Following the 
taskforce’s recommendations, Obama signed an executive order on November 2010 that 
took steps to create more clarity, transparency, and constitutional compliance in the rules 
governing faith based partnerships. However, as close observers and participants in the 
process such as Melissa Rogers (2010) have noted, Obama’s policies in this area were 
marked more by a sense of continuity than change.  
 
Indeed under the Obama administration: a) the federal government still allowed 
religious organizations, even explicitly proselytizing ones, to compete on an equal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 See: www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp/about/council (accessed 23/08/2012) 
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footing with secular organizations for federal social service funds; 178  b) religious 
organizations could still retain a religious name and mission, select board members on a 
religious basis, and provide federally funded social services in buildings containing 
religious art, scriptures, and symbols; and c) religious groups could continue to hire based 
on religious beliefs and sectarian preferences even when using government funding for 
their activities. This last was a policy that candidate Obama had promised to reverse, but 
backtracked on seemingly due to intense lobbying by a wide-range of conservative and 
progressive religious leaders.179 As such funds have continued to flow, as they did during 
the Bush administration, to proselytising and missionary FBOs.  
 
Broadening the Faith-Based Agenda 
 
The President’s emphasis on engaging religious groups and structuring such engagement 
in a more pervasive and systematic way, which was also discussed in the previous 
chapter, has equally translated in the faith-based initiatives realm. As an official in 
USAID’s faith-based office at the time of Obama explains: 
“With Obama, we have moved from faith-based initiatives 1.0 to faith-
based initiatives 2.0. While this office used to focus mainly on “leveling 
the playing field”, ensuring that FBOs are treated equally to secular 
organizations, today we actively seek new ways of engaging and 
developing partnerships with organized religious groups and NGOs across 
different faiths. What we are doing is broader than the Bush years 
[emphasis added]” (USAID CFBCI Official 2010, author’s interview). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 With the understanding though that federal funds could not be directly used by FBOs to proselytize. 
179 In August 2010 a letter was signed by leading conservative and progressive Evangelical organizations 
(such as World Vision, NAE, Samaritan’s Purse, Southern Baptist Convention, Sojourners) and other 
Catholic, Jewish and ecumenical religious organizations, urging members of Congress not to amend laws 
regarding hiring practices: www.worldvision.org/resources.nsf/main/religious-hiring-rights/$file/RHR-
letter.pdf. (accessed 23/08/2012)  
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Joshua DuBois from the White House tasked USAID’s CFBCI with mapping past 
and current aid programs that engaged religious groups abroad.180 This mapping was part 
of a larger effort to “develop mechanisms for the United States Government to 
systematically partner with religious organizations abroad” with the scope of alleviating 
“pain and suffering across the globe” (DuBois 2010, online). The President’s 
commitment to strengthening government partnerships with religious groups was on 
display during the 2011 National Prayer Breakfast. Here Obama argued:  
“…sometimes faith groups can do the work of caring for the least of these 
on their own; sometimes they need a partner, whether in business or in 
government...And through that office [the WHFBO] we’re expanding the 
way faith groups can partner with government” (2011a).  
 
When it comes to international development, it appears that USAID’s CFBCI is 
pursuing three engagement strategies. First the office is involved in including ever more 
actively American faith- and community-based organizations in most new major 
international assistance initiatives launched by the Obama administration. For example, 
USAID would organize an event, among many, in January 2011 bringing together its 
administrator Rajiv Shah with over thirty religious leaders and activists to discuss 
Obama’s new signature program to alleviate global hunger: Feed the Future.181 Similar 
efforts are being carried out for other key initiatives such as the Global Health Initiative, 
Child Survival, and Counter Trafficking in Persons. 
 
Second, USAID’s CFBCI is attempting to find new ways to partner with religious 
groups and leaders on the ground. A case in point was the 2010 Haiti earthquake. During 
this incident USAID’s faith-based office sought to be at the center of the wider USAID 
humanitarian response by coordinating with local religious actors. FBOs in loco plaid an 
important role in Haiti’s recovery phases (Wallin 2011). During the operation, USAID 
was able to capitalize and build upon CFBCI’s network of local religious contacts. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 This is similar to the mapping task given to the State Department’s Office for International Religious 
Freedom by the WHFBO (see chapter 4).  
181  See: blog.usaid.gov/2011/01/administrator-shah-speaks-to-faith-based-leaders-at-white-house-feed-the-
future-event/ (accessed 23/07/2012). 
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experience was used to expand and institutionalize these relations more widely within 
USAID by creating a list-serve of local faith-based organizations for future operations 
(USAID CFBCI Official 2011, author’s interview). 
 
Third, USAID’s faith-based office is increasingly thinking of exploring avenues 
for reaching out to the ever-expanding world of missionaries. As a USAID CFBCI 
Official explains:  
“American churches, especially Evangelical ones, are in droves 
establishing branches in developing communities to provide among other 
poverty assistance. However, these churches, except larger ones such as 
Saddleback, know very little about development. Hence there is a lot of 
scope for us at USAID to partner with them and help them improve their 
poverty reduction activities on the ground” (2011, author’s interview).  
 
(Partially) Rolling Back Religious Conservative Norms on Health Policies 
 
With the election of Obama the role of religion in international health policy was to some 
extent reversed and watered down. Most evidently, the religiously inspired Mexico City 
Policy / Global Gag Rule was lifted also thanks to the persistent campaigning and 
lobbying done by major women’s health and rights organizations (Levey 2009). These 
organizations tend to have a larger constituency among progressive and Democratic 
circles. It is however not clear, whether the Obama administration is planning to restore 
the dwindling funding for family planning activities internationally.182  
 
PEPFAR instead has continued under the Obama administration without any 
major change. For example, while the required percentage for abstinence-until-marriage 
prevention funding was already lifted in the 2008 reauthorization, the “conscience clause” 
was left untouched. Hence, ample resources are still flowing to abstinence-only programs 
promoted by FBOs (Hastings 2010). Likewise, the “anti-prostitution clause” is largely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 See petition by health and reproductive rights groups asking Obama not to cut further family planning 
assistance: health.usnews.com/health-news/blogs/on-women/2010/01/29/reproductive-rights-groups-beg-
obama-not-to-cut-family-planning (accessed 24/08/2012) 
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still in place. Under Obama, PEPFAR constitutes the cornerstone (70% of the funding) of 
a new and broader Global Health Initiative (GHI). The initiative, which was announced 
in 2009, expands U.S. health assistance beyond HIV/AIDS to other areas such as child 
and maternal health, tuberculosis, malaria and other neglected tropical diseases. The 
initiative focuses the resources increasingly on capacity building and building 
partnerships for local health systems. 
 
 
Assessing Desecularization 
 
 
As the above account suggests, since the early 2000s, religious norms, interests, and 
actors have visibly become ever more closely integrated in American international 
humanitarian and development assistance policies and programs. This, I argue, has lead 
to processes of desecularization in the foreign aid regime at multiple levels. This sections 
starts by teasing out the changes in practices and policies, and the growing entanglement 
between these practices/policies and religious and religious related actors. It will then 
focus on institutional developments and the inclusion of religious and religious-related 
actors in the policy-making process. Finally, it will concentrate on the counter-secularist 
ideational and normative changes occurring.  
 
In 1996, Congressionally-mandated Charitable Choice opened up federal 
resources to a wide range of churches and FBOs (especially Evangelical in character) for 
the delivery of domestic social services. Little had yet changed in terms of foreign 
assistance where only a few, well established, and operationally secularized Mainline 
Protestant and Catholic organizations were given regular access to USAID government 
grants. Under the Bush administration there was a push, via presidential executive orders 
in 2001 and 2002, to expand the domestic faith-based agenda abroad. The guiding 
principle was to provide a “leveled playing field” between secular NGOs and religious 
FBOs. In particular the scope was to reduce the latters’ bureaucratic and regulatory 
obstacles when it came to applying for USAID grants and contracts. Resources became 
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increasingly available to a growing number of religious groups including large and small 
Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Mormon ones that had long been excluded because of their 
explicitly religious character.  
 
During the Bush administrations international health assistance and some specific 
programs were molded around religious interests and norms. Policy guidelines such as 
the Mexico City Policy / Global Gag Rule, the prostitution pledge, the conscience clause, 
and HIV/AIDS prevention requirements which stressed A+B, and only last C(ondoms), 
were all structured around conservative religious principles. These changes were 
substantial in term of their desecularizing impact. Indeed the Mexico City Policy / Global 
Gag Rule and the prostitution pledge, for instance, would siphon USAID resources away 
from established secular NGOs such as CARE, Planned Parenthood, Marie Stopes 
International and Population Services International (Kranish 2006). These policy 
frameworks tilted the balance in favor of religious FBOs, since “US or foreign NGOs that 
provide[d] information on abortion (and which, by definition, are overwhelmingly 
secular) [became] ineligible for USAID funding” (Clarke 2007, p.83). New major 
initiatives were launched such as PEPFAR opening up an entirely new stream of funding 
that would be easily accessible FBOs. In some circumstance only accessible to FBOs 
given the insistence that one-third of all prevention funds be used for abstinence-only 
education. 
 
In terms of international health programs, some re-secularizing changes have 
occurred under the Obama administration. The Mexico City Policy / Global Gag Rule, 
for example, was removed. As such, a better “balance” between religious and secular 
NGOs has been restored. This said, compared to the 1990s, the bar has overall moved 
towards a less secular approach to international health issues. For example, PEPFAR’s 
“conscience clause” is largely still in place. This means that FBOs cannot be excluded 
from receiving funds on the basis of their abstinence–only prevention activities when it 
comes to HIV/AIDS.  
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In the case of the broader faith-based agenda, Obama has enthusiastically 
supported it and in many ways sought to expand it. Obama has sought to move forward 
from simply “leveling the playing field” between non-religious and religious 
organizations. His administration has encouraged USAID to seek new and more 
comprehensive ways in which to partner both with FBOs in the delivery of major foreign 
aid programs as well as reaching out to religious actors and churches on the ground when 
responding to local needs. As of July 2012, USAID boasts on its website that “twenty-
five percent of USAID’s partners are faith-based organizations”.183 These policy changes 
have led to a deepening process of desecularization in terms of a growing entanglement 
between American state structures and an ever-greater variety of FBOs and religious 
actors.  
 
Bureaucracies such as the White House and USAID are changing and religious 
and religious-related actors are increasingly called upon to assist in the development and 
management of faith-based policies abroad. The most important step towards institutional 
desecularization was Bush’s decision to establish an office in 2001 and a center in 2002 
for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives respectively in the White House (the 
WHFBO) and in USAID (the CFBCI). When President Obama came into office, rather 
than dismantling Bush’s faith-based institutional architecture he extended, deepened and 
expanded it.  
 
Obama extended it, by reconstituting Bush’s WHFBO into a better resourced and 
equipped office. He consolidated it by placing the new WHFBO closer to the policy-
making process under the White House’s Domestic Policy Council. Obama expanded it, 
by adding a new special Presidential Advisory Council. As a rather enthusiastic staffer in 
Obama’s new WHFBO explained in 2010:  
“There are few gifts that the Bush administration left behind. The faith-
based infrastructure is one of those. It is great and we are planning to 
expand on it. It is especially a gift for us folks interested in the progressive 
movement of faith-based organizations. It allows us to have a voice and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 See: transition.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships (accessed 23/07/2012) 
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carry forward our ideas in the policy process.” (WHFBO Official, author’s 
interview) 
 
Before G.W Bush’s presidency, religious or religious-related actors were 
occasionally, if ever, included in the policy- and decision-making processes when it came 
to international assistance. An ad hoc approach was substituted by a much more 
systematized one following 2000. Both faith-based offices in the White House and 
USAID, Mark Brinkmoeller points out, “created an avenue for more structured 
conversations with faith-based groups” (2011, author’s interview). In theory these offices 
should accommodate both religious and non-religious actors since the U.S. Government 
cannot be seen as supporting, due to Establishment Clause norms, the former over the 
latter. In practice though, the individuals that staff them and the responsibilities these are 
given is overwhelmingly skewed towards the faith-based angle.  
 
During the Bush years policy-makers and pundits with strong religious ties, such 
as John DiIulio and Jim Towey, were appointed to lead the WHFBO. Bush relied also on 
people like Andrew Natsios, who came from the faith-based world, to direct the entire 
USAID. Individuals with close ties to the Christian Right movement, such as John 
Ashcroft and Michael Gerson, held important positions within Bush’s (first) 
administration and were instrumental in creating a regulatory and intellectual fertile 
environment for the institutionalization of the faith based-initiatives and the creation of 
PEPFAR.  
 
Individuals related to the Christian Right movement are, for obvious reasons, 
absent from the Obama administration. The President also chose Rajiv Shah, who comes 
from the secular NGO sector, to head USAID. This may suggest some sort of re-
secularization when it comes to religious actors involvement in policy-making. That is 
not the case however. In fact, Obama has not shied away from expanding the presence of 
religious and religious-related actors in many areas that oversee international 
development policy. He has just made it more diverse. Obama’s WHFBO head, Joshua 
DuBois is an ordained minister and not simply a layperson (as Bush’s appointees were). 
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DuBois’ deputies Mara Vanderslice, up until 2011, and Alexia Kelly thereafter are both 
well-known progressive religious activists, Evangelical the former and Catholic the latter. 
Ari Alexander, a Jewish religious activist, was initially appointed to head USAID’s faith-
based office. Mark Brinkmoeller was chosen to replace him in 2012. Obama’s 25-
member Advisory Council, which is supposed to comprise both faith-based and non 
faith-based leaders, had only 2-3 members (depending on how one counts) representing 
secular organizations in 2010. In parallel, a wide range of external religious leaders and 
activists are regularly consulted and systematically invited to participate in government-
wide discussions about aid and development.184  
 
“There has been an incredible amount of outreach to the faith community from 
this administration. I’ve never seen so much before”, argues an enthusiast Jim Wallis, 
founder of The Sojourners a progressive Evangelical advocacy organization (quoted from 
Marsden 2011a, p.4). Obama’s time in office does seem to suggest a deepening level of 
desecularization in terms of rapprochement between religious actors and policy-making. 
As the American Civil Liberty Union’s (ACLU) argued in reaction to the establishment 
of the President’s Advisory Council:  
“What we are seeing today is significant – a president giving his favored 
clergy a governmental stamp of approval. There is no historical precedent 
for presidential meddling in religion – or religious leaders meddling in 
federal policy […] Although former President George W. Bush gave 
prominence to his faith-based initiative and informally consulted with 
individual religious leaders, even he never formed a government advisory 
committee made up primarily of clergy.” (ACLU 2009) 
 
An increasingly less secularist outlook is detectable among political elites and 
policy-makers themselves when it comes to foreign assistance. During the past two 
decades, discourses favoring a greater inclusion of religion in foreign aid practices and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 For a quick sense of the degree to which the WH reaches out to and engages with religious groups see 
the following blog: www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp/blog (accessed 25/07/2012). For a list 
of events where USAID invited faith groups to participate on international aid discussions and 
programming see: www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/fbci/events.html (accessed 25/07/2012). 
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institutions have been increasingly articulated. Quite noticeable is the weakening of 
ideological secularist assumptions when it comes to the role of religion in improving 
people’s economic and physical wellbeing. This is clearly detectable in the ever more 
bipartisan endorsement among political elites of the faith-based agenda since the mid 
1990s onwards. What is most interesting though is the intellectual shift that seems to 
underpin a similar growing consensus among policy elites around the desirability and 
legitimacy of faith–based approaches.  
 
In policy circles the effectiveness of relying exclusively on secular NGOs to carry 
out development work is increasingly questioned. As Andrew Natsios explains: “you 
simply cannot work in societies around the world which are religious without involving 
religious groups on the ground” (2011, author’s interview). An understanding is 
emerging among USAID and other development experts that working with American or 
local religious organizations makes for sound policy. Religion is progressively seen as 
the solution to underdevelopment, not the problem. The often-repeated advantages that 
FBOs are said to bring to the table are extensive local networks, credibility on the ground, 
and a motivated staff and volunteer force that is able to carry out work under great 
hardship. In this narrative, development and policy elites tend to regularly rhetorically 
emphasize FBOs role as key grass-root service providers reaching there where 
Government should or is unable to intervene. At the same time, for instance, the more 
problematic evangelistic and missionary objectives of many FBOs, and the closer 
association that is being established between American foreign policy and these kinds of 
religious activities, is instead generally de-emphasized.185  
 
As a result, over the years, a blind eye seems to have been turned on inherently 
religious activities carried out by many FBOs USAID has partnered with. Current faith-
based rulings, circumvent the issue of Government support of proselytism by requiring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 In the case of sexual and reproductive health issues the debate however is somewhat more contentious. 
There is, in fact, a strong push back by the development and health communities to religious norms, in 
favour of scientific and evidence-based approaches, when it comes to issues such as HIV/AIDS prevention 
and family planning. The idea of using FBOs for a wide range of other services such as emergency relief or 
education, is not as contentious. 
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that if faith-based organizations engage in religious activities these should be funded 
privately, rather than through USAID grants, and should be separate in either time or 
location from USAID activities. Yet, the degree to which these regulations are effective 
at curbing that USAID money is either indirectly or even directly used for, and more 
broadly associated with, winning converts abroad appears quite limited.  
 
First, USAID itself does not seem to do, or have the capacity to do, much 
monitoring on whether its funds are used to support inherently religious activities. A 
2006 Boston Globe investigation reported USAID director Natsios acknowledging that 
USAID does not and could not really keep a close eye on whether groups were using 
money to proselytize (Kranish 2006). Civil society actors find it equally hard to keep 
USAID accountable. Heather Weaver, a staff attorney at ACLU’s Program on Freedom 
of Religion and Belief, argues that: “compared to grants given at home, which are much 
easier to monitor, it is difficult to establish exactly what faith-based NGOs are doing with 
the funds that go abroad” (2011, author’s interview). 
 
Moreover, even if resources are used in line with current regulations, recipients on 
the ground may not tell the difference between what services are funded with private 
money compared to USAID grants. Above all, beneficiaries have little time for the nitty-
gritty of far-flung and arcane bureaucratic regulations. Recipients hardly distinguish 
between the privately financed religious services, which often proceed or follow the 
USAID financed goods and services that are distributed to the needy. Furthermore, FBOs 
can use USAID funds to buy the necessary hardware (infrastructure, machinery, etc.), but 
then use their own resources to provide services that are often religiously infused. 
Franklin Graham’s comments in this regard are rather instructive:  
“Of course you cannot proselytize with tax dollars, and rightfully so. I 
agree with that. But it doesn’t mean that we can’t build buildings, we 
cannot provide housing and buy bricks and mortar. The proselytizing or 
the preaching or the giving out of Bibles, people give us funds for those.” 
(quoted from Kranish 2006) 
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For example, Samaritan Purse, Graham’s organization, received from USAID 
$830,000 to help build the Evangelical Medical Center in Lubango, Angola. The 
hospital’s staff and clergy, who are not paid by USAID, are all Evangelical. According to 
Minne Prins, director of Samaritan’s Purse operation: “all the nurses are Christians […] 
Nurses will be trained to not only talk about the disease but also talk about Jesus” (quoted 
from Marsden 2011a, p.12). Samaritan Purse received ample USAID grants to intervene 
in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake to provide, among others, shelters, medical care, 
food distribution, clean water and sanitation, and education (Beeson 2010). On the side, 
and thanks to private support, it then carried out its religious duties as is clear from the 
online diary of Dr. Furman, a medical missionary, posted on the organization’s own 
website:  
“I think about the future of Haiti. Will voodoo continue or will this be a 
time for Christ? [...] In the Samaritan’s Purse clinics, many patients 
become first-time believers. I believe the work we are doing here – food, 
shelters, water and latrines, medical –is making a difference. I believe 
Haiti is on the verge. I believe we have one chance in time to change this 
nation. I believe now is the time for these people to connect with God.” 
(Furman 2010) 
 
Similarly, Food for the Hungry, a faith-based development organization, is 
carrying out relief work deep in the mountains of northern Kenya financed by USAID. 
The organization received a $10.9 million grant in the early 2000s to provide training in 
hygiene, childhood illnesses, and clean water. According to the Boston Globe: “the group 
has brought all that, and something else that increasingly accompanies US-funded aid 
programs: regular church service and prayer” (Kranish 2006). Indeed at Food for the 
Hungry’s outpost in Lakartinya, staff members spoke openly to the Boston Globe 
correspondents about how they preached about Jesus while teaching breast-feeding and 
nutrition. According to the fieldworkers and villagers, over the seven years that the 
organization had been operating there, it had converted almost the entire area to 
Christianity (Kranish 2006).  
 
	   226 
World Vision, a major USAID grant recipient, regularly seeks to convert non-
evangelical Christians and people of other faiths during its development operations. In 
countries such as Zimbabwe field staff sign a “statement of faith” and “evangelism 
committees” are set up at project sites (Bornstein 2002). In Kenya for example, Julie 
Hearn states, “of the NGOs with which USAID works, US evangelical missions are a 
significant constituency” among which feature prominently World Vision and Food For 
the Hungry (Hearn 2002, p.34).  
 
In Pakistan, the Boston Globe found a World Witness hospital where top-of-the-
line medical equipment, (computers, machinery, lecture theaters), were emblazoned with 
USAID stickers. The hospital patients however learned about the gospel from missionary 
nurses whose salaries, unlike the medical equipment, was not paid with taxpayer money. 
A brochure for the hospital explained that: “the hospital and staff feel that through Christ, 
terrorism will be eliminated in this part of the world”. “I want Muslims to become 
Christians”, the hospital director explained to his interviewers (quoted from Milligan 
2006). And this may not just be an isolated case. An Ethics and Public Policy Center 
survey in 2003 showed that 81% of Evangelical leaders believed it to be “very important” 
to evangelize Muslims in other countries (Croft 2007, p.702). 
 
Although there are regulatory barriers that prevent FBOs accessing U.S. 
government money from use these resources for missionary purposes, the substance in 
terms of perceptions and end results on the ground is may be quite different. Indeed while 
proselytizing FBOs may use (or report they are using) government resources to buy food, 
medicines, pay for petrol and operations and so on and not to hold sermons and distribute 
religious material; once on the ground the two are indistinguishable as the left hand 
attempts to save lives and the right one attempts to save souls.186 A WHFBO Official has, 
in fact, privately commented that: “As a Government over the past decade we have 
turned a blind eye towards Christian proselytization. We need to be clearer on where we 
stand on this issue” (2010, author’s interview).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 For a similar perspective see also: Marsden (2011a); Pelkmans (2009); Thaut (2009) 
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Important state-normative desecularizing shifts are occurring as well. Changes are 
underway from a strict separationist interpretation of church-state norms when it comes 
to foreign aid. This is in part facilitated by ongoing domestic forces which are pushing 
the Supreme Court towards a more accommodationist understanding of the Establishment 
Clause, which also led to the emergence of Charitable Choice (PEW 2009c, p.11; Rogers 
and Dionne 2008, p.6). The Bush and Obama faith-based initiatives should be squarely 
placed in this shifting legal normative context. Indeed close observers of these 
developments have noted: “The Constitution is no longer a potential obstacle to a 
successful faith-based initiative in the White House” (Kuo and DiIulio 2008, online). 
 
The loosening up of impediments towards building stronger church-state 
partnerships domestically, are mainly translated into foreign aid policy through USAID’s 
2004 Final Rule drafted under the Bush presidency. In spite of campaign promises to 
tighten things up, Obama has simply clarified previously unspecified regulations, while 
leaving intact much of the Final Rule’s permissive approach to financing inherently 
religious organizations who discriminate according to hiring and proselytize 
internationally (Markoe 2011; Banks 2012).  
 
Moreover, as of 2011 the Obama administration was seeking to make the Final 
Rule even less stringent by allowing “federal funding to be used to construct, acquire, or 
rehabilitate houses of worship” abroad (ACLU 2011). The G.W. Bush administration – 
like the preceding Clinton, George H.W. Bush, and Reagan ones – argued that the 
Constitution did not permit taxpayer money to be used to construct or rehabilitate 
buildings devoted to religious use, such as churches, mosques and temples. The proposed 
USAID changes suggest that an attempt is underway to further desecularize strict 
(secularist) norms of church-state separation. The following remarks by Heather Weaver, 
form the ACLU, aptly capture the changes underway:  
“Something is happening here. Once we at ACLU used to focus on 
establishment clause issues mainly domestically, today we are branching 
out into foreign policy issues. There are worrying debates in Washington 
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that the Establishment Clause does not apply abroad.” (2011, author’s 
interview)  
 
Generally there are two cases being made for a less separationist interpretation of 
the Establishment clause when it comes to foreign aid. First Evangelical, and other, 
religious organizations and movements have been successful over the years in 
constructing a powerful narrative around their exclusion from government contracts as 
constituting a “discriminatory” practice – even if such exclusion is based on concerns 
over blurring of church and state. As Mark Brinmoeller explains:  
“In the religious milieu there is a sense of grievance that religion has been 
unfairly squeezed out of the public sphere. As a reaction there are strong 
voices pushing for a less strict separation and grater access to government 
resources” (2011, author’s interview).  
 
Along with the normative argument by FBOs, there is also a foreign policy 
strategic argument, which is being advanced. This is based on the notion that an overly 
stringent interpretation of the Establishment Clause may be at times more of a nuisance 
than anything when it comes to securing America’s national interest and helping people 
overseas. Joshua DuBois has argued that: “if your focus is first and foremost serving 
people in need, then there’s not a tremendous amount of time left to debate the finer 
points of the church-state relationship” (quoted in Draper 2011). A USAID CFBCI 
Official makes a similar case as follows:  
“We need to be pragmatic about how things work in the field. Religion is 
a pervasive presence in civil societies worldwide. Over restrictive 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause ties our hands in certain cases 
and we cannot meet our humanitarian and development objectives. It is 
important that we both clarify and update our understanding of the law, 
this needs to mirror world reality” (2011, author’s interview).  
 
This laxer attitude towards supporting religious partners is filtering through 
USAID programs and practices. Because of mounting legal concerns that USAID was 
	   229 
supporting religious activities abroad, during the 2000s, an audit was carried out in 2009 
of its faith-based initiatives. The audit discovered that USAID funds had been knowingly 
used for religious activities in at least four contracts that amounted to more than $325,000 
(OIG 2009, p.1). The report found that USAID officials, mindful of Establishment Clause 
issues, nevertheless would often overlook whether funding overlapped with religion “in 
light of compelling foreign policy priorities” such as pacifying Iraq or combating the 
spread of HIV/AIDS (OIG 2009, p.7).  
 
The report found that funds were used for the rehabilitation of mosques and 
adjoining community centers in Iraq. USAID also funded, within a program to combat 
HIV/AIDS, lesson plans that contained Biblical applications and discussions. This 
monitoring exercise is however likely to have underestimated the extent to which 
resources were being miss-used. The audit relied on self-reporting by FBOs about 
“whether they had engaged in inherently religious activities using USAID-provided 
funding” (OIG 2009, p.21). This is a rather weak methodology, particularly if one wants 
to uncover any wrongdoing by FBOs themselves. As Lee Marsden has noted: “perhaps 
not unsurprisingly funded organizations reported back that they used the money in 
accordance with USAID practice” (Marsden 2011a, p.7). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
American foreign development aid and assistance have never been, to start with, as fully 
secularized as for instance were its diplomacy and statecraft practices which were 
explored in the previous chapter. USAID and its staff have to some extent always worked 
with religious organizations, especially mainstream Catholic and Mainline Protestant 
ones, and local religious communities. Nevertheless, this chapter has argued, modern 
foreign aid programs, institutions, and intellectual frameworks have largely operated 
from the 1950s-60s onwards on a secular basis. Indeed religious beliefs and organizations 
where often seen as antithetical, if not inimical, to developmental models built around 
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modernization theories of the time. Yet over the past two decades a gradual and 
discernible process of desecularization has occurred.  
 
Since the early 2000s the American government has launched a number of faith-
based development and health initiatives. Gradually and steadily under the Bush 
administration the percentage of federal funds assigned to FBOs in general, and 
Protestant Evangelical ones in particular, grow substantially. With the first Obama 
administration, many Bush era policies were extended. Additionally, new and innovative 
efforts to partner and engage with the faith community at home and abroad were pursued 
by the Obama administration. There have been important institutional developments as 
new offices and centers were launched and then expanded in the White House and 
USAID to coordinate and manage much of the faith-based agenda. Religious and 
religious-related actors are ever more integrated into policy-making by being appointed 
to head offices, direct agencies, and sit on policy advisory councils with a focus on 
international aid. As Melissa Rogers, at Wake Forest University Divinity School and a 
former member of Obama’s Advisory Council, observes: “Today, more than ever, the 
relationship between religion and foreign aid is more intentional, more visible to the 
public, and more widespread” (2011, author’s interview). 
 
Epistemic and ideological secularist assumptions, which implicitly and explicitly 
informed much development thinking before the 1990s, are being reexamined. USAID 
staffers and development experts have come to note the continued and newfound 
vibrancy or religious traditions, communities and actors in local contexts around the 
world. Local churches and faith-based organizations are progressively seen as important 
partners in delivering life-saving services around the world. Because these religious 
institutions and organizations are often rooted deeply in the social fabric of local 
communities, they are increasingly perceived as able, at times even more effectively than 
secular humanitarian organizations, to reach and influence people.  
 
The injection of religion in development has not gone without controversy. 
Concerns have been raised about the blurring boundaries between church and state, 
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whether government funds should be assigned to organizations who discriminate on the 
basis of religion in their hiring practices, and whether resources should be made available 
to organizations which also explicitly proselytize. In the past, and especially before the 
1990s, because of these apparent tensions court judges, policy and political elites were 
wary of granting funds to overtly religious organizations and churches. Today however, 
in the name of reducing discrimination against FBOs and reaching out to the world’s 
poorest, strict norms of church and state separation are being contested and watered down. 
Presidential executive orders and USAID special rulings (in 2004 and a new emerging 
one in 2011) are creating an environment where American religious organizations and 
local religious groups have a freer hand in partnering with the government and USAID 
and vice versa to reduce poverty, violence, illiteracy and diseases abroad.  
 
A number of desecularizing actors are the main causal force driving and 
promoting these policy, bureaucratic and normative changes. Domestic religious activists, 
in particular Evangelical ones, have done much to advance the faith-based agenda at 
grass roots and from “below”. Their growing transnational international missionary work, 
compounded by closer attention to Christian co-religionists’ suffering around the world 
from hunger, poverty, diseases and conflict, has prompted Churches and religious 
advocates to demand a mounting share of the available federal aid budget as well as new 
resources for humanitarian and development activities. Political elites such as Presidents 
Bush and Obama, and their policy advisors, have equally supported from “above” a 
greater role for religious actors in partnering with USAID. Both presidents Bush and 
Obama appear to have been guided by a mix of genuine belief in the power of religion to 
transform peoples’ lives for the better, as well as opportunistic electoral calculations to 
grab the growing Evangelical and religious vote in America.  
 
These desecularizing actors, and their interests and principled intentions, have not 
emerged in a vacuum. A series of international and domestic trends have made this 
process possible. At the international level, the end of the Cold War, the huge expansion 
of the development and NGO sector, a growing consensus around neo-liberal 
development recipes questioning the desirability and efficiency of state welfare systems, 
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compounded with the resurgence of religion in societies across the globe have created the 
context for a growing nexus between religious civil society actors and international 
development. Domestically within the U.S., the demographic growth and political 
salience of Evangelicals, normative shifts loosening previously strict separationist 
interpretations of the Establishment Clause, and the introduction of the domestic 
Charitable Choice provision in the late 1990s, further created a fertile environment for the 
international faith-based agenda. 
 
It is important to highlight that, as was done in the previous chapter, I am not 
claiming that American foreign assistance is today completely desecularized. Nor that it 
follows exclusively a religious logic. Critics, who would like to see both more “resources” 
and more “faith” poured in the faith-based initiatives, have complained that there has not 
been enough of either (Kuo 2006). Rebecca Sager’s (2010) assessment of the faith-based 
parabola, since Charitable Choice up to the present, suggests these initiatives have been 
heavy on “symbolic politics” but quite light on substantive policy changes. Indeed, for 
instance, data show that despite the increases in grants and partnerships with FBOs, the 
lion-share of USAID funds still goes to secular organizations.187 Most development 
programs and initiatives are not really designed around religious norms and interests, but 
follow other secular logics (development theories, economic principles, security 
imperatives, etc.). While strict church-state separation norms are indeed eroding when it 
comes to international development, this is a far cry from arguing that church and state 
have become one or that FBOs can do anything they want with federal resources.   
 
Endless debates can be, and currently are being, entertained on whether the 
developments unpacked and explained in this chapter constitute a dangerous slide 
towards an American theocracy or whether they are just a toothless, yet politically 
expedient, façade. It is not my scope to enter these discussions. It is evident however, that 
religion is penetrating more and more in a small corner of American foreign assistance 
practices and policy-making structures. And with it a clear gradual process of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 For example, USAID top 5 vendors (governments excluded) for FY 2011 were: the World Bank Group, 
Chenomics Internaitonal, World Food Program, Partners for Supply Chain Management and John Snow. 
See: transition.usaid.gov/policy/budget/money (accessed 25/07/2012)  
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desecularization is occurring at the programmatic, institutional, intellectual and 
normative levels.  
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6. AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY: CONFRONTING AND ENGAGING ISLAM 
AND THE MUSLIM WORLD  
 
 
 
 
 
During the Cold War the United States’ chief foreign policy and national security 
concern was containing and deterring secular, indeed “God-less”, Soviet Communism. 
While America always imbued its role in the world and its titanic struggle against the 
Soviet Union with religious meaning, national security policy was largely conceived and 
conducted in secular terms. During the Cold War, there was little space for religious 
concepts, practices, and categories when it came to formulating and executing national 
security policies in the White House’s National Security Council (NSC), or the State 
Department. When the Cold War came to a close and, particularly, following 9/11 things 
changed substantially.  
 
From the 1990s onwards America foreign policy became ever more entangled in 
the Middle East and North African region. Concomitantly local social and political 
dynamics were bringing “Islamism” and “Islamist terrorism” to the fore.188 As different 
forms of political Islamic movements increasingly became over the past decades a central 
strategic concern to the United States, so too confronting or reaching out to the religious 
categories of “Islam”, “Muslims” and “Muslim world”189  progressively turned into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 I understand Islamism along the lines of Katerina Dalacoura’s definition as a: “political ideology which 
employs an interpretation of Islam as a blueprint for building the ideal society” (Dalacoura 2011, p.15). 
Islamism in this sense can be used interchangeably with ‘political Islam’, but not with ‘Islamist terrorism’ 
which is defined as: “those individuals or movements who pursue Islamist objectives using terrorist 
methods” (Dalacoura 2011, p.15). Like Dalacoura, I start from the premise that “not all Islamists are real or 
potential terrorists or terrorist sympathizers, and that, far from being monolithic, Islamism can evolve in 
different and widely divergent ideological directions under the influence of specific factors and conditions” 
(p.47). 
189 Considerable generalisation is involved in using the terms “Islam”, “Muslims”, “Muslim world”. Hence 
the use of quotation marks at this point and in other parts where I analyse foreign policy practices and 
discourses. Quotation marks will be omitted in the more historical and narrative part given the persistence 
and increasingly unproblematic use of these terms adopted by pundits and policy-makers in Washington.  
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central reference objects for American national security discourses, strategies and 
initiatives. This has led to a number of desecularizing trends in terms of foreign and 
national security policies implemented and in terms of changes to the largely secularized 
institutional and normative structures involved in the policy-making process.  
 
Mapping and explaining in clear and precise terms the multiple desecularizing 
changes, which have occurred particularly over the past two decades, is no easy task. 
First of all, there is a nearly infinite amount of public statements, documents, scholarship 
and commentary that falls into what can be described as the Islam and American foreign 
policy literature. In order to circumscribe as accurately as possible what my intents are, I 
will first start by outlining what this chapter is not about. It is not about explaining in any 
comprehensive way the historical or contemporary drivers and results of American 
foreign policy in the Middle East. Nor does it seek to provide an authoritative account or 
critique of the War on Terror, in general, or counter-terrorist practices, in particular. It 
does not chart or critique in any direct or extensive way American policies towards 
political Islam, nor does it have the pretense to be yet another take on the myth or reality 
of an Islamist or Muslim threat to the U.S. or the West.  
 
What is this chapter about then? It is about how Islam as a faith and the Muslim 
world as a set of countries which transcends regional blocks and a category of more than 
a billion people which transcends national borders, have become strategic analytical 
categories, acquiring ontological reality, in national security discourses and practices. 
More precisely, it will unpack how and explain why U.S. presidents and policy-makers 
have come to view inherently religious categories such as Islam and Muslims as 
fundamental to American national security. It charts how confronting or engaging and 
more generally targeting Islam and Muslims has become part and parcel of what 
American policy-makers think about in the process of foreign policy-formulation and do 
when it comes to policy execution. 
 
The chapter is organized slightly differently from the two preceding ones. First of 
all, it takes “Islam” and “Muslims”, rather than the more general categories of “religion” 
	   236 
and “religious actors”, as the salient religious variables. Secondly, compared to the 
previous chapters, the current one will not have a section specifically dedicated to 
outlining key desecularizing actors among civil society, foreign policy elites, and high-
level political leaders. That’s because over the past two decades, and especially following 
9/11, there has been a virtual consensus across American policy and political elites on the 
necessity of either confronting or reaching out to Islam and Muslims as such. 
Disagreements emerge when it comes to defining exactly whom this Muslim “other” is 
and how to go about confronting or reaching out to it or them. Listing all key 
desecularizing actors separately, as previously done, would be a daunting task.  
 
Actors will be instead pulled together into two broad desecularizing worldviews 
between those who see relations with Islam and the Muslim world in terms of “clash and 
confrontation”, on the one hand, and “dialogue and engagement”, on the other hand. 
These two worldviews have their own internal divisions and specific desecularizing 
outlooks. Larger worldviews and more specific outlooks are articulated by members of 
the foreign policy establishment and inform foreign policy debates and thinking in 
Washington on the subject of Islam and national security. The next section will outline 
these desecularizing worldviews and outlooks and to some extent the key desecularizing 
actors espousing them in more detail. 
 
The chapter then moves onto tracing how the different desecularizing worldviews, 
and the actors supporting them, have fed into policy-making processes and outputs. These 
sections will present a comprehensive, albeit not fully exhaustive, account of key foreign 
policy initiatives – speeches and symbolic gestures, public diplomacy efforts, and 
presidential or interagency overt and covert programs – targeting Islam and the Muslim 
world during the past two decades.190 These parts will be divided in a chronological order, 
with thematic sub-sections, starting with the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, 
moving onto G. W. Bush’s presidency (particularly following 9/11), and then Obama’s 
first term in office. The final part of the chapter is dedicated to conceptually teasing out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Due to available sources of information in terms of reports, personal interviews and online content, I 
focus mainly on overt Presidential, NSC and diplomatic initiatives rather than covert programs carried out 
by the Pentagon or the CIA.  
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the different component processes of desecularization as policies intended to target 
inherently religious categories such as Islam and Muslims progressively became 
institutionalized within the decision-making architecture.  
 
 
Desecularizing Worldviews and Actors in Context 
 
 
Over the past three decades, Islamist movements and states have emerged in a vital 
strategic area for American interests such as the Middle East. American targets abroad 
and at home have also been subject to a growing number of terrorist attacks by groups 
claiming to act in the name of Islam. These developments have all reflexively led 
American foreign policy and security elites to grapple more generally with the issue of 
Islam and relations with Muslims in foreign affairs. National security debates involving 
(religiously-defined) Muslims and the Muslim world, rather than (secular) Arabs and 
Middle Easterners, or the Arab world and the Middle East, have become a staple within 
foreign policy circles.  
 
Two broad distinct approaches, what I call “desecularizing worldviews”, have 
come to color American foreign policy elites’ attitude towards political Islam and by 
extension towards Islam as culture and religion. These worldviews are divided amongst 
those who see relations with political Islam and Islam in terms of clash and confrontation, 
on the one hand, and dialogue and engagement, on the other hand. These larger 
worldviews can each be divided into the following two specific sub-categories of 
“desecularizing outlooks”: 
• Worldview: Clash and confrontation  
o Outlook: Good West-bad Islam  
o Outlook: Good Muslims-bad Muslims  
• Worldview: Dialogue and engagement  
o Outlook: Good Islam-bad terrorists 
o Outlook: Good Islamists-bad Islamists 
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These worldviews and outlooks are desecularizing, because regardless of which 
category individual intellectual and policy elites fit in or straddle when addressing the 
threat of terrorism or Islamist movements to American security, these nevertheless feel 
compelled to address also the relationship between Islam, as a faith, or Muslims, as a 
religiously-defined community of nations or people, and violence. By doing so religious 
faith, discourses, practices, identities and actors become a fundamental political category 
in international relations. While differing on many issues, as will be discussed shortly, 
these worldviews are all trapped in what Mamdani has called “culture talk” (Mamdani 
2002).191  
 
Clash and Confrontation Worldview and Strategic Policy Elites 
 
These four desecularizing outlooks are ideal types, inevitably they do not capture in their 
entirety all the debates, complexities and factions in Washington that push and pull for 
specific policies towards Islamist groups, in particular, and Islam and the Muslim world, 
in general. I will start by outlining the outlooks among those who view American-Muslim 
world relations as marked by hostility and antagonism, in other words by a clash of 
civilizations broadly defined or a more specific and circumscribed confrontation between 
America and Islamism.  
 
The “good West-bad Islam” outlook is most explicitly articulated by prominent 
scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, whose opinions have greatly 
influenced public debates on Islam since the 1990s and carried substantial weight, as will 
be discussed later, among certain conservative policy-makers. This perspective tends to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 In developing these categories I drew upon Mahmood Mamdani’s critique of the Bush administration 
rhetorical distinction between “bad” and “good” Muslims. For Mamdami this form of “culture talk” – the 
separation of Muslims into “good” peaceful ones and “bad” terrorist ones - is troubling because it provided 
cultural explanations to political outcomes, avoiding history and other socioeconomic issues, and because it 
superimposes on individuals a fixed identity shaped by the culture in which they are born (2002, p.767). 
The following passage from Mamdani neatly captures the desecularizing power of such framework: “We 
are now told to distinguish between good Muslims and bad Muslims, Mind you, not between good and bad 
persons, nor between criminals and civic citizens, who both happen to be Muslims” (2002, p.767). I argue, 
with the four desecularizing outlooks listed above, that “culture talk” in Washington does take more forms 
than the one identified by Mamdani. 
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see Islam as a monolith religion and culture where something has gone awfully wrong. 
Little effort is made to sharply distinguish Islamists as political ideologies and 
movements from Islam as a religion. The former are seen as a natural outgrowth of the 
latter’s character as a religion or its inability compared to Christianity and the West to 
reform in the face of modernity (Lewis 2002).  
 
As such, Islam and Muslims stand in stark antithesis to the West seen as the 
standard of enlightened modernity and democracy (Lewis 1990; Huntington 1993, 1996). 
The following passage from Huntington aptly summarizes this outlook:  
“The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is 
Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the 
superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their 
power. The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of 
Defense. It is the West, a different civilization whose people are 
convinced of the universality of their culture.” (1996, pp.217-218) 
 
The “good Muslims-bad Muslims” outlook is most explicitly articulated by a 
number of pundits, columnists, think tank and research institutes closely associated with 
the neconservative movement or “persuasion” (Kristol 2003). Those holding such a view 
see the world of Islam as a whole split somewhat in two camps along the lines of violent 
anti-Western and peaceful pro-Western Muslims. Here, Muslims – whether self-
described as such or even personally religious or not is often unclear – are perceived as 
locked into an ideological battle for the future direction of Islam as a religion and 
civilization. The “good Muslims” are apolitical individuals or pro-Western governments 
(Mubarak’s Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc.). These are touted as “moderate Muslims” either 
because of their religious convictions or their international stance which is not in 
antithesis with American interests first and values second.  
 
The “bad Muslims” are instead Islamists of all strides, from globalized terrorist 
networks (Al-Qaeda), to domestic movements (such as the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Hezbollah, Hamas) or anti-Western states (such as Iran). Here, political Islam is 
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monolithically described as “Islamic fundamentalism”, “Islamofascism”, “militant 
Islam”.192 This global deterritorialized force is considered an evil on par with previous 
totalitarian enemies such as Communism and Nazism (Pipes 2002a; Frum and Perle 
2003; Podhoretz 2007).  Islamism is not just a product of historical developments or 
economic and political grievances, but the result of cultural resentment towards the West. 
It is conceived as a an ideological opponent and security threat because of its perceived 
hostility to American values (democracy and freedom) as well as to its interests (access to 
oil, Israel’s security, curbing nuclear proliferation) in the Middle East and beyond. 
 
Dialogue and Engagement Worldview and Strategic Policy Elites 
 
On the dialogue and engagement side of the spectrum are those who challenge the clash 
and confrontation with Islamists and Islam narrative. The “good Islam-bad terrorists” 
outlook portrays terrorists and violent Islamist groups as an exception and a loud 
minority of fanatic extremists. These groups have hijacked and distorted Islam and have 
instrumentally used its language (such as: jihad, umma, kafir, etc.) for their radical 
political purposes (Esposito 2002). Terrorists are largely the product of political and 
socioeconomic forces, not culture or religion. It is a desecularing outlook however 
because those holding it do not make simply the distinction between terrorists and 
civilians. But feel compelled to bring religion in the mix at least to make the case that 
there is little or no link between terrorism and Islam. Indeed, they argue “genuine” Islam 
is a peaceful religion and “real” Muslims are peaceful people, perfectly compatible with 
modernity, democracy and American values (Esposito and Voll 1996; Ahmed 2010). 
Rather than essentializing Islam and Muslims as inherently violent, the religion and its, 
more or less, faithful adherents are portrayed instead as innately peaceful. 
 
Against notions of clashing civilizations, actors upholding such an outlook often 
propose one of interfaith and/or intercultural dialogue to dissipate misunderstandings and 
undercut terrorist narratives. They particularly seek to develop a broader based 
relationship with over one billion members of the world’s population who, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 For an overview of Neoconservative thought on Islam and political Islam see: Lynch (2008).  
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understood to be extremely diverse, are perceived also as sharing a common religious and 
cultural bond and possibly a growing belief that America is at war with them. It is an 
outlook which finds expression in the work of scholars with close connections to 
Washington policy circles such as Akbar Ahmed (Forst and Ahmed 2005). As well as by 
initiatives and centers such as Brookings’ U.S.-Islamic World Forum directed by Stephen 
Grand, or John Esposito and John Voll’s Georgetown University Talal Center for 
Muslim-Christian Understanding.  
 
The “bad Islamist-good Islamist” outlook unpacks more thoroughly the 
phenomenon of political Islam and how this relates in complex and not always 
straightforward ways to violence and terrorism. It does not split all Muslims into two 
simple camps of “good” and “bad”. Those holding this outlook argue that Islam is no 
monolith, but a religion open to multiple and contradicting political interpretations, 
according to specific countries and social and historical context. Scholars, pundits and 
policy-makers holding this outlook distinguish between Islamist movements that may 
have legitimate grievances, pursued through peaceful and democratic means, and other 
more extremist and violent groups. America should recognize these nuances and should 
not be afraid engage with the former rather than dismissing all Islamists and Islam in 
general as inherently hostile and violent. This view tends to be articulated by close 
academic observers of Islamism with important ties to foreign policy circles, such as John 
Esposito (1991, 1999) and Peter Mandaville (2001, 2005).  
 
Overall the two broad opposing desecularizing worldviews, and their more 
specific outlooks, are important because they frame the intellectual context in which 
successive American administrations, from Bush Sr.’s in the early 1990s to the recent 
Obama one, would address the growing salience of Muslim politics and Islamism 
worldwide. Indeed presidents and their administrations have in a way or another relied on 
these worldviews and outlooks – and even upon the very same scholars who articulated 
them – when framing and designing their foreign policies. While these outlooks provide 
different interpretations about the nature of and solution to America’s real and perceived 
Islamist threat in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world, they also have something in 
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common. They share a desecularizing premise to the extent that they all attempt, in their 
own way, to understand and explain the significance of inherently religious categories 
such as Islam and Muslims to international politics, in general, and American security, in 
particular.  
 
 
The Cold War and its Immediate Aftermath: Islam Emerges as a Security Concern  
 
 
During much of the Cold War the state of Islam and Muslims were not central security 
issues for the United States. Let me explain what I mean by this. America’s chief 
international rival during much of the post-World War period up until the late 1980s was 
Soviet Communism, a thoroughly secular and secularizing force. Likewise in the Middle 
East, American foreign policy was largely framed in opposition to, at least up to the 
1970s, revolutionary Arab nationalism led by President Gamal Abdel-Nasser of Egypt. 
Islam and Muslims did not figure prominently in any national security document or 
strategy. Rather than representing a possible threat, Islam and Islamists were actually 
implicitly seen as a force that could be harnessed to counterbalance Soviet Communism 
and secular nationalist Arab forces in the Middle East (Gerges 1999, p.60; Halliday 2002, 
p.ix). The chief example was Carter’s and Reagan’s embrace of the Afghan mujahidin as 
freedom fighters in the aftermath of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Ahmed 
2010, p.126). 
 
The 1979 Iranian revolution was an important turning point. This episode, for the 
first time, brought home to a largely secularized national security establishment the idea 
that Islamism and Islam could pose a security threat. Gary Sick, then NSC staff member 
for Iran and chief assistant to Brezinski throughout the Iran crisis, indirectly reveals the 
epistemic secularist thinking taking place within the administration at the time as follows: 
“…Khomeini’s call for the establishment of an Islamic state [was] 
“absurd”; it ran counter the entire modern history of the Western tradition 
of secularizing revolutions. The U.S. foreign policy elite was thus 
	   243 
unprepared to deal with the unthinkable – the emergence of a cleric-
dominated Islamic republic. U.S. officials failed to grasp the new 
revolutionary flame emanating from the mosques” (quoted in Gerges 1999, 
p.64).193 
 
Ronald Reagan, in an interview for Time Magazine in 1980 was the first to raise 
the specter of a possible “religious war” with “Muslims [who were] returning to the idea 
that the way to heaven is to lose your life fighting the Christians or the Jews” (quoted 
from Gerges 1999, p.59). Reagan fell squarely within a “good West-bad Islam” outlook, 
at least in rhetorical terms. In fact strategies or policies to avoid or win such a “religious 
war” were not being thought-of nor implemented. National security practices remained 
largely within a secular paradigm as the United Stated continued to see the Soviet Union 
and its client states as the real threat to international order.  
 
Towards the end of the Cold War, Islamic movements emerged throughout the 
Middle East. Islamists gained political strength following Egyptian, Tunisian and 
Jordanian elections in the late 1980s. In Sudan a coup d’état, in 1989, brought the 
National Islamic Front to power. In Algeria, Islamists won the first round of elections in 
1991, and event that led to a bloody civil war as the Military refused to cede power. With 
the Soviet threat receding, the issue of Islamic revivalism progressively turned into an 
important American security concern. Especially as U.S. foreign policy became 
increasingly embroiled in the Middle East and East Africa with the 1991 Gulf War, the 
1992 Somali intervention, and renewed efforts in brokering a peace agreement between 
Israeli-Palestinians.  
 
This was the context within which Edward Djerejian, then assistant secretary of 
State for Near Eastern Affairs during the Bush Sr. administration, delivered his famous 
1992 Meridian House Address. The speech was the “first thorough statement given by 
any U.S. administration on the Islamist question” (Gerges 1999, p.78). It was as well the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 For a similar account of the secular mind-frame within Carter’s National Security Council team at the 
time of the Iranian revolution see: Thomas (2005, p.1 ) 
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first major policy statement highlighting the salience of religion and Islam to American 
national security. Djerejian argued that in the post-Cold War world American policy in 
the Middle East would be based, among others, on defusing the idea of a coming 
confrontation between “Islam and the West” (Djerejian 1992).  
 
In the speech Djerejian articulated a position that bridged the “good Islam-bad 
terrorist” and “bad-good Islamist” desecularizing outlooks, falling squarely within a 
dialogue and engagement paradigm. He would point out how “the role of religion has 
become more manifest” especially when it came to “a phenomenon variously labeled 
political Islam, the Islamic revival, or Islamic fundamentalism [emphasis in original]”. 
Yet Islamist political activity was “no monolithic or coordinated international effort”, but 
a complex phenomenon taking shape in different countries in different ways that had 
little to do with Islam itself. Islam in fact was “one of the world’s great faiths”, perfectly 
compatible with Christianity and Judaism as, among others, it “acknowledges the major 
figures of the Judeo-Christian heritage: Abraham, Moses, and Christ”. Those who 
believed that the Cold War was being replaced with a “new competition between Islam 
and the West” were offering a distorted and simplistic analysis of events out there, one 
that the “U.S. Government” did not share. Terrorism, not Islam was the enemy (1992, 
p.36).  
 
The speech would articulate a first explicit approach to countries with strong 
Islamic movements, stressing outreach to Muslim moderates, economic aid, and help in 
resolving ethnic and religious conflicts. It is here that, for the first time, “Islam” and 
“Muslims” enter as formal categories into the discursive articulation of American foreign 
policy. From Djerejian’s address onwards, tackling the role of Islam in relation to 
America’s security concerns progressively became part and parcel of foreign policy 
discourses at the highest levels.  
 
By 1994, against the backdrop of the evolving Arab-Israeli peace process, Bill 
Clinton would consistently address the relationship between the United States and Islam in 
light of emerging security threats posed by terrorism. In a speech to the Jordanian 
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Parliament, Clinton spoke within a “good Islam-bad terrorist” framework. He would 
repute the idea that “cultures must somehow inevitably clash”. In fact, Americans 
“respect Islam” and know that the “traditional values of Islam, devotion to faith and good 
works, to family and society, are in harmony with the best of American ideals.” 
America’s new foe was not a religion, but rather “forces that transcend civilization”, such 
as “terror and extremism” (Clinton 1994). Other similar speeches presenting a 
conciliatory and nuanced understanding of U.S.-Islam relations followed.194  
 
Tentative policy planning exercises to build a more coherent set of policies and 
practices towards Islamist movements and Islam were taking shape too. In 1993, a 
weekend-long seminar was organized on Islamic politics at the State Department 
attended by senior policy-makers, including Warren Christopher, then Secretary of State, 
and Madeleine Albright, then Ambassador to the UN. Informal study-groups of mid-level 
officials were formed to talk about and analyze issues pertaining to political Islam 
(Gerges 1999, p.89).  
 
Islam, and in particular the “bad terrorist-good Islam” outlook which shaped the 
Clinton administration’s rhetoric, made its way into the National Security Strategy (NSS). 
In the context of the American embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the first nod to 
Islam in relation to terrorism appeared in the 1998 NSS. These attacks, the document 
argued, were perpetuated by a network of radical groups affiliated with Osama bin Laden 
who distorted “religion to justify the murder of innocents” (NSS 1998, p.16). The NSS 
went on to explain that American policies in the Middle East were “not anti-Islamic” as 
groups like Al-Qaeda alleged. Indeed Americans recognized and respected “deeply 
[Islam’s] moral teachings and its role as a source of inspiration and instruction for 
hundreds of millions of people around the world”. What U.S. policy in the region was 
directed at were “the actions of governments and terrorist groups, not peoples or faiths” 
(NSS 1998, p.54; see also: NSS 1999, p.45).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 For a sympathetic review of the Clinton administration’s approach to political Islam and Islam see: 
Gerges (1999, pp.86-114). For a very exhaustive, but markedly critical, range of citations from Clinton 
administration officials dispelling the clash of civilization narrative see: Pipes (2002b)  
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Along with emerging religiously charged discourses and evolving policy thinking, 
the first concrete actions explicitly directed towards Islam as a religion took shape 
through a range of symbolic gestures designed to reach out to Muslims and dispel 
misconceptions of inter-religious clashes. During a state visit to Indonesia in 1994, 
Clinton made sure to visit Jakarta’s Istiqlal Mosque. In 1996, then-first lady Hillary 
Clinton hosted the first ever Eid al-Fitr dinner at the White House to celebrate the end of 
Ramadan.195 President Clinton continued the tradition throughout his time in office. The 
foreign policy logic of these events was evident when the Pentagon and State Department 
followed with their own Ramadan celebrations.  
 
To sum up. During the Cold War, security was defined chiefly in secular terms. 
With the 1979 Iranian revolution, Islam and Muslims first appeared on the radar screen of 
American presidents and national security advisors as a potential source of conflict and 
instability. Yet it was not until the end of the Cold War that senior policy-makers, such as 
Djerejian, began to articulate a framework to address the strategic issue of political Islam. 
In his Meridian House Address, Djerejian amply praised Islam, as a faith, and Muslims, 
as a community of believers, to dispel misconceptions of possible civilizational clashes. 
In the depth and breadth of its public pronouncements, strategic thinking, policy planning, 
and symbolic gestures, the Clinton administration went even further in emphasizing that 
America’s security concerns in the Middle East were related to terrorism rather than the 
nature of a religion or its faithful adherents.  
 
The Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations largely adopted a “dialogue and 
engagement” worldview towards Islam. At the time, some praised their approach for its 
sensitivity towards Islam and nuance towards the Islamist phenomenon (Gerges 1999, 
p.17), others saw them as dangerously conciliatory (Pipes 2002b). What is central to the 
argument here is not whether this was sound rhetoric and thinking or not, on the part of 
these administrations, but that it was desecularizing rhetoric and thinking. What is 
relevant here is that Islam and Muslims begin to acquire growing strategic salience for 
policy-makers and policy-making. By seeking through speeches and symbolic gestures to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 See: http://www.history.com/topics/ramadan (accessed 25/08/2012) 
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build bridges with Muslims and put to rest lingering doubts about the potential of a West-
Islam rift, addressing the role of a particular faith and its people in international relations 
increasingly crept into the margins of national security rhetoric and practices. These were 
gradual small changes. There was yet little in the way of major and concrete policy 
initiatives and frameworks that specifically targeted Islam and Muslims.  
 
 
September 11: Islam and the Muslim World Acquire Centre Stage 
 
 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 carried out by Al-Qaeda in the name of a global jihad against 
“Zionists and Crusaders” brought Islam from the margins to the center of American 
national security concerns. President G.W. Bush’s first reaction to 9/11 was to adopt a 
“bad terrorist-good Islam” outlook common to his predecessor. In an effort to downplay 
the idea that a hypothetic clash of civilizations had turned from distant nightmare to 
present day reality, the President visited a mosque in Washington D.C. on September 17. 
Here he pronounced an important and theologically charged speech on the nature of 
Islam as a faith and its compatibility with American values:  
“These acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of 
the Islamic faith…let me quote from the Quran itself: “In the long run, evil 
in the extreme will be the end of those who do evil, for that they rejected 
the signs of Allah and held them up to ridicule”. The face of terror is not 
the true faith of Islam.  That’s not what Islam is all about.  Islam is peace. 
These terrorists don't represent peace. They represent evil and war.” (Bush 
2001) 
 
Following these first conciliatory rhetorical and symbolic moves, the logic of war 
nevertheless soon took over. The administration’s views on the role of Islam in the 
attacks gradually shifted away from Bush’s initial praise of “Islam” and condemnation of 
“terrorists”. Key figures in the administration, such as Vice President Dick Cheney and 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, came to hold a “good West-bad Islam” outlook 
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which was deeply shaped and influenced by scholars like Bernard Lewis (Observer.com 
2006). 196  Conservative evangelical Christians, a central voting bloc of the Bush 
administration, saw 9/11 as the symbol of a deeper religious conflict. Prominent Christian 
Right leaders, who had wide and regular access to the White House, would denounce 
Islam as a violent and oppressing religion. Jerry Falwell (2002) compared Muhammad to 
a “terrorist”. Pat Roberson (2009) has described Islam as a “political movement” bent on 
dominating the world.  
 
Neoconservatives were another key constituency informing the administration’s 
view of Islam. Pundits and policy-makers generally associated with the neoconservative 
movement such as Elliot Abrams, Douglas Feith, Zalmay Khalilzad, Lewis “Scooter” 
Libby, Richard Perle, and Paul Wolfowitz, held important government positions at the 
time. These obtained a growing sway and policy influence within the administration in 
the aftermath of 9/11 (Mann 2004; Fukuyama 2004). Their views of Islam were in the 
confrontationalist camp, but, as argued earlier, they largely espoused a somewhat more 
nuanced “good-bad Muslims” outlook rather than an outright clash of civilizations one.  
 
Within the administration, not everyone subscribed to a specific desecularizing 
outlook. Indeed, “people like Colin Powell and Richard Armitage, worked outside 
cultural frameworks”, a Policy Planning Official argues, adding that “these touted at the 
time a more “Realist” line, which ignored religion and focused on assessing strategic 
interests rather than painting Islam or Islamofascism as the new existential threat to the 
United States” (2011, author’s interview). The “Realists” within the administration, 
however, even before losing the debate on the Iraq war (Woodward 2004, pp.148-53), 
had already lost the battle to frame the new ideologically heightened and religiously 
fervent international context within which America’s national security policy would be 
conducted.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 In speech to celebrate Bernard Lewis’s 90th birthday, Cheney would remark: “I got a wide range of 
advice [in my career] – some of it very good and some of it terrible. No one offered sounder analysis or 
better insight than Bernard Lewis...we have met often, particularly during the last four-and-a-half years, 
and Bernard has always had some very good meetings with President Bush.” (2006) 
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As the 2002 NSS revealed, the administration’s view of the security threat posed 
by Al-Qaeda became crystallized around the “good Muslims-bad Muslims” outlook that 
neoconservative advisors and pundits championed. Terrorism and the war that was being 
conducted against it, the NSS explained: “is not a clash of civilizations. It does, however, 
reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the future of the Muslim world. This is a 
struggle of ideas…” (2002, p.31). Winning the “war of ideas” against radical Islam, and 
influencing the outcome of this internal battle between violent/extremist and 
peaceful/moderate Muslims in favor of the latter, became a central national security 
concern for the administration (Abrams 2011, author’s interview; see also: NSS 2006, 
pp.9-11, 36). By 2006 the notion that an ongoing “war of ideas” was taking place within 
Islam and that the War on Terror was part of a larger ideological struggle against 
“Islamofascism” had even permeated Bush’s rhetoric (Stolberg 2006). 
 
Defeating “Islamofascism” required more than just military operations and sound 
intelligence. Equally important to American national security became reforming Islam 
itself and winning the apparent battle for hearts and minds raging within the Muslim 
world. An ever-increasing number of symbolic gestures were employed from iftar 
dinners, to adding copies of the Koran to the Presidential Library in 2005, to conducting 
more visits to mosques in 2002 and 2007. As the War on Terror drums were well 
underway, policy towards Muslims and the Muslim world, however, moved beyond the 
realm of rhetoric and symbolism acquiring a substantive form.  
 
Policies started to be designed and implemented to turn “bad Muslims” into 
“good” ones. Initiatives fell into two broad areas. First, an active military, diplomatic and 
aid campaign was pursued to promote liberal values and democracy in the Middle East 
and the (religiously defined) Broader Middle East. Influenced in great part by the 
“democratic peace thesis” the Bush administration, and especially its neoconservative 
backers, saw democracy promotion as a potent antidote to the poison of Islamist violence 
and extremism (Dalacoura 2011, pp.3-6; Lynch 2008, p.201). Second, it implemented a 
series of “Muslim-specific initiatives” (GAO 2006, pp.11-7). These initiatives largely 
revolved around a far-reaching public diplomacy and communication strategy designed to 
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overtly or covertly improve America’s image and standing, while also targeting and 
discrediting Islamist ideology, in the Muslim world. 
 
Democracy Promotion in the Muslim World 
 
Democracy promotion as an element of American foreign policy is not a post-
9/11 novelty, but has a long, complex and at times controversial history.197 Yet after Al-
Qaeda’s attacks, America’s national security became increasingly linked to the 
democratization, not only of the Arab world geographically contained within the Middle 
East, but also of the religiously and Muslim demarcated “Broader Middle East”. While 
addressing graduating seniors at West Point in 2002, President Bush would argue that:  
“When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there 
is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to 
Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the 
Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as 
people in every nation [emphasis added].” (2002b) 
 
Soon thereafter, Iraq was presented as the test case for spreading democracy to the 
“entire Islamic world”. The administration would repeatedly explain America’s entry into 
the war as an opportunity “to make the Muslim world safe for democracy” (Kurth 2005, 
p.322). Making the case for the war against Saddam to the international community at the 
UN in 2002, Bush linked Iraq to the ongoing military intervention in Afghanistan and 
diplomatic efforts to promote elections in the Palestinian territories. Iraq was described as 
part and parcel of a broader strategy to inspire democratic “reforms throughout the 
Muslim world [emphasis added]” (2002a). Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq, would “show 
by their example that honest government and respect for women and the great Islamic 
tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond [emphasis added]” 
(2002a).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 For good overviews of democracy promotion as an element of American foreign policy and grand 
strategy, see: Carothers (2007); Ikenberry, Inoguchi, and Cox (2000).  
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Alongside the “hard edge of military-led regime change in Iraq”, the 
administration rolled out “a complementary soft side” to its democracy promotion efforts 
in the Arab and Muslim world (Carothers 2003, p.403). The centrepiece of these efforts 
would be the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). The initiative was described by 
Richard Haas, then-Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, as an attempt to 
“expand political participation, support civil society, and fortify the rule of law [in] 
Muslim nations” (2003, p.144). Launched in 2002, by 2009 MEPI had contributed over 
$530 million to implement more than 600 projects in 17 countries and territories in the 
Middle East (Spirnak 2009).198  
 
MEPI was largely designed around longstanding geographical boundaries, rather 
than Muslim civilizational ones, and housed in the regional Near East Affairs Bureau at 
State. Democratization support for the Muslim “beyond”, as Bush had mentioned in his 
UN speech, came in 2004. A Greater Middle East Initiative was presented by the Bush 
administration at the Sea Island 2004 G-8 summit in Georgia. The initiative was 
described at the time as: “part of President Bush’s “forward strategy of freedom,” by 
which the expansion of political rights and political participation in the Muslim world is 
meant to combat the appeal of Islamist extremism” (Cofman Wittes 2004). The initiative 
was then renamed the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative. It was 
designed as a multilateral development and reform plan aimed at “fostering economic and 
political liberalization in a wide geographic area of Arab and non-Arab Muslim 
countries” (Sharp 2010, pp.19-20). The centerpiece of the initiative was, and at the time 
of writing (2012) still is, the Forum for the Future (FFF). The FFF is an annual gathering 
of G-8 and BMENA Foreign Ministers, civil society and private sector leaders, to 
promote and finance projects that support economic and social reform in the Muslim 
world. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 These sums do not include the war affords in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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Winning the War of Ideas  
 
Public diplomacy and strategic communication became a central tool in winning the “war 
of ideas” against Islamist ideology. Multiple initiatives, some widely publicized others 
undercover, were launched following 9/11. These initiatives were designed to reach out 
and improve America’s image in the Muslim world and expand the pool of “good 
Muslims”. As well as isolate the “bad Muslims” and undermine Islamists’ religious and 
political narratives by influencing theological debates among Islamic scholars and clerics. 
Whether they were effective and achieved their objective, this is a whole other matter, 
one that will not be addressed in any direct way here.  
 
While ramping up its activities targeting “Islam” and “Muslims”, the Bush 
administration faced a number of institutional obstacles in coordinating and delivering 
policies along religious and civilizational lines. This was an important concern within the 
NSC. Elliott Abrams, who was at the time a NSC staffer, recalls how:  
“In the administration some of us were wondering how does a state like 
the U.S. deal with a religion, like Islam? Who is in charge? Our national 
security bureaucracies, such the State and Defense Departments, dealt 
with countries and regions, but were not adept to coming up with a 
strategy that tackled the war of ideas going on within Islam.” (2011, 
author’s interview)  
 
William Inboden, who covered important policy roles in the Bush administration 
at the time, similarly argues:  
“In the administration we saw that within the Muslim world there were 
violent as well as peaceful Muslims. We wanted to reach out to the 
peaceful Muslims, but the State Department was tone deaf on religion and 
on how to engage with Muslims.” (2011, author’s interview) 
 
Coordinating America’s efforts across bureaucracies, and within them, became 
high on the agenda. As Abrams recalls: “we formed an interagency group which sought 
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to understand how to deal with religion and the transnational threat posed by Islamic 
ideology” (2011, author’s interview). In 2002, under Condoleezza Rice’s supervision, the 
first such interagency group, the Strategic Communications Policy Coordination 
Committee (PCC) co-chaired by the NSC and the State Department, was created. In 2004 
the committee was reconstituted as the Muslim World Outreach PCC in order to focus 
more explicitly on public diplomacy efforts towards Muslims and develop a strategy to 
marginalize extremists (Johnson, Dale, and Cronin 2005, p.7; GAO 2005; Kaplan 2006). 
The committee polled U.S. embassies for ideas on how to communicate with Muslim 
audiences. Among the ideas put forward, and thereafter increasingly implemented, 
included:  
“…bolstering the influence of moderate leaders, working through allied 
Islamic nations such as Indonesia to counter extremism, funding moderate 
Muslim think tanks, integrating psychological operations into U.S. efforts, 
and giving foreign aid to establish moderate Muslim schools as well as to 
restore mosques” (Johnson, Dale, and Cronin 2005, p.8).  
 
A comprehensive public diplomacy strategy was then launched in 2007. The 
strategy’s core idea was to: “isolate and marginalize violent extremists who threaten the 
freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture and faith” (PCC 
2007, p.3). This goal would be achieved, among others, by actively engaging “Muslim 
communities”, amplifying “mainstream Muslim voices”, isolating and discrediting 
“terrorist leaders and organizations”, “de-legitimizing terror” as a tactic, and 
demonstrating that the “West is open to all religions and is not in conflict with any faith” 
(PCC 2007, p.3). The strategy was drafted mainly with the scope of improving the 
effectiveness, encouraging the coordination, and giving a direction to an ever-expanding 
pool of Muslim-focused programs and initiatives launched in the aftermath of 9/11.  
 
Media campaigns and TV and radio broadcasting started to be widely used to 
reach out to Muslims. One of the initial efforts to improve America’s image and dispel 
the clash of civilization narrative among Muslims worldwide was a $15 million Shared 
Values Initiative. The initiative, launched in 2002, consisted of a TV and print media 
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campaign depicting religious tolerance and moderate Muslims living happily in the 
United States. The controversial and rather unsuccessful campaign was scheduled to 
overlap with the month of Ramadan and was aired in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
across the Middle Eastern countries that did not bar it. Other media initiatives followed. 
The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), a U.S. government agency responsible for 
overseeing Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, launched the TV station Al-Hurra 
in 2004 and Radio Sawa in 2002 to reach Arab and Muslim audiences.  
 
Exchange programs directed at Muslims, whether religious or secular, became a 
central component of the administration’s outreach efforts. Both Under Secretary for 
Public Diplomacy Charlotte Beers (2001-2003) first, and Karen Hughes (2005-2007) 
later, implemented a wide range of exchange programs directed to Muslim youth, 
students, academics, business people, and religious leaders (Amr 2009, p.8). In 2007 the 
Fulbright Program was expanded to include an Interfaith Community Action Program 
bringing Muslim religious leaders and organizers from around the world to the United 
States with the objective of “building a robust interfaith dialogue”.199 By 2007, through 
the Citizen Dialogue initiative, more than 40.000 “Muslim American citizens”, such as 
clerics, youth leaders, and musicians, were sent “across the world to engage with 
grassroots citizens in Muslim communities” (Hughes 2007).  
 
Efforts to engage directly with Muslim communities and countries around the 
world occurred also at the highest levels levels. Karen Hughes took a much-publicized 
tour of the Muslim world in 2005, which included disparate countries like Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. During the tour she would meet women and 
youth representatives, but also sought to approach the religious dimension of public 
diplomacy. In places like Turkey, she would organize interfaith dialogues among local 
Christian, Jewish and Muslim communities as well as speaking to religious leaders to let 
them know that “faith” was also an “important part of life for so many Americans” 
(Hughes, quoted from: CSIS 2007, p.11).  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 See: www.cies.org/news/download/InterfaithDialogue.pdf (accessed 25/08/2012) 
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A further push to strengthen America’s engagement with Muslims came in 2008 
when Bush appointed Sada Cumber, a Karachi-born Pakistani American, as the first-ever 
U.S. Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Bush would 
explain Mr. Cumber’s responsibilities as follows: 
“The core of his mission is to explain to the Islamic world that America is 
a friend – is a friend of freedom, is a friend of peace, that we value 
religion – that, matter of fact, we value it to the point where we believe 
that anybody should be able to worship the way they see fit.” (2008)200 
 
Great efforts were made to tarnish Al-Qaeda’s image among Muslims. Reports at 
the time showed that the CIA was revitalizing Cold War-era programs of covert action to 
target, this time round, Islamic media, religious leaders, and political parties (Kaplan 
2005, 2006). As Elliot Abrams confirms: “Some of our operations were modeled on the 
Cold War’s CFF [Congress for Cultural Freedom]. Because of her background in Soviet 
studies, Condi was very receptive at the idea that we needed something like the CCF for 
Islam” (2011, author’s interview). 201 The U.S. increasingly worked through “credible 
third parties rather than through direct American spokesmen”(Lynch 2010, p.15), in other 
words through religious leaders and opinion-makers, to expose Al-Qaeda’s narrative. 
During James Glassman’s stint as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy (2008-2009), 
State Department resources were freely used to back a number of religious groups and 
“moderate voices engaged in the battle of ideas with extremists about the true nature of 
Islam” (Waterman 2011).  
 
Madrassas (religious schools), particularly those that appeared to churn out 
Islamist ideology, became a concern. Reports cite $157 million invested by 2004 to 
reform madrassas in Indonesia (Pipes 2011b). USAID launched an initiative directed to 
the broader Middle East region, especially Afghanistan and Pakistan, centered around 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 For an insider view of Sada Cumber’s first meetings with OIC and country representatives and their 
religiously charged diplomatic discussions see the following State Department cable: 
 www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08GENEVA637 (accessed 25/08/2012) 
201 The CCF was a CIA financed initiative during the Cold War that brought together left leaning and 
former-communist intellectuals, scholars and artists from the West and, where possible, from the East to 
denounce and expose Communist ideology and Soviet practices (Scott-Smith 2002). 
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working with madrassa religious leaders to develop textbooks and promote a broader 
curriculum that included mathematics, science, and literature in addition to religious 
studies. According to a USAID brief, the initiative was providing by 2008/2009 formal 
education to 48,000 children at 500 madrassas (Pease 2009, p.8; see also Pipes 2011).  
 
Overall, the Bush administration would quietly spent hundreds of millions to fund 
a growing number of programs designed to promote “moderate Islam” by attempting to 
reform coursework in Muslim schools and building new ones; supporting moderate 
Muslim think tanks and foundations, Islamic media, radio, TV shows, and religious 
leaders; promoting particular strands of Islam such as Sufism; organizing workshops for 
Islamic political activists and non-profit groups; and restoring mosques and ancient 
Islamic texts. Countries and people were targeted across the globe from South East Asia, 
to Central and South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and specific Sub-Saharan 
African and European countries with large Muslim minorities.  A US News investigative 
report calculated that in 2005 the American government was spending around $1.26 
billion in public diplomacy to “change the very face of Islam” (Kaplan 2005). A more 
conservative and detailed breakdown offered by a Brookings report estimated that in 
2006, the U.S. was spending at least $437 million on public diplomacy initiatives 
specifically “targeting Arab and Muslim populations” (Amr 2009, p.8).  
 
By the time President Bush left the White House, American national security 
debates were shot through with endless religious references. More Bush and his 
administration repeated that the War on Terror was not against “Islam” or “moderate 
Muslims”, but a confrontation against “Islamofascism” and “radical Muslims”, the more 
national security rhetoric and policy reflexively acquired a cultural dimension. This 
religiously charged and polarizing rhetoric further contributed to reproducing the clash of 
civilization narrative between the West and Islam on which groups like al-Qaeda based 
much of their ideological appeal (Halliday 2002, p.110-11; Kepel and Ghazaleh 2008, 
p.16).  
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Simultaneously, a growing number of polls began to track, and reify, what 
Muslims thought. PEW found that the War on Terror was contributing to producing a 
“great divide” between “Westerners and Muslims” (PEW 2006). Other opinion surveys 
explained how the Iraqi intervention, the abuses and Koran desecrations at Guantanamo 
and Abu Graib, America’s unconditional backing of Israel, its opposition to Hamas’ 2006 
electoral victory, were fuelling the perception among “Muslims” that the U.S. sought to 
“undermine Islam” (World Public Opinion 2007). A widely publicized Gallup poll by 
John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed purported to explain what “a billion Muslims really 
think” about the West (Esposito and Mogahed 2007). The ire towards America that 
Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia were voicing, the survey argued, had little to do 
with extremist theology or incompatible values, but rather was the product of U.S. 
policies and actions.  
 
Scholars and pundits in Washington when critical of the Bush administration’s 
response to 9/11 – its aggressive and divisive rhetoric and its militarized democratization 
program – would themselves fall back on culture talk. A classical refrain was to criticize 
the administration for repeatedly mistaking the good Muslim forest for the rotten terrorist 
tree. America, some agued, urgently needed to “comprehend Islam, not only for the sake 
of its ideals (which included religious tolerance) but also for its geopolitical needs and 
strategy” (Ahmed 2010, p.6). Prominent liberal policy-makers such as Madeleine 
Albright and Dennis Ross were involved in compiling a major report with the suggestive 
title: “Changing Course: A New Direction for U.S. Relations with the Muslim World” 
(US-Muslim Engagement Project 2009). Dalia Mogahed was, among others, a key 
member of the report’s task force. 
 
With pollsters tracking Muslim attitudes towards America, scholars arguing the 
U.S. was misunderstanding Islam, and policy-makers calling for a new direction with the 
Muslim world, much of the national security debate in Washington critical of the Bush 
administration remained firmly within a desecularizing paradigm. One anchored to an 
understanding of international politics where religious identity, beliefs and actors 
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mattered greatly. This environment would shape the intellectual and national security 
context within which Barack Obama came into the presidency. 
 
 
From Bush’s Confrontation to Obama’s Engagement with the Muslim World 
 
 
When President Obama took office, repairing the “divide between the United States and 
the Muslim world” was among his administration’s most pressing concerns (Amr 2009, 
p.7). Indeed, as a Policy Planning Official argues:  
“The new Obama administration internalized the idea of the “Muslims”. 
Members of the administration would look at polling data out there and 
see that “Muslims” hate us, and that there was a “global Muslim” problem 
that needed to be addressed” (2011, author’s interview).  
 
The administration soon devised a strategy aimed at bridging this apparent divide 
with Muslims. Obama sought to mend fences by: i) shifting rhetoric towards a more 
conciliatory tone (as opposed to the confrontational one adopted by the previous 
administration); ii) attempting to address contentious foreign policy issues (as opposed to 
solely pressing ahead with democracy promotion); and iii) developing a broad-based 
policy framework to engage all Muslims and marginalize radicals (as opposed to solely 
focusing on winning the “war of ideas” against Islamic extremists).  
 
Some pointed out how much of the administration’s strategy towards re-booting 
relations with Islam paralleled closely many of the recommendations from the “Changing 
Course” report (Zaharna 2009, pp.5-8). This is no surprise given the close ties between 
policy-makers like Madeleine Albright and Dennis Ross and the Democratic leadership. 
Another important influence was Dalia Mogahed. She was invited, along with Eboo Patel 
a prominent advocate for inter-faith dialogue with Muslims, to sit on the President’s 25-
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member White House Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood 
Partnerships.202 
 
A New Rhetorical Beginning 
 
President Obama’s first approach was to shift rhetoric and develop a discursive strategy 
on Islam. This strategy consisted in simultaneously underscoring the common values and 
interests that bonded the U.S. and Muslims together while deemphasizing the link 
between Islam and terrorism. The President repeatedly used his oratory qualities and 
personal story – during part of his childhood Obama lived Indonesia, his Kenyan father 
was Muslim – to reach out to Muslim audiences and address the increasingly sedimented 
clash of civilization narrative. During his 2009 inaugural address, Obama would make the 
first of many explicit and increasingly high profile conciliatory gestures towards 
“Muslims”. “To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest 
and mutual respect”, he remarked (2009a). During Obama’s first overseas trip he visited 
among other countries Turkey, where he addresses the parliament remarking that: 
“United States is not, and will never be, at war with Islam” (Obama 2009c).  
 
The apogee of these rhetorical overtures came with Obama’s June 2009 so-called 
Speech to the Muslim World in Cairo. In a speech peppered with quotes from the Koran 
and religious references, Obama explained to an audience that went far beyond the highly 
symbolic Al-Azhar University where he spoke, that:  
“I’ve come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United 
States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and 
mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are 
not exclusive and need not be in competition” (Obama 2009b). 
 
Throughout his first term, President Obama would repeatedly use the power of his 
rhetoric along with a number of symbolic gestures – continuing to host iftar dinners at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 For more information on the Advisory Council in molding Obama’s inherently religious policies see 
Chapters 4-5. 
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White House or visiting mosques overseas. Interestingly, from Cairo onwards the Obama 
administration would start to adopt the term “Muslims around the world” or “Muslim 
communities” rather than the more commonly used “Muslim world”. The difference is 
subtle, a turn of phrase preferred by the administration to signal its focus on diverse 
Muslim peoples rather than a monolithic Muslim bloc. While adding a level of nuance 
and complexity, the new administration would however still substantially work within a 
framework that sought to address rhetorically and policy-wise a religiously-defined 
Muslim “other”. 
 
The second discursive strategy adopted to reduce tensions was to drop references 
to the charged language of the War on Terror, in general, and the “war of ideas” within 
Islam and against Islamists in particular (Burkeman 2009; Waterman 2011). The 
President’s new NSS would frame the terrorist threat in terms of “defeating and 
disrupting violent extremists” (2010, pp.19-22). A USAID Senior Official, who was part 
of Obama’s NSC between 2009-2010, explains the administration’s thinking at the time 
as follows: 
“We sought to disassociate the link between terrorism and Islam. We left 
out references to “Islamic terrorism” from speeches and the NSS. We did 
not want to acknowledge the terrorists as speaking for Islam and their 
religion. We did not want to give Al Qaeda the credit that they wanted as 
Islamic soldiers and theologians, which they don’t have.” (2011, author’s 
interview) 
 
Along with these symbolic shifts, a number of new policies were crafted in line 
with Obama’s new approach to the Muslim world. Similarly to Bush, Obama’s strategy 
can be broadly divided into indirect and direct policies aimed at winning over Muslim 
majorities and marginalizing Islamist terrorists. Indirect policies sought to address a 
number of contentious political tensions between Muslims and Americans. Direct 
policies sought to publicly broaden America’s engagement with Muslims while behind 
the spotlight focus on countering terrorist narratives in a more targeted way.  
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Addressing Policy Tensions with Muslims  
 
Under Obama, indirect policies towards the Muslim “other” concentrated less on pushing 
for democracy across the Middle East and its Muslim beyond. They instead focused more 
on addressing contentious political and policy issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, torture and Guantanamo, and the war in Iraq. Scholars such as Esposito, as well 
as the members of the “Changing Course” report had suggested that these issues, rather 
than just the lack of freedom, were at the root of larger Muslim mistrust and narrower 
terrorist activity towards the U.S. (Esposito 2007; US-Muslim Engagement Project 2009, 
pp.6-7).  
 
Barack Obama made resolving the festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict a priority 
from the very beginning – compared to the tradition of addressing the issue towards the 
end of a presidential career. Obama entered the Oval Office on January 21st, on the 22rd 
he appointed George Mitchell as Special Envoy to the peace process. Within the first 
month of his presidency, Obama signed executive orders to shut down the Guantanamo 
Bay detention center and curb any form of harsh interrogation that was tantamount to 
torture. He would also commit to withdrawing America’s military operations from the 
unpopular “war of choice” in Iraq, refocusing on the less controversial “war of necessity” 
in Afghanistan.203 
 
The new administration abandoned the idea of forcefully promoting liberal values 
and democracy in the Muslim world via military means. It continued and expanded, 
however, most democracy promotion programs launched by Bush, such as MEPI and 
BMENA. Funding for MEPI reached $582 million in 2010, an increase of $50 million 
compared to 2009 (Sharp 2010, p.17). For 2011 the administration requested an 
additional $86 million (McInerney 2011, p.3). According to estimates in fiscal year 2011 
total funding for democracy and governance programs in the “broader Middle East” were 
projected to grow by 10% (McInerney 2011, p.3) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 I borrow these terms from Richard Haas (2009)  
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Overall, addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the issue of torture, and 
America’s occupation of Iraq had clear and explicit foreign policy and national security 
merits in their own right. Yet these policies were not carried forward in a vacuum of 
meaning. They had a more subtle and indirect intent. The urgency, with which they were 
dealt with, was to a great extent tied to the desire of repairing American’s standing in the 
Muslim world. Indeed, if this were not the case, then why would Obama mention these 
very same issues as important sources of “tension between the United States and Muslims 
around the world” in his 2009 Cairo speech?  
 
Widening America’s Engagement with Muslims and Targeting Terrorists Narratives 
 
A number of policy initiatives were implemented directly aimed at the Muslim world. 
Rhetorically and to some extent policy-wise the Bush administrations’ “bad Muslims-
good Muslims” outlook which underpinned much of the “war of ideas” framework was 
abandoned. This was replaced by a “good Islam-bad Terrorist” outlook that lead the 
Obama administration to concentrate programmatically on engaging all Muslims, while 
simultaneously focusing more narrowly on countering extremist and terrorists’ narratives. 
Overall, the idea animating the administration was to “launch a broad-based engagement 
effort” that moved “away from the “distorting lens” of terrorism” with which the U.S. 
had approached much of the Muslim world during the Bush administration (Lynch 2010, 
p.5).  
 
An overarching organizing policy framework called “Muslim engagement” was 
developed (Lynch 2010, p.19). Under this framework, Obama pulled together, 
restructured and expanded many of the overt and covert public diplomacy initiatives 
launched by the Bush administration. Above all, Obama structured “Muslim engagement” 
around a set of new key offices and appointees designed to overcome the coordination 
problems and bureaucratic silos encountered by the previous administration when 
framing policies around religious and civilizational lines. The cardinal institutional 
centers of the “Muslim engagement” policy framework became: i) a newly appointed 
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Special Representative to Muslim Communities in the State Department; ii) the Special 
Representative to the OIC; and iii) a newly constituted Global Engagement Directorate in 
the NSC. 
 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton204 appointed Farah Pandith, a Muslim American 
of Pakistani origins, as Special Representative to Muslim Communities. Farah Pandith, 
had already worked as a staff member on Muslim outreach and democratization in the 
NSC from 2004-2007. Now she would report directly to the Secretary of State. Her 
mission was to “build respectful and strong long-term relationships between the U.S. 
government and Muslim communities”, “support organic and credible alternative 
narratives that counter violent extremism”, and building new “networks of like-minded 
leaders”.205  
 
Under her watch U.S. embassies worldwide were increasingly tasked to host iftar 
dinners and actively connect, even across Europe, with Muslim leaders and communities 
(Kern 2012). Her office launched grass-roots initiatives and exchange programs targeting 
Muslim youth and women in America and around the world. Religious leaders and clerics 
have been brought in growing numbers to the United States with the scope of showcasing 
the country’s religious diversity and Muslim communities. In 2011, Pandith introduced – 
together with the State Department’s Special Envoy against Anti-Semitism – a campaign 
to promote pluralism and respect across lines of culture, religion, and tradition. She 
traveled widely to countries with significant Muslim populations meeting with local 
entrepreneurs, faith leaders, students, activists, bloggers, NGOs, and foundations.206  
 
Along with appointing a representative to engage with Muslim people, President 
Obama also continued Bush’s policy of appointing an envoy to Muslim countries. In 
February 2010 Rashad Hussain was designated U.S. Special Envoy to the OIC. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Secretary of State Clinton has been very active in pushing forward Obama’s engagement strategy, see:  
www.rollcall.com/news/hillary_clinton_pushes_post_911_muslim_outreach-208558-1.html (accessed 25/08/2012) 
205 See: www.state.gov/documents/organization/155334.pdf (accessed 25/08/2012) 
206 See the State Department’s webpage dedicated to the Special Representative: www.state.gov/s/srmc/index.htm 
(accessed 25/08/2012) 
	   264 
Interestingly, one of the characteristics that made Hussain a stand out candidate for the 
job, President Obama explained, was his knowledge of the Koran by heart (BBC 2010). 
Before the appointment, Hussain worked with NSC staff in developing and implementing 
President Obama’s “Muslim engagement” policies leading up to and in the aftermath of 
Cairo 2009. In 2008 he had co-authored a Brookings Institute report titled: 
“Reformulating the Battle of Ideas: Understanding the Role of Islam in Counterterrorism 
Policy” (Hussain and Madhany 2008). As Special Envoy, Hussain was tasked with 
strengthening business, health and technology partnerships with the OIC.207 He has also 
not shied away from publicly calling on Muslim religious leaders to go further in 
theologically denouncing terrorism and violence (Hussain 2010).  
 
A third cardinal institutional center was a newly created Global Engagement 
Directorate in the NSC. The directorate was broadly geared towards overseeing public 
diplomacy and other government-to-people activities across the executive. However, 
much of its responsibilities during the first Obama administration were dedicated to 
formulating and coordinating the “Muslim engagement” agenda (Lynch 2010, p.19; 
Policy Planning Official 2011, author’s interview). The Directorate was first lead by 
Pradeep Ramamurthy, a Washington intelligence and policy insider. Under his watch a 
multimillion Technology and Innovation Fund as well as new business investment 
initiatives (such as Partners for a New Beginning) were launched directed to the Muslim 
world. Business and science exchanges with Muslim countries were expanded, summits 
for Muslim entrepreneurs were hosted in Washington (Ramamurthy 2010). Ramamurthy 
traveled to Muslim majority countries to meet with government officials and secular and 
religious civil society groups to help “address concerns and misperceptions about 
American attitudes towards Islam and Islam in America” (Wikileaks 2010).  
 
Accompanying Obama’s wider “Muslim engagement” framework was a narrower 
and less public focus on activities known as “countering violent extremist” (CVE) 
narratives. The introduction of the term CVE was part of Obama’s strategy to de-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 See the State Department’s webpage dedicated to the Special Envoy: www.state.gov/p/io/c36387.htm (accessed 
25/08/2012) 
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emphasize both in terms of discourse and, to some extent, practice the notion of a “war of 
ideas” against an undistinguished and unified Islamist ideology. CVE’s activities focused 
mainly on local and context specific Islamist discourses and anti-American narratives, 
rather than suggesting the existence of a grand struggle of ideas at the global level. Given 
these important conceptual differences, at the heart CVE policies were very much in line 
with those of the previous administration. Especially, to the extent that their core intent 
was to “delegitimize the ideologies and ideas that animate violent extremists” (Lynch 
2010, p.20).  
 
Implementation hence focused not only on al-Qaeda’s global discourse, but also 
on countering the appeal of extremist ideas at a more context specific level. When it came 
to implementation, the Obama administration would however build upon “the initiatives 
of the last years of the Bush administration to empower, support and amplify credible 
voices inside the Muslim world [i.e. religious leaders and scholars] speaking out against 
extremists efforts” (Lynch 2010, p.20). Overall these changes in practices were not a 
major shift away from a desecularizing paradigm, but remained locked within it. The 
shift from a global war of ideas to CVE was a shift along the desecularizing outlook axis 
away from the “bad Muslim-good Muslim” framework of the neoconservatives, to a 
more nuanced “bad Islamist-good Islamist” one articulated by scholars with close ties to 
the administration such as John Esposito and Peter Mandaville.  
 
Interest in reforming madrassas and religious education institutions continued. In 
October 2011, Doug Johnston’s ICRD (see chapters 3 and 4), began work on a contract 
from the State Department to assess the progress of educational reform in Saudi Arabia as 
part of the Kingdom’s deradicalization efforts. Part of the assignment is to determine the 
possible downstream impact of such reforms on other Muslim majority countries. “The 
ICRD’s reputation for competence and balance demonstrated in its work with the 
madrasas in Pakistan has led to this assignment,” explained a former U.S. Ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia (quoted in Johnston 2011a). 
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In January 2011, as the Arab Spring was breaking out across the Middle East, 
Quintan Wiktorowicz, an expert of Islamic movements and radicalization, replaced 
Ramamurthy at the head of the Global Engagement Directorate. This appointment would 
alter the directorate’s focus from a broad engagement with all Muslims (whether 
entrepreneurs, youth, scientists, etc.), towards a more detailed and targeted attention to 
Islamist movements and CVE activities. Interestingly, the appointment reinforced and 
confirmed that the directorate’s chief responsibilities were to coordinate, in a way or 
another, the administration’s policies dealing primarily with Muslim world matters. 
 
Overall, during Barack Obama’s first term in office, re-focusing America’s War 
on Terror and re-booting its relations with the Muslim world became among the 
President’s priorities ever since his Inaugural Address. Obama did not move beyond a 
desecularizing framework, he simply move from a “clash and confrontation” to a 
“dialogue and engagement” approach to Islam and the Muslim world. Exemplary in this 
regard is the following observation by a Policy Planning Official: 
“We saw the carrying over from an administration [Bush’s] to the next 
[Obama’s] of an ontological category, the one of Muslims.  The previous 
administration saw Muslims as a danger, the current one wants to reach 
out and engage with them” (2011).  
 
As such, in terms of the salience of religion to American national security, this 
shift was not a change in paradigms. Rather it was a move along a continuum from a 
more confrontational desecularizing worldview to one more open to dialogue. The 
religious categories of Islam and Muslims, and the role of holy texts, religious practices, 
actors, and countries associated with these categories, still loomed large in national 
security thinking and policies. Indeed both liberal (Roy and Vaisse 2008) and 
conservative (Marshall 2010) critics exhorted the Obama administration to abandon 
altogether the idea of reaching out to “Islam” and the “Muslim world”. Obama’s strategy, 
they argued, dangerously reproduced, reified and legitimized Islamic identity and actors.   
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In terms of practices, the administration did launch new initiatives but it also built 
upon, modified and expanded upon what was already there from the Bush years. In the 
process Obama ended up both broadening and deepening America’s entanglement with 
“Islam” and “Muslims”. Indeed, as Farah Pandith, Hillary Clinton’s Special 
Representative to Muslim Communities, would enthusiastically point out: 
“Having worked on this issue [U.S.-Muslim relations] for many years now 
and especially in the context of a post-9/11 world, I cannot imagine more 
energy, dedication and interest in the issue of relationship building with 
Muslims around the world…No other time in our history have we seen the 
kind of attention over the course of the last year and a half on the issue of 
engagement with Muslims around the world” (2010). 
 
 
Assessing Desecularization 
 
 
Ever since the end of the Cold War and particularly following 9/11, the state of “Islam”, 
as a religion, and “Muslims”, as a group of countries and people sharing a particular faith 
or identity, have become central American national security concerns. In parallel there 
has been a gradual yet discernible process of bureaucratizing relations with this specific 
religious community and its more or less faithful adherents. This process of 
bureaucratization relates to the type of policies targeting “Islam” and “Muslims”, the 
institutional changes that have accompanied this development, and the growing 
entanglement between Muslim and Muslim-related actors in the delivery and formulation 
of foreign policy. This development has led to, and has been driven by, important 
counter-secularizing and counter-secularist changes, which will be teased out carefully in 
this section. I will proceed in order by looking at changes in practices, then looking at 
institutional developments and entanglements between the policy-making process and 
religious-related actors. Finally I move onto exploring the extent to which there have 
been changes to secularist epistemic, ideological and state-normative knowledge 
structures.  
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In terms of practices, during the Bush Jr. and Obama administrations a growing 
number of polices were implemented to either indirectly or more directly confront, 
reform, dialogue or engage “Islam” and “Muslims”. In terms of the most direct policies 
towards Islam and Muslims, both the Bush and Obama administrations implemented a 
wide range of initiatives designed to win over the hearts and minds of a group of states 
and non-state actors especially targeted across continents because of their religious 
identity and/or faith. Bush discursively and in practice couched these set of policies in 
terms of a “war of ideas”, Obama in terms of “Muslim engagement” and “countering 
violent extremist” narratives. Attempts to win Muslim hearts and minds were pursued, by 
both administrations, first by making an ever increasing number of symbolic gestures, 
such as hosting iftar dinners in Washington and in embassies around the world, visiting 
mosques in the U.S. and worldwide, and by praising “good” Muslims (Bush) or “all” 
Muslims (Obama).  
 
Secondly, by pouring hundreds of millions of dollars to implement tangible and 
concrete initiatives engaging “Muslims” in order to influence what they thought about 
violence, religious tolerance, democracy, West-Islamic world relations, and America. For 
instance, “Muslims” in general were being reached out to through an ever-growing 
number media, health, business, youth, women, scientific, and educational initiatives. At 
the same time government resources were increasingly directed to supporting activities 
with a decidedly religious dimension. These included organizing interfaith-dialogues, 
exchanges with religious scholars and clerics, restoring mosques, reforming madrassas, 
supporting particular religious groups over others (especially Sufi Muslims), and 
financing “moderate” Muslim religious figures and Islamic organizations in order to 
promote a theological interpretation of Islam that was not antithetical to U.S. security and 
interests. In terms of practices enacted and actors engaged to deliver American foreign 
policy, these policies constitute a rather profound level of desecularization. Indeed, at this 
level, American foreign policy has effectively sought to shape the course and content of a 
major world religion.  
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Accompanying these markedly desecularized policy practices, are important 
processes of institutional change across policy-making bureaucracies. Since 9/11 a 
number of desecularizing institutional developments have taken place in order to 
coordinate policy frameworks planned around religious and cultural faultiness. These 
developments were designed especially to overcome the secularized thematic, country, 
and regional boundaries around which much of the national security and foreign policy 
bureaucratic apparatus was accustomed to operate. Under Bush a number of interagency 
committees were organized in the NSC, such as the Muslim World Outreach PCC, to 
coordinate and implement America’s “war of ideas”.  Special responsibilities on “Muslim” 
matters were also assigned to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy in the State 
Department. A Special Envoy to the OIC was appointed in 2008. Many of these 
institutional changes were extended and deepened during the Obama administration. An 
OIC envoy was re-appointed and a new position of Special Representative to Muslim 
Communities was created in the State Department. A new Global Engagement Directory 
was set up in the NSC. While the directory was broadly designed to coordinate 
government-to-people activities, the people it has been mostly concerned with have 
overwhelmingly been “Muslims”.  
 
A growing entanglement between policy-making structures, on the one hand, and 
Muslim and Muslim-related actors, on the other hand, has occurred. Foreign policy 
decision-makers regularly rely on external expertise. Hence is no surprise that following 
9/11 scholars recognized for their knowledge of Islam and political Islam such as Bernard 
Lewis, during the Bush administration, or John Esposito, Peter Mandaville, and Quintan 
Wiktorowicz during the Obama one, were included or consulted in the policy-making 
process. What is most salient, however, was the inclusion of officials and experts in the 
policy-making process not just because of their knowledge of “Muslim” matters, but also 
because of their publicly recognized “Muslimness”, in terms of their background or their 
faith commitments. This was very much the case, for instance, with the appointments of 
Sada Cumber (Bush), Farah Pandith (Bush, Obama), Rashad Hussain (Obama), Dalia 
Mogahed (Obama), and Eboo Patel (Obama).  
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With time a loosening grip of secularist epistemic and ideological knowledge over 
policy-makers worldviews and institutional cultures is evident. Religious categories such 
as “Islam” and “Muslims”, largely absent from security discourses and policies before the 
end of the Cold War, have become ever more a concern to policy-makers. Especially 
since 9/11, American security is increasingly perceived by Presidents and high-level 
officials in Washington, as dependent upon what a group of countries and people, spread 
across continents with hugely different histories but unified by a particular religious 
identity or faith, think and do.  
 
I distinguish here between the emergence of “identity Muslims” and that of “faith 
Muslims” as important non-secularist categories in American foreign policy discourses 
and thinking. “Identity Muslims” are all those countries and more than a 1 billion people 
that have become defined increasingly by their religious affiliation, regardless of whether 
these are faithful adherents to Islam or define themselves in religious terms. Over the 
decades there has been a construction of a religiously defined “Muslim” as an agent and 
the “Muslim world” as a spatial frame of reference. As such, men, youth, women, 
business people, scientists, activists, or countries, become the target of a wide variety of 
policies because they are “Muslim” rather than because of other non-religious criteria 
such as geographical location or social status. Implicitly capturing this desecularizing 
change, Justin Vaisse, a Senior Fellow at Brookings, has argued that:  
“American policy-makers over time have come to address the “Muslim world” 
rather than the “Arab World”. But Muslims exist only in representations. 
Representations however do matter. Representations become reality when 
taken into consideration in research, analysis and policies” (2011, author’s 
interview).  
 
The reification of “identity Muslims” dovetails with a growing attention paid to 
“faith Muslims” and “Islam”. This entails a dwindling power of epistemic secularist 
knowledge structures, as well as in some circumstances a weakening of ideological 
secularism. As this process occurs religious authority and theology becomes important, at 
times even magnified and reified, in the worldview of leading decision- and policy-
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makers. A number of issues follow from this. First, a notion gains ground (in certain 
policy circles) that the tensions between America and “Muslims”, in general, and 
America and Islamist groups, in particular, is the result of religious differences and 
misunderstandings rather than the product of conflicting political and economic interests. 
Second, the state of Islam as a faith, its different theological interpretations and traditions, 
and its history become a major concern for American policy-makers. Third, religious 
texts and beliefs are seen, or elevated, as representatives of entire groups of people or 
countries. Policy-makers come to believe, for example, that a secular Indonesian or 
Nigerian or any other Arab, may be susceptible to an American president quoting the 
Koran in Cairo. This belief constitutes an evident move away from a purely secular 
understanding of the forces and dynamics taking place in international politics.  
 
Fourth, Presidents and high-level officials start feeling increasingly confortable 
intervening in theologically charged debates about Islam and religion. They start 
entertaining discussions about what Islam’s true nature is, exploring the compatibility of 
Islam with other religious faiths, explaining what Muhammad’s real teachings were, 
highlighting what the correct interpretations of the faith are and who is a religious 
moderate, a fundamentalist or a jihadist, and so on. For instance, is Islam really a 
“religion of peace”, as President Bush explained outside a mosque while quoting the 
Koran just after 9/11? According to some of his own Christian Right and neoconservative 
supporters this was not the case. Staunch secularists like Christopher Hitchens and 
Richard Dawkins would surely find equally problematic such a comment. For them Islam, 
like any other religion, is unlikely to be peaceful. By making a call on the nature of Islam 
and quoting the Koran in his mosque speech – rather than simply arguing that 9/11 and 
Islam were completely unrelated and then moving on – Bush made theological 
interpretation and discussion an important part of national security debates. So did 
Obama in Cairo after him.  
 
The policy outcome of this process is the emergence inter-faith dialogue 
initiatives as well as programs designed to develop particular interpretations of Islam as 
an antidote to violence and terrorism. Islam itself increasingly becomes seen as the 
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solution to America’s security problems. This is quite ironic given that “Islam is the 
solution!” is a slogan that Islamists themselves, such as the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, have widely adopted.  
 
Finally, a progressive erosion of a strict separationist interpretation among policy-
makers of the Constitution’s Establishment Clause is detectable. Due to national security 
concerns, norms of church-state (or better mosque-state) separation are seen as ever less 
binding when it comes to winning over Muslim hearts and minds. Policymakers at the 
time of Bush, a US News report argues, realized that the “war of ideas” was going to drag 
“Washington into a battle involving mosques, mullahs, and Scripture [which] went 
against 200 years of U.S. church-state relations” (Kaplan 2005). Yet, the Bush 
administration still pressed ahead with initiatives to reform and build madrassas, or that 
supported “moderate” Islamic movements and actors. 
 
Legal experts have questioned whether America’s growing involvement with 
Islam is in line with the constitution. Herman Schwartz, a constitutional law professor at 
American University, has argued that many programs implemented during Bush’s first 
term were  “probably unconstitutional” (quoted from Kaplan 2005). Indeed, capturing 
how state-normative secularism has been relaxed over time, Schwartz noted that back in 
1991 the American Civil Liberties Union was able to win case against USAID to stop it 
from funding 20 Catholic and Jewish schools overseas. That “seems a long time ago”, 
Schwartz remarked and continued to explain, “I don’t know if anyone would support that 
kind of suit today” (Schwartz quoted from Kaplan 2005). Similar practices have 
continued during the Obama administration. Daniel Pipes, a neoconservative pundit, has 
equally attacked the Obama administration for breaching the U.S. Constitution by 
funneling taxpayer money to build, support, or reform Muslim institutions and leaders 
(Pipes 2011b).   
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Conclusion 
 
 
Since the 1970s onwards, political Islam and Islamist groups have gradually become 
important political players across Northern and Eastern parts of Africa, the Middle East, 
Central, Southern and South-Eastern Asia. America’s initial approach towards this social 
and political development was both distracted and ambiguous. Distracted by the larger 
Cold War rivalry against the atheist Soviet Union. At the time political Islam and Islamist 
movements were nothing more than a distant speck in its calculations. Ambiguous 
because political Islam, as distant as it seemed, it also appeared as a double-edged sword. 
While Washington would support the Afghan mujaheddin to contain the God-less Red 
Army, it was also bitten back by the 1979 Iranian revolution. It was then that for the first 
time Muslim politics appeared in a major way on the national security radar screen of 
American policy-makers. 
 
At that time scarce thinking was poured into understanding the role of Islam in 
politics and international relations. References to Islam and Muslims in official security 
discourse and strategies were nearly inexistent. No detailed or comprehensive policy 
frameworks were developed and implemented towards political Islam, in particular, let 
alone the Muslim world understood as a somewhat coherent category of countries and 
peoples sharing the same faith, more broadly. Aside from the religiously infused 
American exceptionalist rhetoric of presidents like Ronald Reagan, at the height of the 
Cold War national security was largely debated, formulated and conducted along secular 
lines in Washington. With the end of the Cold War, America’s attention towards the 
Islamist phenomenon increased as its national security interests became ever more 
entangled with the fate of the Middle East and its neighboring regions. Here the U.S. was 
confronted with an emerging set of domestic and transnational forces often opposed to it 
and which claimed to draw their inspiration from the Koran and Islamic history, rather 
than from secular texts and leaders. As a result, Washington’s foreign policy elites were 
ever more reflexively drawn into understanding and explaining, not solely the political, 
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but also the religious and cultural dynamics within societies and countries in these 
particular regions.  
 
During the 1990s the American scholarly and policy establishment’s views on 
Islamism largely crystallized around two broad desecularizing worldviews with their own 
internal differing desecularizing outlooks. These outlooks all sought to make sense of 
what political Islam was about, whether there was a link across Islamist groups and 
ideologies, what was the relationship between Islamism (as political ideology) and Islam 
(as a religion), what was the nature of Islam as a religion, and what was its compatibility 
with American and Western values. These outlooks all gave somewhat different answers 
to these various questions. What they all shared, however, was a common concern for 
what was happening to “Islam” and “Muslims”. They all have been caught in a way or 
another in culture talk and thinking, between the fear of an impending clash and 
confrontation with, or the desire to promote a dialogue and a deeper understanding of the 
“Muslim world”.  
 
These worldviews, and the pundits and scholars holding and promoting them 
within the Washington foreign policy circles, were responsible for making Islamic and 
Muslim discourses, identities and actors ever more central to national security thinking 
from the 1990s onwards. The events of 9/11 were a major turning point. Since then 
addressing the religious categories of “Islam” and the “Muslim world”, moved beyond 
the realm of rhetoric and acquired materiality under the Bush Jr. and then Obama 
administrations. Managing U.S.-Muslims relations, while also undermining Islamist 
power and discourses in the “Muslim world”, all became a central national security 
concern. Each administration pursued these objectives by implementing policies that 
were in line with the desecularizing outlook that carried most weight with the President 
and high-level officials. 
 
The growing salience that was assigned to religious identities, dynamics and 
actors (state and non-state) has gone hand in hand with a process of desecularization in 
terms of practices and decision-making structures. Foreign policies have been designed to 
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change governments and societies in the “Muslim world”, win over the hearts and minds 
of “Muslims”, and reform the faith of “Islam”. America’s institutional architecture has 
evolved as well. New special representatives to Muslim countries (the OIC) and Muslim 
communities have been appointed. Interagency coordinating bodies in the NSC have 
gradually emerged and then progressively institutionalized to better coordinate programs 
geared no longer just towards secularly defined nations but also to the transnational entity 
of Islam. Actors identified as Muslims, and with knowledge of and faith in Islam, have 
been increasingly consulted and brought into the formulation of American national 
security policies.  
 
Epistemic secularism has weakened as religious categories such as “Muslims” and 
the “Muslim world” became major organizing principles for policy discourses and 
initiatives, and acquiring ontological reality for American policy-makers. Counter-
secularist processes are evident, as presidents have increasingly felt compelled and 
authorized to intervene in theological disputes explaining what the “true nature” of Islam 
is. The idea that Islam, or religion more generally, is inherently problematic, is being 
replaced by an attitude among policy-makers that sees Islam also as the solution to 
America’s security concerns. Hence, the growing interest in inter-faith dialogues as well 
as pressing Muslim clerics to issue fatwas that condemn terrorism and violence. These 
activities often involve funding religious individuals and institutions abroad. Despite 
much publicly available information on such programs, no major legal challenge 
compared to past instances is appearing on the horizon to dispute the current decrease in 
“mosque-state” separation. This seems to suggest that policy-makers and the broader 
legal environment are adopting an ever more accommodationist interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause when it comes to national security concerns.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
This conclusion is structured as follows. First it outlines this thesis’ understanding of the 
concept of desecularization, particularly in relation to American foreign policy, and 
briefly summarizes some of the findings of this research. The part that follows goes over 
the Historical Sociological (HS) approach to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) that was 
employed to explain why processes of desecularization have occurred, how they came 
about and why they took place at specific historical moments over the past two decades. 
Lastly, building on the empirical findings, theoretical framework adopted, and the 
argument developed, I will reflect on the most significant contributions this project as a 
whole makes to our present understanding of secular and religious dynamics in IR and, to 
some extent, the sociology of religion.  
 
 
Tracing and Unpacking American Foreign Policy Desecularization  
 
 
Since the second half of the 1990s, the United States has implemented a growing range of 
inherently religious foreign policies. American diplomats and Foreign Service officials 
have become increasingly concerned with promoting “international religious freedom”, 
and improving their understanding and engagement with “religious actors and issues” 
worldwide. Humanitarian and development practitioners have become ever more 
involved in delivering foreign assistance through a number of “faith-based initiatives”. 
National security experts and advisors have repeatedly attempted to confront, reform, or 
reach out to “Islam” as a religion, and the “Muslim world”, as a religiously-defined 
category of countries and people. During the past two decades, think tanks, universities 
and research institutes, which hold great sway over policy debates in Washington, have 
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increasingly conducted research, organized conferences and opened centers dedicated to 
the study of international religious dynamics and factors, particularly as they intersect 
with issues of conflict and terrorism, poverty reduction, peace-building, or human rights 
and democracy. 
 
This thesis argued that these changes in American foreign policy and within the 
American foreign policy establishment have all led to, and are sustained by, multiple 
processes of desecularization. In its analysis of American foreign policy this thesis 
distinguished between bureaucratic state practices and policy-making structures that 
characterize foreign policy on the one hand, and the broader character and identity of the 
American people and the personal inclinations and discourses of individual Presidents on 
the other. Ordinary people and American Presidents have often been quite religious 
themselves. Likewise, America’s place in the world and confrontation with its enemies 
has regularly been cast in (civil) religious imagery and language since its very inception, 
through to the Cold War and more recently the War on Terror. In this sense, there is little 
that is secular in the private life and public discourses of Americans and their Presidents. 
On the contrary, this thesis argued, and hopefully convincingly demonstrated, that state 
policies, bureaucracies and bureaucrats, have been instead overwhelmingly secularized 
(in terms of functional differentiation) and secularist in their ideational and normative 
orientation, overwhelmingly at least until the mid-1990s when processes of 
desecularization most visibly started to occur.   
 
Building mainly on the work of sociologists of religion such as José Casanova 
(1994, 2011), Peter Berger (1999) and Vyacheslav Karpov (2010), I proposed in Chapter 
2 a conceptual framework to unpack processes of secularization and desecularization 
applicable to the case of a state’s foreign policy. In terms of foreign policy I distinguished 
between practices (policies implemented, norms promoted, initiatives launched and so 
on) and policy-making structures (the institutions involved in formulating and delivering 
policies, and the cultural and normative-environment defining the contours within which 
policy-makers operate). In terms of processes of desecularization I distinguished between 
processes which are counter-secularizing and those that are counter-secularist.  
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Bringing everything together, then, foreign policy practices are undergoing 
processes of counter-secularization when there is an increasing and systematic 
entanglement: a) between religious issues and norms and foreign policy practices; and b) 
between religious and religious-related actors and the delivery/execution of foreign 
policy. Foreign policy-making institutions are undergoing processes of counter-
secularization when: a) new offices, departments and appointees are created with an 
implicit or explicit religious content; and b) religious and religious-related actors are ever 
more included in policy-making. Counter-secularist processes occur when there is a 
growing contestation, renegotiation and weakening of entrenched epistemic, ideological 
and state-normative secularist ideational formations in the minds of policy-makers and 
the culture of policy-making institutions.  
 
This thesis’s central empirical and conceptual concern was to trace across time the 
emergence of inherently religious foreign policies and unpack the multiple and complex 
desecularizing changes which have accompanied these developments over the past two 
decades. In terms of foreign policy practices, desecularization has occurred as America 
has progressively sought to monitor and sanction countries around the world deemed to 
be religious freedom violators. Simultaneously it has sought to promote these norms by 
influencing other states’ regulatory frameworks and implementing a small but growing 
number of initiatives and projects to encourage interfaith-dialogue and understanding. 
The U.S. has come to rely in an ever more structured way on religious organizations and 
institutions, including some who hire exclusively along sectarian lines and openly 
proselytize, to assist in the delivery and implementation its foreign assistance programs to 
fight poverty. New health initiatives to fight HIV/AIDS have been structured, such as 
PEPFAR, partly around the preferences, concerns and norms of (conservative) religious 
advocates. Countless overt and covert programs have been carried out to encourage the 
development of a “moderate” Islam. Simultaneously numerous initiatives were launched 
to improve relations with a set of countries and people chiefly defined by their Muslim 
faith or identity.  
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From the mid-1990s onwards, noticeable desecularizing changes occurred in 
terms of new offices and appointments being created, and actors being brought in, to 
manage, promote and coordinate policies with an inherently religious content. As of 2012, 
the State Department houses an Office (OIRF) and an Ambassador-at-Large for 
International Religious Freedom. A Government-mandated independent Commission on 
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) supports, or duplicates as critics argue, 
OIRF’s work. State has also launched a working group on Religion and Foreign Policy 
that seeks new ways of partnering and engaging with religious groups to advance 
American national interests.  
 
The White House hosts an Office for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships 
(WHFBO) in the Domestic Policy Council. This office is assisted in its role and 
responsibilities to promote the President’s faith-based agenda across the executive, by a 
25-member strong Presidential Advisory Council. Directly linked to the WHFBO, is a 
USAID-based Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (CFBCI) overseeing the 
partnerships with faith-based organizations (FBOs) in foreign assistance. A Global 
Engagement Directory, which is overwhelmingly concerned with policies towards the 
Muslim world, is housed in the White House’s National Security Council. The State 
Department is also home to the offices of a Special Envoy to the Organization for Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) and a Special Representative to Muslim Communities. All the above 
offices or positions are mostly staffed with religious actors, religious-related advocates, 
or officials and advisors who are chosen because of their religious expertise or identity.  
 
Conscious or unconsciously held epistemic secularist beliefs that led policy-
makers to ignore religious forces and dynamics, believed to be also a dying force in an 
ever modernizing world, have been replaced by a much greater awareness that religion 
actually does matter in modern world politics. Training programs are implemented, 
national security strategies and operational tool-kit manuals are being drafted, and 
presidential speeches are delivered which reveal that religion as an analytical category in 
international politics is being taken increasingly seriously. Explicit and implicit 
ideological secularist assumptions that led policy-makers to view religion exclusively as 
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an inherently dangerous and problematic force, often linked to the most perverse 
behaviors and seemingly irrational violence, are giving way to a greater interest in 
exploring how religion can be harnessed to serve American interests. This is attested by 
the growing attention to using interfaith-dialogues, diplomatic efforts to engage and reach 
out to religious communities (especially Muslim) worldwide, making resources available 
to faith-based organizations to carry out poverty and HIV/AIDS reduction initiatives, and 
promoting particular brands of Islam which are deemed to be more “peaceful”.  
 
I argued that state-normative secularism in the U.S. mainly takes shape in a strict 
separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution’s First 
Amendment. Strict separationism prohibits most forms of government aid and support to 
religious institutions. Such an interpretation of the Establishment Clause has been both 
formally weakened by domestic challenges in the Supreme Court as well as informally 
within foreign policy circles. A number of legal-normative and policy-instrumental 
arguments are being advanced quite successfully for a more accommodationist stance 
towards issues of church and state separation. An accommodationist stance on the 
Establishment Clause still maintains that church and state should be institutionally 
separate, but argues that the government can and should be allowed to fund, aid and 
support religion, as opposed to a strict interpretation that excludes most forms of support.  
 
The legal-normative argument develops along the two following axes: a) the 
Establishment Clause applies mainly/only domestically, not internationally and in terms 
of foreign policy; or b) inherently religious organizations should not be discriminated 
against when attempting to access state resources and should be allowed to receive 
government funding just as non-religious organizations do. The policy-instrumental 
argument develops along the following lines: around the world from the Middle East to 
Africa and Asia, religion and politics regularly mix, and increasingly appear to do so in 
ways that have an impact on American interests. Hence if America is to reach its foreign 
policy objectives (improve security, reduce poverty, promote human rights, etc.) the U.S. 
must embrace a certain level of entanglement with religion.  
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It is important, however, to be modest and not exaggerate the scale and scope of 
these changes. I am not claiming here, nor in the preceding chapters, that American 
foreign policy is now solely committed to religious issues, or that the United States has 
become some kind of theocracy with little or no separation between spiritual and 
temporal powers. The foreign policy apparatus is a complex and sprawling machine 
dealing with an endless number of issues and concerns well beyond religion. It counts on 
the inputs and assistance of a wide range of non-state actors – scientists, scholars, 
activists, NGOs, and specialists and experts of all kinds – which have nothing to do, at 
least publicly, with religion. In a sense there is still a high degree of functional 
differentiation between American foreign policy practices and institutions, and religion.  
 
Likewise it would be an exaggeration to claim that the secularist epistemic and 
ideological worldview of much of the elites in Washington and within bureaucracies has 
been completely diluted. A degree of indifference and skepticism among policy-makers 
towards the necessity of mainstreaming religious considerations in American foreign 
policy is still prevalent (see Johnston 2011c). Nor have state-church separation norms 
been completely jettisoned. Although these are progressively interpreted in 
accommodationist terms, the Establishment Clause still stands. Furthermore new 
religious-based foreign policies can be resisted by bureaucratic inertia and material 
constrains. Indeed, compared to the wide variety of issues American decision- and 
policy-makers are daily called upon to address, institutional, monetary and human 
resources are instead limited.  
 
For instance, while the international religious freedom agenda is quite a break-
though, one would be hard pressed to say that the promotion of these norms are the 
highest priority in American foreign policy. Although OIRF’s responsibilities and staff 
are expanding, it is still a small office with scarce resources and its Ambassador does not 
report directly to the Secretary of State as other Ambassadors-at-Large tend to do, but 
rather to the lower-ranking Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 
(see Farr 2012). The future of USCIRF is uncertain, and the commission is currently 
being downsized, albeit it seems with the intention to strengthen the OIRF. The 
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normative and institutional changes brought about by the faith-based initiatives are a 
controversial and significant development, particularly with the establishment of what 
appear to be permanent and growing faith-based offices in the White House and USAID. 
Yet the resources spent on these initiatives are a small fraction of those the U.S. dishes 
out for humanitarian and development purposes to secular institutions, such as the World 
Bank, implementing governments, and secular international NGOs.  
 
The symbolic moves and wide-ranging programmatic efforts directed at 
influencing and reaching out to Islam and Muslim public opinion around the world 
during Bush’s War on Terror and the first Obama administration are surely 
unprecedented. Yet these initiatives are largely public diplomacy and strategic 
communications-based, and pale in comparison to the resources invested in the war 
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the, known and unknown, military-based counter-
terrorism initiatives implemented around the world in the wake of 9/11.  
 
This said we should not underestimate the significance of the changes that have 
occurred. What is being argued here is that while before the 1990s American foreign 
policy practitioners mostly did not “do religion” in a public, structured, and systematic 
way, this no longer is the case in the 2010s. Indeed today, among its countless activities, 
American foreign policy practitioners increasingly and explicitly “do religion”. As a 
result there has been a process of desecularization of a number of foreign policy practices 
and policy-making structures. This is a rather substantive, important, under-investigated 
and, in many respects under-theorized, development.  
 
 
A HS Approach to FPA: Explaining Foreign Policy Desecularization  
 
 
What can explain both the variety and multiplicity of religious issues that are being 
tackled across diplomatic, foreign assistance, and national security areas, as well as the 
fact that these changes all share a common non-secular dimension? In particular what can 
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coherently account for the common desecularizing thread that binds the disparate policy 
changes, institutional developments and cultural/normative shifts analyzed above – along 
with, let’s not forget, the changes in the American foreign policy establishment? 
Moreover, how did these developments come about, and why did they happen when they 
did? That is, how and why did most of the observed changes occur within the space of a 
decade or two following the end of the Cold War? 
 
One may point at the growth of Protestant Evangelicals in the United States or the 
rise of the Christian Right in the past decades. But these may only, and partially, explain 
the adoption of certain policies such as international religious freedom and faith-based 
initiatives while leaving out, however, policies targeting Islam and, to a great extent, 
religious engagement policies. One may point at the rise of political Islam and Islamist 
terrorism, or the War on Terror more broadly, as inspiring Muslim-related policies and, to 
some extent, the religious engagement framework. Vice versa this explanation does not 
account for the development of religious freedom and faith-based initiatives. Some may 
find in “born again” President Bush the chief architect of American foreign policy 
desecularization. However, much of the religious freedom and faith-based agendas 
predated Bush, and the religious engagement agenda mostly followed his presidency. Nor 
does the Bush explanation take into account that the “non-born again” Obama has mostly 
extended, and in many circumstances expanded, U.S. involvement with religious issues 
and actors. While we may look at this or that specific cause, it appears evident that most 
of these explanations remain incomplete and partial, unless they are framed within a 
larger context. In other words, the net should be cast wider.  
 
In particular, we cannot make sense of these changes without looking at how the 
domestic and international context within which American foreign policy is formulated 
and conducted has substantially changed over the past forty-fifty years. What appeared 
for the most part of the 20th century as, and in many senses was, a secular or at least 
relentlessly-secularizing world, in recent decades has instead experienced a process of 
global religious resurgence. As such, I have argued and attempted to demonstrate, that 
without taking into account the broader social and cultural historical process of religious 
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resurgence we cannot fully make sense of these shifts. By religious resurgence I mean the 
growing political salience of religious ideas, discourses, identities, practices, symbols, 
objects and actors which has occurred in multiple, complex and often locally specific 
ways, but simultaneously, across most religions and geographic areas of the world over 
the past five decades.  
 
This thesis opened with a quote from a milestone book in the field of religion and 
IR, a book that pulls together more than a decade-worth of thinking by three leading 
American scholars on the subject: Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy 
Samuel Shah (2011). In the book these scholars explain why and how religions have been 
resurging and, as quoted in the passage of my introduction, warned governments that 
“like it or not” they would have to “reckon” with this new fact of international life. It 
seems to me that a process of “reckoning” is well underway in the case of America. This 
line of argument, however, raises even more questions than it answers. How do broad, 
long-term trends explain the specific and diverse policy and institutional outcomes 
observed? And why, if the process of resurgence has its roots in the 1960s-70s, did the 
desecularizing changes examined here take place mostly from the late-1990s onwards?  
 
At this point, looking at specific historical events (such as the end of the Cold 
War and 9/11) and actors (such as the political rise of Protestant Evangelicals, the role of 
Presidents Bush and Obama, or the emergence of Islamists movements across Africa and 
Asia), firmly placed within a context of religious resurgence, becomes crucial to explain 
processes of foreign policy change and desecularization. In order to explore the complex 
causal mechanisms that this line of argument implies, and investigate the links between 
broad global trends, historical events and specific foreign policy changes, this thesis 
articulated in Chapter 1 a HS approach to FPA. Such a framework appears to be well 
suited to tease out and explain the wider sources and conditions that give rise to changes 
in foreign policy practices and decision-making structures. Andrew Linklater argues that 
“the plain desire to understand social and political change is often the primary motivation 
for pursuing historical-sociological inquiry” (2009, p.137). Transported to foreign policy, 
one can argue that the plain desire to understand foreign policy change, and its 
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relationship to international transformations, is a primary motivation for pursuing a HS 
FPA enquiry.  
 
A number of key HS insights add to the study of change in FPA. A HS FPA 
advances an explicit view of the international that is analytically pluralist, ontologically 
pluralist, and historicist, which tends to be lacking in much mainstream FPA theorizing. 
Secondly, it leads to an understanding of foreign policy and international politics as 
mutually constitutive. This analytical move rests on two theoretical assumptions that 
come with taking a HS lens. On the one hand, an insistence on linking macro-level social 
and historical processes and trends with actors and social action at the micro-level. On 
the other hand, a particular concept of the state that emphasizes its autonomous 
institutional underpinnings that lies at the intersection between the international and 
domestic spheres and acts as a meso-level institutional ligature between macro-level 
processes and micro-level actions.  
 
When it comes to conceptualizing the international, HS’s analytical pluralism 
gives equal weight to the international society of states and the world society of peoples. 
Its ontological pluralism sees the international as constituted by both materialist and 
ideational forces and structures. HS’s historicism takes discontinuity and temporality 
seriously in the international sphere, rather than focusing on uncovering a-historical law-
like generalizations. These insights have important implications for this research.  
 
Analytical and ontological pluralism allow me to locate the global resurgence of 
religion as a social and cultural process not only either domestically or externally, but 
more broadly at the world social level which is both domestic and international at the 
same time. From here I can then explore how processes of religious resurgence that are 
simultaneously taking place domestically, transnationally and externally impact on 
American foreign policy. Attention to historicity and temporality means taking both (a) 
the processes of religious resurgence, and (b) historical events that are somewhat 
connected to the growing salience of religion in international politics (the end of the Cold 
War, the election of President G.W. Bush, the attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing War on 
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Terror), as integral elements and critical junctures in understanding and explaining 
foreign policy desecularization.  
 
A mutually constitutive account of international politics and foreign policy has a 
number of repercussions for this research. First, it highlights the necessity of linking 
processes of macro change with agency at the micro-level. On the one hand, the social 
process of global religious resurgence at the world social level has domestically brought 
to the fore in the United States a growing and thickening number of religious advocacy 
groups embedded in and contributing to the resurgence. These are mostly Protestant 
Evangelical, but also belong to a wide range of other religious denominations and 
traditions within and beyond Christianity (Hertzke 2012). Many of these religious 
organizations and advocates hold transnational links to fellow co-religionists outside the 
United States. These religious advocates have been increasingly committed to the health 
and wellbeing of their co-religionists abroad and have attempted to influence the practice 
and conduct of American foreign policy accordingly. I have identified these actors as 
desecularizing activists. These activists, have formed coalitions with principled 
desecularizing policy elites and desecularizing political elites in Washington which share 
their concerns, and mobilized mainly around two inherently religious agendas: i) 
promoting international religious freedom, and ii) opening up foreign assistance 
resources to faith-based organizations.  
 
On the other hand, both the social and cultural processes of resurgence are 
affecting the beliefs and perceptions of foreign policy elites within and outside the 
government. These are whom I called strategic desecularizing foreign policy elites. The 
rise of political Islam, the appearance post-Cold War conflicts which increasingly seem 
to pit warring parties along sectarian lines, the attacks of 9/11 and the events that 
followed, have fostered a belief among scholars, pundits and officials in Washington that 
religious issues and actors increasingly “matter” in international politics. American 
foreign policy practices and bureaucratic structures, these policy elites argue, need to 
shed their entrenched and multiple secular biases, and respond adequately to this new 
religiously vibrant reality. These have mobilized mainly to promote two inherently 
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religious agendas: i) greater attention to engaging with religious actors and issues abroad; 
and ii) policies designed to confront, reform or reach out to Muslims across the globe.  
 
Secondly, the historical sociological notion of the institutional state makes two 
important analytical contributions. First, the idea of the institutional state as a relatively 
autonomous entity from both the domestic and external sphere sits comfortably with a 
central tension identified in the research. The distinction between America as a secular 
state – especially in terms of its foreign policy bureaucracies and bureaucrats – and 
Americans as a religious people. Second, the concept of the institutional state opens up 
the space to trace causality by looking at the emergence and development of new foreign 
policy practices and bureaucratic structures at the level of institutions. Institutions are 
understood here to act as meso-level ligament sites between macro-level trends of 
religious resurgence and critical junctures at specific historical points in time, with the 
actions of desecularizing actors at the micro-level.  
 
These triangulations help explain why even though processes of resurgence had 
their roots roughly in the 1960-70s, only in the late-1980s early-1990s, as the Cold War 
ended, religious agendas concerning religious freedom, religious engagement, faith-based 
initiatives, and confronting or dialoguing with Islam, started to be explicitly articulated 
among religious activists and foreign policy pundits and scholars in Washington D.C. A 
string of domestic and international events then occurred, which opened up critical space 
for the initial adoption and institutionalization of these agendas by political elites during 
the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Important turning points were the 
Republican victory in the 1994 mid-term elections granting them control of both the 
House and the Senate, the rise of terrorist attacks abroad and directed towards U.S. 
targets in the second part of the 1990s by groups claiming to act in the name of Islam, the 
election of the highly publicly religious and “born again” President G.W. Bush in 2000, 
and the events of September 11, 2001.  
 
A number of causes ensured that once inherently religious policy frameworks 
became institutionalized in foreign policy practices and bureaucracies, these were then 
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extended, in the great majority of cases, and expanded, in some circumstances, under the 
Obama administration. Explanations revolve around issues of institutional path 
dependence, the continued resonance of domestic and international actors and factors 
connected to the resurgence of religion, and President Obama’s own efforts at reaching 
out and engaging, motivated by a mix of principled and strategic beliefs, with religious 
actors domestically and abroad. 
 
 
Contributions to the Study of Religion and its Resurgence in IR  
 
 
In this concluding section, I consider some of the most significant theoretical, conceptual, 
and analytical implications of my argument and empirical analysis for the study of 
religion and the secular in IR and sociology. The discussion is divided into three main 
parts, dealing in turn with: i) the nature of the resurgence of religion; ii) introducing the 
concept of desecularization to unpack what is distinctive about religion and its resurgence 
in IR; and iii) the contribution of a historical sociological framework to the study of 
religion and its resurgence in IR. 
 
The Nature of the Global Resurgence of Religion 
 
The notion and understanding of a resurgence of religion in world politics, although 
produced and reproduced by a wide range of social scientific literature, is not 
unproblematic and uncontested. Firstly, I argued in the Introduction that if the concept is 
to have analytical weight it should be tied to the public visibility and political salience of 
religion. Conversely it should be linked less to the changing nature of religion/s per se or 
the persistence and deepening of religious beliefs among people and communities around 
the world, say in an era of globalization. In many respects, as the verbs “changing”, 
“deepening”, and “persisting” suggest, there is in fact little “resurging” going on.  
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Having said this, it is also important to distinguish between two different and 
independent, yet possibly mutually-reinforcing, processes of resurgence. On the one hand, 
there are processes of politicization of religion that Thomas (2005) partly alludes to in his 
work, and Toft, Philpott and Shah (2011) more firmly subscribe to. These are processes 
whereby over the past four or five decades, religions, theologies, and religious and 
religious-related actors (individuals, non-state actors, and communities) have become 
ever more publicly and politically engaged. On the other hand, there are processes of 
religionization of politics which indirectly Samuel Huntington (1993), Fabio Petito 
(2010) and the general identity politics literature refer to, and which Bassam Tibi (2007) 
and Jeffrey Haynes (1995) more explicitly have talked about. This is a cultural process – 
a change in intersubjective meanings and knowledge – whereby religious ideas, identities, 
discourses, practices, symbols, objects, and actors acquire growing political weight and 
meaning, also for secular actors themselves.  
 
Secondly, the notion of a “resurgence” holds if we frame the issue in a historical 
perspective, as was done in Chapter 2. In the chapter I argued that there was indeed a 
time of “decline” in the public and political authority of religion, albeit in distinctive and 
uneven ways across the world. I looked at the rise of the modern-state, the functional 
differentiation of religious institutions from a wide range of knowledge areas (especially 
natural and social sciences), the emergence and spread of secular ideologies and political 
projects, and the drafting of constitutions mandating the creation of “secular states” or the 
“disestablishment of church and state”, as important historical occurrences. I then 
suggested, along the lines of many others before me, that these events and processes, and 
the actors associated with them, did much to curtail and dampen throughout the past 
centuries the power and role of religion/s’ institutional and normative authority in the 
public sphere208 starting in Europe and then across most regions of the world – albeit in 
complex, uneven and geographically distinctive ways.  
 
Thirdly, the idea of a resurgence of religion also stands up if one takes a 
historicist perspective on ongoing scholarly debates. E.H. Carr saw the work of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Note that I am not arguing for the same effect in the private sphere, this is a whole other matter.  
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historian as largely bound to and reflecting his own empirical and historical context 
(1990). If one sees (as I do) the work of the IR scholar much like E.H. Carr saw that of 
the historian, then the fact that inquiries on the resurgence are being pursued in the 
academy reflects not just intellectual fads but also the kinds of practices and events which 
are taking place “out there”, on the ground of international politics. Finally, if one accepts 
this thesis’s argument and its empirical findings, then processes of desecularization 
further reveal the impact that the global resurgence of religion is having on a state’s 
practices and institutions.  
 
Desecularization and Teasing out what is Distinctive about Religion and its Resurgence 
 
This research follows in the footsteps of ongoing debates about the impact of the 
“resurgence of religion” and “the secular” on international relations practices and theory. 
It adds to this scholarship by bringing into the discipline the sociological concept of 
desecularization. This concept proves to be a particularly useful way to explore how 
processes of religious resurgence are leading to a renegotiation of material and ideational 
boundaries that were long-assumed to be settled between “the religious” and “the secular” 
within the social sciences in general and American foreign policy in particular.  
 
In order to unpack what this project understands to be highly contested terms such 
as the secular and the religious, secularization and desecularization, it turned to debates 
largely outside IR and in the sociology of religion. The thesis worked mostly within the 
confines of José Casanova’s (1994, 2011) understanding of the secular, secularization/s 
and secularism/s, and Peter Berger’s (1999) initial intuition and Vyacheslav Karpov’s 
(2010) more explicit conceptualization of desecularization/s. This cross-disciplinary 
effort is not a first. Much of the current literature on the religious and the secular in IR 
draws inspiration from somewhere else. For instance, some like Hurd (2008) have drawn 
heavily from the work of anthropologist Talal Asad on the power-laden and socially 
constructed notion of the secular. Others like Barbato and Kratochwil (2009), draw from 
social theorists like Jürgen Habermas and his normative concerns surrounding the 
emergence of a post-secular public sphere.  
	   291 
 
Rather than focusing singularly on the power of secular forms of authority, or 
unpacking the normative dilemmas that surround a post-secular world, this thesis has 
called for more attention in IR to the issue of desecularization. It has done so not with the 
intent of simply pillaging from other disciplines,209 but to initiate a fruitful and mutually 
beneficial dialogue between IR and the sociology of religion. The hope is that 
sociologists may find much analytical and empirical value in this project, especially as it 
highlights the international dimensions that surround the political contestations involved 
in processes of secularization and desecularization of state practices and institutions. In 
this concluding section I will, however, mostly tease out what an attention to sociological 
issues such as descularization yields to ongoing debates about religion and its resurgence 
within IR.  
 
Most promisingly, I contend that a desecularization lens brings more starkly to the 
fore what is distinctive about religious forces and dynamics in international relations. 
Teasing out how religion “matters” and what is “distinctive” about religion is something 
that scholars lament has often been under-theorized in current IR research (Philpott 2009, 
pp.192-93; Sheikh 2012). Indeed, over the years IR and FPA scholars have often focused 
on very non-religious outcomes of religion’s revival. As a result, much of what is studied 
under the rubric of religion regularly seems to have very little religious flavor. What is 
distinctive about the increasing mixing observed over the decades of “the religious” 
(whether norms, beliefs, organizations or social movements) with “the political”, 
evaporates somewhat in research programs focused on dynamics and outcomes which 
most secular actors or norms could produce. Religious variables are generally entangled 
with explanations about conflicts and violence, or when it comes to foreign policy with 
explaining the support – or lack thereof – for a particular military intervention, country or 
international institution. Some suggest that conflicts may last longer if they have a 
religious dimension, which may point towards something unique about religious factors 
(Horowitz 2009). Nevertheless, one is often left wondering: what are the distinctive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 A practice it seems IR more broadly tends to be guilty of, see: Buzan and Little (2001) 
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features and outcomes that the processes of resurgence carry for the way we theorize and 
conceptualize IR as a discipline and as practice?  
 
What current literature often leaves out are the implications and effects that the 
growing mixing of religion and politics is having, not simply in causing this war or that 
peace, but in bringing about more religion itself in international relations discourses and 
practices and examining the ways in which this process creates new social dynamics, 
institutions, power structures, incentives and possibilities of action. In terms of this 
research, for example, the concept of desecularization has helped draw connections 
between a string of apparently unrelated changes in secular American foreign policy 
practices and institutions that however all shared an inherently religious content. 
Injecting a desecularization lens brought out more explicitly the interaction and dynamics 
between religious and secular forces, and the way actors gave meaning, negotiated and 
sought to redesign the boundaries, by articulating a series of “principled” and “strategic” 
arguments, between the two.  
 
A second area that a desecularization lens sheds light on is a set of American 
foreign policies that (directly or indirectly) seem to be geared towards producing 
religious outcomes. In fact, it appears that as American foreign policy desecularizes this 
becomes increasingly tied with defending and advancing religion worldwide in general, 
and Christianity in particular, while also attempting to reform and promote certain 
theological interpretations and brands of Islam. I will now address these two claims – 
advancing religion and Christianity on the one hand, and reforming Islam on the other – 
in order.  
 
First, through processes of desecularization, a growing institutional, regulatory 
and normative space has been created domestically whereby religious actors can 
increasingly have access to and influence over American foreign policy.  It is appropriate 
to keep in mind that a core issue most of these actors care deeply about, at times even 
more so than America’s national interest, is the domestic and worldwide health and state 
of their co-religionists and their religion. As Daniel Philpott eloquently frames it when 
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discussing what is singularly distinctive about religious activism:  
“What is important to understand about religious actors is that religious 
politics, even when it converges with that of the state, emanates from 
beliefs, practices, and communities that themselves are prior to politics.” 
(2009, p.193) 
 
Hence policies such as religious freedom and the faith-based initiatives that have 
been, and currently are, most explicitly and vigorously advanced by religious and lay 
activists and scholars, are not just promoted with the intention of advancing human rights, 
relieving poverty or mitigating violence around the world, but also with scope of 
promoting religious outcomes. The secular-religious split is evident when, rather than 
subsuming religious freedom norms within a broader and expanded human rights 
framework, these instead are pursued on a separate parallel track. Mostly secular activists, 
scholars and organizations (such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
Freedom House) push American foreign policy to be concerned with human rights. 
Which are then monitored in the State Department Human Rights Reports. Predominantly 
faith-based or lay but publicly religious activists, scholars, members of Congress, and 
organizations, push American foreign policy to be concerned with international religious 
freedoms (IRF). Which are then monitored in another set of State Department IRF 
Reports.  
 
The scope of the international religious freedom agenda is to track religious 
persecution, restrictions on religious practices and actors, and mistreatment of religious 
minorities worldwide. As was discussed in Chapter 4, whether the persecution, 
restrictions, or mistreatments are all truly religiously-based, rather than caused at times 
by other political or economic interests and grievances, is often unclear. This policy 
framework also seeks to promote around the world social and legal norms that are 
friendly towards religion, and religious practices and expression. This is something that 
quite interestingly, and not coincidentally, goes to the advantage of actively proselytizing 
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religions, 210  such as Christianity in general and Protestant Evangelical strands in 
particular.  
 
Not surprisingly, this agenda has come to hold both a perceived and, in some 
respects, a real, Christian bias. The perception that the religious freedom agenda is 
somewhat of a Trojan horse for the protection and the export of a particular religion, 
which is present among both domestic and international observers,211 is not completely 
unfounded. The 1997 Wolf-Specter bill, the “Freedom from Persecution Act”, that 
preceded IRFA did not come out of a historical, geopolitical and social vacuum. The fact 
that the initial input for religious freedom activism was rooted in concerns about the state 
of Christians, especially in the Middle East and Communist countries, is an obvious case 
in point.212  
 
Even if the anti-persecution agenda did expand with time into a religious freedom 
one that includes other religious groups (Jewish, Muslim, Baha’i, Mormons, and so on) 
and human rights organizations, in practice the Christian interest remains the most 
apparent and dominant. It is often the well organized Protestant Mainline and Evangelical, 
along with Catholic institutions and groups, that have the greatest access to power, and 
the friendliest ears in Congress and the Executive (see Abrams 2001; Rock 2011). These 
groups also have the most extensive networks to denounce the mistreatment of their 
Christian brethren around the world (from China, to Nigeria, to Iraq and so on), as well as 
the greatest financial resources for international missionary work (see Hertzke 2004; 
Wuthnow 2009).213  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 For a friendly perspective on the relationship between religious freedom and proselytism see the Berkley Center’s 
“Report of the Georgetown Symposium on Proselytism & Religious Freedom in the 21st Century” (Berkley Center 
2010) 
211 See for example discussions in: Fore (2002); Mahmood (2012); Smolin (2000) 
212 It also does not help, in terms of perceptions, that the USCIRF has come under fire for allegedly having 
a pro-Christian and anti-Muslim bias (Boorstein 2012). 
 213 The link between the state of religious communities abroad and Christian interests is evident in the 
widespread resonance and traction that violence directed towards Christian minorities in the Middle East 
during the Arab spring, and especially Copts in Egypt for example, receive in American media and public 
opinion (Fahmy and Lee 2011). Another example was the well documented vocal reaction by Evangelical 
and religious freedom advocates to Morocco’s expulsion of Evangelical proselytizers in 2010 (Bandow 
2010).  
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Likewise, assisting the poor is a noble cause and one that religious groups and 
organizations have championed, and courageously so, across history. At the same time 
poverty reduction and taming the spread of HIV/AIDS have become important foreign 
policy goals, as well as means to shore up American soft power, since the end of the Cold 
War. As was discussed in Chapter 5, thanks to a successful advocacy and lobbying 
campaign by religious groups, particularly Evangelical ones, substantial foreign 
assistance resources have progressively been made available to a growing range of 
American religious groups and organizations that have an overt, public and explicit 
missionary purpose. It is evident from a cursory glance at the websites of organizations 
such as World Vision, Samaritan Purse, Operation Blessing, Food for the Hungry, World 
Relief – which have all received federal grants within the faith-based initiative 
framework over the past decade – that a central goal of these organizations is to actively 
“spread the good word” through caring for the suffering. They do so by planting new 
churches, re-constituting old ones, and by preaching the gospel before or after (at times 
also during) providing services and handing out aid.  
 
Current faith-based rulings circumvent the issue of Government support of 
proselytism by requiring that if FBOs engage in religious activities these should be 
funded privately, rather than through USAID grants, and should be separate in either time 
or location from USAID activities. Yet, the degree to which these regulations are 
effective at preventing USAID money from being used  indirectly or  directly for winning 
converts appears quite limited. USAID does not seem to be monitoring very closely how 
money is spent on the ground in terms of funding inherently religious activities. 
Moreover, even if resources are used in line with USAID rules, the substance in terms of 
perceptions and end results on the ground is nevertheless quite different, as needy 
beneficiaries have little time for the nitty-gritty of far-flung and arcane bureaucratic 
regulations set out in Washington. Recipients may hardly distinguish when an FBO uses 
private resources for religious activities and USAID grants for goods and services. Indeed, 
while evangelizing FBOs may use government resources to buy food, medicines, pay for 
petrol and operations, but not to hold sermons and distribute religious material, once on 
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the ground the two are often indistinguishable, since often while the left hand attempts to 
save lives the right one attempts to save souls.  
 
Furthermore, the faith-based agenda is in principle an effort to integrate an 
increasingly wider range of religious groups into American foreign assistance and aid 
programs. However, once again, in practice the reality appears somewhat different. The 
sense that the U.S. Government may be complicit in spreading a particular religion 
worldwide is compounded by numbers showing that “the faith-based initiative overseas is 
almost exclusively a Christian initiative” (Kranish 2006). Christian organizations 
received 98.3% of all funds to religious groups from fiscal 2001 to fiscal 2005.  
 
The above statistic may have since then changed somewhat, especially as Obama 
attempted to make the faith-based agenda more inclusive of non-Christian groups. 
However, it is unlikely that is has changed that substantially by the end of 2012. The fact 
that the faith-based agenda is overwhelmingly a Christian endeavor is the product of two 
factors. On the one hand, as in the case of religious freedom advocacy, it may be a natural 
outgrowth of America’s religious landscape where Christian organizations are more 
established, numerous and better organized when it comes to accessing U.S. 
Governmental resources than other non-Christian groups. But it also may reveal a bias 
towards working with Christian organizations, compared, say, to Muslim ones, even in 
foreign contexts where Islam is the dominant religion such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Indonesia. An issue which in a post-9/11 world is reinforced, as a USAID official 
admitted, by the fear that if: “a suicide bomber were to come out of an Islamic orphanage 
that has received U.S. funding, whoever made the funding decision could be held 
personally liable […] this would simply not be the case with funding a Christian charity” 
(quoted from CSIS 2007, p.19). 
 
Policy-makers in Washington are well aware of these tensions. Indeed there is an ongoing 
discussion, although not very publicly visible, about the relationship between religious 
freedom, faith-based initiatives and Christian proselytization. For instance, a White 
House official working in the realm of the faith-based initiatives admits that: “As a 
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Government over the past decade we have turned a blind eye towards Christian 
proselytization. We need to be clearer on where we stand on this issue” (WHFBO 
Official 2010, author’s interview). Likewise, at a Global Leadership Forum on 
“Evangelicals and Muslims: Perspectives on Mission and Partnership” sponsored by IGE 
and held at Georgetown in June 16-17, 2010, the issue of missionary work and 
proselytization was hotly debated throughout the conference. For example Knox Thames, 
USCIRF Director of Policy and Research, speaking not as a representative for the 
commission but in his faculty as private citizen, recognized that the mixing of foreign aid 
with proselytization activities by Christian groups was problematic and at times, 
especially in Muslim majority areas, counterproductive. Yet he also supported the right of 
groups that received federal funding to nevertheless “spread the word” with private (but 
not federal) resources as an essential religious freedom (Thames 2010, author’s 
participant observation).  
 
A second area of religious outcomes that a desecularization lens sheds light on is 
the way in which American presidents and foreign policy practitioners have become ever 
more concerned and entangled with theological debates about and within Islam. As 
Chapter 6 discussed, Muslim clerics, imams, foundations and religious schools 
(madrassas) are being privately and indirectly supported to advance messages of 
religious tolerance and provide theological condemnation for violence and terrorism. 
Another strategy has been to bestow recognition to branches of Islam that appear more 
“moderate” and “peaceful”, such as Sufism. The whole notion of reforming Islam and 
supporting “good” Muslims is premised on the idea that the United States has a vested 
interest in stirring religious debates and controversies in its favor.214 Damaged Mosques 
are being rebuilt in key strategic areas to improve America’s image among local Muslim 
populations in the Middle East. And the active promotion of interfaith-dialogues at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 This is a belief, as was discussed in Chapters 3-6, that cuts across the conservative-liberal spectrum and 
the Muslim non-Muslim one in Washington.  Witness for example recent calls to the Obama administration 
by Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, chairman of the Cordoba Initiative, to invest more in the religious sphere and 
Islam, rather than secular groups, if the U.S. is to pacify, bring democracy and improve women’s rights in 
Afghanistan (Rauf and Khan 2012). 
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international and local level have become an important and ever more utilized religio-
diplomatic tool.  
 
Overall, what this analysis reveals is quite substantial, but not anything outside of 
the ordinary in many respects. The fact that states directly or indirectly support and seek 
to meddle in religious affairs internationally is surely not a new practice. Turkey, 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia tacitly, and not so tacitly, for instance support the work of 
preferred Islamist non-state actors in places like central Asia (Adamson 2005, pp.561-64). 
Likewise the history of European empires such as the British, French and Spanish ones is 
deeply entangled with the history of religion and that of worldwide missionary activities 
(Gascoigne 2008).  
 
Without getting bogged down in endless debates about whether the United States 
is an empire or not,215 it is surely a very powerful state in the international system today. 
The correlation between America’s rise to preeminence and the worldwide spread of 
Protestant Evangelicalism is hard to ignore. At this point, an intriguing question comes to 
the fore. Is the global expansion of Christianity and particularly of American brands of 
Protestantism (Jenkins 2007) simply the product of effective transnational missionary 
work by these organizations (Wuthnow 2009)? Or are these social and religious changes 
also at times directly but more often indirectly supported by American policies, 
especially those related to international religious freedoms and faith-based initiatives? 
These are interesting questions that seem to have largely gone unaddressed.  
 
Moreover, many of these religious outcomes as they relate to American foreign 
policy raise new and thorny normative and policy questions, which this research however 
was not designed to tackle. What ought to be the status of church and state separation 
norms in an era of religious resurgence? Should they be doubly protected or continued to 
be relaxed? Is it in the American interest to support religious outcomes that are perceived 
to, and often do, favor Christian groups? Some have argued that supporting FBOs helps 
with efforts to reduce poverty (Thomas 2004; DiIulio 2007). Others note that Christianity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 For a good starting point to these debates see for example: Cox (2012); Nexon and Wright (2007) 
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around the world, especially Protestant Pentecostalism, is the most pro-American religion 
(Mead 2010), hence making an implicit argument that what is good for Christianity 
abroad is good for America. Others suggest instead that turning a blind eye towards 
proselytism, especially in geopolitically sensitive spots such as majority Muslim 
countries, may put other FBOs and NGOs in jeopardy (Thaut 2009), or give the 
impression that the U.S. is on an actual crusade against Islam (Marsden 2011a).  
 
Would greater efforts by the U.S. to promote religious freedom norms abroad help 
unequivocally reducing worldwide conflict and violence as some suggest (Farr 2008b; 
Grim and Finke 2010)? May it open up spaces for aggressive proselytization efforts 
which risk increasing local sectarian tensions (ICG 2010)? To what extent does attention 
to Christian persecution or reforming Islam abroad risk undermining the cuius regio, eius 
religio foundational principle on which the Westphalian order rests? Moreover, to what 
degree should the U.S. be investing substantial resources into molding and shaping a 
major world religion such as Islam? What kind of new and unforeseen social and political 
dynamics is this process likely to generate in the future? These important issues and 
tensions are only recently and passingly starting to be addressed by few interested, and at 
times partisan, observers. Much wider and sustained attention and research is needed to 
unpack and give some answers to these fundamental normative and analytical issues.  
 
Historical Sociology and the Study of Religion in IR 
 
A HS approach to FPA advances a mutually constitutive understanding of foreign policy 
and international politics. One where the international society of states and world society 
of people affect in multiple and complex ways state behavior, and where state actions can 
affect international and world society. This is a picture of the international where states, 
and material and ideational social forces, constantly interact and influence each other. 
Such a theoretical framework has important consequences for the way we think about the 
resurgence of religion in IR. I will here tease out three issues in particular: first 
explaining the causes of the resurgence, second the impact the resurgence is having on 
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the Westpahlian states-system, and thirdly the implications for current debates about 
religion and IR theory.  
 
This thesis was not committed to explaining the causes of the resurgence, but 
rather explore its effects on American foreign policy. Yet a closer examination of the 
case studies and empirical findings leads me to make some preliminary observations and 
add to debates about the causes of resurgence. Scholarship in IR, and to some extent in 
cognate disciplines, can be largely divided into two camps when it comes to explaining 
the resurgence at the world social level. On the one hand are those who see this processes 
as a result of broad structural developments such as the rise of globalization, the spread of 
democracy worldwide, or the social dislocations brought about by modernity and 
modernization. On the other hand are those who see the resurgence as both a 
phenomenon of resistance to, and a force emerging out of, the crisis of secular ideologies 
and projects such as neo-liberal economics, communist ideologies and regimes, or Arab 
nationalism.  
 
Little attention though has been given to the role of the “state” and its policies in 
promoting, reinforcing or undermining such processes. Indeed if we think about the 
active role of the Soviet Union and its policies in crushing religious beliefs and 
institutions, then we can also appreciate the impact that American foreign policy may 
have in fostering social and cultural processes of global religious resurgence. Both the 
religious freedom agenda and the confronting/engaging Islam and the Muslim world one 
can be seen as contributing to cultural processes of resurgence (i.e. the religionization of 
politics). These policies have injected religious language both at the highest levels and in 
everyday policy discourses. They have reified, to some extent, religion as a primary 
source of identity for peoples and countries which may and would not necessarily 
identify themselves primarily in religious terms, and have often elevated religious factors 
as causes of events and religious actors as spokespersons for entire communities, peoples 
and states.   
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In terms of contributing to social process of resurgence (i.e. the politicization of 
religion), the U.S. is ever more actively supporting, directly and indirectly, domestic and 
international socially and politically active religious groups worldwide through its faith-
based intiatives. By making the available pot of foreign assistance resources increasingly 
accessible to an ever-wider range of explicitly religious organizations, the U.S. increases 
their relative influence and power with respect to secular NGOs and humanitarian 
organizations. In a way this process further incentivizes religious communities and 
institutions to develop more engaged and activist political theologies. Simultaneously 
resources are channeled towards developing Islamic religious organizations and 
theologies, not all quietists and disengaged from politics, in order to undermine those 
Islamist groups and actors that are seen to be the most threatening to American interests. 
When it comes to relations with and intervening within Islam, what is new is the 
systematic and public approach pursued, but not necessarily the practice itself. Indeed the 
well-known support for the Afghan Mujahidin and Osama Bin Laden’s organization by 
the U.S. during the Cold War (Coll 2005), ensured that following 9/11 the resurgence of 
religion became a hot topic in IR scholarship.  
 
This emphasis – undergirded by a HS FPA framework – on state practices and 
policies as they relate to religion’s revival, leads to the second issue I alluded to earlier: 
exploring the impact of the resurgence of religion on the Westphalian international 
society of states. In existing scholarship there is a recurrent and underlying narrative that 
religion’s revival may undermine the centrality of the state and/or bring about systemic 
changes to the international order.  
 
Some have explored how the politicization of transnational religious civil society 
actors has the potential to dilute state sovereignty (Rudolph and Piscatori 1997). Giorgio 
Shani (2008) points to a globalizing Muslim Umma and the Sikh Khalsa Panth as 
embryonic post-Westphalian transnational communities. Barak Mendelsohn (2012) 
maintains that religions, and religious inspired groups such as al-Qaeda and Hizb ut-
Tahrir, can attempt and may have the ability to provide an alternative organizational 
principle for world politics that challenges the logic of the state-based system. In Richard 
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Falk’s (2002, 2003) work on the possibilities of a post-Westphalian international order, 
religious forces often appear as a contributing factor towards this trend. Fabio Petito and 
Pavlos Hatzopoulos (2003b, p.2) suggest that religion’s return, from the Westphalian 
exile it was confined to has the potential to bring about a post-Westphalian order.  
 
Similarly Scott Thomas (2005) suggests that the global resurgence of religion can 
lead to the “transformation” of international relations by, among others, influencing states’ 
behavior and foreign policies, the source of international conflicts, and the possibilities 
for international cooperation. According to Daniel Philpott (2002, pp.83-92), the events 
of September 11 posit a powerful challenge to secularism in international relations by 
bringing to the fore religiously motivated groups such as Al Qaeda that question the very 
legitimacy of the secular Westphalian international order. Philpott’s (2001, see Part II) 
investigation into the causal impact of the Protestant Reformation on European politics 
during the 16th and 17th centuries and the pivotal role this event played in the creation of 
the modern sovereign states-system indirectly speaks to present-day concerns and 
implicitly reinforces an image of religion’s revolutionary power for international society. 
 
Clearly stating that religion’s return may and has the potential to “transform” or 
“revolutionize” the Westphalian international society of states, is different from arguing 
that it will. Yet an impression is created that monumental changes may be waiting to 
happen. Are they? Is religion’s challenge to the international Westphalian states-system 
as far-reaching as the current literature at times explicitly, but more often than not 
implicitly, tends to suggest?  
 
A HS FPA perspective on these debates cautions against jumping on the post-
Westphalian bandwagon too quickly. For instance Chris Alden and Amnon Aran (2012, 
pp.78-91) have partly used insights from HS to advance a mutually constitutive thesis of 
foreign policy and globalization. Much conventional globalization literature tends to treat 
states as secondary actors being subjected to, if not undermined by, economic-
technological and spatio-temporal globalizing forces, argue Alden and Aran. These 
scholars instead contend that it is often states and their foreign policies, particularly those 
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of liberal democracies, which actually are at the center of and responsible for producing 
and reproducing processes of globalization. They also recognize that globalizing 
dynamics, once unleashed, gain an independent force of their own compelling states, 
particularly weaker ones, to respond to these forces and adjust their foreign policies. 
Overall Alden and Aran conclude that states’ foreign policies and globalization dynamics 
are not counter-positioned, but actually mutually constitutive. 
 
As the preceding discussion about America’s role in producing and reproducing 
processes of religious resurgence suggests, a similar dynamic may be at work here. 
Indeed, states may be thought of as facilitating, rather than simply being undermined by, 
religious revivals. Likewise if one examines the relationship between politicized religious 
movements and America it is not at all clear whether the former are gaining to the 
expense of the latter. The impact of al Qaeda’s attack on the U.S. seems to have both 
increased some kind of broad-based civilizational politics in terms of presidents and 
programs reaching out to a socially constructed transnational Muslim world. Yet it also 
increased American nationalism, led the U.S. into two major wars against specific states 
and their regimes, and greatly strengthened the power of the state to monitor, control and 
imprison foreign and domestic citizens. Likewise Protestant Evangelicals and Christian 
Right activists, among others, are pressuring American decision-makers to care more 
about their co-religionists around the world, yet they are also staunch defenders of 
American sovereignty and quite skeptical about international arrangements and 
organizations. 
 
By looking at processes of American foreign policy desecularization, this project 
has substantially sought to bring to light qualitative new changes in state practices and 
institutions that processes of religious resurgence may be causing. Yet even here it 
remains uncertain whether higher levels of entanglement between state and religious 
institutions like the ones that, for example, countries like the U.K., Saudi Arabia or Iran 
exhibit compared to the United States, necessarily lead to states working to undermine 
the Westphalian system. It is obviously difficult to generalize from the American case. If 
anything may be said, though, is that the impact of the resurgence in undermining the 
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centrality of the state and leading us to a post-Westphalian system is, in the case of 
America rather ambiguous to say the least, and more generally still quite underspecified 
and under-researched thus far in the overall literature.  
 
Finally, a word on theory. There have been heated debates on whether the revival 
of religion in modern times meant a complete overhaul of IR’s theoretical apparatus or 
not. The first wave of scholarship on the subject appeared to suggest that IR was in 
urgent need of some kind of paradigmatic shift if it were to comprehend and explain 
religion (Hatzopoulos and Petito 2003b, p.3; Thomas 2005, pp.72-77). Some even called 
for a new International Political Theology (IPT), which explored the singular power of 
religion, as International Political Economy sought to grasp that of economic forces 
(Kubalkova 2003). Those advancing these ambitious pleas, somewhat found it 
themselves hard to follow through. Thomas has largely worked within the parameters of 
the English School, Petito within a mix of International Political Theory and 
Constructivism, and Kubalkova’s revolutionary cry for a new IPT was more akin to a 
plea for constructivists to pay closer attention to religious norms and identities rather than 
simply secular liberal ones.216  
 
A second wave of scholarship however has taken a more pragmatic tack, seeking 
to explicitly integrate religion within the main IR theoretical paradigms (Sandal and 
James 2010; Snyder 2011a).  Constructivism (in its multiple shades) with its attention to 
issues of culture, norms, discourses, identity, and norm entrepreneurs and epistemic 
communities has appeared to be a well suited home for much research on religion.217 Yet, 
like much Constructivist literature in other subject-domains, there is a sense in which the 
causal arrow overwhelmingly flows one way from the religious “identity”, “value” or 
“norm entrepreneur” to the political outcome investigated and rarely the other way round. 
Meanwhile attempts to integrate religion within other paradigms seem to flounder in the 
face of the overwhelming materialist nature of Liberal, Realist, and Marxian approaches 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 For a good discussion about the secular liberal bias of much constructivist research see: Adamson 
(2005); Phillips (2010). 
217 See for example the following constructivist inspired work: Hurd (2008); Philpott (2001); Sandal 
(2011); Sheikh (2012) 
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to theory.218 If it is interests, politics or economics which determine religious beliefs and 
communities’ structures, then why take religion seriously in the first place?  
 
As Daniel Nexon has argued elsewhere: “fetishizing religion is as much a danger 
as not taking it seriously enough” (2011, p.161). This thesis has attempted the difficult 
and delicate balance-act called for by the Georgetown University-based scholar. By 
putting attention on processes of desecularization it has sought to capture a distinctive 
feature about the global resurgence of religion for international relations. This framework 
highlights how boundaries between “the secular” and “the religious” are becoming 
increasingly contested, re-examined, and re-negotiated by actors in the ivory tower of 
academia as well as pundits and practitioners of American foreign policy embedded and 
responding to processes of resurgence. New possibilities for political as well as religious 
outcomes are emerging.  
 
Simultaneously this project has relied on a HS FPA theoretical framework that 
takes seriously social forces, but also states. It is an ontologically pluralist framework, 
one that gives weight to both ideational and material variables, as well as one that takes 
both change and continuity as central to its enquiry. In a sense this approach is a 
promising via media, it helps mitigate some of the excess of Constructivist enthusiasts 
about the independent power of religious variables, without sliding as easily into the 
skepticism of more materialist-based theories. By grounding my empirical research in 
such a theoretical framework, and integrating it with insights from FPA, I have carefully 
sought to explore why, how, when, and to what extent the resurgence of religion is 
bringing about change in the secular practices and institutional and normative policy-
making structures of the United States.  
 
The resurgence has indeed brought more religion into the international system, 
and important and substantial changes are occurring in American foreign policies that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 While Realists and Liberal scholars have largely continued to ignore religion, Marxian oriented ones 
have taken up the challenge. These however have often been quite sceptical about religion often seen as a 
dependent variable of more concrete economic forces and interests, or no more than an ideological 
instrument leaders use at their whims to legitimize themselves and mobilize masses. See: Shaffer (2006). 
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testify to this. These however appear to be falling short of the post-Westphalian prospect 
some see on the horizon. This thesis, rather than echoing ongoing pronouncements about 
Westphalia’s impeding demise, which may be as imprudent as past ones about the “death 
of God”, suggests that much more sound conceptual and especially theoretically robust 
empirical work is still needed. Especially when it comes to exploring in more nuanced 
and complex ways the relationship between religious dynamics and the state across space 
and time. This thesis has offered some new and hopefully useful tools in pursuing what 
appears to be an arduous, but promising and fascinating research program.  
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